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“The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities will mark the beginning of a new era in 
which they will have the same rights and opportunities as everyone else” 
 UN Secretary-General 1997-2006, Kofi Annan 
 
 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1. Introducing the CRPD and the overall research 
The present research aims to analyse the impact of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD hereinafter) on the EU legal order and governance. To this end, it will focus on 
three different dimensions: international human rights law, EU law and domestic law. 
The CRPD was formally adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2006 and entered into 
force in May 2008.1 It represents the first human rights Convention introduced in the new millennium 
and the most recent enforceable instrument provided by the United Nations in the context of the 
international human rights protection. The Convention is also the first human treaty to be open for 
signature by regional integration organisations and the European Union become a party to the CPRD 
in November 2009. It is worth noting that the CRPD has now been signed by 160 countries worldwide 
and ratified by 174.2 This means that it is one of the most widely ratified international treaties which 
can effectively and positively address the rights of persons with disabilities across the globe.3 In 
particular, the EU’s ratification of the Convention establishes a clear obligation in law for its 
provisions to be taken into account in interpreting EU primary and secondary legislation.  
                                                      
1 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106 (2007). The Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol was adopted on 13 December 2006 at the United Nations Headquarters 
in New York, and was opened for signature on 30 March 2007. 
2 Data provided by the UN Division for Social Policy and Development Disability. 
3 S. Quinlivan, 'The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: An Introduction'  
(2012) 13 ERA Forum 71. 
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The Convention does not introduce new rights under international human rights law, but it seeks to 
ensure the correct interpretation and implementation of existing human rights obligations.4 The 
primary objective of the Convention is to obligate States Parties to provide general measures in order 
to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability. To this end, 
Article 4 demands “the adoption of all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for 
the implementation of the rights recognised in the Convention, including the necessary legislation to 
modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination 
against persons with disabilities”. 
The CRPD represents a remarkable improvement to the legal protection of the rights of persons with 
disabilities. It embraces a human rights approach according to which persons with disabilities are 
considered as rights bearers who can enjoy all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal 
basis with others. This understanding of disability rejects the traditional social welfare or medical 
model that depicts certain categories of individuals as objects of pity and charity.5 In order to achieve 
the ambitious goals of the human rights approach, the CRPD enshrines a substantive model of 
equality that acknowledges diversity and aims to ensure that individuals in different situations are 
treated differently. By doing so, it moves away from the formal concept of equality in accordance 
with “things that are alike should be treated alike”.6 This approach fails to address the concrete 
differences of vulnerable groups of individuals and does not confer a right or a benefit on the basis 
of a personal or physical characteristic. The cornerstone of the substantive model of equality adopted 
by the CRPD is the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities. 
This duty is crucial to enable persons with disabilities to have access to, participate in, or advance in 
                                                      
4 G. Quinn, The United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: toward a new international politics 
of disability (2009-2010) 15 Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights 33. 
5 M. Stein and P. Stein, Beyond disability rights (2007) 58 Hastings Law Journal 1203. 
6 Aristotle, 3 Ethica Nicomachea, 112-117, 1131a-1131b, Ackrill, J. L. and Urmson J. O. (eds.), W. Ross translation, 
(Oxford University Press, 1980). 
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employment. It requires an adjustment or a modification of the environment to accommodate the 
specific needs or characteristics of persons with disabilities and eliminate such disadvantages in 
comparison with others. 
Against this background, it may be argued that the CRPD shows the legal potential to improve the 
protection of persons with disabilities by clarifying and broadening the personal and material scope 
of the existing instruments of international human rights law. 
2. Research questions and objectives: EU equality law 
This research has been guided by the following research questions: 
1. How is the CRPD impacting the legal protection of persons with disabilities in the 
EU legal order? 
2. Does EU equality law comply with international human rights law? 
3. Is the CJEU’s understanding of the prohibition of discrimination in line with the 
CRPD? 
4. What is the legal status of the CRPD in the EU legal framework? 
5. What is the state of play of the proposed Horizontal Directive? 
The central goal of this research is to critically assess the impact of the CRPD on EU equality law 
and the extent to which the CRPD has influenced the current EU legal framework with a particular 
focus on the implementation of the Directive 2000/78/EC.7 The Framework Equality Framework 
Directive is the main piece of EU legislation that aims to combat discrimination on grounds of 
disability in the workplace. It embodies a specific prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination on 
grounds of disability (Article 2) and the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation (Article 5). 
The research objective is to examine whether the judicial interpretation of the Court of Justice of the 
                                                      
7 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, [2000] OJ L303/16. 
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European Union (CJEU) with regard to the Directive 2000/78 does or does not comply with the new 
legal background delineated by the CRPD. The case law of the CJEU that concerns the 
implementation of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability will also be critically 
analysed. 
The EU ratification of an international human rights treaty represents an unprecedented event which 
raises several issues in terms of the legal validity and effects of the CRPD’s provisions. This research 
will therefore seek to examine the interplay between the CRPD and EU law in order to identify the 
legal status of the Convention within the EU legal framework. The judicial reasoning and 
understanding of the Convention will be assessed by taking into account the most relevant CJEU’s 
judgements. 
This study will also investigate the evolution of the legislative process that characterises the so-called 
Horizontal Directive.8 In 2008, the Commission presented a proposal for a Directive which addresses 
discrimination on grounds of disability, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation in both the public 
and private sector, concerning access to social protection, education, goods and services. It sets out a 
general framework to combat discrimination beyond the field of employment and occupation by 
means of a horizontal approach. However, eight years after the Commission issued its proposal, 
negotiations are still under way. This doctoral thesis aims to identify the main political and legal 
obstacles that jeopardise the final adoption of the Horizontal Directive via an analysis of the 
legislative process and the substantive content of last version of the Council’s draft. 
2.1 EU governance 
Another research objective of the present study is to analyse how the EU accession to the CRPD is 
affecting EU governance. In this regard, this research will answer the following key questions: 
                                                      
8 Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation [2008] COM/2008/0426. 
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1. Does the EU independent framework provide an effective mechanism to monitor the 
CRPD’s implementation? 
2. Is the open method of coordination an appropriate governance model to monitor the 
CPRD’s implementation? 
It is worth noting that the Convention encompasses a new mechanism to monitor its implementation 
at regional and national levels.9 Article 33 of the CRPD requires a monitoring framework that 
includes: i) a national or regional focal point; ii) an independent mechanism to promote, protect and 
monitor the implementation of the Convention; iii) civil society organisations. As a result, the EU 
established an independent framework to monitor the CRPD that involves the European Parliament 
Petitions Committee (PETI), the European Ombudsman, the European Commission, the EU Agency 
for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the European Disability Forum (EDF). This comprehensive 
framework operates in the legislative and policy sector falling within the scope of EU powers. 
This study will argue that the monitoring system required by Article 33 CRPD reflects mechanisms 
and procedures which are usually associated with experimentalist governance. The EU has crafted a 
governance model that mirrors the open method of coordination (OMC). The OMC is a system to 
coordinate policies among Member States through procedures of soft law with the purpose of 
achieving EU objectives.10 The participation of different actors, such as civil society organisation and 
stakeholders, is considered a positive and innovative characteristic of the decision-making process 
provided by the OMC. 
This research intends to assess the functions of the EU institutions involved in the governance 
mechanisms to monitor the CRPD’s implementation. In particular, it will examine whether the 
European Parliament and civil society organisations are influential within the EU independent 
                                                      
9 G. De Beco, Article 33(2) of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: another role for national 
human rights institutions? (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly Human Rights, 84. 
10 C. M. Radaelli, The Open Method of Coordination: A new governance architecture for the European Union, Swedish 
Institute for European Policy Studies (2003). 
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framework. The final objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of the governance mechanisms adopted 
by the EU to monitor the implementation of the CRPD. 
2.2 International human rights law and global governance 
The research questions are the following: 
1. Has the CPRD introduced an innovative paradigm of substantive equality and non-
discrimination under international human rights law? 
2. Is the model of participatory democracy adopted by the CRPD feasible for improving 
the EU decision-making process? 
To fully understand the impact of the CRPD on EU equality law, this research will also outline the 
main legal developments introduced by the Convention in the area of non-discrimination and equality. 
The analysis will focus on the theoretical framework of equality provided by the CRPD and other 
international human rights treaties. Specific attention will be given to the model of substantive 
equality, the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation and the concept of multiple and 
intersectional discrimination. The theoretical background of the CRPD lays the foundations for the 
whole research that will examine the implementation of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of disability in the workplace at EU and national level. The principle of equality and non-
discrimination falling under Article 5 of the CPRD constitutes the lens through which this study will 
explore the legal protection of persons with disabilities. 
In addition, the Convention promotes the inclusion of civil society organisations and persons with 
disabilities in the decision-making process (Article 4.3). An overview of the emergence of civil 
society groups in the global governance will be given in order to assess to what extent NGOs can 
inform and improve the decision-making process at international level. This study will embrace a 
concept of global governance intended “as a process and a state whereby public and private actors 
14 
 
engage in the international regulation of societal relationships and conflicts”.11 It will be shown that 
the CRPD enshrines a model of participatory democracy that requires the involvement of all relevant 
stakeholders in the entire policy chain, from conception to implementation, on the basis of an 
inclusive approach. This approach reflects the model of participatory democracy embodied in Article 
15 of the TFEU according to which “the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies conduct 
their work as openly as possible in order to ensure the participation of civil society and thus promote 
good governance”. It will be submitted that the CRPD is a positive model when it comes to promoting 
the structured participation of civil society groups in the EU decision-making process. 
2.3 National case studies 
A crucial objective of the CRPD is the promotion of the rights of persons with disabilities in the open 
labour market. Article 27 of the Convention lays down that States Parties have to recognise the right 
of persons with disabilities to work, on an equal basis with others; this includes the right to the 
opportunity to gain a living by work freely chosen or accepted in a labour market and a work 
environment that are open, inclusive and accessible to persons with disabilities. The main provision 
to ensure the right to work is the duty to provide reasonable accommodations for persons with 
disabilities in the workplace (Art. 27(i)). The concept of reasonable accommodation is specifically 
defined by the UN Convention and includes all the necessary and appropriate modification and 
adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to 
ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
This research sought to investigate the implementation of the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation at national level so as to identify the impact of the CRPD on national legal system 
by underlying positive and negative judicial practices with regard to the interpretation of the 
                                                      
11 B. Kohler-Koch, B. Rittenberger, Review Article: the Governance turn in EU studies (2006) 3 Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 205. 
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obligation to accommodate persons with disabilities in the workplace. To this end, this study has 
adopted a comparative approach and will offer a comparative assessment of disability equality law in 
the US and Canada, the UK and Italy. 
The key research questions are: 
1. Does the American Disability Act (ADA) effectively foster the protection of persons 
with disabilities? 
2. What are the main differences in the US and Canada in relation to the concept of 
disability and the duty to accommodate? 
3. How has the duty to accommodate been implemented in the UK and Italy and may 
one of these two legal systems be said to offer a better implementation model? 
The US and Canada were selected primarily due to the fruitful nature of a comparison between two 
federal systems offering a different approach; the US benefits from a comprehensive piece of 
legislation, i.e., the American Disability Act (ADA), whereas Canada lacks an overarching act for the 
protection of persons with disabilities. An account of American disability law is also crucial to 
understand EU equality law, as it has been shaped in part by legal developments in the US as well as 
other legal systems. To quote Gerard Quinn and Eilionòir Flynn, “the past, present and future of EU 
disability law and policy are a story of intellectual borrowings, of takings and givings”.12 US and EU 
disability discrimination laws are highly interconnected in terms of legal principles and judicial 
practices. The “civil rights" model of disability that underpins discrimination law in the United States 
has been absorbed within the EU legal framework and enshrined in the Framework Equality 
Directive. 
                                                      
12 G. Quinn & E. Flynn, “Transatlantic borrowings: the past and future of EU non-discrimination Law and Policy on the 
ground of disability” (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 23. 
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The inclusion of the UK and Italy in this study is also useful to the extent that it allows for a 
comparison between a system where a national piece of legislation (i.e. the UK Equality Act) is 
implemented in compliance with the CPRD to a national legal system lacking an exhaustive 
legislation in relation to disability. While UK Equality law encompasses a comprehensive piece of 
legislation to tackle discrimination, Italy is characterised by a ‘fragmented’ and unharmonised legal 
framework in the field of equality and non-discrimination. This comparative analysis will also help 
identify the different implementation of the CRPD at national level, by considering the pure dualist 
system of the UK and the monistic legal system of Italy that promotes the integration of supranational 
and domestic norms.  
To sum up, the overall comparative approach seeks to analyse the extent to which comprehensive 
and horizontal pieces of legislations can facilitate or improve the protection of persons with 
disabilities at national level. The final objective of this research is to identify positive and negative 
practices as regards the implementation of the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation on 
the workplace. 
3. Thesis structure 
The present doctoral thesis is composed of three main parts. Part one offers an analysis of the 
international legal framework (Chapter 2), while Part two focuses on EU law and governance 
(Chapters 3 and 4). Part three covers national cases studies (Chapters 5 and 6). 
Chapter two (this introduction being Chapter 1) will examine two main subjects: the substantive 
concept of equality and non-discrimination on grounds of disability and the model of participatory 
democracy underpinning the CRPD. An overview of the development of the notion of equality under 
international human rights law will be offered. The theoretical model of equality enshrined in the 
CRPD will be the main point of reference to interpret and critically analyse the equality and non-
discrimination norms of the EU legal framework. The Convention embraces a comprehensive and 
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transformative concept of equality which takes into account the specific differences of vulnerable 
groups and reinforce the legal protection of persons with disabilities. This approach is characterised 
by an overarching definition of direct and indirect discriminations (Art. 2), the objective to ensure 
multidimensional equality (Arts. 6 – 7), the fundamental obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation (Art. 2) and the duty to launch affirmative action programs (Art. 27).13 The 
Convention not only abandons the asymmetrical model of equality, but it formalises a substantive 
paradigm of equality which addresses those structural disadvantages that jeopardise the full 
enjoyment of fundamental rights. Moreover, the CRPD’s adoption symbolises a positive practice of 
participatory democracy which offers significant guidelines to structure the participation of civil 
society in the EU political decision-making process. In this regard, the extent to which civil society 
organisations contributed to shape the final draft of the CRPD will be illustrated. Participatory 
democracy enhances the legitimacy and transparency of international governance by opening up 
decisional procedures and involving more experts and organisations in adopting and delivering 
policy. The unprecedented level of participation of civil society groups in the CRPD’s negotiations 
brought about significant results with regard to the legal protection of persons with disabilities. In 
particular, the adoption of a social model of disability and the concept of multiple discrimination are 
mainly due to the lobbying activities of civil society organisations. The CRPD highlights the 
beneficial outcomes of consulting civil society in the decision-making process and may represent 
good practice to foster participatory democracy at EU level. The CPRD’s negotiations show that the 
participation of civil society groups in the decision-making process should be structured on the basis 
of precise and formal rules that ensure the “representativeness” and “expertise” of civil society 
organisations. 
                                                      
13 O.M. Arnardottir, A future of multidimensional Disadvantage Equality? in O.M. Arnardottir & G. Quinn (Eds.) The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian perspectives, pp. 320 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009). 
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Chapter three will provide a comprehensive overview of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of disability under EU equality law. In particular, the legal meaning of disability, the concept of 
multiple and intersectional discrimination and the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation 
will be examined. To this end, the CJEU’s leading cases will be critically explored and the legal status 
of the CPRD under EU law will be assessed. This research will demonstrate that the CJEU is 
gradually moving away from the social model of disability and the substantive paradigm of equality 
embraced by the CRPD. The CJEU wrongfully focuses its analysis on the individual impairment itself 
rather than on the final consequences of the deficiency. The return to an outdated medical model of 
disability reveals a cautious and conservative approach of the CJEU that narrows the substantive 
content of EU equality law. The Court’s judgements also exhibit an inadequate approach with regard 
to multiple and intersectional discrimination. The CJEU’s reasoning reflects a flaw in the EU legal 
order which is still characterised by a single-ground equality paradigm. The lack of a legal instrument 
which recognises discriminations based on the intersection of two or more grounds compromises the 
effective protection of vulnerable individuals and leaves a significant gap in the EU legal framework. 
Last but not least, a critical assessment of the political and legal developments of the pending proposal 
for a new Directive regarding equality and non-discrimination on grounds of disability beyond the 
employment area will be offered. It will be shown that the last Council instrument is not fully in line 
with the CRPD. The Council’s draft significantly diverges from the initial Commission proposal and 
disregards the major amendments presented by the Parliament. The Council’s last instrument leaves 
out the field of ‘social advantages’, the ‘anticipatory’ obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation on workplace and the prohibition of multiple and intersectional discrimination from 
the scope of the Directive. This approach of the Council reflects a political compromise that privileges 
those Member States which would be the most affected by the Directive’s adoption. 
Chapter four will focus on EU governance and the independent framework for promoting, protecting 
and monitoring the CRPD at EU level. This chapter will explore whether the governance mechanisms 
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adopted by the EU are effectively fostering the implementation of the CPRD. The mechanisms 
established according to Article 33 CRPD marginalise the European Parliament, the body closest to 
European citizens and civil society organisations, which lacks formal structures to adequately monitor 
the CRPD’s implementation. In addition, this research found that the main shortcoming of the existing 
EU independent framework is represented by the reporting and benchmarking process. The majority 
of Member States fail to regularly produce clear and analytical evidence with regard to the 
implementation of disability policies. As a result, the Commission cannot carry out rigorous 
assessments of the rights of persons with disabilities at national level. The reporting methods and the 
coordination mechanisms of the open method of coordination should be improved in order to 
effectively mainstream disability in the EU. To this end, i) the objectives of the Disability Strategy 
2010-2020 should be enhanced by developing precise timeframes and key performance indicators; 
ii) clear procedures and deterrents should be introduced to penalise non-cooperation of the Member 
States and iii) precise responsibilities and duties should be assigned to the EU bodies that participate 
in the open method of coordination. 
Chapter five adopts a comparative approach to illustrate how the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation is applied beyond the EU legal context. In this regard, the judicial interpretation of 
the concept of disability and the obligation to accommodate in the U.S and Canada will be analysed. 
This chapter highlights how American Courts still embrace a formal model of equality, whereas the 
Canadian Supreme Court handed down promising decisions that promote substantive equality and a 
social understanding of disability in compliance with the CRPD. American judges are reluctant to 
apply a socio-political model of disability according to which disability results from the failure of 
society to advance the rights of persons with disabilities. In addition, the US Supreme Court merely 
considers the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations as a “charitable” provision that aims 
to ensure preferential treatments for persons with disabilities and places burdensome obligations on 
employees. By contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court rightfully endorses a concept of reasonable 
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accommodation that requires a structural change of the legal framework by removing able-bodied 
norms and introducing diversity in all new norms.14 It also adopts a flexible and open concept of 
disability that takes into account several factors such as the subjective component of being considered 
disabled and those biomedical, social or technological elements that are continuously evolving in 
society. The judicial interpretation of the Canadian Supreme Court may constitute a leading model 
for the judiciary to implement substantive equality at national and international level. 
Chapter six will offer a comparative assessment of the legal framework regarding disability equality 
law in the UK and Italy. The primary aim of this chapter is to explore the impact of the CPRD at 
national level by taking into account the main judgements in relation to reasonable accommodation 
in order to determine best practices. The legal content and the limit of the obligation to provide 
reasonable accommodation will be examined. This chapter describes how British courts are gradually 
rejecting the substantive model of equality adopted by the House of Lords in Archibald. The cases 
examined prove that reasonable accommodations are often perceived more as a privilege rather than 
a right of workers with disabilities in the UK legal order. Italian courts, on the other hand, are 
positively promoting an objective and functional understanding of the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation which takes into account both the necessity of removing a particular barrier for the 
worker with disabilities and the proportionality of the measure that should not impose an undue 
burden on the employer. Moreover, this chapter illustrates that the CRPD and EU equality law have 
a more relevant impact in the Italian legal framework compared  to the British one. UK courts do not 
make references to the Convention in order to interpret the concept of reasonable accommodation. 
This approach compromises the legal protection of persons with disabilities and does not contribute 
to improve the interpretation of the Equality Act. UK judges also hesitate to specifically mention EU 
law provisions when deciding cases affecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The UK judiciary 
                                                      
14 D. Pothier, Tackling disability discrimination at work: toward a systemic approach, (2010) 4 McGill Journal of Law 
and Health 1. 
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is characterised by the emergence of a “protectionist” approach with regard to supranational law that 
reduces the impact of EU and international law in the domestic system. By contrast, Italian judges 
are more likely to explicitly refer to the provisions of international law when deciding legal issues 
that are not properly regulated at national level. This approach reflects the fact that international 
obligations have an “infra-constitutional” nature and must be considered as interposed standards 
between the Constitution and ordinary law. To the same extent, Italian judges explicitly mention 
CJEU’s judgements and the Directive 2000/78 to define the concept of reasonable accommodation. 
The Italian legal framework promotes a monistic approach that recognises the coexistence of 
supranational norms which can permeate the domestic legal order. 
Chapter seven will offer a final evaluation and summary of the main findings of the overall research. 
The final chapter will provide critical remarks and recommendations on how to improve the legal 
understanding and interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability. 
4. Methodology: Doctrinal and comparative approaches 
The present study is based on a traditional doctrinal approach which provides a systematic review of 
the rules governing disability equality law and examines the interplay between those rules.15 It will 
illustrate the main areas of difficulty in order to identify legal gaps and suggest future developments 
with regard to the interpretation of those norms. To this end, the analysis will focus on the primary 
sources of the law: treaties, primary and secondary legislation as well as case law.16 This method 
seeks to recognise the nature and content of international and EU law that address the rights of persons 
with disabilities. However, doctrinal research does not aim to merely locate secondary information, 
                                                      
15 T. Hutchinson and N. Duncan, Defining and describing what we do: doctrinal legal research (2012) 17 Deakin law 
review 83. 
16 See for instance, M.H. Redish, ‘The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the Importance of Analyzing Legal 
Doctrine’ (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 1378. 
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but to enable scholars to offer a critical and transversal analysis of the primary sources of legal 
doctrine.17 
The present doctoral thesis will therefore take into account leading judgements of the UN Committee 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and of the CJEU in relation to the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of disability. The judicial understanding of the concept of equality will be 
critically examined and linked to those international and EU legal instruments that ensure the 
protection of persons with disabilities. This research will clarify the current state of law by providing 
a comprehensive and coherent presentation of disability equality law at international, European and 
national levels. In order to interpret and examine primary sources, the present study will also rely on 
legal scholarship and the research carried out by international civil society organisations in relation 
to the implementation of the CRPD. 
The traditional doctrinal methodology will be combined with the comparative legal approach which 
represents a valuable instrument of learning and knowledge.18 By comparing the law of one country 
with another, commonalities and key dissimilarities between different legal systems may be 
identified.19 To the same extent, the close examination of those divergent approaches adopted by 
national courts in relation to similar norms may assist to determine the appropriate understanding (or 
not) of certain legal obligations. 
This comparative method will be employed when analysing the impact of the CRPD and EU law at 
national level. This will give a specific understanding of how equality obligations and, in particular, 
the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation has been concretely implemented by national 
judges. The comparison of different models of disability legislation and judicial reasoning concerning 
equality will be used to underline the existence of various legal frameworks delineated by Member 
                                                      
17 T. Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Reuters Thomson, 3rd ed, 2010), p. 7. 
18 J. M. Smit, Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Elgar Publsihing, Second edition, 2006). 




States to protect persons with disabilities. Moreover, the comparative approach will allow us to draw 
lessons and good practices at national level with the purpose to evaluate the effectiveness of those 
laws introduced by State Parties under the CRPD. The comparative research will not be limited to a 
mere comparison of legal rules, but  will also take into account the way the law has been interpreted 
in practice by courts.20 The choice to compare two European countries, in this case the UK and Italy, 
derives from the objective to evaluate the process of harmonising disability equality law within the 
EU legal system. By contrast, the comparison between the U.S. and Canada aims to assess how 
disability law is applied beyond the EU context and to what extent the American legal framework has 
influenced EU equality law. 
An analytical method will be adopted to examine the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation in different legal systems and detect common parts and differences in the 
understanding of this duty. This approach implies the identification of an ‘ideal type’ that will allow 
ranking legal concepts and rules on a scale according to the degree they fit with the core 
characteristics of the ‘ideal type’.21 The ideal concept of reasonable accommodation is embodied in 
the CRPD and will be used to verify whether or not national judges are interpreting the obligation to 
accommodate in line with the core characteristics enshrined in the Convention. 
5. Filling the research gaps 
This doctoral thesis identifies research gaps with regard to: i) the implications of the CRPD for EU 
equality law; ii) the status of the CRPD within the EU legal order; iii) the functioning of the EU 
independent framework to monitor the CRPD’s implementation and; iv) the potential influence of the 
CRPD at national level. 
                                                      
20 M. Van Hoecke, Methodology of Comparative Legal Research (2015) Law and Method 1. 
21 Ibid, p. 28. 
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Leading scholars have written extensively in relation to disability discrimination at EU level, in 
particular with regard to the concept of disability.22 However, the existing research lacks to point out 
the exact sphere of application and the main limits of EU equality norms. This research contributes 
to the academic debate on the implementation of disability rights in the EU system by 
comprehensively analysing all the CJEU’s judgements addressing the prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of disability. The controversial evolution of the CJEU’s interpretation of the personal 
scope of the Directive 2000/78 will be examined and a critical analysis of the single-ground approach 
of EU equality law will be provided. The CJEU’s reluctance in embracing the social model of 
disability and the substantive paradigm of equality demonstrates that the CPRD is not fully producing 
its potential to substantially improve the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities in the 
EU. 
In addition, this doctoral thesis aims to bridge the research gaps which concern the correct 
examination of the legal relevance of the CPRD in the EU legal system. The EU, for the first time in 
its history, ratified an international human rights treaty, yet it remains unclear to what extent the 
CRPD produces legal effects into the EU. This research will attempt to fill this gap by taking into 
account (and criticising) the CJEU’s reasoning and the provisions of EU Treaties. In this regard, the 
CJEU is narrowing the chances to invoke international norms and challenge rules of EU law by 
demanding the assessment of ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise’ international provisions. This 
                                                      
22 See for instance, S. Quinlivan, S and C. Bruton, C., (2017) 'Defining Disability in the Employment Context: 
Perspectives from the CRPD & European Union Anti-discrimination Law' In: The UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities: Comparative, Regional and Thematic Perspectives. Dublin: Clarus Press; A. Hendriks, The 
UN disability convention and multiple discrimination: should EU nondiscrimination law be modeled accordingly? (2010) 
2 European Yearbook of Disability Law 7; D. Ferri, The conclusion of the UN convention on the rights of persons with 
disabilities and the EC/EU: a constitutional perspective, (2010) 2 European Yearbook of Disability Law 47; G. Quinn & 
E. Flynn, “Transatlantic borrowings: the past and future of EU non-discrimination law and policy on the ground of 
disability” (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative law 23; G. Quinn, O. M. Arnardóttir, The UN Convention on the 
rights of persons with disabilities European and Scandinavian perspective, (Nijhoff, 2009.); L. Waddington, “The 
European Union and the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: a story of exclusive and 
shared competences” (2011) 18 Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative law 431. 
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‘protectionist’ and ‘minimalist’ approach wrongfully limits the direct effect of international 
agreements in the EU legal framework. 
This research also investigates how the EU is monitoring the implementation of the CRPD. Existing 
research does not provide a complete analysis of the current governance mechanisms adopted at EU 
level to monitor the CRPD. Several studies have been carried out to examine the national mechanisms 
to implement the Convention, however there is still no broad assessment of the functioning of the EU 
independent framework to monitor the CRPD’s implementation.23 It will be argued that the open 
method of coordination is not the most appropriate solution to effectively implement the CRPD, but 
the improvement of certain governance mechanisms will foster the achievement of the Disability 
Strategy objectives. 
To conclude, national case studies will be considered and explored to determine the influence of the 
CRPD in domestic legal systems. The study will fill existing research gaps in the area of disability 
equality law that lack specific comparative analyses of how national courts are concretely interpreting 
the core equality obligations embodied under EU law and the CRPD. In particular, disability equality 
law is still not properly identified as an independent discipline under Italian law and academic 
research in this field is very limited. Disability equality law should be recognised as a valuable and 
autonomous discipline that requires a comprehensive and systematic piece of legislation according to 
international human rights law. This research will therefore put emphasis on the judicial 
understanding of the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation in order to promote good 
practices that may be taken into consideration by lawmakers and academic scholars. It is worth noting 
that the approach of Italian courts towards the CRPD may gradually improve the protection of the 
                                                      
23 See for instance, G. De Beco, Article 33(2) of the Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities: another role for 
national human rights institutions? (2011) 29/1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 84; G. De Beco, Study on the 
Implementation of Article 33 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Europe (The Regional 
Office for Europe of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014). 
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rights of persons with disabilities and align the interpretation of domestic equality norms with 
international human right law. 
The overall research finds that EU equality law still requires significant changes and improvements 
to fully comply with the CRPD and strengthen the legal protection of persons with disabilities. In this 
regard, the EU legislator is called to enact a new piece of legislation that takes into account the 
fundamental developments introduced by the CRPD in the fields of disability and equality law. To 
the same extent, the CJEU should abandon its resistance in applying the social model of disability by 
embracing a substantive approach towards equality that addresses multiple and intersectional 















THE CRPD: A NEW APPROACH TO EQUALITY AND GOVERNANCE 
1. Equality and non-discrimination: a new approach for disabilities rights 
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) is the most complex human 
rights treaty ever drafted. It mainstreams equality, intersectional diversity and inclusion. In doing so, 
the CRPD reflects the remarkable evolution of international human rights law as regards the concept 
of equality and the prohibition of discrimination. To put it differently, the Convention may be said to 
crystallise the legal shift from a formal approach of equality to a substantive and asymmetrical model 
of equality and non-discrimination. Indeed, these fundamental principles underpin the entire 
Convention and bring together socio-economic rights with civil and political rights.24 
In this context, discriminations on the basis of disability are recognised as serious violations of the 
inherent dignity and worth of the human person. The legal backdrop delineated by the CRPD places 
the protection of persons with disabilities at the heart of international human rights law and 
definitively acknowledges disability as a ground of discrimination. The main purpose of the 
Convention is to promote the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
by all persons with disabilities. To this end, States are obligated to provide general measures in order 
to ensure and promote the full realisation of all human rights for persons with disabilities without 
discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability, including the necessary legislation to modify or 
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices that constitute discrimination against 
persons with disabilities. 
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The principle of non-discrimination is embodied within the general values underlying the entire 
Convention: 
a) respect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own choices, and 
independence of persons; 
b) non-discrimination; 
c) full and effective participation and inclusion in society; 
d) respect for difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity and 
humanity; 
e) equality of opportunity; 
f) accessibility; 
g) equality between men and women; 
h) respect for the evolving capacities of children with disabilities and respect for the right of children with 
disabilities to preserve their identities.25 
Equality norms and the prohibition of discrimination represent essential legal tools to achieve an 
effective and solid framework for the protection of persons with disabilities. Normative acts and 
policies often trigger discrimination against particular groups of individuals. For this reason, the 
principle of equality includes procedural and substantive rules to prevent and address human rights’ 
violations. 
The principle of equality constitutes the fundamental lens through which human rights issues will be 
investigated in the present research. Equality is indeed a structural principle that provides a systematic 
analytical framework to assess and examine the protection of human rights.26 The main theoretical 
and practical features of the concept of equality and non-discrimination under international human 
rights law will now be underlined. The aim is to outline the conceptual background that will assist 
the analysis of the rights of persons with disabilities at EU and national level. 
                                                      
25 Art. 3 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol (A/RES/61/106). 
26 J. Clifford, ‘Equality’ in D. Sheldon, The Oxford Handbook of International human rights law (Oxford university press 
2013), p. 421. 
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2. The complex and intriguing evolution of the right to equality in international law 
International law encompasses an ever-changing and complex concept of equality, which is deeply 
rooted in the norms for the protection of human rights. However, equality does not find a 
comprehensive and clear definition in international law. As such, it has been subject to an intense 
doctrinal debate. Indeed, theoretically speaking, the international legal order is characterised by the 
controversial coexistence of two different approaches: formal and substantive equality. 
According to the Aristotle’s notion of formal equality, “things that are alike should be treated alike”.27 
By contrast, the substantive equality’s model points out that treating individuals alike despite 
disadvantage or discrimination does not tackle inequality.28 These two separate approaches entail a 
distinction between negative and positives duties to promote equality. On one hand, civil and political 
rights merely trigger duties of restraint which prevent the State from interfering with individual 
freedom. On the other hand, socio-economic equality requires specific and positive duties on the State 
in order to eliminate discriminations and disadvantages.29 
This theoretical framework shows that the concept of equality is profoundly interwoven with the 
prohibition of discrimination. The principle of equality indeed demands that equal situations are 
treated equally and unequal situations differently. Failure to comply with this obligation will amount 
to discrimination unless the difference of treatment cannot be justified objectively and reasonably by 
a legitimate aim.30 This implies that not every distinction or difference of treatment amounts to 
                                                      
27 Aristotle, ‘3 Ethica Nicomachea, 112-117, 1131a-1131b, Ackrill, J. L. and Urmson J. O. (eds.), W. Ross, Translation, 
Oxford University Press, 1980. 
28 S. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (Oxford University Press, 2008). See 
also, C. Barnard and B. Hepple, Substantive equality (2010) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 562. 
29 Ibid. It is worth noting that the distinction between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights is not strictly 
accurate in the light of the new developments of international human rights law. The CRPD requires positive actions and 
affirmative programmes also in relation to those civil and political rights which are merely associated to duties of 
restraints. For instance, the civil and political right to a fair trial for persons with disabilities would involve significant 
investments from the State to implement procedural accommodation, physical, informational and communicational 
accessibility and ensure the training of court staff, judges, police officers and prison staff. 
30 See Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Explanatory 
Report, (ETS No. 177), para. 15. 
30 
 
discrimination. For instance, the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales 
and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, concluded that: "a difference of treatment is discriminatory 
if it ‘has no objective and reasonable justification’, that is, if it does not pursue a ‘legitimate aim’ or 
if there is not a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 
sought to be realised’".31 It is thus commonly recognised that equality and non-discrimination are 
positive and negative statements of the same principle.32 
The development of the notion of equality under international human rights law will now be 
illustrated. It will be briefly shown that the CRPD’s provisions mirror the significant evolution 
occurred in legal theory and practice with regard to the notion of equality. 
2.1 The controversial “sameness” model 
The formal model of equality is also referred to as the “sameness” or symmetrical approach.33 It is 
based on the idea that equals have to be treated equally and unequal unequally. In doing so, it ignores 
the personal characteristics of an individual. The fundamental principle that sustains the entire 
paradigm of formal equality is the concept of equality before the law in accordance with all are equal 
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.34 The 
approach of de jure equality avoids conferring a right or a benefit on the basis of a personal or physical 
characteristic. Indeed, it only forbids direct discriminations which occur when a person is treated less 
favourable than another in a comparable situation on specific grounds, such as race, sex or disability.35 
In this regard, the treatment must be different in relation to a comparable circumstance or it must be 
                                                      
31 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, Judgement of 28 May 1985, ECHR, Series A, No. 94, 
paragraph 72. 
32 A. Bayefsky, The Principle of Equality and Non-Discrimination in International Law (1990) 11 Human Rights Law 
Journal 1. 
33 O. M. Arnardóttir, A Future of Multidimensional Disadvantage Equality? in O.M Arnardottir and G. Quinn (eds.), The 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff 
2009), p. 41-66. 
34 Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III). 
35 L. Waddington and A. Hendriks, The Expanding Concept of Employment Discrimination in Europe: From Direct and 
Indirect Discrimination to Reasonable Accommodation Discrimination (2002) 18 The International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 403. 
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similar in comparison with a different situation. However, not all the different treatments are deemed 
discriminatory, but only those measures which lack a legitimate purpose in light of the democratic 
principles that regulate the social and legal order.36 
The idea of formal equality comprises a concept of procedural justice which does not assure the 
realisation of any specific result. This approach does not address the concrete differences of certain 
vulnerable groups of individuals and fails to ensure the effective achievement of equality. The 
application of a principle of equality, merely intended as consistent treatment, does not imply an 
assessment of the legitimacy of the law, allowing the possibility to apply equally an unfair legal act. 
For instance, according to Catherine Barnard, the requirement for equal treatment could be fulfilled 
also by depriving both the persons compared of a particular benefit as well as by conferring the benefit 
on them both.37 
In a famous decision of the European Court of Justice, Smith v Avdel Systems Ltd, it was ruled that 
equalisation in pension age can be secured by either upwards or downwards equalisation (for instance 
increasing the women's age to that of men).38 This judgement strictly applied the concept of equality 
and laid down the compatibility of the legislation rising the pension age to 65 for women. It represents 
a concrete implementation of the so-called principle of levelling down.39 This canon of protection 
aims to remove inequality through a levelling-down process which worsens the situation of the 
advantaged group to the same level of the disadvantaged one.40 Consequently, this approach merely 
risks perpetuating unlawful discriminations and exacerbating the conditions of a particular group, 
instead of enhancing the real situation of those individuals who are more assailable. 
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2.1.1 Embracing the symmetrical approach at international level 
At the international level, the symmetrical approach to equality and non-discrimination noticeably 
influenced the adoption of the first human rights treaties, such as the Universal Declarations of 
Human Rights (UDHR), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the two United 
Nations Covenants: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).41 
The UDHR expressly introduced the prohibition of non-discrimination as a fundamental clause 
applying to everyone, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.42 This provision 
acquired a significant role in the context of international law and it has been acknowledged as a norm 
of customary international law in the dissenting opinion of the judge Tanaka of the ICJ.43 Article 7 
of the Declaration sets forth the right to equality, according to which “all are equal before the law and 
are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal 
protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to 
such discrimination”. 
The same model of equality has been adopted in the ICCPR; for instance Article 26 reflects those 
identical words and structure of the UDHR.44 Moreover, Article 2(2) of the ICESCR uses the same 
language of the ICCPR, stating that “States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee 
that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any 
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kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status”. 
It is worth noting that these influential instruments for the international protection of human rights 
emphasise an open model of non-discrimination and a paradigm of formal equality. Open-ended 
clauses are not bound by a strict list of discrimination grounds.45 The utilisation of the ‘or other status’ 
term means that the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination is not exhaustive, but on the contrary,  
is purely indicative and allows the inclusion of other grounds. The open approach does not clarify the 
legal standards and guidelines to assess an unequal treatment.46 As a result, the lack of a clear 
demarcation between unlawful discriminations and justified treatments implies a ‘creative’ 
involvement of the courts, which are called upon to identify illegal conducts. This approach leaves a 
wide margin of discretion to the judges in interpreting the notion of reasonable justification and the 
set of prohibited treatments.47 To the same extent, the leeway stemming from the open model of non-
discrimination does not preclude the possibility to advance an unlimited amount of exceptions and 
defences for justifying differentiations. This model seems therefore highly vague and inappropriate 
to combat discrimination. 
In addition, those international provisions concerning the prohibition of discrimination and the right 
to equality cannot be considered as independent norms because their application is subordinated to 
the violations of specific rights embodied in the treaty. This structure is also evident in the formulation 
of Article 14 of the ECHR which lays down that “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
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language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national 
minority, property, birth or other status.”48 
2.1.2 Is the formal approach adequate to combat discrimination? 
A significant weakness of the formal model is represented by the essential requirement of a suitable 
comparator for the analysis of equality. The choice of a comparator can often be challenging and 
problematic. Indeed, this requisite implies the exclusion of discriminatory grounds such as pregnancy 
and disabilities which lack adequate comparators. In this context, individuals who suffer systematic 
discriminations can only claim the same treatments as the privileged group despite having different 
and special needs.49 For instance, the case of Lisa Jacqueline Grant and South-West Trains Ltd shows 
the main limits of the formal approach. 50 In this case, a travel concession was denied to the lesbian 
partner of a female employee. The CJEU stated that the refusal of the travel concessions to Ms Grant’s 
partner did not amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex, as the rules concerning its grant 
applied equally to men and women. The CJEU explained that the employers’ refusal to allow travel 
concessions to the person of the same sex with whom a worker has a stable relationship did not 
constitute discrimination as prohibited by Article 119 of the EC Treaty or Council Directive 
75/117/EEC. The CJEU made the comparison with a hypothetical gay partner of a male employee 
and concluded that there was no discrimination. By contrast, whether the comparator had been a male 
employee of a female partner, the applicant would have benefited from the travel concession. This 
means that there is no violation of equality law where a contested measure lacks the necessary 
comparator. 
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To conclude, it may be said that this approach does not tackle those systemic problems which 
permeate the legal system and does not provide normative indicators to identify illegal 
differentiations. The formal conception is also strictly related to the idea according to which States 
have only negative obligations and must abstain from introducing positive measures to guarantee 
equality. Thence, the sameness model emerging from the legal text of the first human rights treaties 
outlines ‘empty’ clauses of non-discriminations and equality. International instruments such as the 
UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR symbolised an outstanding step forward for the protection of human 
rights, but they failed to recognise and accommodate the specific characteristics of vulnerable 
individuals. The crucial shift from the open model of formal equality to the substantive equality 
approach will now be examined. 
2.2 The shift towards substantive equality: acknowledging the diversity 
Substantive equality refers to the concept that individuals in different situations should be treated 
differently. This model includes two significant approaches: equality of results and equality of 
opportunity. Equality of results aims to reach equal outcomes through the adoption of specific 
measures in favour of marginalised groups of individuals. Differently, equality of opportunity seeks 
to guarantee an equal opportunity in order to gain access to a particular benefit, without assuring the 
achievement of the final result.51 
The substantive model gradually assumed a leading role in international law and filled the legal 
vacuum deriving from the conception of formal equality. Indeed, the adoption of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1965, along with 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 
1979 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1989, highlighted a fundamental and 
profound change in the approach towards equality and non-discrimination. 
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The new paradigm starts to take into account the concrete differences of disadvantaged persons and 
exceptionally establishes the conditions to accommodate specific biological and unalterable 
characteristics. The substantive model also refuses a passive role of the State and points out the 
necessity to introduce affirmative and relevant measures in the legal system for eliminating unequal 
treatments. This context privileges an asymmetrical approach that focuses on group characteristics 
and disadvantages. It sets out the requirements to assess the equality of a treatment and constitutes 
fertile ground to address indirect discriminations. In this way, the legal analysis aims to deal with 
those discriminations that continue to be perpetuated despite the application of formal equality’s 
rules. 
2.2.1 Substantive equality jurisprudence 
The main proof of this change in human rights law is represented by the revolutionary interpretation 
of the Human Rights Committee concerning Article 26 of the ICCPR.52 In the view of the Committee: 
“Article 26 does not merely duplicate the guarantee already provided for in Article 2 but provides in itself 
an autonomous right. It prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by 
public authorities. Article 26 is therefore concerned with the obligations imposed on States parties in regard 
to their legislation and the application thereof. Thus, when legislation is adopted by a State Party, it must 
comply with the requirement of Article 26 that its content should not be discriminatory. In other words, the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in Article 26 is not limited to those rights which 
are provided for in the Covenant”.53 
In its General Comment 18, the Committee underlined a renovated idea of equality and non-
discrimination, which includes normative contents and positive duties upon State Parties. The 
emphasis on substantive equality also has its historical explanations. Human rights advocates and 
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civil society organisations strongly advocated for substantive equality to tackle those laws, policies 
and practices bringing about systematic racial and gender discrimination. Moreover, this broader 
interpretation was promoted by several academics and scholars who criticised the emptiness of the 
formal model of equality.54 
The departure from this model is also noticed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. For instance, in the 
Schuler-Zgraggen case, the Court held that denying a woman her invalidity pension, when it has been 
granted to men under the same circumstance, amounts to discrimination on ground of sex.55 The 
Court adopted a strict scrutiny and stressed the necessity to verify the objectiveness and 
reasonableness of the unequal measures. According to the Court, “the advancement of the equality of 
the sexes is today a major goal in the Member States of the Council of Europe and very weighty 
reasons would have to be put forward before such a difference of treatment could be regarded as 
compatible with the Convention”.56 This interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of sex is in line with the substantive concept of equality that aims to concretely ensure the 
equal enjoyment of human rights for all groups of individuals. 
An overview of the content of the substantive equality model will now be offered. The aim is to 
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2.2.2 Affirmative actions as special measures to achieve equality 
The legal shift towards equality of result is also reflected in several provisions of human rights treaties 
such as the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
They encompass a substantive and closed model for combating discriminations based on the 
identification of specific groups.57 The closed model limits the grounds of discrimination and 
enshrines guidelines to identify objective justifications for certain treatments. Both Conventions use 
the same language and refer to the various types of discrimination which have the effect or purpose 
of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
The concept of de facto equality is the cornerstone of the CERD; the Preamble expressly refers to the 
goal to guarantee the enjoyment of certain rights without distinction of any kind and to prohibit 
discrimination between human beings on the grounds of race. The CERD acknowledges the 
possibility to provide distinctions for the purpose of launching affirmative actions and enhancing the 
social development of the various ethnic, racial and national groups. In this regard, Article 2(1) (c) 
of CERD underlines the duty of the States to take policy measures and to amend, rescind, or nullify 
any laws or regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination. This 
framework illustrates the legitimacy of introducing positive and affirmative actions in order to reach 
an effective level of equality within the society, but at the same time it identifies these measures as 
exceptions. Article 1(4) states that: 
“Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic 
groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or 
individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed 
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racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the 
maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the 
objectives for which they were taken have been achieved”. 
According to Theodor Meron, this provision marks an exception in respect to the definition of racial 
discrimination and excludes affirmative actions, because it allows the adoption of “special measures” 
unless they bring about “the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups” or are 
“continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved”. As a result, there 
would be the risk to justify discriminatory rules and exclude action programmes.58 Moreover, Article 
2 (2) lays down that: 
“States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social, economic, cultural and other 
fields, special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial 
groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the 
maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they 
were taken have been achieved.” 
This provision guarantees wide margins of discretion to the States in order to adopt positive measures 
in favour of marginalised groups by providing that, ‘when the circumstances so warrant’, they shall 
take special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate protection of certain racial groups. In 
addition, the provision does not set out the guidelines to identify the vulnerable individuals and the 
extent to which the social, political and economic circumstances permit the issue of affirmative 
measures. 
The same approach has also been embraced by Article 4 of the CEDAW: 
“Adoption by States Parties of temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between 
men and women shall not be considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention, but shall in 
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no way entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate standards; these measures shall be 
discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved.” 
In the context of the CEDAW, the concept of de facto equality has been confirmed in compliance 
with the new developments occurring in international human rights law. However, the CEDAW 
presents the same weaknesses found in CERD’s framework and reveals a substantive model of 
equality in which affirmative action programmes continue to be deemed as special measures. 
The approach emerging from these international instruments seems to reflect a paradigm that focuses 
on the biological and immutable differences of the person rather than the social barriers preventing 
individuals from the enjoyment of the rights.59 The adoption of close-model discrimination clauses 
accelerated the process towards a broader and more effective protection of human rights, 
accommodating the specific diversity of disadvantaged groups of individuals.60 Despite that, the 
active role of the State and the duty to provide affirmative actions for implementing the prohibition 
of discrimination still remain controversial issues, because they are considered as exceptions to the 
formal equality model. All the international instruments examined above focus on “substantive 
equality without forfeiting the merits of formal equality”.61 The final stage of the gradual 
development of the concept of equality under international human rights law will now be analysed. 
2.3 Beyond differences: time to recognise social barriers and positive duties 
The interpretation of human rights treaties by international courts started to reinforce the concept of 
equality and acknowledge those structural factors that jeopardise the concrete enjoyment of all human 
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rights. The substantive model of equality was applied to recognise the positive role of the State to 
tackle those social and external barriers that lead to discriminations. 
For instance, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women pointed out that 
special measures taken under Article 4, Paragraph 1, by States Parties should aim to accelerate the 
equal participation of women in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. The 
Committee expressly considered “the application of these measures not as an exception to the norm 
of non-discrimination, but rather as an emphasis that temporary special measures are part of a 
necessary strategy by States Parties directed towards the achievement of de facto or substantive 
equality of women with men in the enjoyment of their human rights and fundamental freedoms”.62 In 
the same recommendation, the Committee put the emphasis on the social meaning of gender, which 
is an ideological and cultural construct. In this sense, gender refers to those constructed identities, 
attributes and roles for women that are imposed by society. 
A similar approach has been adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
in the General Comment 8. The Committee stated that the identification of an individual, as a member 
of a particular racial or ethnic group, should be based upon self-identification by the individual 
concerned.63 In line with this assumption, the Committee considered even the concept of descent as 
a form of social construction, strongly reaffirming that discrimination based on “descent” includes 
discrimination against members of communities based on forms of social stratification such as caste 
and analogous systems of inherited status which nullify or impair their equal enjoyment of human 
rights.64 
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The significant evolution concerning equality and non-discrimination at the international level 
emerges also in the draft of the UN Convention on the Rights of Child (CRC). To give an example, 
Article 2 of the CRC lays down that State Parties are the main negative and positive duty-holders 
without referring to the adoption of any special or temporary measures:65 
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within 
their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s or his or her parent’s or 
legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, property, disability, birth or other status. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of 
discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the 
child’s parents, legal guardians, or family members. 
The Convention promotes the introduction of specific protection measures to repair the unlawful 
consequences of unequal treatments and consolidate the concept of material equality in compliance 
with the new legal developments of international human rights law. 66 The application of the 
Convention’s provision cannot be made dependent “upon budgetary resources” and the affirmative 
obligations are not regarded as exceptional actions.67 In this general framework, the principle of non-
discrimination gradually acquired an asymmetrical and substantive connotation. This model 
explicitly requires positive duties to remove social barriers that prevent the most vulnerable from the 
full enjoyment of their rights. 
Currently, the peak of this process is mirrored by the adoption of the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). As it will be further explained below, the CRPD aims to redress 
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inequality and encourages real disability law reform, based on a conception of non-discrimination 
that goes beyond formal equality and involves a relevant category of substantive rights.68 
2.4 The prohibition of discrimination under the CRPD 
The CRPD not only represents the most recent human rights treaty introduced at international level, 
but also encompasses important legal developments concerning the model of equality. The 
Convention embraces an overarching concept of non-discrimination, which takes into account the 
specific differences of vulnerable groups and extends the legal protection in favour of persons with 
disabilities. To this end, the Convention’s backdrop outlines the importance to provide affirmative 
action programmes and requires an active role of States Parties. In addition, it is worth noting that the 
CRPD Committee stated that the Convention is based on an “inclusive” concept of equality that 
embraces and extends the substantive model of equality. The new inclusive approach to equality 
implies:  
(a) a fair redistributive dimension to address socioeconomic disadvantages; (b) a recognition dimension to 
combat stigma, stereotyping, prejudice and violence and to recognize the dignity of human beings and their 
intersectionality; (c) a participative dimension to reaffirm the social nature of people as members of social groups 
and the full recognition of humanity through inclusion in society; and (d) an accommodating dimension to make 
space for difference as a matter of human dignity.69 
Furthermore, according to Article 5.1, “States Parties recognize that all persons are equal before and 
under the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection and equal benefit of 
the law”. This provision does not replicate a simple and empty concept of equality, but it triggers the 
issue of legal capacity and it is closely related to several provisions of the Convention.70 The CRPD 
lays down that persons with disabilities shall enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
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aspect of life and have the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law.71 It follows that, 
persons with disabilities are deemed as bearers of rights and responsibilities,72 in need of special 
protection in case  they are unable to manage their affairs independently.73 This provision concretely 
prohibits the legislator from adopting measures that set forth the legal incapacity of persons with 
disabilities and nullify their capacity to take independent decisions. In that regard, States Parties are 
called upon to guarantee the access of persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity.74 Moreover, persons with disabilities are entitled to equal benefit of 
the law and consequently to have access to justice without encountering barriers. 
The approach of the Convention not only departs from the asymmetrical model of equality, but it 
formalises the increasing need to ensure a clear, normative framework for the protection of an 
invisible group of individuals. From the CRPD a dynamic and holistic model of equality and non-
discrimination emerges. The main evidences of this approach are constituted by a comprehensive 
definition of discrimination (Art. 2), the fundamental obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation (Art. 2), the duty to launch affirmative action programs (Art. 27) and the goal to 
promote multidimensional equality (Arts. 6 – 7).75 The prohibition of discrimination is regulated by 
Article 5(2) of the Convention which states that: 
“States Parties shall prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to persons with 
disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all grounds. In order to promote 
equality and eliminate discrimination, States Parties shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable 
accommodation is provided. Specific measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto 
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equality of persons with disabilities shall not be considered discrimination under the terms of the present 
Convention”. 
This clear-cut provision expressly introduces disability as ground of discrimination under 
international human rights law. To the same extent, only the Convention on the Rights of Child and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union added disability to the potential grounds 
of discrimination.  
The CRPD expressly prohibits all forms of discrimination, including denial of reasonable 
accommodation. A reference to indirect discrimination can also be found under Art. 2.4 of the 
Convention which mentions “any distinction, exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which 
has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an 
equal basis with others, of all human rights”. By doing so, it notably enlarges the guarantees in favour 
of disabled people, because it triggers the protection when a practice, rule, requirement or condition 
seems to be neutral on its face but impacts disproportionately upon particular groups. 
This legal framework reveals an innovative agenda for assuring the highest standards of protection 
for persons with disabilities. The interpretation of prohibiting discrimination by the UN Committee 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities will now be analysed. It will be shown that the CRPD 
adopted a solid and comprehensive concept of substantive equality. 
2.4.1 The case of H.M. vs Sweden 
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities seems to adhere to the logic and scope 
underlying the Convention. For instance, in a recent decision, the Committee held that Sweden failed 
to fulfil its obligations under Articles 5(1), 5(3), 19(b), 25 and 26, read alone and in conjunction with 
Articles 3 (b), (d) and (e), and 4(1) (d), of the Convention.76 The claimant in the case involving 
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Sweden had suffered from chronic connective tissue disorder, which led to hypermobility, severe 
luxations and sub-luxations, fragile and easily damaged blood vessels, weak muscles and severe 
chronic neuralgia. For this reason, she has not been able to walk or stand for eight years. The claimant 
was prevented from leaving her house or being transported to hospital or rehabilitation care due to 
the increased risk of injuries that may be incurred due to her impairment. The only type of 
rehabilitation that could stop its progress was hydrotherapy, which in the claimant’s circumstances 
would have only been practicable in an indoor pool in her house.77 To this end, the claimant applied 
for obtaining the permission for an extension of approximately 63 square meters to the house, but the 
request was rejected by the Örebro Local Housing Committee. The Administrative Court of Appeal 
also refused the claimant’s application for planning permission. In this context, the applicant claimed 
that she had been discriminated against by the decisions of the State Party’s administrative bodies 
and courts and her rights to equal opportunity for rehabilitation and improved health were violated. 
Furthermore, she argued that the refusals were based merely on public interest to preserve the 
development plan and that a specific exception to the development plan would not have jeopardised 
the surrounding area.78 On the contrary, the justifications of the Swedish Government reflect the 
obsolete approach of formal quality. The State indeed emphasised that: 
“the relevant act in this case, the Planning and Building Act, is applied in the same way to all, whether they 
have disabilities or not. Nor are there any clauses in the Act that might lead indirectly to discrimination 
against persons with disabilities. The rejection of the application for a building permit in this case is in no 
way due to the author’s disability, but rather consistent with practice that applies equally to all”.79 
By contrast, the Committee’s stance confirms the significance of the substantive model of equality 
and non-discrimination. The Committee asserted that: 
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“A law which is applied in a neutral manner may have a discriminatory effect when the particular 
circumstances of the individuals to whom it is applied are not taken into consideration. The right not to be 
discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention can be violated when 
States, without objective and reasonable justification, fail to treat differently persons whose situations are 
significantly different”. 
In addition, the Committee observed that the prohibition of discrimination requires the 
implementation of the duty to provide reasonable accommodations. In this regard, the access to a 
hydrotherapy pool at home would have been an essential and effective mean to improve the health 
needs of the claimant. Consequently, appropriate adjustments demanded a departure from the 
development plan in order to guarantee the building of a hydrotherapy pool. 
With this background, the Committee affirmed that the refusal of the State Party to approve the 
applicant’s request for a building permit constituted a failure to accommodate the specific 
circumstances of her case and her particular disability-related needs.80 The Committee therefore 
considered the decisions of the Swedish authorities disproportionate, since they brought about a 
discriminatory effect that adversely affected the claimant, as a person with disability, access to the 
health care and rehabilitation required for her specific health condition. The Committee underlined 
that the State Party is under a specific obligation to redress the violation of the claimant’s rights under 
the Convention, including by reconsidering her application for a building permit for a hydrotherapy 
pool. 
The UN body stressed that the State Party has the legal obligation to prevent similar violations in the 
future by adopting normative rules that do not have the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of any right for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with 
others.81 
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2.4.2 The substantive content of the non-discrimination requirement 
The decision of the Committee exhibits an outstanding interpretation of the prohibition of 
discrimination that requires the adoption of affirmative action by the State to advance the dignity of 
persons with disabilities. The equality paradigm of the CRPD crystallises the legal developments of 
international human rights law. 
Article 5 of CRPD concerning equality and non-discrimination is a directly justiciable clause, which 
can be invoked by an individual to claim the violation of his or her rights. This provision represents 
an autonomous clause and its application is not strictly subordinated to the breach of other rights 
contained in the Convention. It enshrines specific obligations upon the State Party that has the positive 
duty to remedy the violation by introducing those necessary and concrete measures to implement 
disability rights. The State Party has also the general obligation to acknowledge the structural factors 
that prevent persons with disabilities from the enjoyment of their rights. The State Party has to ensure 
that its legislation and its application by domestic courts is consistent with the Convention’s 
provisions. 
It is noteworthy that the prohibition of discrimination triggers a dual obligation on the State Party 
which has the broader duty to “prevent similar violations in the future” and eliminate the systemic 
barriers affecting the national legal system. The principle of non-discrimination is not a mere and 
vague guideline underlying the CRPD, but it is the keystone of the legal protection of other 
fundamental provisions, such as the right to respect for home and family life, health, education, work 
and employment, adequate living standards and social protection, and participation in political and 
public life.82 
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In light of this context, it is important to point out that the duty to provide reasonable accommodation 
illustrates the main non-discrimination obligation. According to the definition of Article 2 of the 
Convention, reasonable accommodation means “necessary and appropriate modification and 
adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to 
ensure persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”. This provision has a “peculiar bridging role”, because its 
application affects all rights and promotes the indivisibility of human rights.83 Thus, the recognition 
of the duty to guarantee reasonable accommodations within the general prohibition of non-
discrimination implies the imposition of positive obligations to identify social barriers and take 
actions to remove them.84 The reasonable accommodation duty facilitates and accelerates the 
pragmatic application of the commitments embodied in the concept of substantive equality. This 
obligation entails the legal responsibility of different public and private actors including the State, 
employers, education and health care providers, providers of goods and services and private clubs.85 
The only defence that allows a departure from the reasonable accommodation duty concerns the 
concept of “disproportionate or undue burden” that should introduce a notion of progressive 
realisation into the non-discrimination analysis. 86 This clause has not been explicitly defined by the 
Convention, but it seems to reflect the approach of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), in 
accordance with an undue hardship is “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense when 
considered in light of factors such as an employer’s size, financial resources, and the nature and 
structure of its operation”.87 However, the Committee requires specific proofs from the State Parties 
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in order to demonstrate the existence of disproportionate or undue burdens and exclude consequently 
the application of the duty. For instance, in the case analysed above, the individual sought appropriate 
modifications and adjustments to allow the building of a hydrotherapy pool. The Committee noted 
that the State Party failed to explain the extent to which these adjustments would have required 
difficult expenses. It could therefore not conclude that the building of a hydrotherapy pool would 
have imposed a “disproportionate or undue burden” on the State Party.88 
The CRPD establishes a clear objective to accommodate persons with disabilities on an individual 
basis and confers the main responsibilities to provide reasonable accommodations to the State Party, 
which has the duty to adopt appropriate policies and measures including affirmative action 
programmes and incentives. 
To conclude, it may be said that the legal framework of the Convention is characterised by a dynamic 
and transformative conception of equality and non-discrimination, which accommodates the multi-
layered disadvantages of person with disabilities. The CRPD not only abandons the formal approach 
towards equality but also extends the substantive guarantees in favour of a vulnerable group of 
persons. It aims to promote an active and effective role for the State Parties, which are under a positive 
duty to correct inequalities. The Convention stresses the increasing complexity of human rights law, 
which needs to be tailored to the specific experience of those persons who are prevented from the full 
enjoyment of their rights because of social and structural barriers. The intersectional dimension of 
the principle of equality embraced by the CRPD will now be examined. 
2.5 Defining the concept of multiple and intersectional discrimination 
The UN Convention embodies a concept of equality that takes into account both multiple and 
intersectional discrimination. Article 6 CRPD expressly mentions only ‘multiple discrimination’, but 
the CRPD Committee clarified that this provision, like article 7, must be regarded as “illustrative, 
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rather than exhaustive, setting out obligations in respect of the two prominent examples of multiple 
and intersectional discrimination.89 The Committee emphasised that women and girls with disabilities 
are among those groups of persons with disabilities who most often experience multiple and 
intersectional discrimination.90 
The CRPD recognises the difficult conditions faced by persons with disabilities who are subject to 
multiple or aggravated forms of discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinions, national, ethnic, indigenous or social origin, property, birth, age or other 
status.91 The intersectional equality approach acknowledges the failure to classify a person on the 
basis of a single attribute, because various characteristics of an individual or any combination of them 
may constitute grounds of discrimination.92 The adoption of this model symbolises a significant 
improvement in the context of non-discrimination law, since it fills the gap between law and reality. 
This gap originates from the lack of legal instruments that address discrimination based on multiple 
grounds. The interaction between multiple identities and attributes increases the possibilities to suffer 
from discriminations and accentuates the vulnerable conditions of disadvantaged groups. 
The concept of multiple and intersectional discrimination comprises different types of situation. 
According to the CRPD Committee, multiple discrimination is a “situation where a person can 
experience discrimination on two or several grounds, in the sense that discrimination is compounded 
or aggravated”.93 For instance, compound discrimination occurs when discrimination is based on two 
or more grounds and each ground increases the possibilities to experience discrimination.94 The 
famous UK case of Perera v Civil Service clearly illustrates this form of discrimination.95 The 
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applicant, who was born in Sri Lanka, claimed that his application for a job in the Civil Service had 
been rejected on several occasions on grounds of his colour or national origin. The requirements for 
the job such as age, experience in the UK, nationality and knowledge of English language operated 
to exclude the claimant from successfully applying for the position. Thus, the lack of one factor did 
not prevent him from the possibility to obtain the job, but every discriminatory requirement 
contributed to decrease his chances to be selected for the position. 
Intersectional discrimination is instead the category used to refer to a situation where two or more 
inseparable grounds interact with each other and constitute the basis of discrimination. For example, 
a woman with disabilities may experience discrimination for a job promotion, while at the same time 
non-disabled women or men with disabilities are not excluded from the career advancement. 
2.5.1 The unsatisfactory one-dimensional approach to discrimination 
The first UN human rights treaties, as well as EU law and many national regulations, are informed 
by the ‘single-ground approach’, which conceptualises discriminations as separate illegal acts based 
on a single-ground.96 
This model presents evident limitations that jeopardise the effective protection of persons with a 
multidimensional identity. Indeed, if an individual has been discriminated against on different 
grounds, the person concerned can bring the complaint before the Court in relation to a sole ground, 
choosing the most favourable ground for obtaining a positive judgement. Otherwise, the claimant is 
obliged to claim alternated or cumulative grounds for introducing a judicial case.97 The famous case 
of Bahl v the Law Society exemplifies the limits of the one-dimensional approach to equality. In this 
case, an Asian woman claimed to have been subject to discriminatory treatments on grounds of race 
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and gender.98 The Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal ruled that it was not possible 
to consider both grounds in the same case, although the claimant experienced them as inevitably 
interconnected. It is worth noting that this legal model does not take into account the real 
discriminatory experience of the individual and the impact of the intersection between different 
characteristics. 
As a result, the single-ground approach excludes situations from the protection of equality legislation 
where the claimant cannot demonstrate the existence of a comparator who has suffered the same 
treatment. For instance, a woman with disabilities, victim of intersectional discrimination, may not 
successfully bring a judicial case because of the presence of non-disabled women comparators in a 
claim related to gender. At the same time, in a separate complaint related to disability, the claimant 
would lose the lawsuit because of the existence of men with disabilities comparators. This flaw 
characterises several national legal systems that do not provide effective remedies to address the 
multiple nature of the discrimination. 
The single-ground approach has been embodied in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms 
of Racial Discrimination which prohibits race discrimination and does not allow for individual 
complaints based on both sex and racial grounds. However, the weaknesses of this approach have 
been recognised by the monitoring Committee of the CERD that acknowledged the importance to 
condemn certain forms of racial discrimination towards women, specifically because of their 
gender.99 
This development in the interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination has also been hailed by 
the General Recommendation 18 of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. The Committee addressed the issue of discrimination against women, in particular 
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those from the most disadvantaged sectors of society, such as women of African descent.100 The 
Committee noted that the claimer has been subject to multiple discrimination not only on ground of 
sex, but also because of her status as a woman of African descent and her socio-economic 
background.101 
The last step of the legal evolution concerning the concept of multidimensional equality was the 
adoption of the General Comment No. 20 of the Committee on Economic and Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR). According to the Comment: 
“Some individuals or groups of individuals face discrimination on more than one of the prohibited grounds, 
for example women belonging to an ethnic or religious minority. Such cumulative discrimination has a 
unique and specific impact on individuals and merits particular consideration and remedying”.102 
The Committee on CESCR pointed out the necessity to tackle intersectional and multiple 
discrimination. The jurisprudence of the international human rights bodies exhibited an increasing 
interest towards multidimensional equality. In doing so, multiple and intersectional discrimination 
have been gradually recognised under international law. This changing attitude mirrors the 
complexity of the contents of human rights law and the multifaceted aspects informing the notion of 
substantive equality. 
2.5.2 Intersectional equality under the CRPD: women and children with disabilities 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities could be said to be the first human rights 
treaty that expressly provides a comprehensive framework for combating multiple and intersectional 
discrimination. Article 6 states that States Parties recognise that women and girls with disabilities are 
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subject to multiple discrimination, and in this regard, shall take measures to ensure the full and equal 
enjoyment by them of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. In addition, States Parties are 
called on to take all appropriate measures to ensure the full development, advancement and 
empowerment of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms set out in the Convention.103 The CRPD legitimates the idea 
according to which the combination of two inseparable grounds can bring about discriminations, 
taking into account the specific condition of women and children with disabilities.104 These groups 
of individuals are extremely susceptible to experience dual forms of discrimination within the family 
and society.105 It is noteworthy to outline that unequal treatments due to gender are widespread in 
every region of the world and include unlawful practices such as female genital mutilation, child 
marriage, the practice to compel women to become prostitutes and the ethnic tradition to deprive 
women of the freedom of choice in marriage. Consequently, persons with disabilities are more 
vulnerable than women and children without disabilities. 
One may for instance refer to data provided by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which 
shows that women and children with disabilities are more likely to be subject to sexual abuse, physical 
violence and discriminatory treatments.106 The Factsheet on Persons with Disabilities also reveals 
that in Orissa, India, 25 percent of women with intellectual disabilities had been raped and six percent 
of women with disabilities had been forcibly sterilised.107 Moreover, according to a UNDP study, the 
global literacy rate for adults with disabilities is as low as three percent, while it decreases to one 
percent for women with disabilities.108 Data concerning children with disabilities shows that 90 
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percent of children with disabilities in developing countries are prevented from attending school.109 
Women with disabilities are more disadvantaged in comparison with men with disabilities as regards 
to access to education, services, employment and social assistance.110 Thereby, women with 
disabilities are less likely to be employed and have lower wages in respect to men. 
The intimate combination of both gender and disability status represents a “double jeopardy” and 
increases the possibilities to face discrimination in the workplace.111 The intersectional approach to 
equality acknowledged by the Convention marks a remarkable improvement for the protection of 
human rights at the international level, because it contemplates the multi-layered experience of 
discrimination. The prohibition of multiple and intersectional discrimination contributes to reinforce 
a substantive model of equality that aims to break the cycle of disadvantages and remove social 
obstacles.112 By contrast, the one-dimensional approach perpetuates the limits of the formal model of 
equality which does not accommodate those disadvantages of the individual’s identity. 
The concept of disability will now be examined and it will be briefly shown how to interpret the 
model of disability endorsed by the CRPD. 
3. The CRPD’s model of disability: from a social construct towards a human rights approach 
The CRPD introduces an ideal framework for tackling discriminations, and favours the true societal 
adaptation to the needs of persons with disabilities. The substantive equality paradigm is supported 
and reinforced by a social understanding of disability that emphasises the importance of eliminating 
external barriers that jeopardise the full enjoyment of human rights for persons with disabilities. The 
CRPD does not provide a strict legal definition of disability, but points out “a soft threshold definition 
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in the form of guidance which is open-ended and inclusive”.113 The CRPD’s preamble recognises that 
disability “is an evolving concept and that disability results from the interaction between persons with 
impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers”. Moreover, Art. 1 of the CRPD distinctly 
sets out a concept of disability that includes those individuals “who have long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full 
and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”.  
The CRPD enshrines a social construct of disability replacing the traditional ‘medical view’ which 
merely places the impairment within the individual.114 The CRPD tries to overcome the limits of the 
medical model of disability, which locates the failure to meet the norm with the individual and regards 
disability as an impairment that needs to be cured. The medical approach recognises disability as the 
“exclusive realm of helping and medical disciplines”115 and prevents the application of the equality 
principle to persons with disabilities.116 In doing so, this model reduces persons with disabilities to 
their impairments and does not acknowledge them as rights holders. By contrast, the CRPD 
crystallises the concept according to which society contributes to disable persons with 
impairments.117 
The social approach to disability has often been criticised because it does not consider the extent to 
which individual deficiencies concretely affect persons with disabilities.118 In this regard, an 
accessible and inclusive society would not equalise persons with disabilities with non-disabled 
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individuals.119 However, it is worth noting that the CPRD adopts a flexible and evolving concept of 
disability which takes into account the interplay between the individual impairment and the external 
barriers. By doing so, it aims to overcome the main limitations of a rigid model of disability and 
provides significant leeway to adapt the concept of disability to different socio-contextual 
circumstances.  
It may be argued that the social model provides fertile ground to build and develop a new “human 
rights” approach to disability in accordance with the individual impairment must be valued as part of 
human variation. The recent General Comment No. 6 on equality and non-discrimination adopted by 
the CRPD Committee expressly states that the:  
“Human rights model of disability recognizes that disability is a social construct and impairments must not be 
taken as a legitimate ground for the denial or restriction of human rights. It acknowledges that disability is one 
of several layers of identity. Hence, disability laws and policies must take the diversity of persons with 
disabilities into account. It also recognizes that human rights are interdependent, interrelated and indivisible.”120  
The reasoning of the CRPD Committee embraces the new developments in academic literature 
concerning the human rights model of disability, which focuses on the inherent dignity of the human 
being and the inclusion of persons with disabilities in all decisions affecting their life. The social or 
contextual concept of disability embodied in the CPRD does not ignore the effects that impairments 
might have upon individuals, but it seeks to promote a paradigm shift in the understanding of 
disability by focusing on those final results caused by the impairment in a given social context. 
It may be said that the CPRD reshapes the social model of disability and recognises impairments as 
part of human diversity.121 For instance, Art. 3 of the CRPD explicitly lays down that “respect for 
difference and acceptance of persons with disabilities” must be considered as part of human diversity 
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and humanity. By doing so, it does not embrace “a radical social constructionist view of disability, in 
which impairment has no underlying reality”,122 but rightfully rejects the idea of persons with 
disabilities as objects of charity, medical treatment and social assistance. The CRPD acknowledges 
that persons with disabilities are subjects of rights and active members of society. To this end, it 
requires the removal of those structural and external obstacles that obstruct the full enjoyment of their 
fundamental rights. The objective to ensure substantive equality is assisted by a social construction 
of disability that encourages the alteration of able-bodied norms and the adoption of reasonable 
adjustments to accommodate persons with disabilities. The CPRD provides the tools to drive a change 
in the judicial interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability by expanding 
the analysis beyond those individual limitations caused by a medical condition. The social model of 
disability will be used as the basis of the analysis of this doctoral thesis, as the General Comment that 
raised the human rights approach was adopted well after this work commenced.  
The next section will briefly examine the extent to which the CRPD integrates civil and political 
rights with socio-economic rights to enhance the protection of persons with disabilities. It will be 
shown that a new ambitious and proactive model of rights is emerging under international human 
rights law that goes beyond the simplistic dichotomy between socio-economic rights and civil and 
political rights. 
4. Reconceptualising the human rights dichotomy 
International human rights law has traditionally been characterised by a distinction between civil and 
political rights (CP) on the one side and economic, social and cultural rights (ESC) on the other one.123 
Civil and political rights are generally regarded as rights of first generation, while socio-economic 
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rights as second generation rights.124 The third generation includes the right to development, the right 
to self-determination, minority rights and the right to a healthy environment. After the adoption of 
the 1948 Universal and inter-American declarations of human rights which lay down a 
comprehensive catalogue of rights, the drafting of subsequent global treaties has reflected the classic 
division of rights into two categories. The content of the UDHR was codified into the two 1966 sister 
covenants: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).125 
In this context, the traditional paradigm tends to distinguish between rights on the basis of their 
correspondent duties. Duties of restraints are associated with “freedom-protecting civil and political 
rights”, whereas positive duties are related to “equality-promoting socio-economic rights”.126 As a 
result, positive duties are immediately applicable; by contrast duties of restraint require to be realised 
progressively.127 Moreover, civil and political rights are considered as justiciable and inexpensive, 
while social, economic and cultural rights as non-justiciable and costly. For instance, social rights 
have been traditionally viewed as not imbued of legal contents and inherently not-justiciable on the 
grounds that their implementation was a political matter, not a matter of law.128 
Nowadays, this dichotomy seems to be highly contested as the most recent international treaties 
adhere to a holistic and indivisible notion of human rights. For example, the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) protects both civil and political and socio-economic rights. It also has 
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been made legally binding by the Lisbon Treaty.129 The Charter does not replicate traditional human 
rights documents, but aims to integrate civil and political rights with socio-economic rights, imposing 
positive and proactive duties on the State.130 According to de Búrca, the Charter does not distinguish 
between justiciability and non-justiciability. It is likely to “function as a source of values and norms 
[...] to influence the interpretation of EU legislative and other measures and to feed into policy-
making and into EU activities more generally”.131 
In addition, the Declaration adopted during the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights explicitly 
emphasises that human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.132 The 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action underlines the obligation of the international 
community to treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with 
the same emphasis. To this end, the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, is to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.133 Despite that, the 
international protection of socio-economic rights continues to encounter legal difficulties and 
political obstacles as it demands positive and costly actions by States.134 Differently, civil and 
political rights do not always trigger a positive duty upon the State to provide all the necessary 
measures to guarantee the implementation of the right. This backdrop demonstrates that the 
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demarcation between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights is still an interesting issue 
in the discourse of human rights law.135 
4.1 Disabilities rights as universal and indivisible: do civil and political rights demand economic 
resources? 
The CRPD overturns the stark dichotomy between civil and political rights and socio-economic 
rights. The Preamble specifies that a comprehensive and integral international convention is 
necessary to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities. The emergence 
of a new proactive model of rights seems crucial to redressing the profound social disadvantage of 
persons with disabilities and promoting their participation in the civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural spheres with equal opportunities, in both developing and developed countries. In that regard, 
the States Parties reaffirm the “universality, indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the need for persons with disabilities to be guaranteed 
their full enjoyment without discrimination”.136 This means that all rights require positive actions and 
affirmative programmes, also those civil and political rights which are merely associated to duties of 
restraints. 
An overview of the most recent decisions of the Committee will now be offered. It will be 
demonstrated that the implementation of civil and political rights related to persons with disabilities 
implies a proactive role of the State. 
In order to guarantee the participation in political and public life of persons with disabilities, the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities pointed out the importance to enhance the active 
participation of persons with disabilities in politics through affirmative action and ensure the 
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accessibility of all voting stations.137 It took note of the difficult situation of persons with hearing 
impairments in accessing information due to lack of official recognition of the significance of sign 
language by Hong Kong, China. The Committee highlighted those fundamental obligations stemming 
from the freedom of expression and opinion, and access to information. The Committee therefore 
urged Hong Kong, China, to enhance the training for and the services provided by sign language 
interpreters.138 In this context, the proactive role of the State is central for assuring the effective 
enjoyment of civil and political rights in favour of persons with disabilities. 
Even in relation to the freedom from exploitation, violence, and abuse (Art. 16), the Committee did 
not only recommend the State from abstaining to carry out those violations, but it was particularly 
concerned about the positive duties to investigate the incidents and prosecute the perpetrators. Lastly, 
the Committee recognised the difficult conditions of women and girls with intellectual disabilities 
who may be subjected to sexual violence. Thus, it urged the State to guarantee sex education to 
children and adolescents with intellectual disabilities and appropriate trainings for the law 
enforcement personnel on handling violence against women and girls with disabilities.139 As a 
consequence, it may be argued that the full realisation of civil and political rights depends on the 
economic resources invested by the State Parties. All rights have budgetary implications and rights 
of persons with disabilities require supplementary funds.140 
To give another example, in the observations on the initial report of Argentina, the Committee held 
that the Argentinian legal framework positively takes into account the principle of inclusive education 
for persons with disabilities. However, it concluded that the implementation of the right to education 
is limited, in practice, “by a failure to tailor programmes and curricula to the needs of pupils with 
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disabilities and by the prevalence of all sorts of barriers that prevent persons with disabilities from 
accessing the educational system without discrimination and on an equal footing with other 
students”.141 Consequently, the Committee recommended the development of a comprehensive State 
education policy that assures the right to inclusive education and allocates sufficient budgetary 
resources. This example is one of many demonstrating the progressive emergence of a new 
substantive and demanding approach towards disability rights, in compliance with the commitments 
of the CRPD. This new legal approach is based on the indivisibilities of duties and a uniform level of 
protection that facilitates the interaction between the two different sets of rights.142 The next sub-
section will investigate to what extent socio-economic rights, as resources-demanding rights, are 
justiciable before the CRPD Committee. 
4.2 Disability rights as (quasi)-justiciable rights 
The traditional theory separates civil and political rights from socio-economic rights also on the 
ground of justiciability, excluding the latter from the judicial arena. A right is generally considered 
“justiciable” when it can be examined by a judge in a concrete set of circumstances and when this 
examination can imply a further determination of this right’s significance.143 Civil and political rights 
were seen as precise enough to be applied, while socio-economic provisions were thought as vague 
and unenforceable. Positive duties associated to socio-economic rights were regarded to go beyond 
the institutional legitimacy of the courts, because entailing a significant level of resource 
commitments.144 They were deemed as excessively costly, requiring welfare measures by the State 
and therefore falling under the exclusive competence of the political decision-makers. However, the 
CRPD has removed these conceptual boundaries between civil and political rights and socio-
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economic rights that inform the traditional human rights discourse. Currently, both categories of 
rights are justiciable before the CRPD Committee. 
The Committee represents a quasi-justiciable body and has the competence to receive and consider 
communications from, or on behalf of, individuals or groups of individuals subject to its jurisdiction 
who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of the provisions of the Convention.145 The 
treaty-body has the competence to request that the State Party adopts interim measures as needed to 
avoid possible irreparable damage to the victim (Art. 4). The Committee may also issue non-binding 
and quasi-judicial recommendations for eliminating violations and redressing any damage caused by 
them (Art 5).146 The UN body may also promote an inquiry in case it receives reliable information 
indicating grave or systematic violations by a State Party of rights set forth in the Convention (Art 
6). Interestingly, the decisions of the Committee explicitly reveal a resource-demanding approach 
that urges State Parties to provide welfare measures for implementing all disability rights. This 
approach entails the justiciability of those socio-economic rights that have usually been associated 
with non-justiciable duties. The next sub-section will analyse a remarkable decision of the CRPD 
Committee which demonstrates the justiciability of all human rights. 
4.2.1 The right to control one’s own financial affairs 
In a recent communication, the Committee has recognised the right to control one’s own financial 
affairs in favour of persons with visual impairments.147 The case originated from the compliant of 
two Hungarian citizens, who concluded a contract with the OTP Bank Zrt. credit institution (OTP) in 
order to use banking cards. Despite that, the applicants were prevented to use the automatic teller 
machines (ATMs) because of the lack of assistance. Indeed, the ATM keyboards were not marked 
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with Braille, nor did the ATMs make audible instructions and voice assistance for banking card 
operations available. The applicants claimed that they were unable to use the services provided by 
the ATMs at the same level as non-disabled clients, although they paid annual fees for banking card 
services and transactions equal to the fees paid by other clients.148 
In light of this factual background, they claimed to be victim of direct discrimination in accessing the 
financial services provided by the ATMs compared to persons without disability. By contrast, the 
State Party underlined that the accessibility of banking services is a crucial issue which can only be 
achieved gradually, due to the related costs and technical viability, through the installation of new 
ATMs providing physical and info-communication accessibility. Therefore, the State Secretary 
recommended OPT to adopt the appropriate machines in the future. At the same time, it found the 
compatibility of the Supreme Court’s decision with the State Party’s law, in accordance with OTP, is 
exempted from the obligation to assure equal treatment under the Equal Treatment Act because the 
applicants accepted the contractual terms for private current account services, including the facility 
of limited use.149 
The Committee noticed that the State Party did not acknowledge the duty upon private entities to 
provide accessibility of information, communications and other services for persons with visual 
impairments on an equal basis. On contrary, the Committee emphasised that under Article 4, 
Paragraph 1(e), of the Convention, States Parties have the general obligation “to take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability by any person, organization or private 
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enterprise”. To this end, States Parties are required pursuant to Article 9 of the Convention “to take 
appropriate measures to ensure to persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis with others, to, 
inter alia, information, communications and other services, including electronic services, by 
identifying and eliminating obstacles and barriers to accessibility”. In particular, the UN body 
recalled the specific duty of the State to guarantee that private actors provide accessible services to 
persons with disabilities. States Parties should take appropriate measures to develop, promulgate and 
monitor the implementation of minimum standards and guidelines for the accessibility of facilities 
and services open or provided to the public (Art. 9, para. 2(a), of the Convention), and ensure that 
private entities that offer facilities and services which are open or provided to the public take into 
account all aspects of accessibility for persons with disabilities (Art. 9, para. 2(b))150. As a 
consequence, the Committee held that Hungary failed to fulfil the obligations embodied in Article 9, 
Paragraph 2(b), of the Convention. 
4.2.2 Debunking the argument of “the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights” 
This case exhibits interesting and innovative legal aspects in relation to the protection of socio-
economic rights under international human rights law and the issue of accessibility. Indeed, the State 
Party sought to advance the common justification of the “progressive realization of economic, social 
and cultural rights” in order to deal with the accessibility of the ATMs and other banking services. In 
that regard, it argued that “steps are to be taken to change the accessibility of the ATMs and other 
banking services, including accessibility not only for the blind, but also for persons with other 
disabilities” and “the above target can only be achieved gradually”.151 
The notion of progressive realisation is often used by governments as an ‘escape hatch’ with the 
purpose to postpone or dodge the fulfilment of their human rights obligations.152 According to this 
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argument, the lack of available resources constitutes a legitimate reason to avoid the immediate 
realisation of socio-economic rights. This justification introduces flexible elements in the application 
of human rights law and brings about a sort of uncertainty in relation to the contents and extent of the 
legal obligations imposed by the UN treaties.153 However, the CRPD sets out that with regard to 
economic, social and cultural rights, each State Party undertakes to take measures to the maximum 
of its available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international cooperation, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of these rights.154 
Despite the introduction of this controversial clause in the Convention’s framework, the Committee 
did not hesitate to affirm the importance of an effective and successful implementation of disability 
rights at national level. The Committee was not persuaded by the Hungarian Government’s 
assumption to gradually achieve accessibility due to costs involved. On contrary, the Committee 
observed that the measures adopted by OTP and other financial institutions have not ensured the 
accessibility of banking card services for the applicants or other persons in a similar situation. The 
final decision clearly shows that the main objective of the Convention is to bring about a real change 
in the society. The Committee required the adoption of “a legislative framework with concrete, 
enforceable and time-bound benchmarks for monitoring and assessing the gradual modification and 
adjustment by private financial institutions of previously inaccessible banking services provided by 
them into accessible ones”.155 
It may be said that the Committee plays a key role in monitoring the application of the Convention’s 
provisions within the national systems and increasing the awareness of persons with disabilities with 
regard to their own rights. The aim of the Convention is to improve the legal protection of persons 
with disabilities. To this end, it promotes the justiciability and implementation of those socio-
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economic rights (such as the right to control one’s own financial affairs) which can concretely 
enhance the protection of persons with disabilities, regardless of the amount of economic resources 
needed by States Parties. 
4.2.3 The peculiar case of accessibility: a bridge between civil-political and socio-economic rights? 
The above case confirms that the CRPD’s goal to ensure the justiciability of all human rights, in 
particular of those socio-economic rights that are often excluded from the political agenda of the State 
Parties. Notably, the issue of accessibility represents a critical point for the concrete empowerment 
of persons with disability. The concept of accessibility implies a profound adaptation of the society, 
both in its public and in its private dimensions, to the specific needs of person with disabilities in 
order to enable all people to fully participate in all aspect of life.156 Accessibility refers not only to 
the physical environment, but it also affects the participation of individuals in the political and 
economic sector.157 It should be viewed as an essential instrument to pursue equality and non-
discrimination. Indeed, according to Article 9 of the CRPD, in order to enable persons with 
disabilities to live independently and participate fully in all aspects of life, States Parties have the 
obligations to introduce all appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities have access 
to transportation, information and communications and other facilities and services open or provided 
to the public. Accessibility is a vital pre-condition for the effective and equal enjoyment of different 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights by persons with disabilities.158 The 
implementation of this provision is therefore crucial to ensure the full realisation of the rights of 
persons with disabilities. 
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An overview of the emergence of civil society groups in the global governance will now be offered. 
The aim is to identify to what extent NGOs can inform and improve the decision-making process at 
international level. The role of disability advocacy organisations in the CRPD’s negotiations and 
drafting will be analysed. In particular, it will show that the CRPD encompasses a model of 
participatory democracy that requires the involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the entire policy 
chain, from conception to implementation, on the basis of an inclusive approach. 
5. The rising of civil society in global governance 
The relevant participation of NGOs in the CRPD’s negotiations is a positive and beneficial aspect of 
the current relationship between society and international politics. Civil society can contribute to 
improve the quality of the decision-making process of international bodies and the functioning of 
global governance. According to Antonio Gramsci, civil society is “a set of institutions through which 
society is organised and represented itself autonomously from the state”.159 Non-governmental 
organisations represent a fundamental and crucial segment of international civil society, which cannot 
be identified with the State or the market.160 Indeed, the concept of “civil society” encompasses a 
broad range of social actors, such as voluntary associations, human rights promoters, educational 
institutions, environmental movements, organisations for development cooperation, academic forums 
and think tanks. On the other hand, global governance entails those laws, policies and institutions that 
define trans-border relations between states, citizens, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations, and the market.161 
The realist idea according to which international relations are shaped exclusively by global power 
arrangements and State interests is outdated, because it does not consider the emerging role of 
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international civil society.162 Global relations and contemporary governance are characterised by the 
interaction of transnational, regional and local actors that permanently operate in the international 
realm.163 In this context, the multi-layered identity of individuals is not adequately represented and 
protected by the current interests of national governments. For this reason, the development of higher 
standards of protection for human rights at international level is the outcome of the decisive action of 
those multiple groups belonging to civil society. 
The United Nations’ framework has often been criticised because its institutional structure 
marginalises the independent role of NGOs and individuals.164 The UN Charter merely recognises 
the consultative role of non-governmental organisations in the formal process of deliberation of the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Article 71 points out that “the Economic and Social 
Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations 
which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with 
international organisations and, where appropriate, with national organisations after consultation with 
the Member of the United Nations concerned”. 165 The UN has opened its door to NGOs, but their 
participation is limited to the specific competences of the ECOSOC.166 
Despite this State-centric approach, civil society has gradually carried out a “quiet revolution” in the 
UN system.167 For instance, it is noteworthy to stress the essential contribution of NGOs in the 
promotion of policy in favour of gender’s equality, children education, environmental protection and 
disability rights. NGOs have always boosted a bottom-up process for enhancing the international 
human right’s framework. In that regard, non-governmental organisations carried out not only 
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lobbying activities towards political institutions, but also campaigns to raise public awareness and 
understating of human rights issues and transnational law.168 However, the restricted access to the 
UN decision-making process has not thwarted NGOs to inspire the international debate around 
significant issues. 
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and the Fourth World 
Conference on Women (FWCW) are very recent example of the outstanding involvement of 
international civil society in the global arena.169 Since the UNCED in 1992, there has been a call for 
a broadest public participation in poverty eradication and sustainable development. Transnational 
civil society groups were key players in this process, complementing the work of state actors and 
intergovernmental organisations.170 Thus, the CRPD’s elaboration is the highest point of the 
increasing activity of non-governmental organisations in the UN system. 
5.1 Participatory democracy and global governance 
Academic studies and political activists have often been concerned with making the global political 
system more democratic. Global governance is generally deemed as devoid of democratic legitimacy, 
because of the lack of civil participation, transparency and accountability.171 By contrast, a different 
school of thought tends to underline that the proper yardstick for the analysis of international 
institutions is not a national model of democracy.172 International organisations are therefore 
intrinsically unable to encompass direct democratic deliberations. They lack those essential 
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democratic mechanisms provided by national political systems for direct electoral or interest group 
accountability.173 
In light of this backdrop, the aim of the present research is not to equate national institutions and 
international bodies, or to argue that the latter will have to comply with the traditional model of 
representative democracy. However, it will be shown that the requirement of participatory democracy 
and the direct participation of civil society within the international legal processes may have a positive 
impact on global governance. 
5.1.1 Opening up the decision-making process 
The increasing participation of NGOs has a remarkable impact on the functioning of global 
governance, because it constitutes the starting point for opening up the international community’s 
system. International institutions such as the WTO or the UN are pervaded by inadequate democratic 
standards.174 This “democratic deficit” implies the absence of identifiable and accountable decision-
makers along with transparent and open decision-making processes. International governance 
regimes are permeated by the existence of intergovernmental networks and relations which may 
exclude the participation of citizens from the decision-making.175 However, international 
organisations hold that they are not obliged to guarantee any democratic requirements, because they 
are not elected by people and there is no collective transnational demos (in terms of supranational 
collective identity) to represent.176 
The above scenario does not reflect the changing system of global governance, inasmuch the 
exponential increase of civil society and business groups that seek to participate in the decision-
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making process. The model of participatory democracy requires an institutional and political 
framework that creates the conditions for a broader participation and consultation of civil society at 
the international level.177 Participation is at the heart of political practice. Participatory conditions 
constitute essential requisites of a deliberative decision-making process that includes stakeholders 
and promote public participation. To this end, the process of deliberation should consider the 
preferences and interests of civil society. 
Participatory democracy aims to strengthen the legitimacy of the entire global governance’s 
framework by opening up the decisional procedures and involving more experts and organisations in 
shaping and delivering policy. The main contribution of civil society is represented by the possibility 
to guarantee visibility to stakeholders. In particular, NGOs are the voice of invisible groups of 
individuals who are not able to directly participate in social and political initiatives.178 They can 
properly support stakeholders’ concerns and provide specific information, expertise, analysis and 
reports to decision-makers. The active role of NGOs would enrich the international community’s 
functioning and foster good governance. 
5.1.2 Ensuring transparent procedures 
NGO participation also represents a catalyst for enhancing the transparency of global governance. 
Transparency means openness of the policy and rule-making processes by means of clear procedures 
and accessible decisions.179 It implies control and public scrutiny to encourage the adequate 
accountability of decision-makers.180 Transparency constitutes a fundamental principle to apply for 
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the elaboration of international treaties, because the majority of society is not always aware of the 
most important issues debated in the global arena. Civil society has appropriate instruments to involve 
citizens in sensitive topics of discussion and interact critically with policy makers. The role of civil 
society mitigates the “democratic deficit” of global governance and brings human rights concerns 
into international law. 
The increasing request of a more transparent global governance also poses significant dilemmas 
concerning the importance to countervail competing legitimate interests, such as security, privacy 
and business secrets.181 In this respect, it is worth noting that transparency should be considered as a 
legal presumption, as opposed to a strict and immovable rule. Accordingly, transparency entails the 
duty to justify, on the basis of clear and definite legal exceptions, the failure to provide public 
meetings and accessible documents. This obligation should be placed on the institutions in order to 
ensure the proper fulfilment of the transparency requirement. 
The participation of civil society in the drafting process of the CRPD will now be examined. It will 
be shown that civil society has played a proactive role to improve the international protection of 
persons with disabilities and contributed to an open and transparent decision-making process. 
5.2 Mainstreaming disability in the international agenda 
International organisations for the rights of persons with disabilities have performed a fundamental 
task in order to mainstream disability into global agendas, frameworks and processes. Mainstreaming 
is the process of assessing the implications for persons with disabilities of any planned action, 
including legislation, policies or programmes, in any area and at all levels.182 It is part of a strategy 
for promoting disability rights in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies 
and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres. To this end, NGOs advance 
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influential proposals, criticisms and perspectives for building an effective framework for the 
protection of persons with disabilities. 
For instance, a crucial moment of the increasing activity of civil society was the World NGO Summit 
on Disability which took place in Beijing on the 12th of March 2001. During the summit, a resolution 
concerning the importance of introducing an international convention on the rights of all disabled 
people was adopted.183 The resolution emphasised that “the full inclusion of people with disabilities 
in society requires our solidarity in working towards an international convention that legally binds 
nations, to reinforce the moral authority of the United Nations Standard Rules on the Equalization of 
Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities.”184 At a later stage, the involvement of NGOs in the 
drafting process of the CRPD has contributed to feed into the policy discussion, in particular with 
regard to the renewed concepts of disability, accessibility and multi-discrimination. It may be said 
that civil society has concrete tools to bring the interests of society into an international institutional 
system that facilitates participatory democracy.185 
5.2.1 “Nothing about us without us”: a commitment to participatory democracy 
Article 4(3) of the CRPD lays down that “in the development and implementation of legislation and 
policies to implement the present Convention, and in other decision-making processes concerning 
issues relating to persons with disabilities, States Parties shall closely consult with and actively 
involve persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through their representative 
organizations”. This framework shows that civil society has been expressly recognised as a 
fundamental actor of the international community. 
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The CRPD enshrines the motto “nothing about us without us” that illustrates the importance to 
actively involve persons with disabilities in planning and implementing strategies and policies that 
affect their lives. The definition of policies requires the active involvement of persons with disabilities 
and their organisations, in particular the participation of non-governmental organisations in the 
negotiations of the Convention. This slogan has been used by the majority of organisations for 
disabled people around the world in order to promote the full participation and equalisation of 
opportunities for, by and with persons with disabilities. Persons with disabilities have fully 
participated in the process for mainstreaming disability in the international arena and developing a 
truly inclusive society in which all voices are heard. The elaboration and final adoption of the CRPD 
demonstrates how civil society can effectively contribute to shape and influence international law. 
5.2.2 The participation of persons with disabilities in the Ad Hoc Committee 
In more practical terms, one may refer to the work done by disability organisations which started their 
lobbying activities towards the Ad Hoc Committee before its first meeting in July 2002 in order to 
obtain access to sessions and meetings.186 The Ad Hoc Committee was in charge to take into account 
proposals and contributions for a disability rights treaty not only by States and relevant United 
Nations bodies, but also by observers, entities and agencies, regional commissions and 
intergovernmental organisations, as well as civil society including non-governmental organisations, 
national disability and human rights institutions and independent experts. 
The pressure exercised by disability organisations and advocates produced successful outcomes. To 
give an example, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution concerning the participation of 
persons with disabilities in the Ad Hoc Committee on a comprehensive and integral international 
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Convention on protection and promotion of the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities.187 
Interestingly, the General Assembly recommended the Secretary General to facilitate the access and 
participation by persons with disabilities in the meetings and deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee. 
To this end, the Assembly requested to organise the UN meetings in conference rooms well-equipped 
to facilitate the participation of persons with mobility-related and other physical disabilities. 
Moreover, it demanded the adoption, to the extent necessary and possible, of measures to enable 
persons with hearing disabilities to participate in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee. 
The General Assembly expressly introduced the conditions for a legitimate and active participation 
of non-governmental organisations in the discussion within the Ad Hoc Committee. The Assembly 
decided to allow the access to all non-governmental organisations enjoying consultative status with 
the Economic and Social Council.188 The UN body extended the possibility to participate also to those 
NGOs not accredited previously to the Ad Hoc Committee. The Assembly gave the opportunity to 
the majority of non-accredited organisations to apply to the Secretariat for obtaining such 
accreditation, through the submission of all the information on the competence of the organisation 
and the relevance of its activities to the work of the Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee established 
certain and clear modalities for the NGOs participation in the debate concerning the adoption of a 
comprehensive international instrument on the rights of persons with disabilities.189 In doing so, non-
governmental organisations had the opportunity to attend any public meeting and make statements. 
They were also allowed to receive copies of the official documents and make written or other 
presentations. 
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It may be argued that the drafting process within the Ad Hoc Committee represented a unique 
opportunity for civil society organisations to lobby and advocate for the rights of persons with 
disabilities. 
5.2.3 The Working Group on the Convention: mixing state delegates and stakeholders 
The New Zealand’s Ambassador Don McKay, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, emphasised that 
the process of negotiating the CRPD “truly enshrined the slogan of the international disability 
movement, “nothing about us without us”.190 The involvement of NGOs in the drafting process 
reached its peak after the second meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee convened in June 2003. Thus, 
during this meeting, it was formally decided to set up a Working Group with the goal to prepare a 
draft text for the convention, which would have provided the basis for future negotiations by Member 
States.191 Non-governmental stakeholders, such as the European Disability Forum, Disabled People’s 
International and Rehabilitation International gave a significant contribution to the Convention’s 
elaboration. 
The Working Group was composed of twelve NGOs, one representative from a human rights 
institution (South African Human Rights Commission) and 27 representatives of national 
governments.192 A fundamental role was performed by the Disabled Peoples International (DPI), a 
human rights organisation engaged in the protection of disabled people’s rights and the promotion of 
their full and equal participation in society. DPI had the ability to draw together the initiatives of 
several disability organisations in order to speak with a single voice during the negotiations. To this 
end, international disability organisations and NGOs decided to create the International Disability 
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Caucus (IDC) for the shared scope to comment and influence the provisions’ drafting. In doing so, 
DPI also favoured the participation of advocates from developing countries and arranged valuable 
workshop for enhancing the lobbying skills of the participants in the UN meetings.193 An overview 
of the main results obtained by civil society groups within the CRPD’s negotiations will now be 
presented.  
5.2.4 Civil society’s main achievements 
The participation of organisations of people with disabilities along with human rights institutions as 
full members of the Working Group ensured that the Convention effectively took into account 
disabled rights.194 It may be said that advocacy organisations successfully achieved a global 
recognition of disability as a human rights issue. 
For instance, NGOs and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) strongly advocated for the 
adoption of a definition of disability. To the same extent, they supported the adoption of a progressive 
social model rather than the traditional and restrictive medical approach of disability.195 By contrast, 
state delegations preferred to avoid the inclusion of a comprehensive definition of disability that 
would have been discordant with narrow national laws.196 The final adoption of fundamental 
guidelines reflecting the social model of disability symbolises a successful compromise obtained by 
virtue of the participation of non-governmental stakeholders in the drafting process. 
To give another example, all German Disability Council associations, the European Women’s Lobby 
and the International Disability Caucus promoted the acknowledgement of multi-discrimination 
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against women with disabilities in the CRPD’s framework.197 A twin-track approach based on both 
gender and disability grounds found the opposition of several State Parties, because of the existing 
protection guaranteed by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women.198 Nonetheless, disabilities organisations achieved the specific recognition of the 
vulnerability of women with disabilities within a separate and independent provision dealing 
exclusively with women’s issues (Article 6 CRPD). 
The unprecedented level of participation and lobbying activities of civil society groups brought about 
notable changes in the drafting of the Convention. The negotiations of the CRPD show an innovative 
and fascinating framework as regards the adoption of international legal instruments, because the 
participation of civil society has actively informed the process for making international human rights 
law. An overview of the specific involvement of NGOs in the national mechanisms for implementing 
the CRPD will be offered below. 
5.3 The civil society’s role in implementing the CRPD at national level 
The significant contribution of NGOs to the development of a new participatory governance at the 
international and national levels emerges also from the framework for monitoring the implementation 
of the CRPD. It indeed calls for the full participation of civil society, in particular persons with 
disabilities and their representative organisations in the monitoring process. In other words, civil 
society is called to exercise an effective influence on the implementation of the law and the 
application of disability rights in practice. To this end, the Convention points out a fundamental 
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institutional change in order to accelerate the concrete implementation of the rights of persons with 
disabilities.199 Article 33(2) of the CRPD sets forth that: 
“States Parties shall, in accordance with their legal and administrative systems, maintain, 
strengthen, designate or establish within the State Party, a framework, including one or 
more independent mechanisms, as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor 
implementation of the present Convention. When designating or establishing such a 
mechanism, States Parties shall take into account the principles relating to the status and 
functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights”. 
The idea to create independent mechanisms to promote, protect and monitor human rights in line with 
the Paris Principle is not completely new under international law.200 The first treaty introducing these 
independent mechanisms was the 2006 Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT), which lays down the obligation 
to set up national mechanisms for the prevention of torture at the domestic level.201 The establishment 
of independent national mechanisms represents a considerable opportunity to strengthen human rights 
protection. Indeed, international institutions cannot guarantee an appropriate level of respect for 
human rights without effective national systems that operate to achieve the same outcome. For this 
reason, the CRPD created a legal bridge between the international and national levels in order to 
facilitate structural changes and concretely improve the life of persons with disabilities. The 
Convention expressly refers to the Paris Principle for the creation of such mechanisms, as they 
constitute a set of international standards which frame the functioning of National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs). These guidelines were adopted during the 1993 World Conference on Human 
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Rights in Vienna and aim to guarantee the independent work of NHRIs for implementing human 
rights.202 
5.3.1 Institutionalising civil society 
NHRIs have important responsibilities such as the submission of opinions, recommendations, 
proposal and reports on any matters concerning the promotion and protection of human rights to the 
Government, Parliament and any other competent body.203 Moreover, they perform the main task to 
foster and ensure the harmonisation of national legislation, regulations and practices with the 
international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective 
implementation.204 NHRIs should also “publicize human rights and efforts to combat all forms of 
discrimination by increasing public awareness, especially through information and education and by 
making use of all press organs”.205 NHRIs are dynamic and pluralistic hubs which incorporate State 
and non-State actors in compliance with the Paris Principles.206 Interestingly, the involvement of 
civil society groups is expressly mentioned by the principles regarding the composition of such 
national mechanisms. According to the Paris Principles, the composition of national institutions and 
the appointment of its members “shall be established in accordance with a procedure which affords 
all necessary guarantees to ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian society) 
involved in the protection and promotion of human rights”. In particular, the NHRIs’ structure should 
include specific categories such as: “non-governmental organizations responsible for human rights 
and efforts to combat racial discrimination, trade unions, concerned social and professional 
organizations, for example, associations of lawyers, doctors, journalists and eminent scientists; trends 
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in philosophical or religious thought; universities and qualified experts; Parliament and Government 
departments”. 207 
This framework highlights the significant involvement of NGOs in the delicate process for 
reinforcing the rule of law and implementing human rights. National independent mechanisms can 
rely on the collaboration of NGOs that have awareness and expertise of issues concerning 
marginalised individuals. Article 33(2) of the CRPD represents fertile ground for the active inclusion 
of civil society in the complex challenge to bring rights home. At the European level, the direct 
participation of persons with disabilities emerges both from the composition of independent national 
institutions and their formal relationship with civil society. For instance, the British Equality and 
Human Rights Commission requires that at least one member of the 15 Commissioners is a person 
with disability.208 The Scottish Human Rights Commission ought to be composed by Commissioners 
with NGO or academic backgrounds.209 A broad representation of civil society can be found also in 
the composition of the Board of Trustees of the German Institute for Human Rights which 
encompasses human rights NGOs, media and academic exponents.210 Particularly, in accordance with 
Art. 33(2) of the Convention, the German Government have founded the National CRPD Monitoring 
Body at the German Institute for Human Rights in May of 2009. Italy also has established a national 
Observatory on the situation of persons with disabilities that includes several members of NGOs and 
civic associations.211 
In addition to the formal involvement of civil society representatives in the independent national 
bodies mentioned above, NGOs produce an influential impact in the monitoring process through 
positive actions and systematic engagements. A good practice is represented by the National CRPD 
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Monitoring Body in Germany which has the duty to assess the situation of persons with disabilities 
within the country on the base of regular meetings with disability advocacy organisations, inspections 
of care facilities and consultations with experts. To this end, it can release statements and 
recommendations in relation to political, administrative and judicial decisions.212 This framework 
shows that the Monitoring Body works closely with civil society organisations, in fact it hosts the 
Civil Society Consultations in Berlin three times each year. Consultations take place in inclusive and 
accessible environments and promote the open exchange of experiences between the National CRPD 
Monitoring Body and civil society disability advocacy organisations. Moreover, the Civil Society 
Consultations also focus on the importance to plan shared strategies for the implementation of rights 
of persons with disabilities. Currently, the organisations regularly invited to participate in these events 
are over 60.213 According to the rules of the German institute, consultations are theoretically open to 
all civic and non-governmental organisations that are interested in issues concerning the CRPD’s 
application, but only those organisations formally invited by the Monitoring Body have the right to 
participate. However, Germany assimilated the fundamental objectives of Article 33(2) through the 
creation of a national institution tailored to the participatory requirements emphasised by the CRPD. 
Undoubtedly, the cooperation with civil society is an essential element of the system outlined by the 
Convention in order to enrich the implementing process of the law. Indeed, the designation of 
independent and pluralistic mechanisms composed by NGOs and persons with disabilities fosters the 
implementation of the CRPD’s provisions. The Convention recognises those obstacles that prevent 
State Parties to guarantee the protection of all vulnerable individuals and provides a flexible 
framework which promotes partnership between State and non-State actors. It is submitted here that 
it is necessary to maintain a sort of continuity between the contribution of disability rights advocacy 
groups to the CRPD’s drafting and the following implementation process. In doing so, transformative 
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changes are more likely to occur by virtue of the permanent civil society’s participation throughout 
the entire policy chain. In the EU context, several countries are acting in compliance with the principle 
of participatory democracy embodied in the innovative treaty’s scenario. Different actors such as 
NHRIs, NGOs, human rights organisations and civic associations along with governments are fully 
involved at all levels for realising the ambitious goal of an inclusive society. Traditional legal tools, 
new bottom-up strategies and participatory conditions have to be combined to transpose international 
obligations into the national realm. 
5.3.2 Awareness-raising: a synergetic action between States Parties and NGOs 
Public campaigns and activities are also fundamental instruments to increase citizen’s awareness of 
transnational issues and improve social attitudes towards persons with disabilities.214 Public 
awareness and civic education can contribute to consolidate the legal framework for the protection of 
persons with disabilities. The concept of “awareness-raising” is expressly embodied in the CRPD and 
refers to the duty of States Parties to raise awareness throughout society, including at the family level, 
regarding persons with disabilities, and to foster respect for the rights and dignity of persons with 
disabilities.215 States Parties have the positive obligation to introduce effective measures for 
combating stereotypes, prejudices and harmful practices relating to persons with disabilities, 
including those based on sex and age. Moreover, they are called to promote awareness of the 
capabilities and contributions of persons with disabilities. 
Hence, the Convention recognises States Parties as duty-holders in the crucial process for awareness-
raising on disabilities rights into the society and indicates specific measures for pursuing this 
objective. The measures required by Article 8(2) of the CRPD seek to change the social attitude 
towards persons with disabilities. To this end, they promote the improvement of the education system, 
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the support of the media and the adoption of awareness-training programmes regarding persons with 
disabilities. Interestingly, the Convention provides the opportunity to implement human rights 
through “non-legislative methods” moving beyond the classical structures of previous international 
human rights treaties.216 
In this pioneering framework, civic awareness on disability rights considerably depends on the efforts 
of those NGOs that are key players in raising awareness on such issues throughout society. The lack 
of participation of civil society at international or national level would jeopardise achieving this 
crucial objective. Thereby, States Parties cannot underestimate the fundamental contribution of 
NGOs for carrying out social education activities and attracting the attention of the media. The 
Convention confers an unprecedented duty upon State Parties to raise awareness on disability issues 
and requires the vital involvement of representative organisations of persons with disabilities in order 
to effectively bring change at national level. The synergetic action of States Parties and NGOs 
constitutes an essential partnership to engage the public community in a dynamic dialogue on 
disability rights, cultural and social values. 
The next sub-section will investigate how participatory democracy has been applied in the EU 
framework. It will be demonstrated that the CRPD represents a positive benchmark to promote a 
structured participation of civil society groups in the decision-making process. 
5.4 Participatory democracy in the EU: from the White Paper to the Lisbon Treaty 
The striking involvement of NGOs in drafting, monitoring and implementing the UN CRPD raises 
challenging issues with regard to the role of civil society in the EU system. Indeed, the CRPD’s 
adoption encourages the development of good governance at the international level and highlights 
the beneficial outcomes of the civil society’s consultation. As mentioned above, Article 4(3) lays 
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down the crucial concept “nothing about us without us” in order to promote a permanent and 
productive consultation between governments and persons with disabilities. 
Increased participatory rights are not incompatible with the traditional model of representative 
democracy, but rather constitute a fundamental tool to legitimate democracy and reinforce the idea 
of European citizenship.217 European institutions have a long history of informal consultations with 
the voluntary sector. This form of cooperation was expressly acknowledged for the first time by 
Declaration 23 of the TEU, which stresses “the importance, in pursuing the objectives of Article 117 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community, of cooperation between the latter and charitable 
associations and foundations as institutions responsible for welfare establishments and services”. 
Civil society can therefore perform a complementary role in the decision-making process and ensures 
that policy makers at EU level systematically consider the perspectives and grassroots experiences of 
citizens to provide effective policies. In addition, voluntary associations can disseminate information 
from the European level down to the local level to increase citizens’ awareness and promote a 
common European identity. 
Against this background, the Commission proposed to avoid jeopardising creativity and free 
expression of civil society through over-bureaucratised or institutionalised procedures of 
consultation.218 To this end, it recommended the introduction of flexible but systematic relations 
between the voluntary sector and the European institutions without compromising the principle of 
subsidiarity and the specificities of each Member State. 
The necessity to update the EU political system has also been reaffirmed in the White Paper of the 
Commission on European Governance.219 Political leaders indeed admitted the existence of an 
                                                      
217 See L. Pech, La solution au 'déficit démocratique': une nouvelle gouvernance pour l’Union Européenne? (2003) 2 
Journal of European Integration 131. 
218 Communication of the Commission, “Promoting the role of voluntary organisations and foundations in Europe”, COM 
(97) 241 final, OJC95, 30.3.1998. 
219 Commission, European Governance —A White Paper, Com (2001) 428 final (2001/c 287/01). 
89 
 
increasing distrust towards EU institutions and the deep lack of confidence in a complex and 
undefinable system such as the European Union. As a result, the Commission put emphasis on the 
commitment to renew the EU political framework by means of a less top-down model and 
complementing its policies with non-legislative tools.220 The White Paper basically reflects those 
fundamental values underlying the idea of participatory democracy and outlines five principles of 
good governance: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. The concept 
of openness affects the functioning of the EU institutions which should operate in a more open 
manner. They should constantly release communications concerning their actions and decisions in an 
accessible and understandable language for the general public. Participation influences the quality of 
EU policies and implies the involvement of civil society in the entire “policy chain, from conception 
to implementation, on the base of an inclusive approach”.221 Accountability requires a clarification 
of roles in the legislative and executive procedures with the purpose to assess political and legal 
responsibilities of EU institutions. Effectiveness concerns the adequate impact of policies at the 
national level and the proportional implementation of law, which have to respond to clear and shared 
objectives. In the end, coherence is an essential element of future EU policies to solve urgent issues 
related to climate and demographic changes, diversity and European enlargement. For this purpose, 
the White Paper calls for a strong political leadership and institutional responsibility to advance a 
cohesive approach within the EU multi-layered system. These strategic commitments launched by 
the Commission are still decisive and impelling matters in the current EU agenda. 
Interestingly, the Treaty of Lisbon also emphasises the importance to strengthen the participation of 
civil society in the EU political debate. Thus, according to Article 15 of the TFEU: 
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• “In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, 
the Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as 
openly as possible. 
• The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when considering 
and voting on a draft legislative act. 
• Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents of the 
Union's institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to 
the principles and the conditions to be defined in accordance with this paragraph 
(….)” 
The TFEU tends to move towards a broader participatory democracy for citizens in European affairs 
and recognises that political institutions have to build democratic connections with people to launch 
more effective and relevant policies.222 However, despite these efforts, the EU continues to denote 
significant democratic shortcomings,223 in particular with regard to the lack of procedural or “input 
legitimacy”,224 which requires the inclusion of those who are affected by a regulation in the decisional 
procedure.225 
The concept of participatory democracy entails a decision-making process which involves all 
stakeholders and is based on “the action of interest groups and citizens initiatives”.226 It is 
distinguished from the idea of representative democracy that relies on a peculiar form of legitimacy 
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by input in accordance with citizens are represented at Union level by voting at European and national 
elections.227 
5.4.1 The inclusive process of the EUCFR’s adoption: the “Convention” method 
Participatory democracy has not been fully realised in the European Union system, but significant 
developments are underway. For instance, the Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) was adopted 
on the basis of an unusually transparent and inclusive process.228 During the drafting of the Charter 
there was a wide and plural participation of different actors such as jurists, human rights experts of 
the EU legal order, NGOs and civic associations. The Charter’s elaboration has seen the coexistence 
of legal technicians and political advocacy groups. According to Olivier De Schutter, the total 
openness of the decisional procedure encourages the legitimacy of the process, but it requires a 
“structured” participation of civil society.229 
The scholar underlined the side effects provoked by an open and broad participation without definite 
rules and guidelines. During the Charter’s drafting, this openness shifted the power from its 62 
members to the Secretariat of the Convention engaged with the evaluation of several amendments 
presented to reshape the final document. Moreover, the collective decision on the Charter brought 
about a fragmentation of responsibilities, because none of the actors claimed the paternity of the 
deliberation. The lack of certain rules concerning the requirements to participate in the drafting 
process downgraded the right “to be consulted” to a simple right to “freedom of expression”. In light 
of these deficiencies, Olivier De Schutter suggested to open up intergovernmental conferences to 
those organisations that represent common concerns at the EU level by adopting formal procedures 
to select those interest groups that can effectively inform the deliberative process. 
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In the first place, civil society organisations have to represent interests of European society and be 
permanently based in the European Union. The criteria of “representativeness” must be the first 
requirement to assess in order to allow these organisations to take part in the decision-making process. 
The Economic and Social Committee also states that “the assessment of the degree of 
representativeness of NGOs must under no circumstances be based solely on quantitative criteria, it 
must also involve qualitative criteria”. 230 The Committee holds that representativeness of civic 
organisations should be measured not only in relation to the amount of members whom they represent, 
but the “judgement must take account of the ability of such bodies to put forward constructive 
proposal and to bring specialist knowledge to the process of democratic opinion-forming and 
decision-making”.231 Therefore, NGOs have to guarantee an adequate level of expertise to flesh out 
the political arena and establish a real dialogue with the EU institutions. In this framework, civil 
organisations would not merely have the right to be heard, but they would be entitled to receive 
feedback concerning the impact of their proposals on the decision-making process. 
The “Convention method” has also been applied during the elaboration of the EU Constitutional 
Treaty, which attracted the attention of civil society’s organisations and participatory democracy 
advocates.232 However, the drafting of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights still symbolises 
the most relevant experiment in good governance at the EU level, but at the same time it reveals 
shortcomings and weaknesses of an incomplete model of participatory democracy. The concept of 
participatory governance is a crucial point of reference for the European Union’s future and requires 
an output-oriented paradigm of citizen involvement. This governance approach intended “as a process 
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and a state whereby public and private actors engage in the international regulation of societal 
relationships and conflicts”233 is a necessary condition for the development of the EU system. 
5.4.2 How to improve EU participatory democracy? The good practice of the CRPD 
The CRPD’s adoption constitutes a good exercise of participatory democracy, which offers some 
guidelines to structure the participation of civil society in the political arena. A focal point regards 
the accreditation and participation of non-governmental organisations in the decision-making 
process. 
The drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has been characterised by a total and “random” 
openness. This means that the participation of NGOs in the decision-making process has not been 
informed by clear guidelines to assess the “representativeness” of the civil society groups. By 
contrast, the involvement of NGOs in the Ad Hoc Committee’s work has been regulated by precise 
and formal rules. As mentioned in Paragraph 4, the accreditation of NGOs has been granted to all 
non-governmental organisations enjoying consultative status with the Economic and Social 
Council.234 In addition, the participation has also been broadened to those NGOs that could 
demonstrate they carry out relevant activities in respect to the work of the Committee. The application 
to be accredited to the Ad Hoc Committee was also based on clear requirements and accurate 
conditions. The NGOs had to submit an application package containing specific information such as 
“the purpose of the organization, the programs and activities of the organisations in areas relevant to 
the Ad Hoc Committee, confirmation of the activities of the organization at the national, regional or 
international level, copies of the annual or other reports of the organization with financial statements, 
a description of the membership of the organizations and a copy of the constitution and by-laws of 
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the organization”.235 In this way, the participation of civil society groups in the decision-making 
process has been well structured and formalised. However, it may be argued that the establishment 
of precise rules concerning the participation of civil society is easier when the treaty being drafted 
focuses on a very specific issue (disability rights) rather than a whole set of human rights. This 
statement may be debunked by underling the legal complexity of an international human rights treaty 
such as the CRPD. It indeed addresses several aspects of human rights law as accessibility, gender 
equality, legal capacity, health and development, work, education, situations of risks and 
humanitarian emergencies. The involvement of NGOs with different backgrounds and objectives has 
contributed to improve the quality of the protection ensured by the CRPD. 
Those NGOs involved in the CRPD’s elaboration properly represented the main civil society’s 
interests and met the qualitative criteria established by the Economic and Social Committee. The lack 
of appropriate “representativeness” that reduced the quality of the democratic participation in the 
Charter’s drafting has been successfully overcome in the UN Convention’s framework. The model 
of participatory democracy embodied in the CRPD may offer important solutions in respect to the 
problem of “representativeness” which undermines the functioning of global and EU governance. 
Civil society groups may indeed not reflect all the interests for which it purports to act and increase 
inequalities related to class, gender, nationality, race and religion in case it depicts a disproportional 
representation of society.236 To avoid “fake” inclusiveness, the involvement of civil organisations in 
deliberative procedures should be based on a strict control of their representative capacity. This 
assessment should be mainly focused on qualitative criteria, such as the capacity of the NGOs to 
represent common interests and carry out effective advocacy activities. In the CRPD’s context, 
necessary prerequisites have been clarified ex-ante in order to prove the high quality of the NGOs’ 
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activities for promoting disabilities rights at the international level and obtain the accreditation to the 
Ad hoc Committee. A structured participation also contributes to consolidate the NGOs’ efforts that 
would “receive appropriate feedback on how their contributions and opinions have affected the 
eventual policy decision, thereby making the relationship a real dialogue”.237 To conclude, the 
imposition of certain requirements for authorising the participation of civic organisations in the 
institutional system constitutes an essential condition to enhance the effectiveness of the civil 
dialogue. Such a structuration would not hamper the autonomy of civil organisations; on the contrary 
it promotes the participation of “representative” groups that can advance constructive proposals and 
bring relevant expertise to the decision-making process. 
In light of these observations, civil dialogue stands out for its beneficial effects in the political and 
legal background of the CRPD. Participatory rights are actively emerging both from the new 
international human rights instruments and the increasing demand of good governance at the EU 
level. The institutional architecture of the European Union now opens the doors to civil society. 
Article 15 TFEU is a key provision to further enhance “input legitimacy”. In particular, the European 
Union should learn the lesson from the CRPD’s framework and promote a structured participation of 
civil society in the decision-making process. The legal challenges stemming from the EU’s 
ratification of the CRPD are an unmissable opportunity to start a new participatory democratic course 
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THE EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
1. An overview of the prohibition of discrimination under EU law 
The concepts of equality and non-discrimination are deeply rooted in the EU legal framework. Article 
2 of TEU for instance establishes that: 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values 
are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”. 
Moreover, Article 3(3) TEU points out that the Union “shall combat social exclusion and 
discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, 
solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child”. 
Currently, the Treaty of Lisbon has helped consolidate the principles of equality and non-
discrimination as fundamental values of the Union by imposing a mainstreaming duty to prohibit 
discrimination on EU institutions. Article 10 TFEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, lays down 
that “in defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation”. Actions to address discrimination require the consent procedure in accordance with the 
consent of the European Parliament is needed in order to adopt a Directive. Indeed, Article 19 of the 
TFEU sets out that: 
“Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by 
them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure 
and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation”.  
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According to the latter provisions, EU secondary law has to promote equality and ensure the 
protection against discrimination in the EU legal context. The importance of the prohibition of 
discrimination has also been confirmed by the CJEU in the famous case of Mangold v Helm,238 where 
the Court declared non-discrimination on grounds of age to be a general principle of Community 
law.239 
1.1 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The right to equality and non-discrimination also plays a significant role in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, which has acquired a legally binding status after the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon.240 The Charter now binds both the EU institutions and Member States when 
they act within the scope of EU law 241 Article 21 of the Charter states that: 
1. “Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.” 
2. “Within the scope of application of the Treaty establishing the European Community and of the Treaty 
on European Union, and without prejudice to the special provisions of those Treaties, any discrimination 
on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.” 
The Charter provides a wider list of possible grounds of discriminations in comparison with the 
European Treaties as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, but at the same time it does not introduce any 
new rights in the area of EU anti-discrimination law. The Charter only “addresses discriminations by 
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the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the 
Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law”.242 The Charter 
however represents an essential instrument for the interpretation of provisions of EU law, which 
contributes to improve the protection of fundamental human rights within the European Union. 
Article 47 of the EU Charter sets out the right to an effective remedy to everyone whose rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union might have been violated by executive power. 
As a result, the CJEU has been placed at the heart of the new EU architecture on fundamental rights 
and symbolises the key guarantor of the Charter.243 The Court’s legal reasoning has often made 
reference to the Charter’s content since it became a legally binding instrument of EU law.244 The 
positive impact of the Charter on the EU case law is particularly evident in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice.245 The Charter’s norms strongly influenced the CJEU’s interpretation in the field 
of asylum law and with regard to the rights of the child.246 According to the Commission’s report, the 
European Union Courts have increasingly referred to the Charter in their judgements.247 The number 
of decisions quoting the Charter developed from 43 in 2011 to 87 in 2012. In 2013, this number 
amounted to 113 and exponentially increased to 210 cases in 2014, while in 2015 it settled at 167.248 
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1.2 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Ultimately, it is worth noting that disability is not expressly included in the list of prohibited grounds 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Article 
14 of ECHR merely states that “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms (…) shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”. 
Despite that, the Court of Strasbourg, in the case of Glor v. Switzerland, reiterated that Article 14 
contains a non-exhaustive list of prohibited grounds, which also includes discrimination based on 
disability.249 
Interestingly, the accession of the EU to the Convention became a legal obligation under the Treaty 
of Lisbon. Article 6(2) of the TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty, provides that the European 
Union “shall accede” to the Convention. The EU’s accession to the ECHR would bring about a 
comprehensive and coherent legal framework for protecting human rights across the continent. EU 
law would be subject to external control to ensure the observance of the rights and freedoms of the 
ECHR. However, the accession to the Convention may create several issues in relation to the 
autonomy of the EU’s legal order, the EU competences and the CJEU’s position as the ultimate 
guardian of EU law.250 In April 2013, following almost three years of technical discussions, a revised 
draft agreement was finalised from the 47 Council of Europe countries and the Commission to 
regulate the EU accession to the ECHR.251 In July 2013, the European Commission asked the CJEU 
for an opinion concerning the compatibility of the draft agreement with the EU Treaties. The Court 
concluded that the draft agreement is not compatible with EU law and provided a checklist of 
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amendments to ensure its compatibility with the EU Treaties.252 This context shows that the EU 
accession under the current draft agreement has become highly complicated. It is hoped therefore that 
ECHR and EU authorities will find durable solutions to harmonise the judicial work of the ECtHR 
and the CJEU enhancing the protection of fundamental fights in the Union system. 
Following this brief overview of the new human rights framework in the EU following the Lisbon 
Treaty, it is worth repeating that the principles of equality and non-discrimination are seen as central 
goals in the EU system for the protection of human rights. The EU’s political and legal approach 
towards disability rights will be briefly discussed below. 
2. Disability rights in the European Union 
Disability policy has always been regarded as part of the European social agenda.253 EU social policy 
was consolidated by the introduction of the Treaty of Amsterdam on May 1, 1999. A remarkable 
aspect of the Treaty establishing the European Community, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
was the adoption of a new anti-discrimination provision.254 According to Article 13 of the EC Treaty: 
“without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty, and within the limits of the powers conferred by 
it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, and after 
consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, 
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” 
The inclusion of this article brought about a ground-breaking change at EU level, to the extent that it 
laid down the competence of the Community to launch legal measures to counteract discriminations 
on grounds of disability for the first time.255 European disability policy has since been characterised 
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by a rights-based approach which enshrines civil and social rights.256 The key idea of this approach 
is that societal factors operate to exclude persons with persons with disabilities from full participating 
in society. As a consequence, such disabling barriers should be tackled by laws and policies to 
guarantee equal opportunity to persons with disabilities.257 
In more practical terms, this led the Commission to enact a Community action programme (HELIOS 
I) to promote vocational training and rehabilitation, economic integration, social integration and an 
independent way of life for disabled people.258 It also adopted a second programme to improve social 
integration and employment for persons with disabilities259. Moreover, a third disability programme 
(HELIOS II) was introduced to foster equal opportunities for and the integration of disabled people. 
This programme stressed the importance of the political mobilisation of persons with disabilities and 
established therefore the European Disability Forum (EDF).260 Lastly, the 1993 Social Policy Green 
Paper introduced the fundamental concept of “mainstreaming” intended as “acceptance of people as 
full members of society, with opportunities for integrated education, training and employment, and 
to lead their lives independently”.261 This new approach aimed to accelerate the integration of persons 
with disabilities in ordinary schools and their effective inclusion in the open labour market. In line 
with these important changes, at the end of November 2000, the Council of Ministers adopted an 
“anti-discrimination package” comprising two fundamental legal instruments: the Race Directive262 
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and the Framework Equality Directive.263 The next section will focus on the provisions introduced 
by the Framework Equality Directive and the legal protection it afforded to persons with disabilities. 
3. The EU anti-discrimination framework: Directive 2000/78/EC 
The Framework Equality Directive (2000/78/EC, henceforth the Directive) lays down a general 
framework for combating discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation as regards employment and occupation. The material scope of the Directive is confined 
to the area of employment and occupation.264 By contrast, the Racial Equality Directive also covers 
access to and supply of goods and services, housing, education, transport, healthcare, social security 
and social assistance.265 
The objective of the Directive is to ensure that persons with disabilities do not suffer discrimination 
and instead enjoy equal treatment in the workplace. To this end, Article 2 of the Directive establishes 
that “the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination 
whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1”. The Directive also considers harassment 
(Art. 2.3) and instruction to discriminate (Art. 2.4) as different forms of prohibited discrimination. A 
general overview of the legal categories introduced by the Directive will be offered below with a 
focus on those decisions of national courts applying the prohibition of discrimination. 
3.1 Exploring the meaning of direct discrimination 
According to Article 2(2) (a) of the Directive, direct discrimination on grounds of disability occurs 
“where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a 
comparable situation”. The assessment of the less favourable treatment should be based on a 
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comparative exercise. To this end, the comparator must not have the same characteristic as the 
claimant and must enjoy a better treatment.266 However, in the situation where it is not possible to 
identify the comparator, the Directive allows a comparison with a previous or hypothetical 
comparator by referring to another person who “has been” or “would be” treated more favourably.267 
3.1.1 The previous or hypothetical comparator 
The case of Aylott v Stockton on Tees Borough Council illustrates the concrete application of this 
particular comparative approach.268 The claimant suffered from bipolar disorder and he submitted 
several complaints against colleagues, including for bullying, before going on paid leave. After 
returning to work, his performance was strictly monitored. Once again, he fell ill and was accused by 
his manager to be unprofessional, intimidating and displaying inappropriate behaviours towards other 
colleagues. The employer suspended him and after several months of absence due to his sickness, he 
was ultimately dismissed on the grounds of capability. 
The Employment Tribunal (ET) found that this treatment amounted to direct discrimination on 
grounds of disability. In absence of an actual comparator, the ET held that the appropriate comparator 
was an individual who had been off for a similar number of days without having the same disability 
as the claimant. The ET finally considered that the comparator who had a similar sickness record in 
respect of, for example, a complicated broken bone or other surgical problem, would not have been 
subjected to the same treatment. 
This judgement reflects the approach of the Directive that aims to enlarge the protection of persons 
with disabilities and allows a comparison also with a hypothetical comparator. The Employment 
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Appeal Tribunal (EAT) however rejected the first decision of the ET and confirmed a restrictive test 
for disability-related discrimination. The EAT established that “for a meaningful comparison to be 
made, the hypothetical comparator should have all the attributes or features which materially affected 
the employer’s decision to carry out the act which is said to be discriminatory.” 269 This decision of 
the EAT required the hypothetical comparator to have all the relevant attributes or features of the 
complainant and therefore reduced the guarantees in favour of persons with disabilities, who have to 
demonstrate the existence of a “clone”.270 By contrast, the Framework Directive seems to permit the 
comparison with an individual who receives a better treatment in a similar situation without sharing 
the same characteristic of the claimant. 
3.1.2 Identifying the suitable comparator 
The Directive does not merely allow the possibility to compare a disabled person with a non-disabled 
individual, but it offers the additional opportunity to draw a comparator by referring to a person with 
different disabilities. Indeed, the term “another” used by the Directive constitutes an open clause for 
identifying the comparator.271 The Directive’s approach aims to overcome the legal shortcomings of 
those national legislations that only take into account comparisons between a person who has a 
disability and another who has not. 
The case of Granovsky v. Canada may be used to illustrate how to identify the proper comparator in 
order to prove a discriminatory treatment.272 The claimant challenged the constitutional validity of 
the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) that guarantees income benefits in the case of retirement, disability, 
or death.273 The CPP provides disability benefits to persons who are permanently disabled and have 
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paid sufficient earnings contributions. Mr. Granovsky injured his back at work and was assessed by 
workers' compensation as "temporarily totally disabled”. Thirteen years later, after various jobs, he 
applied for a permanent disability pension under the Canada Pension. His application was rejected 
because he missed to make the required CPP payment during the relevant ten-year period prior to the 
application.274 Mr. Granovsky did not fall under the protection of the "drop-out" provision, according 
to which periods of permanent disability causing absence from employment are not counted in the 
contribution calculation. In this context, Mr. Granovsky claimed the violation of the right to equality. 
Interestingly, the claimant argued that the appropriate comparator was not a permanently disabled 
individual, but a non-disabled worker who is able to pay the contributions in compliance with the 
CPP. 
The Court held that the claimant wrongly identified the comparator, because non-disabled employees 
are not disabled and, thus, have no need “to resort to the drop-out provision”.275 As a consequence, 
in this case, the Court considered permanently disabled persons as the appropriate comparator group. 
The Canadian Court admitted the possibility to evaluate a comparison with individuals with different 
disabilities. This judgement is highly interesting as it shows the importance of selecting a comparator 
that is relevant for the legal analysis. Although the present case does not fall within the EU legal 
framework, it exemplifies a concrete application of the provision that prohibits “direct 
discrimination” under the Framework Directive. Article 2(2)(a) gives the opportunity to draw a 
comparator by referring to a person with different disabilities. This case may help to understand the 
purpose of the Directive and its possible implications with regard to EU case law. 
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3.2 Introducing the concept of indirect discrimination 
Article 2(2)(b) of the Framework Directive lays down a comprehensive definition of indirect 
discrimination according to which: 
“Indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice 
would put persons having a particular religion or belief, a particular disability, a particular age, or a 
particular sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons unless: 
1. that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary, or 
2. as regards persons with a particular disability, the employer or any person or organisation to whom 
this Directive applies, is obliged, under national legislation, to take appropriate measures in line with 
the principles contained in Article 5 in order to eliminate disadvantages entailed by such provision, 
criterion or practice.”276 
This prohibition constitutes a fundamental tool for achieving substantive equality and reinforcing the 
protection of vulnerable groups of individuals. In the case of S. Coleman v Attridge Law, the General 
Advocate of the CJEU stated that indirect discrimination should be intended as an inclusionary 
mechanism “by obliging employers to take into account and accommodate the needs of individuals 
with certain characteristics”.277 Indirect discrimination may indeed occur where an employer’s neutral 
policy or practice puts an employee in a disadvantaged position in comparison with other 
employees.278 For instance, a job recruitment process that requires presentation skills may indirectly 
discriminate an applicant who suffers from stammer, in particular where the presentation skills are 
not relevant to the job. This neutral practice is likely to be regarded as “indirect discrimination” in 
accordance with EU law. The Directive places great emphasis on this prohibition as it represents a 
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significant percentage of disability discrimination and considerably enlarges the protection for 
persons with disabilities. 279 
In section 4.2 infra, the case of Ring and Skouboe-Werge will be analysed to illustrate the CJEU’s 
understanding of indirect discrimination under Directive 2000/78/EC. 
3.3 Reasonable accommodation: the paramount obligation 
The main duty imposed upon employers by the Directive regards the introduction of necessary 
adaptations to the workplace in order to accommodate the special needs of persons with disabilities. 
Article 5 of the Directive lays down that: 
̏“In order to guarantee compliance with the principle of equal treatment in relation to persons with 
disabilities, reasonable accommodation shall be provided. This means that employers shall take appropriate 
measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person with a disability to have access to, 
participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would impose a 
disproportionate burden on the employer. This burden shall not be disproportionate when it is sufficiently 
remedied by measures existing within the framework of the disability policy of the Member State 
concerned.” 
The obligation to provide reasonable accommodation is the cornerstone of the Directive because it 
seeks to enable persons with disabilities to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment. 
The assessment of the proper accommodation must be based on a specific analysis of the individual 
situation and the employment at issue.280 However, the Directive determines the appropriate measures 
to adapt the workplace to the disability, such as the adaptation of premises and equipment, patters of 
working time, the distribution of tasks or the provision of training or integration resources.281 The 
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reasonable accommodation must not impose an excessive inconvenience or cost on the employer. 
Recital 21 of the Preamble sets out the “disproportionate burden” limit that should take into account 
the financial cost of the measures entailed the scale and financial resources of the organisation and 
the possibility of obtaining public funding. 
It may be said that the EU provision reflects the content of Article 2 CRPD, which defines the 
meaning of reasonable accommodation.282 Hence, the duty to guarantee reasonable accommodations 
requires positive obligations to remove environmental barriers and a concrete application of the 
principle of substantive equality.283 
A brief overview of the main legal concepts under the Directive 2000/78 has been offered above. The 
next section seeks to assess the impact of the CRPD on EU equality law through an analysis of the 
CJEU’s case law. 
4. Filling in the gap: the evolving concept of disability 
In order to apply the legal guarantees enshrined in the EU Framework Directive, the first fundamental 
step is to identify the conditions for a person to be classed as having disabilities. The Directive does 
not provide for a definition of disability or general guidelines on the personal scope of the 
legislation.284 Therefore, national courts have faced serious obstacles in regard to the interpretation 
of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability in the absence of any assistance from the 
Court of Justice. This is why the debate surrounding the legal category of disability quickly became 
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a crucial issue for the European Court of Justice to address.285 This section will focus on the analysis 
of the main judgements of the CJEU concerning the application of the Framework Directive in order 
to examine to what extent relevant EU provisions are concretely implemented. It will aim to clarify 
the concept of disability and examine how the CJEU is dealing with the interpretation of the CRPD. 
4.1 The EU approach to disability 
The first important case referred to the CJEU with the purpose of clarifying the provision of the 
Directive that prohibits disability discrimination was Chacón Navas v. Eurest Colectividades SA.286 
In this case, the national court asked whether a worker who had been dismissed solely because of her 
sickness could fall under the protection of the Directive. In addition, the national court referred 
another question in relation to the possibility of adding “sickness” to the list of protected grounds 
covered by the Directive. 
The preliminary ruling before the CJEU originated from national proceedings between Ms Chacón 
Navas and Eurest Colectividades SA ('Eurest') concerning her dismissal whilst she was on leave of 
absence from her employment on grounds of sickness. Sonia Chacón Navas was employed by Eurest, 
a company specialising in catering, and she was certified as unable to work on grounds of sickness. 
She was considered by the Public Health Service to not be in a position to return to work in the short 
term. The applicant was forced to stay at home for eight months due to her illness after which, on the 
28th of May 2004, she received written notice of her dismissal. However, the notification letter did 
not lay down any specific reasons for the dismissal, whilst acknowledging that it was unlawful and 
offering her compensation. In the action before the Spanish court, Navas sought a declaratory 
judgement that her dismissal was void on the grounds of the unequal treatment and discrimination to 
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which she had been subject. As a consequence, she sought reinstatement to the position in which she 
was. 
The national court acknowledged that she was fired merely on account of her sickness. At the same 
time, it found that Spanish law did not recognise illness as protected grounds along with age, 
disability, gender, or race to void a dismissal.287 The referring court observed that, according to 
Spanish case law, there are precedents to the effect that this type of dismissal is classified as unlawful 
rather than void, because “illness” and “disability” are separated concepts.288 It is worth noting that 
under Spanish law, dismissals are regarded as void in cases where they occur in violation of the 
employee's fundamental rights, such as the right to not be discriminated against on those grounds 
prohibited by the Constitution or by law.289 Accordingly, the employee would obtain the right to be 
reinstated into his previous position. By contrast, dismissals are unlawful when they breach statutory 
requirements and the employer only has the obligation to compensate the former employee.290 The 
Spanish court recognised the necessity to protect the worker in a timely manner under the prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of disability, because sickness is often capable of causing an irreversible 
disability.291 It correctly argued that “the protection intended by the legislature would, in large 
measure, be nullified, because it would thus be possible to implement uncontrolled discriminatory 
practices”. 292 In light of this complex background, the Madrid court decided to refer two questions 
to the CJEU in order to get out of the impasse and in doing so, displayed a degree of sympathy for 
Ms Chacón Navas’ situation.293 
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4.1.1 A first controversial approach of the CJEU 
The Court of Justice pronounced an influential judgement on the definition of disability under 
Directive 2000/78/EC. According to the Court, “the concept of 'disability' must be understood as 
referring to a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological 
impairments and which hinders the participation of the person concerned in professional life”.294 In 
order for the limitation to fall under the category of disability, “it must therefore be probable that it 
will last for a long time”.295 Thus, the Court set out a distinction between temporary sickness and 
long-term disability. 
The definition elaborated by the EU judges is quite controversial, as it is based on an obsolete and 
charitable model of disability. The ruling placed strong emphasis on the personal impairments, which 
would hinder the full participation of persons with disability in professional life rather than 
discriminatory treatment. This approach moves away from the socio-political model that stresses the 
need to remove environmental barriers and encourages the inclusion of persons with disabilities 
within the society.296 The definition adopted by the CJEU did not take into account the guidance of 
major EU institutions, which all have highlighted the importance of eliminating the social barriers 
that persons with disabilities face.297 For instance, the Council affirmed its commitment to equal 
opportunities for people with disabilities and to the principle of avoiding or abolishing all forms of 
negative discrimination based solely on disability.298 The Commission also emphasised that: 
“Historically, the response to disability has been mainly one of social compensation through charity and 
the development of specialist caring services outside the mainstream of society. However necessary and 
well intentioned they might be, such responses have compounded the problem of exclusion and under-
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participation. The traditional approaches are slowly giving way to a stronger emphasis on identifying and 
removing the various barriers to equal opportunities and full participation in all aspects of life”. 299 
The CJEU failed to comply with the new commitments and guidelines of the EU institutions which 
require to accommodate the legitimate demands for equal rights of persons with disabilities who are 
not anymore passive recipients of compensation.300 This decision may be due to poor legal research 
carried out by the CJEU which did not take into account the new disability strategy embraced by the 
EU. 
Secondly, the Court held that workers are not protected by the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of disability as soon as they develop any type of sickness. The CJEU overlooked the 
possibility that sickness is often the main cause of an irreversible disability and that workers must be 
protected in a timely manner under the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability. The 
judges refused the arguments of the Advocate General who proposed to regard those persons who 
suffer from long-term or permanent diseases as disabled.301 This decision seems highly vague. It did 
not distinguish between illnesses that have long-lasting effects and conditions that are not durable.302 
For instance, the UK Equality Act 2010 states that, for the purpose of deciding whether a person is 
disabled, a long-term effect of the impairment is one which has lasted at least 12 months.303 It is worth 
noting that sickness was not regarded by analogy as additional grounds to those in relation to which 
Directive 2000/78 prohibits discrimination. By doing so, the Court confirmed a closed list of 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. However, the CJEU recently identified the legal circumstances 
under which a worker, who is temporarily unable to work, may be considered to have a disability. In 
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the case of Daouidi, the CJEU overcame the main gaps of Chacon Navas and positively provided 
specific guidelines to determine the extent to which a long-term limitation amounts to disability.304  
Lastly, the CJEU gave an interesting interpretation of Article 5 of the Directive, which sets out the 
duty to provide ‘reasonable accommodation for disabled persons’. In line with the above provision, 
the Court held that “dismissal on grounds of disability is not justified by the fact that the person 
concerned is not competent, capable and available to perform the essential functions of his post”.305 
This interpretation is very significant, because it reinforces the obligation of the employer to take 
appropriate measures in order to enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or 
advance in employment. Hence, this obligation implies that employers cannot dismiss workers where 
they could perform their duties if a reasonable accommodation is provided. 
4.1.2 Chacón Navas: a missed opportunity 
The case of Chacón Navas represents the first decision of the CJEU dealing with the definition of 
disability under the Framework Directive. The Court was called upon to define the personal scope of 
the Directive and interpret the disability provisions concerning reasonable accommodation. The 
Court’s approach raises several issues as it highlights a controversial “medical model” of disability 
in conflict with the developments occurred at EU and international level. It focuses on the individual’s 
impairments, and not on the failure of society to take into account such limitations. However, the 
main shortcoming of the judgement is that sickness itself is not enough to trigger the protection under 
the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability. The Court did not consider the possibility 
to include those illnesses which are characterised by long-term or permanent limitation within the 
Directive’s scope. By contrast, the CJEU was correct in interpreting the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation in compliance with the Directive and therefore in precluding dismissals on grounds 
of disability. In light of the above, one may argue that the Court established a narrow definition of 
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disability and missed the opportunity to enhance the legal protection of the Directive. The main 
positive consequences one may derive from the Court’s interpretation of the concept of disability will 
now be offered. 
4.2 An intriguing evolution: the case of “Ring and Skouboe Werge” 
The ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities by the EU has 
positively influenced the judicial application and interpretation of EU equality law.306 In the case of 
Ring and Skouboe Werge, the Court of Justice adopted a revolutionary judgement according to which: 
“the concept of disability must be interpreted as including a condition caused by an illness medically 
diagnosed as curable or incurable where that illness entails a limitation which results in particular from 
physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the 
full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other 
workers, and the limitation is a long-term one”. 307 
The understanding symbolises a turning point in EU anti-discrimination law, because it expressly 
embraces the innovative contents of the CRPD and extends the concept of disability. Moreover, the 
CJEU stressed that the “primacy of international agreements concluded by the European Union over 
instruments of secondary law means that those instruments must as far as possible be interpreted in a 
manner that is consistent with those agreements”.308 In doing so, the Court rightly acknowledged the 
EU’s commitment to adopt and implement a cohesive policy in line with the international provisions 
of the CRPD. 
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4.2.1 Facts and questions 
This preliminary ruling case took place after an action was brought by two applicants, Ms Ring and 
Ms Werge, before Danish Court. The issue regarded a national law permitting the dismissal of 
employees with only one month’s notice in cases where they had been on sick leave for a period of 
120 days over a 12-month period (Paragraph 5(2) of the Law on the legal relationship between 
employers and salaried employees, hereafter ‘FL’).309 The applicants claimed that they had a 
disability and they had been subject to unlawful discriminatory treatments. Ms Ring was employed 
by DAB and was absent from work on several occasions from 6 June 2005 to 24 November 2005. 
The medical certificates stated that she was suffering from constant lumbar pain, but it did not predict 
the return date to full-time employment.310 On 24 November 2005, she received a dismissal letter. 
Similarly, Ms Skouboe Werge, an employee of Pro Display, was the victim of a road accident on 19 
December 2003 and started to suffer from whiplash injuries. From that moment, she went first on 
part-time sick leave for four weeks and then on full-time sick leave. The Danish National Office for 
Accidents at Work and Occupational Diseases quantified Ms Skouboe Werge’s degree of invalidity 
at 10% and her loss of working capacity at 65%. She was also dismissed with only one month’s 
notice. 
The trade union HK, acting on behalf of the two applicants, brought proceedings against their 
employers in the Maritime and Commercial Court (Sø‑og Handelsret), seeking compensation on the 
basis of the Anti-Discrimination Law. HK claimed that both employees were suffering from a 
disability and that their employers had the duty to offer them reduced working hours, by virtue of the 
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obligation to provide accommodation pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 2000/78.311 HK also argued 
that Paragraph 5(2) of the FL could not apply to those two applicants, because their absences were 
caused by their disability. The employers however submitted that the applicant’s state of health was 
not covered by the concept of ‘disability’ within the definition of Directive 2000/78, because the 
illness affected only their full-time working capacity. According to this stance, the applicants could 
not fall within the definition of disability elaborated during the Chacón Navas case, because they 
were able to work part-time and consequently they were not completely excluded from professional 
life.312 In addition, the employers held that, in cases of absence on grounds of illness caused by a 
disability, the dismissal of a worker with a disability pursuant to Paragraph 5(2) of the FL does not 
constitute discrimination, and is therefore not contrary to the Framework Directive. 
Against this controversial backdrop, the Danish Court referred several questions to the CJEU in order 
to obtain a clarification of the concept of disability. The national court also asked whether a reduction 
in working hours can amount to a measure covered by Article 5 of Directive 2000/78. Lastly, the 
Court was called upon to decide if the Directive precluded the application of a provision of national 
law under which an employer is entitled to dismiss an employee with a shortened notice period, where 
“the absence is caused by the disability” or where “the absence is due to the fact that the employer 
has not implemented the measures appropriate in the specific situation to enable a person with a 
disability to perform his work”.313 
4.2.2 Defining disability and the personal scope of the Directive 
The first relevant point of this judgement affects the definition of disability under EU law. 
Interestingly, for the first time, the CJEU strongly adhered to the concept of disability enshrined in 
the UN Convention, focusing on those barriers that may hinder the full and effective participation of 
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the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers. The CRPD indeed 
rejects the medical model and lays down that “disability is an evolving concept that results from the 
interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders 
their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”. 314 
As noted above, the ruling of the European Court of Justice acknowledged the legal supremacy of the 
UN CRPD over European law. As a preliminary point, the Court emphasised Article 216(2) of the 
TFEU315 and observed that international agreements concluded by the European Union are binding 
on its institutions, and consequently prevail over acts of the European Union.316 The Court therefore 
interpreted the missing concept of disability under the Directive in compliance with the international 
guidelines of the CRPD. 
Moreover, the CJEU stated that disability does not require complete impossibility to work, but does 
imply a hindrance to the exercise of a professional activity. The Court refused the argument of the 
employers according to which disability necessarily implies complete exclusion from work, because 
it would be incompatible with the purpose of Directive 2000/78, which aims to enable a person with 
a disability to have access to or participate in employment. It may be argued that the Court embraced 
a flexible concept of disability that results from the combination of individual impairments and social 
barriers. In doing so, the Court correctly interpreted and enlarged the personal scope of Directive 
2000/78 by covering not only disabilities that are congenital or derive from accidents, but also those 
disabilities caused by curable or incurable illness. 
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4.2.3 Reasonable accommodation as adaptation of working hours? 
The second crucial issue of the preliminary ruling regards the possibility to include “a reduction in 
working hours” within the accommodation measures required by the Directive. The Courts noted that 
neither Article 5 of Directive 2000/78 nor recital 20 in its preamble mention reduced working hours. 
The recital only mentions the concept of ‘patterns of working time’. The employers argued that the 
latter category only refers to such matters as the organisation of the patterns and rhythms of work in 
connection with the production process. 
The Court extended the concept of ‘patterns of working time’ to such adaptations of working hours 
that accommodate the peculiar needs of persons with a disability who are not capable, or no longer 
capable, of working full-time to work part-time. The duty to provide reasonable accommodation 
envisages not only material but also organisational measures. The term ‘pattern’ of working time 
therefore may include the rhythm or speed at which the work is done. The CJEU did not find any 
relevant fact to justify the exclusion of Ms Ring from occupying a part-time post. Indeed, after her 
dismissal, Ms Ring started a new part-time job as a receptionist with another company. The Court 
underlined that Danish law promotes public assistance to undertake accommodation measures whose 
purpose is to facilitate the access to the labour market of persons with disabilities, including initiatives 
aimed at encouraging employers to recruit and maintain in employment persons with disabilities. In 
the light of the foregoing, the Court held that a reduction in working hours may constitute one of the 
accommodation measures under Article 5 of Directive 2000/78. 
This part of the judgement is remarkable as it clarifies the legal content of the duty to take appropriate 
measures according to the provision of reasonable accommodation. The definition of appropriate 
measures under recital 20 of the Directive is not exhaustive and leaves a wide margin of appreciation 
to Member States in determining the appropriateness of such measures. Recital 20 generically states 
that “appropriate measures should be provided, i.e. effective and practical measures to adapt the 
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workplace to the disability, for example adapting premises and equipment, patterns of working time, 
the distribution of tasks or the provision of training or integration resources”. The conclusions of the 
Court contributed to enlarge the protection afforded by the Directive and strengthen the rights of 
persons with disabilities in the workplace. The CJEU expressly interpreted recital 20 and Article 5 of 
Directive 2000/78 in line with the second paragraph of Article 2 of the CRPD which establishes the 
duty to provide ‘reasonable accommodation’. The Court should therefore be commended for 
clarifying the concept of reasonable accommodation under EU law and highlighting that it “must be 
understood as referring to the elimination of the various barriers that hinder the full and effective 
participation of persons with disabilities in professional life on an equal basis with other workers”.317 
4.2.4 Addressing indirect discrimination: legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality 
The CJEU was also called upon to decide the compatibility of national legislation with EU law where 
an employer is allowed to terminate an employment contract with a reduced period of notice if the 
disabled worker has been absent because of illness for 120 days during the previous 12 months, where 
those absences are the consequence of the employer’s failure to take the appropriate measures. In this 
regard, the CJEU set out that whether the absence of the workers is attributable to the employer’s 
failure to adopt appropriate accommodation measures, such national legislation should be in conflict 
with Directive 2000/78. 318 
In addition, the referring court asked if the Directive precludes national legislation under which an 
employer can terminate the employment contract with a reduced period of notice if the disabled 
worker has been absent because of illness, where the absence is caused by his disability. The Court 
noted that Paragraph 5(2) of the FL, which relates to absences on grounds of illness, applies in the 
same way to disabled and non-disabled persons who have been absent for more than 120 days on 
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those grounds. As a consequence, this provision does not bring about difference of treatment based 
directly on disability, within the meaning of Article 1 in conjunction with Article 2(2)(a) of Directive. 
The Court correctly argued that a person with a disability “is more exposed to the risk of application 
of the shortened notice period laid down in Paragraph 5(2) of the FL than a worker without a 
disability”.319 The CJEU explicitly referred to the observations of the Advocate General, according 
to which a worker with a disability runs the additional risk of an illness connected with his disability. 
This circumstance implies that the worker is more exposed to the risk of accumulating days of absence 
on grounds of illness, and therefore of reaching the 120-day limit. It may be said that the 120-day 
rule is more likely to place workers with disabilities at a disadvantage than workers without 
disabilities. Thus, it establishes a difference of treatment indirectly based on disability under the 
meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78. 
In this case, the CJEU examined whether that difference of treatment is objectively justified by a 
legitimate aim and whether the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. The 
Danish government submitted that Paragraph 5(2) of the FL aims to encourage employers to recruit 
and maintain workers who often are absent because of illness. The latter measure would allow 
employers to dismiss workers with a shortened period of notice, where the absences are too long. At 
the same time, those workers can retain their employment during the period of illness. The Danish 
government argued that the provision is adopted in the interests both of employers and employees. 
The government underscored the general regulation and functioning of the Danish labour market, 
which promotes not only the flexibility and freedom of contracts, but also the protection of workers. 
In line with the government’s considerations, DAB and Pro Display observed that the 120-day rule 
is intended to protect those workers who are sick for long periods of time, because employers who 
agree to apply it are inclined to wait longer before dismissing a worker. 
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The CJEU remarked that the promotion of recruitment represents a legitimate aim of the social or 
employment policy of the Member States. Theoretically speaking, such aims may be regarded as 
objectively justifying a difference of treatment on grounds of disability. Nonetheless, the Court 
clarified that it is for the referring court to assess whether the means used by the Danish employers 
to realise those aims can be considered as appropriate and necessary. In this respect, such assessment 
must take into account the additional risks faced by disabled persons, who generally encounter several 
obstacles in re-entering the labour market compared to persons without disabilities. The Court placed 
great emphasis on the importance of accommodating the specific needs of persons with disabilities. 
By doing so, it laid down that Directive 2000/78 precludes “national legislation under which an 
employer can terminate the employment contract with a reduced period of notice (…), where those 
absences are the consequence of his disability, unless that legislation, as well as pursuing a legitimate 
aim, does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim, that being for the referring court to 
assess”. 320 
In addressing crucial issues such as legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality, the Court had to 
counterweight delicate and competing (private and public) interests: the legitimate aim of the Danish 
government to promote recruitment in the labour market and the opposing interest of workers with 
disabilities not to be discriminated against. In this respect, the CJEU established a fundamental 
criterion to assess whether a provision goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the aims pursued. 
The provision must be “placed in its context and the adverse effects it is liable to cause for the persons 
concerned must be considered”.321 This approach seems highly valuable as it takes into account the 
relevant factors that hamper the professional life of persons with disabilities. To the same extent, it 
leaves a wide margin of appreciation to national courts in determining the concrete risks run by 
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disabled persons in re-entering the labour market. A brief overview of the main findings of the 
judgement in Ring and Skouboe Werge will now be given. 
4.2.5 A significant development for EU equality law 
The judgement in Ring and Skouboe Werge can be viewed as the most important step forward in the 
protection of persons with disabilities in the EU legal framework. This case is the first disability 
discrimination-related preliminary reference following the conclusion of the CRPD by the EU. It 
represents a unique opportunity for mainstreaming disability rights, as it places the CRPD at the 
centre of EU law. The Court not only pointed out that the UN Convention forms ‘an integral part of 
the European Union legal order’, but also that the Framework Equality Directive must be interpreted 
in a manner consistent with such international instrument. This decision may accelerate the process 
of revising and updating EU equality legislation by expressly referring to the primacy of international 
agreements over instruments of EU secondary law. The CRPD’s ratification indeed implies that the 
EU has the legal obligation to adopt all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for 
the implementation of the rights of persons with disabilities. Importantly, this judgement addresses 
different complex issues such as the personal scope of the Directive, the meaning of indirect 
discrimination, and the legal content of the duty to provide reasonable accommodation in the 
workplace. 
In primis, the Court strongly adhered to the social model of disability embodied in the UN 
Convention, focusing on those external barriers which may hinder the full and effective participation 
of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers. The CJEU overcame 
those shortcomings that characterise the definition of disability developed in the case of Chacón 
Navas. In particular, the Court clarified the status of persons who are sick under Directive 2000/78. 
In doing so, it filled the legal gap left by the Chacón Navas judgement which merely held that sickness 
could not be added to the list of grounds covered by the Directive. The Court adopted a broad 
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approach according to which individuals can be protected as long as their condition led to the required 
degree of impairment. The impairment must be on a ‘long-term’ basis as established by Article 1 
CRPD. In addition, the Court enlarged the Directive’s personal scope by stressing that a disability 
does ‘not necessarily imply complete exclusion from work or professional life’. This interpretation 
properly purses the Directive’s objective to foster a labour market favourable to social integration 
that aims at combating discrimination against groups such as persons with disability. Employment 
and occupation are key elements in guaranteeing equal opportunities for all and contribute strongly 
towards the full participation of citizens in economic, cultural and social life and to realising their 
potential.322 The ‘hindrance’ to exercise professional life does not require the full ‘impossibility’ to 
carry out professional activities. Such interpretation positively allows persons with disabilities who 
are only able to work part-time to fall under the protection of the Directive. In other words, the Court 
definitively abandoned the medical paradigm of disability and laid the foundations to build a new 
comprehensive legal framework in compliance with international law. 
The Court also considered the compatibility with the Directive of Danish legislation allowing for a 
shortened period of notice. It observed that such law applies to the same extent to disabled and non-
disabled persons who have been absent for more than 120 days on the grounds of illness. The Court 
acknowledged the existence of an indirect discrimination, because a neutral provision puts persons 
having a disability at a particular disadvantage compared to other persons without disability. The 
prohibition of indirect discrimination has been rightly applied to cover workers with disabilities who 
are more likely to accumulate days of absence on grounds of illness. In more general terms, this 
provision has the effect to protect those individuals who face greater difficulties and barriers in the 
workplace. The recognition of indirect discrimination as a form of discrimination reflects a more 
substantive approach to the concept of equality and enhances the protection of vulnerable categories 
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of individuals.323 It should be observed, moreover, that the Court applied the justification test to 
examine whether the difference of treatment was justified by a legitimate aim. To this end, it sought 
to balance public and private interests. It held that the 120-day rule “must be placed in its context and 
the adverse effects it is liable to cause for the persons concerned must be considered”.  
The CJEU’s reasoning significantly considered the relevant factors that affect the professional life of 
workers with disabilities. However, it overlooked the impact of such an interpretation on the freedom 
of the Danish government to regulate its labour market. In this respect, the Danish ‘flexicurity’ model 
combines flexibility and security. It is based on flexible hiring and firing rules, considerable social 
safety net and active labour market policies.324 The Court’s interpretation may therefore constitute a 
burdensome obligation for Member States adopting flexible labour market regulations.325 The CJEU 
instructed the Danish court to ‘take account of relevant factors relating in particular to workers with 
disabilities’ (para. 90), noting that such workers often find it difficult to re-enter the workforce 
following dismissal and have ‘specific needs in connection with the protection their condition 
requires’ (para. 91).326 This additional protection requirement may narrow the freedom of employers 
to organise and manage their workforce.  
The last interesting question faced by the Court concerned the interpretation of Article 5 of Directive 
2000/78 that creates the obligation for employers to provide reasonable accommodation. As noted in 
the first chapter, this duty constitutes the main non-discrimination obligation in the CRPD’s context. 
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation contributes to an effective achievement of substantive 
equality in the workplace through the imposition of positive obligations on employers. Indeed, it 
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entails the responsibility of public and private actors to ensure persons with disabilities the enjoyment 
or exercise of all human rights on an equal basis with others. 327 In this case, the CJEU explicitly 
stated that the CRPD’s provision prescribes a broad definition of ‘reasonable accommodation’ and 
found that the adaptation of working hours accommodates the specific needs of persons with 
disabilities who are not capable, or no longer capable, of working full-time. This understanding may 
be considered as highly relevant because it takes into account those organisational measures that do 
not constitute a disproportionate burden on employers. Moreover, when the failure of the employer 
to provide reasonable accommodation is the main cause of the employee’s absence from work, the 
national legislation under which an employer can terminate the employment contract with a reduced 
period of notice breaches the purpose of Directive 2000/78/EC. The link between the employer’s 
failure to act and the employee’s absence from work is a necessary condition to prove the violation 
of the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation. In doing so, the Court introduced an 
anticipatory element to the obligation to act upon the employer in order to prevent further absences 
of a worker with disabilities. This interpretation seems to go even beyond the CRPD’s legal content 
as it embraces an extensive definition of reasonable accommodation which entails anticipatory duties 
upon employers. By contrast, the CRPD does not enshrine an anticipatory obligation to accommodate 
persons with disabilities, but it requires State Parties to take all appropriate steps to ensure that 
reasonable accommodation is provided for persons with disabilities in order to promote equality and 
eliminate discrimination (Art. 5.3). The findings of the Court mirror and reinforce the paradigm of 
substantive equality introduced by the CRPD. The Directive’s interpretation is not only in line with 
the developments of international human rights law, but recognises also effective and affirmative 
obligations under EU law. The most recent ruling handed down by the CJEU with regard to the 
concept of disability under the Framework Directive will now be examined. 
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4.3 The case of Kaltoft v Municipality of Billund 
The recent case of Fag og arbejde (FOA) v Kommunernes landsforening (Kl)328 represents a crucial 
and controversial step of the process concerning the jurisprudential interpretation of the Equality 
Framework Directive’s personal scope. 
The main dispute regards Mr Kaltoft, hired as a childminder by the Municipality of Billund, one of 
the Danish public administrative authorities. During his work period, he was obese according to the 
definition of the World Health Organisation (WHO). Kaltoft attempted to lose weight with the 
support of the health programme provided by the Municipality of Billund. After a leave of one year, 
due to family reasons, he resumed his work as a childminder. Thereafter, he started to receive several 
unexpected visits from the head of the childminders with the purpose of monitoring his weight loss. 
During those visits, the head of the childminders pointed out that Mr Kaltoft’s weight had remained 
unchanged. 329 The education inspectors of the Municipality of Billund were requested to dismiss a 
childminder and the head of the childminders decided to nominate Mr Kaltoft. The Municipality of 
Billund formally notified Mr Kaltoft of its intention to dismiss him “following a specific assessment 
on the basis of a decline in the number of children, thus that of the workload, having severe financial 
implications on the childminding service and on its organization”.330 However, he claimed to be the 
only childminder dismissed because of the alleged decline in workload and expressed the opinion 
that his dismissal was induced by his obesity. 
The workers’ union Fag og Arbejde (FOA), acting on behalf of Mr Kaltoft, brought an action before 
the District Court of Kolding claiming that Mr Kaltoft had been discriminated against on grounds of 
obesity. In this context, the Danish Court referred a question for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU 
with the purpose of asking whether obesity can be deemed a disability covered by the Directive 
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2000/78/EC. Moreover, it asked which criteria would be decisive to assess whether a person’s obesity 
falls under the protection of the prohibition of discrimination. The CJEU was also requested to decide 
if discrimination on grounds of obesity in the labour market is contrary to EU law, as expressed in 
Article 6 TEU concerning fundamental rights. 
4.3.1 The prohibition of discrimination on grounds of obesity 
The Court properly highlighted that EU law does not provide for any prohibition on grounds of 
obesity as such. In particular, neither Article 10 TFEU nor Article 19 TFEU make any reference to 
obesity. At the same time, neither EU secondary legislation nor Directive 2000/78/EC set out a 
general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of obesity as regards employment and occupation. 
The Court pointed out that only the general principle of non-discrimination, which is also enshrined 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, is binding for Member States where the national situation at 
issue falls under the scope of EU law. The principle of non-discrimination indeed represents one of 
the fundamental rights which form an integral part of the general principles of EU law. 
In light of this legal backdrop, the CJEU decided not to operate any extension by analogy of the 
Directive’s scope beyond the listed grounds. It held that EU law must be interpreted as not laying 
down a general principle of non-discrimination on grounds of obesity as such with regards to 
employment and occupation.331 This interpretation seems to rely on the fact that only Article 21 of 
the Charter includes an open-ended prohibition of discrimination which could potentially cover 
obesity as a stand-alone ground. Thus, Article 6(1) TEU precludes recourse to the Charter to extend 
‘in any way’ the competences of the European Union as defined in the Treaties. Similarly, Article 
51(2) of the Charter states that it “does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the 
powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks 
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as defined in the Treaties”. These provisions, according to the A-G Jaaskinen, lay down an outer-
boundary of EU fundamental rights law that is pertinent to the present case.332 
4.3.2 The prohibition of discrimination in the labour market: the CJEU’s minimalist approach 
The Kaltoft judgement is particularly silent with respect to the nature of the principle of non-
discrimination in the labour market. The Court concluded that the situation, in so far as it relates to a 
dismissal purportedly based on obesity, does not fall within the scope of EU law. In that context, the 
provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are likewise inapplicable in 
such a situation. The Court implicitly embraced the Advocate General’s arguments according to 
which the general principle of EU law precluding discrimination on grounds of age, which is reflected 
in Article 21(1) of the EU Charter, and which can, in some circumstances, have horizontal direct 
effects on two private parties, could not be applied in this case. He argued that “there is nothing in 
the relevant age-discrimination rulings pointing toward the existence of a general principle of law 
precluding discrimination in the labour market generally”. Nor can constitutional provisions common 
to a handful of Member States, or a protocol to the ECHR, such as Protocol 12 to the ECHR establish 
a general principle of law which would oblige Member States to combat discrimination on grounds 
which, unlike age, are not spelled out in the Treaties or in EU legislation.333 The General Advocate 
recalled Article 51(1) of the EU Charter that only binds the Member States when they are 
‘implementing’ EU law. He considered the fact that discrimination occurred in a substantive field 
such as the labour market “as an insufficient foundation for concluding that a Member State is 
implementing EU law”. 334 In case of the objective of the main proceedings is not related to the 
interpretation or application of a rule of EU law, the requisite link should be regarded insufficient. 
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However, the CJEU avoided deciding whether the principle of non-discrimination in the labour 
market, as either a Charter right or a general principle as expressed by Directive 2000/78, may be 
invoked in proceedings between private parties. Moreover, the CJEU did not clarify the criteria to 
assess the ‘link’ between a provision of Member State law and the substantive scope of an equally 
specific provision of EU law. By contrast, the Court purely handed down that dismissals based on 
obesity fall outside the scope of EU law and therefore the provisions of the Charter are inapplicable 
in such a context. In doing so, the Court confirmed the emergence of “judicial minimalism” in 
preliminary references cases.335 This approach does not help identify the nature and the horizontal 
effects of the Charter’s provisions in national civil proceedings between private parties, in particular 
with regard to the prohibition of discrimination. 
4.3.3 Is obesity a disability under the Framework Directive? 
The CJEU first dealt with the issue of admissibility. The Danish government observed that the 
referring question concerning the possibility to consider the obesity of a worker as a ‘disability’ was 
inadmissible. It argued that the facts did not exhibit the inability of Mr Kaltoft to carry out his 
functions during the period in which the Municipality of Billund employed him. In addition, the 
government held that the answer could be clearly deduced from the existing case law of the CJEU 
and the referring court could itself give a ruling in the main proceedings on the definition of 
‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78.336 The Court regarded the question as 
admissible because, according to Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which 
the dispute has been brought, to determine both the need for a preliminary ruling and the relevance 
of the questions which it submits to the Court under Article 267 TFEU. 
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The Court then turned to examine the matter of the preliminary reference. Its analysis began with the 
explanation of the concept of ‘disability’, which includes not only the impossibility of exercising a 
professional activity, but also the hindrance to exercise such an activity. The Court clarified that the 
complete inability of the worker to carry out his professional tasks does not constitute a compulsory 
condition to apply the Directive’s provisions. On the contrary, it is sufficient to assess the hindrance 
to the exercise of a professional activity to trigger the protection of EU law. Indeed, the main purpose 
of the Directive is to enable a person with a disability to have access to or participate in employment. 
Interestingly, the Court also asserted that the concept “does not depend on the extent to which the 
person may or may not have contributed to the onset of his disability”.337 
The Court mentioned the legal contents of the CRPD outlining the definition of disability previously 
adopted in the case of Ring and Skouboe Werge. It concluded that obesity may be a disability if it 
entails a limitation resulting from an impairment which hinders equal participation in the workplace. 
It is worth noting that the CJEU identified three main criteria to fall under the Directive’s protection: 
the existence of a personal and long-term limitation, the interaction between a person with 
impairments and the environmental barriers, and the hindrance to fully exercise professional life. In 
accordance with the above considerations, the Court stated that: 
“in the event that, under given circumstances, the obesity of the worker concerned entails a limitation which 
results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments that in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of that person in professional life on an equal basis 
with other workers, and the limitation is a long-term one, obesity can be covered by the concept of 
‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78/EC”.338 
At first glance, this understanding of the concept of disability may be considered as a proper 
implementation of the social model adopted by the CPRD. However, the judgement tends to 
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emphasise the physical constraints of the claimant as a test to assess whether he fell within the 
Directive’s personal scope. Paragraph 60 of the judgement stated that disability falls under the 
meaning of Directive 2000/78 “if the obesity of the worker hindered his full and effective 
participation in professional life on an equal basis with other workers on account of reduced mobility 
or the onset, in that person, of medical conditions preventing him from carrying out his work or 
causing discomfort when carrying out his professional activity”. It is unclear from the judgement 
whether attitudinal and external barriers would have been sufficient to establish the existence of a 
disability in this case. As a result, Kaltoft does not make a true break with the medical model of 
disability as it excessively focuses the analysis on those physical impairments of the individual. 
4.3.4 Should obesity be considered a disability? 
In Kaltoft, the Court did not consider obesity per se as a disability, unless it results in a limitation that 
hinders equal participation in employment. This judgement refused the ‘fat right’ claim according to 
which obesity should be regarded per se a prohibited ground of discrimination or should be expressly 
included under the concept of disability.339 The Court’s approach has been considered ‘cautious’ 
because it left the national court to decide whether obesity constituted a disability.340 The Court’s 
reluctance to expressly define obesity as a disability has also been ascribed to the consequences that 
could have affected the labour market and the costs imposed on Member States.341 
It may be said that the inclusion of obesity per se under the concept of disability is not required neither 
by Directive 2000/78 nor the CRPD’s provisions. There is no evidence in Directive 2000/78 to 
suggest that workers are protected by the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability as 
soon as they develop any type of sickness. By contrast, it is established in the case law that only when 
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a ‘curable or incurable illness’ entails a ‘long-term’ limitation, can it be covered by the concept of 
‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78. In this regard, obesity does not always constitute 
a long-term limitation or represent a limitation that hinders the person’s full and effective 
participation in professional life on an equal basis with other workers. As a consequence, 
automatically classifying obesity as a disability would be highly simplistic and would fall outside the 
scope of Directive 2000/78. To the same extent, the CRPD sets out that disability is an ‘evolving’ 
concept that demands the coexistence of a long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairment with the hindrance to fully participate in society. It seems that the Convention adopts a 
flexible and dynamic concept of disability which demands a case-by-case assessment of those 
situations falling under this wide notion. 
The CJEU’s legal reasoning however still highlights some aspects of an outdated medical model of 
disability that merely identifies disability as a medical condition located within the individual. A final 
evaluation of the work carried out by the CJEU and an overview of the main findings of this research 
will now be offered. 
4.4 Is the CJEU still a real promoter of disability rights? 
The judgement, in the case of Kaltoft v Municipality of Billund, symbolises a contradictory approach 
of the CJEU with regard to the personal scope of the Framework Directive. EU law does not consider 
obesity as a self-standing ground of discrimination and the CJEU concluded that the existence of 
discrimination on grounds of obesity must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The main flaw of this 
reasoning is the reference to a concept of disability which does not fully embrace the CRPD’s social 
model. This is a negative development in comparison with the interpretation adopted in Ring and 
Skouboe Werge when the CJEU expressly aligned the EU concept of disability to the new paradigm 
embraced by the CRPD. It appears that the initial CJEU’s judicial activism is gradually converting in 
a sort of judicial “prudence” when addressing sensitive issues that may significantly impact the labour 
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market. The uncertain position in relation to the prohibition of discrimination in the labour market 
and the return to a medical model of disability reveal  the CJEU’s cautious approach that restricts the 
substantive content of EU equality law and avoids clarifying the legal (and economic) implications 
for Member States. 
By contrast, the CJEU considered the prohibition of indirect discrimination and the duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation as essential provisions for tackling disability discrimination in the 
workplace. Indeed, in Ring and Skouboe Werge, the notion of reasonable accommodation has been 
extensively interpreted as including adaptions of working hours and anticipatory duties upon 
employers. The Court drew attention to the importance of eliminating the barriers that hamper the 
effective participation of persons with disabilities in professional life on an equal basis with other 
workers. The CJEU also stated that apparently neutral provisions may place workers with disabilities 
at a particular disadvantage compared to workers without disabilities. These provisions may therefore 
bring about indirect discrimination under the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78. This 
interpretation is consistent with the UN Convention which has strongly influenced the judicial 
interpretation of EU secondary law and consolidated the rights of persons with disabilities in EU 
cases-law. 
Against this background, the CJEU has certainly performed a crucial role in implementing the rights 
of persons with disabilities in the EU legal framework. More generally speaking, the last rulings of 
the CJEU show meaningful and positive effects of the Framework Directive on the rights of persons 
with disabilities. However, a more coherent judicial approach is required in relation to the legal 
understanding of the concept of disability. An overarching understanding of disability that takes into 
account the guidelines of the CRPD and clarifies the ambiguous CJEU’s jurisprudence would be 
needed under EU law. To do so, the EU should put in place a comprehensive legal framework to 
reinforce the social model of disability and the prohibition of discrimination in the labour market. 
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The judicial approach of the CJEU with regard to the concept of disability and the necessary 
requirements to assess the ‘long-term’ nature of the impairment will now briefly be examined. 
4.5 The case of Daoudi: clarifying the long-term nature of the impairment 
The case of Daoudi also illustrates the CJEU’s judicial interpretation of the personal scope of the 
Framework Equality Directive.342 Mr. Daoudi worked as a kitchen assistant and dislocated his left 
elbow after slipping on the kitchen floor of the restaurant in which he worked. As a result, he initiated 
the procedure to have his temporary incapacity for work recognised. He could not return to work 
immediately and while he was still temporarily unable to work, Mr. Daoudi received a notice of 
disciplinary dismissal. He submitted that the dismissal was discriminatory and that, in particular, he 
was covered by the concept of ‘disability’, within the meaning of Directive 2000/78. The Spanish 
court was therefore called to decide whether his impairment could be classified as ‘long‐term’ in 
order to apply the disability legislation. However, the Spanish court referred the case to the CJEU 
and asked whether Mr. Daoudi would fall under the concept of disability of the Framework Equality 
Directive, given the uncertain duration of his injury.  
The Court positively recognised that the CRPD may be relied on to interpret Directive 2000/78, which 
must, as far as possible, be interpreted in a consistent manner with the UN Convention’s provisions. 
The Court clarified that the Framework Equality Directive also covers those disabilities caused by an 
accident. Therefore, if an accident entails a limitation resulting in particular from long-term physical, 
mental or psychological impairments which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder the full 
and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other 
workers, and if that limitation is long-term, it may come within the concept of ‘disability’ within the 
meaning of Directive 2000/78.343 However, the CPRD does not define ‘long-term’ as regards a 
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physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment. To the same extent, the Directive 2000/78 lacks 
to identify the concept of a ‘long-term’ limitation of a person’s capacity for the purposes of the 
concept of disability.  
Against this background, the CJEU provided specific guidelines to assess the ‘long-term nature’ of 
the impairment which have to be taken into account by the national court to assess the concept of 
disability under the Framework Equality Directive. It pointed out that the ‘long-term’ nature of the 
limitation must be assessed in relation to the condition of incapacity of the individual concerned at 
the time of the alleged discriminatory act adopted against him/her. The evidence of a ‘long-term’ 
limitation should include the fact that the incapacity of the person does not “display a clearly defined 
prognosis as regards short-term progress” or the fact that it “is likely to be significantly prolonged 
before that person has recovered”.344 Moreover, in order to verify the ‘long-term’ nature of the 
individual limitation, national courts have to consider all the objective evidences relating to that 
person’s condition, in particular documents and certificates, “established on the basis of current 
medical and scientific knowledge and data”.345 In case the capacity of the person concerned is 
recognised as ‘long-term’, it is necessary to demonstrate that an unfavourable treatment on grounds 
of disability represents discrimination under the meaning of Article 2(1) of the Directive 2000/78.  
This judgement may be considered as highly relevant because it helps better define the concept of 
disability under EU equality law by providing precise guidelines to assess the 'long-term’ nature of 
the individual impairment. The Court indeed emphasises the need to ensure a uniform application of 
EU law and the principle of equality in light of the objective pursued by the legislation in question. 
This approach seems to overcome the flaws of the Chacón Navas’ judgement where the Court did 
not explain the conditions under which a long-term limitation amounts to disability. In Chacón Navas, 
the Court stated that ‘sickness’ and ‘disability’ are different concepts. It defined disability as a 
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“limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments and which 
hinders the participation of the person concerned in professional life”.346 However, it did not adopt 
any specific guidance to verify when a limitation falls within the concept of disability. The Court 
merely concluded that it must be probable that the impairment will last for a long time. In addition, 
the Court excluded that “workers are protected by the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
disability as soon as they develop any type of sickness”.347 By doing so, it disregarded the possibility 
to consider, as falling under the concept of disability, a sickness which caused long-term or permanent 
limitations.  
In the case of Daoudi, the CJEU’s interpretation concerning the concept of disability still retains a 
major focus on the (long-term) nature of the medical impairment rather than its interaction with 
external barriers. Nevertheless, it offers significant guidance to legally identify the long-term nature 
of the impairment and include under the protection of the Framework Equality Directive a wider 
category of limitations that, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder the full and effective 
participation of person with disabilities in professional life.  
The analysis will now focus on the CJEU’s interpretation of the concept of disability beyond the legal 
borders of the prohibition of discrimination in the workplace. It will briefly show the extent to which 
the social model of disability has or has not been absorbed by the EU legal system. 
4.6 Defining disability beyond the labour market: the case of Glatzel 
The case of Wolfgang Glatzel v. Freistaat Bayern exhibits the reluctance of the CJEU in embracing 
the social model of disability.348 This case concerns the application of Directive 2006/126/EC on 
driving licences and the definition of disability beyond the employment area in relation to Article 21 
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EU Charter according to which any discrimination based on any ground such as disability shall be 
prohibited.349 
Mr Glatzel lost his driving licence on the ground that he had driven under the influence of alcohol. 
His application for a new driving licence for categories C1 and C1E (heavy goods vehicles) was 
refused on the ground that he suffered from unilateral amblyopia, involving a substantial functional 
loss of vision in one eye. He did not meet the requirements of Directive 2006/126 which sets out that 
drivers of heavy vehicles must have visual capacity of at least 0,1. Following an unsuccessful 
objection against that decision, Mr Glatzel brought an action before the Verwaltungsgericht 
Regensburg (Administrative Court, Regensburg). As that court dismissed his action, Mr Glatzel 
brought an action before the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof. The court observed that “there is 
no ground on which to prohibit persons who have a visual acuity of less than 0,1 in one eye from 
driving a motor vehicle where, first, they have binocular vision, second, their field of binocular vision 
satisfies the requirements laid down in point 6.4 of Annex III to Directive 2006/126 and, third, they 
have learned fully to compensate for their lack of spatial vision”.350 
The court therefore referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling concerning the validity of the strict 
requirements established by Directive 2006/126 in the light of Articles 20, 21(1) and 26 of the Charter 
concerning equality before the law, non-discrimination on grounds of disability, and the integration 
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4.6.1 The problematic CJEU’s assessment 
For the purpose of this research, the case of Glatzel is highly relevant as it addresses several important 
issues such as the legal understanding of disability and the legal value of the CPRD and the EU 
Charter. 
It is worth noting that the CJEU correctly recalled the notion of disability developed in the case of 
Ring and Skouboe Werge that expressly embraces the social model embodied in the CRPD. 
However, the Court concluded that it “did not have sufficient information to ascertain whether such 
impairment constitutes a disability within the meaning of Article 21(1) of the Charter”. The Court 
mainly focused its analysis on the nature of the individual impairment and those medical standards 
required by EU law.351 In doing so, the external barriers hindering the participation of the person 
concerned in professional life have been complexly overlooked. This approach reflects the obsolete 
medical paradigm of disability that has been rejected by the recent developments of international 
human rights law. 
The Court incorrectly disregarded the opinion of the Advocate General who underlined that “from 
the definition given by the Court and from that given by the United Nations, disability must not be 
understood according to the degree of the deficiency at issue, but must be determined having regard 
to the end result occasioned by that deficiency in a given social context or environment”.352 
Accordingly, to assess a disability, the analysis should focus on the final consequences of the 
deficiency and not on the impairment in itself. A person should be considered having a disability, 
whether the interplay between the deficiency and the external environment brings about a restriction 
of the activity of the person concerned, who is prevented from participating in professional life on 
equal basis with others. The Advocate General’s opinion reflects an appropriate understanding of the 
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social model of disability and proposes an adequate solution of the case at issue. In Glatzel, the 
interaction between the individual impairment (the amblyopia which affects his vision of the right 
eye) and those high standards required by Directive 2006/126 to release a category C1 or 
category C1E driving licence prevents the claimant from fully participating in professional life. This 
reasoning should have been upheld by the CJEU which instead confirmed a reluctant approach 
towards the social model of disability. 
In this case, the CJEU was called to identify the interaction between the personal deficiency and the 
disabling rules of the social context. Moreover, it should have found a balance between the individual 
interest to not be discriminated against on grounds of disability and the collective considerations of 
safety. The Court merely concentrated its analysis on the claimant’s visual impairment and resorted 
in a simplistic way to the overriding considerations of road safety as an objective justification. This 
judgement illustrates how the Court is progressively departing from the rights-centred approach 
enshrined in the CPRD and lowering the protection of EU disability law. 
4.6.2 The role of the CRPD: a confusing approach 
The Court adopted an inconsistent position with regard to the legal value of the CRPD within the EU 
legal framework. The CJEU stated that the CRPD is an integral part of the EU legal order. 
Notwithstanding, it specified that the CRPD’s provisions are subject, in their implementation or their 
effects, to the adoption of subsequent acts of the contracting parties. The provisions therefore do not 
constitute, from the point of view of their content, unconditional and sufficiently precise conditions 
which allow a review of the validity of the measure of EU law.353 
This judgement exemplifies the controversial and undefined relation between the CPRD and EU law. 
The Court denied the possibility to challenge provisions of EU law in the light of the CRPD’s 
obligations and therefore restricted the implementation of Article 216(2) TFEU according to which 
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international agreements concluded by the EU are binding upon the institutions and on its Member 
States. This approach seems highly contradictory as it acknowledges that the CPRD is part of the EU 
legal order but in a partial and limited way. This means that the CRPD does not produce any legal 
effects per se in the EU system as it requires implementing measures by the Member States.354 Only 
those implementing measures should be consistent with the CPRD’s provisions which however do 
not constitute unconditional and sufficiently precise conditions. This reasoning confirms the negative 
trend in the CJEU’s jurisprudence to protect EU norms from the interference of international human 
rights law. The same approach has been adopted in the case of Z. v A Government Department and 
the Board of Management of a Community School.355 This case will be analysed further in section 6 
of this chapter in order to illustrate and criticise the judicial approach of the CJEU in relation to the 
CRPD. 
4.6.3 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a narrow interpretation 
Art. 26 of the Charter is a fundamental provision for the protection of persons with disabilities 
according to which “the Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit 
from measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and 
participation in the life of the community”. The CJEU embraced a narrow interpretation of Art. 26 of 
the Charter and merely labelled it as a principle.356 The Court stated that Directive 2006/126 
implements the principle contained in Article 26 of the Charter and recognised the applicability of 
the latter provision to the case in the main proceedings.357 The CJEU also concluded that the principle 
enshrined in Article 26 does not require the EU legislature to adopt any specific measure and it must 
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be given more specific expression in EU or national law in order to produce legal effects. 
Accordingly, Article 26 “cannot by itself confer on individuals a subjective right which they may 
invoke as such”.358 
The Court clearly reduced the sphere of application of Art. 26 by classifying it as a principle that 
cannot confer a subjective right on individuals. This interpretation may be problematic when 
identifying the conditions which “would give rise to an Article 26 case”.359 This Article is indeed 
considered as a non-interference provision binding only the EU. Moreover, it generates minimal 
effects as it merely aims at recognising and respecting the rights of persons with disabilities. This 
approach reflects the general and vague wording of Article 26 that does not specify the nature of 
those obligations and measures that Member States should fulfil and enact to integrate persons with 
disabilities.  
The CJEU’s reasoning is disputable because it refuses to acknowledge the human rights approach 
underlying Article 26 of the EU Charter and the importance of those positive rights required to 
promote the integration of persons with disabilities. This provision should indeed help the CJEU in 
aligning the judicial interpretation of EU norms with the social model of disability and identifying 
the obligations of the EU in the area of social and occupation inclusion. The case of Glatzel once 
again shows that the CJEU is highly uncomfortable in recognising the full legal effect of those 
provisions that may foster disability equality rights. 
The next section will examine a remarkable decision of the Court that takes into account 
discrimination by association. The aim is to delineate a comprehensive picture of the personal scope 
of the Directive and underline the evolution of the CJEU’s interpretation of EU equality norms. 
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5. Discrimination by association on grounds of disability 
The CJEU, for the first time, introduced the concept of discrimination by association in EU law in 
the Coleman case.360 This case clarifies whether the Directive prohibits discrimination against an 
individual by virtue of his or her association with someone who is a disabled person.361 As it will be 
shown below, this case represents an important development for EU anti-discrimination law as it 
extends the personal scope of the Directive 2000/78/EC to those individuals who do not personally 
possess the protected characteristics. 
5.1 Factual background 
The claimant, Sharon Coleman, was a legal secretary and mother of a disabled child. She alleged that 
she was discriminated against and harassed at work after the birth of her child. Her son’s condition 
required specialised and particular care, but her former employer refused to allow her the same 
flexibility as regards her working hours and the same working conditions as those of her colleagues 
who were parents of non-disabled children. Ms Coleman was described as ‘lazy’ when she requested 
time off to care for her child, whereas parents of non-disabled children were allowed time off.362 She 
received insulting comments about both her and her child and was threatened with dismissal after 
having occasionally arrived late at the office because of problems related to her son’s condition. She 
submitted that such threats were not made to employees with non-disabled children who were late for 
similar reasons. 
Ultimately, Coleman accepted voluntary redundancy and started a procedure before an Employment 
Tribunal claiming that she had been unfairly dismissed and had been subject to discrimination 
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because she was the mother of a disabled child. Her claim was based on the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1995 and Directive 2000/78. The claimant argued that the Directive prohibits discrimination not 
only against disabled persons themselves, but also against individuals who are victims of 
discrimination because they are associated with a disabled person. The Employment Tribunal found 
that the case raised questions of interpretation of EU law and decided to refer some questions to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The Court was called upon to decide whether the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of disability only protects from direct discrimination and harassment 
persons who are themselves disabled, or also protects employees because of their association with a 
person who has a disability. 
5.2 The Advocate General’s Opinion 
The opinion of the Advocate General represents a landmark legal reasoning because it underlines that 
equality constitutes a fundamental principle of Community. Indeed, Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro pointed out that Article 13 EC, now 19(1) TFEU, is an expression of the commitment of the 
Community legal order to the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination.363 He contributed 
to clarify the aim of Article 13 EC and of the Directive which is the protection of the dignity and 
autonomy of persons belonging to those suspect classifications.364 A person’s dignity and autonomy 
may be affected when an individual is directly targeted because they have a suspect characteristic. At 
the same time, he recognised that discrimination can occur in different ways, not only targeting a 
person who has a particular characteristic. By contrast, another “way of undermining the dignity and 
autonomy of people who belong to a certain group is to target not them, but third persons who are 
closely associated with them and do not themselves belong to the group”.365 The Advocate General 
emphasised that a substantive approach towards equality should also address these subtler forms of 
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discrimination, because they concretely affect vulnerable people belonging to suspect classifications. 
He convincingly argued that this form of discrimination jeopardises the ability of persons who have 
a suspect characteristic to exercise their autonomy. In light of this conceptual background, Advocate 
General Maduro turned his attention to the Directive and found that the Coleman’s case raised an 
issue of direct discrimination. According to his conclusion, Directive 2000/78/EC must be interpreted 
as establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation that “protects 
people who, although not disabled themselves, suffer direct discrimination and/or harassment in the 
field of employment and occupation because they are associated with a disabled person”.366 
Advocate General Poiares Maduro released a meaningful Opinion with regard to the general 
principles underlying EU equality law and the scope of Directive 2000/78. He emphasised that human 
dignity and personal autonomy are fundamental values of equality law which are protected by Article 
13 EC, now Article 19 TFEU. He considered that directly targeting a person who has a particular 
characteristic does not constitute the only way of discriminating against him or her, but there are also 
“more subtle and less obvious ways of doing so”.367 In this respect, he correctly stressed a robust 
conception of equality that entails other, subtler forms of discrimination. For instance, one way of 
undermining the dignity and autonomy of people who share a certain characteristic is to target not 
them, but a third person who is closely associated with them. 
Furthermore, the Advocate General offered a detailed analysis of the functioning of Directive 
2000/78. He clarified that the Directive performs an exclusionary function.368 This understanding 
means that religious belief, age, disability and sexual orientation are excluded from the set of 
legitimate grounds an employer may rely upon to treat one employee less favourably than another. 
According to this approach, the prohibition of direct discrimination is based on an exclusionary 
mechanism that prevents an employer from relying on certain grounds to treat employees differently. 
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By contrast, the prohibition of indirect discrimination encompasses an inclusionary mechanism that 
obliges employers to take into account and accommodate the needs of individuals who belong to 
certain groups. In doing so, he coherently included discrimination by association in the scope of the 
prohibition of direct discrimination as a natural consequence of the exclusionary mechanism through 
which the prohibition of direct discrimination operates. Discrimination on grounds of religion, age, 
disability and sexual orientation represents unfair treatment breaching dignity and autonomy of 
individuals. As a result, the fact that an employee who is the object of discrimination does not possess 
a certain characteristic is irrelevant. The Directive operates at the level of grounds of discrimination 
and requires that an individual has been mistreated on account of ‘disability’, not on account of ‘her 
or his disability’. This reasoning shifts the emphasis from the person who is discriminated against to 
the grounds of discrimination covered by Directive 2000/78. It may significantly reinforce EU 
equality law by triggering the Directive’s protection not merely when the claimant is disabled 
herself/himself, but every time there is an instance of less favourable treatment because of disability. 
5.3 Analysis of the judgement: who falls under the protection of discrimination by association? 
The CJEU held that the Framework Directive does not limit the principle of equal treatment to people 
who themselves have a disability within the meaning of the directive.369 On the contrary, the purpose 
of the Directive, as regards employment and occupation, is to combat all forms of discrimination on 
grounds of disability. The analysis of the CJEU focused on the principle of equal treatment enshrined 
in the Directive, which does not apply to a particular category of person, but to the grounds mentioned 
in Article 1. In order to support this interpretation, the Court recalled the wording of Article 13 EC, 
which constitutes the legal basis of Directive 2000/78 and confers on the Community the competence 
to take appropriate action to combat discrimination based, inter alia, on disability. 
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However, the CJEU acknowledged that the Directive includes a number of provisions which apply 
only to disabled people. For instance, Article 5 sets out the duty to provide reasonable accommodation 
and implies that employers must take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to 
enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment. 
Similarly, Article 7(2) also lays down that, with regard to disabled persons, Member States have the 
right to maintain or adopt provisions on the protection of health and safety at work or to measures 
aimed at creating or maintaining provisions or facilities for safeguarding or promoting their 
integration into the working environment. Interestingly, the Court found that disability-specific 
measures do not exclude from the Directive’s scope individuals who do not have a disability 
themselves.370 Indeed, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court stated that: 
“Where an employer treats an employee who is not himself disabled less favourably than another employee 
is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and it is established that the less favourable 
treatment of that employee is based on the disability of his child, whose care is provided primarily by that 
employee, such treatment is contrary to the prohibition of direct discrimination laid down by Article 
2(2)(a)”. 
Moreover, the Court applied the same conclusions with regard to the prohibition of harassment and 
found that it is not limited only to people who are disabled. Accordingly, where it is established that 
the harassment is suffered by an employee who is not himself disabled but is related to the disability 
of his child, such conduct is contrary to the prohibition of harassment laid down in Article 2(3).371 
The wide approach of the Court prevents depriving the Directive of an important element of its 
effectiveness and reinforces the protection which it is intended to guarantee. However, the Court 
seems to underline some important requirements to trigger the legal protection under the category of 
discrimination by association. The CJEU indeed stressed not only the importance of the relationship 
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between Ms Coleman and her son, but also noted that the employee primarily needed to take care of 
her disabled child.372 In doing so, the Court acknowledged that two determinant elements are required 
to assess discrimination by association: (i) the existence of a profound legacy and (ii) an apparent 
level of dependency between the two individuals. This interpretation is likely to extend the protection 
to those relatives who have the main caring duties with regard to family members with disability. The 
decision of the Court clearly establishes the necessary guidelines to interpret the prohibition of 
discrimination and contributes to ensure that national legislations will provide protection against 
direct discrimination and harassment based on the association with a disable person.373 
5.4 The controversial nature of reasonable accommodation 
As noted above, an interesting matter addressed by the CJEU regards the application of the duty to 
provide reasonable accommodation according to Articles 5 and 7(2) of the Directive. In relation to 
the latter obligations, the Court adopted a different interpretation of the Directive’s provisions and 
placed great emphasis on the personal nature of these measures. Thus, the Court clarified that they 
are specifically related to disabled persons as they only concern positive discrimination measures in 
favour of persons with disabilities. Moreover, they are specific measures which “would be rendered 
meaningless or could prove to be disproportionate if they were not limited to disabled persons 
only”.374 In this way, the Court evaluated reasonable accommodations as “positive discrimination 
measures” in favour of disabled persons. 
The use of the term “positive discrimination” instead of “discrimination” would exclude protection 
for those non-disabled persons who suffer a disadvantage by virtue of the accommodation provided 
to persons with disabilities.375 Positive discrimination means treating one person more favourably 
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than another on the grounds of a specific characteristic. The terminology used by the Court is quite 
confusing as it differs from the usual approach of EU law, which makes reference to the concept of 
“positive action”. The CJEU’s stance is also not compatible with the fundamental provisions of the 
CRPD.376 Indeed, Article 2 of the Convection defines a denial of reasonable accommodation as a 
form of discrimination. By contrast, the Directive does not explicitly classify the failure to provide 
reasonable accommodation as a specific form of discrimination. In this occasion, the Court’s 
interpretation missed the opportunity to improve the Directive’s framework and include the failure to 
adopt reasonable accommodation within the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability. 
The inclusion of reasonable accommodation into the formal prohibition of non-discrimination would 
facilitate the realisation of fundamental rights that require implementation through positive measures. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
The judgement delivered in the Coleman case constitutes an important improvement of EU non-
discrimination law as it sets out the conditions to apply the legal protection against discrimination by 
association under the Directive 2000/78/EC. For the first time, the Court introduced the concept of 
discrimination by association, which occurs when an individual is discriminated against because of 
his/her association with someone who possesses a disability or another protected ground. The CJEU 
significantly extended the fundamental guarantees to those persons who do not have the protected 
characteristics. The ratio of the judgement is to protect individuals who primarily take care of persons 
with disabilities and may encounter several environmental obstacles in the workplace. The approach 
of the Court contributes to empowering a vulnerable category of people through a wide interpretation 
of the personal scope of the Directive. By contrast, the CJEU’s ruling raises several concerns in 
relation to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation. Now, Article 2 of the CRPD recognises 
the failure to adopt reasonable accommodation as an unlawful form of discrimination. 
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This judgement has been handed down before the ratification of the CRPD by the EU, but it exhibits 
crucial developments in relation to the personal scope of the Directive 2000/78 marking an important 
shift towards substantive equality. The Court rightly focused its analysis not on the individual 
impairment of the claimant, but on the fact that disability was the ground of the less favourable 
treatment which she claimed to have suffered. In a nutshell, the CJEU shifted the attention from the 
personal characteristic of the individual to the external barriers hindering her professional life. In 
doing so, the CJEU anticipated the implementation of some fundamental aspects of the social model 
of disability introduced by the CRPD. As noted above, this approach has not been fully endorsed in 
the recent judgements of Kaltoft and Glatzel where the Court showed a sort of judicial reluctance in 
applying the social model. It may be said that the CJEU’s jurisprudence in relation to the personal 
scope of the Directive and the legal definition of disability has not developed a clear and coherent 
position yet. 
To complete the study concerning the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability, the 
phenomenon of multiple and intersectional discrimination will now be explored from a legal 
perspective. The aim is to identify how the EU legal framework tackles multiple and intersectional 
discrimination and to what extent this phenomenon may be addressed in light of CRPD’s rules. 
6. Why does multiple and intersectional discrimination matter? 
As noted in the second chapter, the CRPD Committee held that the Convention covers both multiple 
and intersectional discrimination. Multiple discrimination is based on multiple characteristics and 
includes a situation where a person can experience discrimination on two or several grounds. 
Intersectional discrimination instead ‘refers to a situation where several grounds operate and interact 
with each other at the same time in such a way that they are inseparable and thereby expose relevant 
individuals to unique types of disadvantage and discrimination’.377  
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By contrast, EU anti-discrimination law is single-ground oriented. It lacks a comprehensive approach 
towards discrimination and does not provide a specific instrument to address multiple and 
intersectional discrimination. The Directive 2000/78 vaguely refers to multiple discrimination against 
women in the preamble, but it contains no precise reference to this form of discrimination in the 
binding norms.378 The Race Equality Directive does not mention disabled women or disability as a 
ground of multiple or intersectional discrimination.379 The Recast Gender Directive does not prohibit 
discrimination against women with disabilities or any other form of multiple and intersectional 
discrimination.380 At EU level, the main effort to tackle this issue has been made during the European 
Year of Equal Opportunities for All 2007 (EYEOA).381 The major objective of the European Year 
was to raise awareness of the right to equality and non-discrimination and of the problem of multiple 
discrimination. It sought to address multiple discrimination based on two or more of the grounds 
listed in Article 19 TFEU and to promote a balanced treatment of all these grounds. 
From the perspective of international human rights law, only the CRPD mentions the concept of 
multiple and intersectional discrimination and lays down a specific article that prohibits 
discrimination against women and children with disabilities. Multiple discrimination is also 
addressed in the Action Plan 2006-2015 of the Council of Europe, which acknowledges that persons 
with disabilities face specific barriers and experience two-fold discrimination.382 It takes into account 
not only the situation of women and children with disabilities, but also the particular conditions of 
ageing persons with disabilities and people with disabilities from minorities such as refugees, 
migrants and Roma. The Plan requires the adoption of relevant policies and implementation measures 
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to remove barriers and challenges faced by each of these groups in order to ensure that individuals 
can reach their full potentials alongside with other citizens. 
In this framework, the adoption of equality law based on an intersectional approach is crucial, because 
the fragmentation in discrimination legislation may lead to several legal problems as it brings about 
hierarchies of equality grounds and different level of protection.383 Diverse equality provisions imply 
different definitions of the same key concepts and different approaches in terms of protection.384 In 
that regard, the protection afforded by EU disability equality law is weaker compared to race and 
gender anti-discrimination law. Directive 2000/43/EC (Race Equality Directive) has indeed a broader 
application than the Framework Equality Directive. The former prohibits discrimination in a wide 
range of activities such as employment and occupation, education, housing and good and services. 
On the contrary, the scope of the Framework Equality Directive is confined to employment and 
occupation. As a consequence, a disabled woman of colour may be merely protected with regard to a 
limited range of areas or may need to recourse to different pieces of legislation to obtain legal 
protection. The discrepancies in the protection afforded to different grounds and the single approach 
to equality reduce the guarantees in favour of those individuals who are subject to multiple and 
intersectional discrimination. Moreover, the absence of proactive duties to deal with intersectional 
disadvantages in both directives jeopardises the effective eradication of multiple and intersectional 
discrimination.385 
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The case of Odar will be now briefly analysed in order to underline how the CJEU’s interpretation 
of the Framework Equality Directive tends to consider the different grounds of discrimination as 
“separate harms”.386 
6.1 The Odar case: disability and age discrimination 
In the Odar case, the Court considered both disability and age discrimination, but found that there 
was only indirect discrimination on grounds of disability.387 The Court held that the special 
calculation method adopted to determine compensation for employees over the age of 54 was 
discriminatory for those disabled employees who would be entitled to an early disability pension.388  
Dr Odar worked for Baxter Deutschland Gmbh which operated a redundancy scheme based on age, 
length of service and gross monthly pay. Dr Odar was over 54 and suffered from severe disabilities. 
According to the German state pension scheme, the claimant was entitled to an ordinary old age 
pension at 65 and an additional pension for severely disabled people at 60. When the claimant ended 
his employment contract, he received a gross redundancy payment of €303,253.31. However, by 
applying the standard formula, if he was not aged over 54, Dr Odar would have received €616,506.63. 
The claimant therefore claimed both direct age discrimination and indirect disability discrimination 
due to the calculation criteria of his redundancy payment. 
In this case, a special formula was applied to workers over 54 years old which had the effect of 
reducing compensation. As observed by the Advocate General in her Opinion, the “special formula 
calculation will always be lower for a severely disabled worker than for a non-disabled worker of the 
same age”.389 The fact that the calculation is neutrally based on the pensionable age means that 
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disabled workers will receive less compensation on termination of employment because of their 
serious disability.  
Against this background, the CJEU held that the special formula that applies to workers aged over 
54 represents a differential treatment on the grounds of age. However, the ECJ found that that the 
age-based criteria was justified under Article 6(1) as a proportional means to distribute on a fair 
basis limited financial resources within a social plan.390 Such a treatment also pursues the 
legitimate aim to protect younger workers and facilitate their reintegration into employment.  
By contrast, the Court positively found that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
disability precludes the application of an occupational social security scheme under which, the 
compensation to which workers older than 54 are entitled is calculated on the basis of the earliest 
possible date on which their pension will begin, with the result that the compensation paid is lower 
than the standard formula compensation. The measure at issue disregards those risks faced by 
severely disabled people, who generally face greater difficulties in finding new employment. 
Severely disabled people have specific needs stemming both from the protection their condition 
requires and from the need to anticipate possible worsening of their condition.391    
This case shows that the concept of multiple and intersectional discrimination is not yet embodied 
in the reasoning of the CJEU. The Court did not take into account the intersectional aspect of 
discrimination and the fact that different grounds not only add to each other but intrinsically 
interact. The CJEU rightfully found discrimination on grounds of disability, but it did not expressly 
recognise the necessity to assess the interaction between several grounds when analysing 
discriminatory treatments.  
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The case of Z. v A Government Department and the Board of Management of a Community School392 
will now be analysed in order to show how the CJEU is dealing with other cases concerning multiple 
and intersectional grounds of discrimination. 
6.2 Z. v A Government Department and the Board of Management of a Community School: 
Factual background 
The request for a preliminary ruling in this case originated from national proceedings between Ms Z, 
a commissioning mother who had a child trough surrogacy, and an Irish Government Department and 
the Board of management of a community school. The dispute concerned the refusal to grant Ms Z. 
paid leave equivalent to maternity leave or adoptive leave following the birth of her child. Ms Z was 
employed as a post primary school teacher in a school managed by the Board of Management in 
accordance with the employment’s conditions of the Government department. She had a rare disease 
preventing her from supporting a pregnancy. For this reason, Ms Z and her husband decided to have 
a child through a surrogacy arrangement and turned to a specialist agency in California. In vitro 
fertilisation occurred in Ireland and the egg transfer to the surrogate mother took place in California. 
According to California law, Ms Z and her husband are regarded as legitimate parents of the child. 
By contrast, Irish law does not regulate surrogacy arrangements and there is no provision about 
maternity or adoptive leave following the birth of a child under surrogacy. Ms Z. made an application 
to the Government department to obtain adoptive leave, but the government refused that request 
because she did not meet the requirements established by the maternity or adoptive leave scheme. 
Ms Z. started an action against the Government department before the Equality Tribunal. The 
claimant argued that she has been discriminated against on grounds of gender, family status and 
disability. Moreover, she claimed that the Government department failed to reasonably accommodate 
                                                      




her as a person with a disability.393 In light of these circumstances, the Equality Tribunal decided to 
refer some fundamental questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The first question concerned 
whether Directive 2006/54 has to be interpreted as meaning that there is discrimination on the ground 
of sex where a woman, whose genetic child has been born through a surrogacy arrangement, is refused 
paid leave from employment equivalent to maternity leave or adoptive leave. Then, the CJEU was 
asked whether Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as meaning that there is discrimination on the 
ground of disability where a woman, who suffers from a disability which prevents her from giving 
birth, is refused paid leave from employment. Lastly, the Equality Tribunal asked if the UN CRPD is 
capable of being relied on for the purposes of interpreting and challenging the validity of the 
Framework Equality Directive. 
6.2.1 Court’s findings 
The first question addressed by the Court was the issue of discrimination on grounds of sex with 
regard to Gender Directive 2006/54 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and 
equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation.394 Article 4 of that 
Directive provides that, for the same work or for work to which equal value is attributed; direct and 
indirect discrimination on grounds of sex with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration is 
to be eliminated. In this context, the Court selected a male comparator to assess whether the refusal 
to grant maternity leave constitutes unlawful discrimination on grounds of sex.  
The CJEU noted that, under the national legislation applicable in the main proceedings, a 
commissioning father who has had a baby through a surrogacy arrangement is treated in the same 
way as a commissioning mother in a comparable situation.395 It follows that a commissioning father 
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is not entitled to paid leave equivalent to maternity leave. As a consequence, the Court found that the 
refusal of Ms Z.’s request was not based on a ground that applies exclusively to workers of one sex 
at the expense of women. Further, the CJEU stated that the claimant could not be subject to less 
favourable treatment related to her pregnancy because she had not been pregnant. The Court declared 
that Directive 2006/54 does not undermine the right of Member States to provide distinct rights to 
paternity and/or adoption leave. It preserves the freedom of Member States to grant or not to grant 
adoption leave, and that the conditions for the implementation of such leave. In view of these 
considerations, the Court concluded that a refusal to provide paid leave equivalent to maternity leave 
to a female worker who had a baby through a surrogacy arrangement does not constitute 
discrimination on grounds of sex. 
The second issue regarded the interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
disability as defined by Directive 2000/78. The CJEU referred to the Advocate General’s opinions 
according to which “the inability to have a child by conventional means does not in itself, in principle, 
prevent the commissioning mother from having access to, participating in or advancing in 
employment”.396 This stance stressed that the claimant’s conditions did not prevent Ms Z. from 
carrying out her work or constituted a hindrance to the exercise of her professional activity. The Court 
failed to underline the importance of assessing the functional link between the personal impairment 
and the rule preventing her effective participate in professional life. In doing so, Ms Z. was not 
recognised as a ‘disabled’ within the meaning of the Framework Directive and therefore the 
application of the duty to provide reasonable accommodation was ruled out. 
The last question concerned the validity of the Directive in the light of the UN Convention. In that 
regard, the Court argued that EU case law shows that an EU act may be challenged if incompatible 
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with provisions of international law.397 The validity of the Directive can be assessed only where the 
provisions of the international agreement appear to be unconditional and sufficiently precise. Such a 
condition is fulfilled “where the provision relied on contains a clear and precise obligation which is 
not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure”.398 The CJEU 
considered the CRPD as a ‘programmatic’ international agreement. To support this argument, it 
expressly referred to Article 4(1) of the UN Convention that obligates States Parties to adopt all 
appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for the implementation of the rights 
enshrined in that Convention. In addition, the Court also highlighted Article 4(3) of the CRPD, which 
requires the involvement of persons with disabilities, through their representative organisations, in 
the development and implementation of legislation and policies to implement the Convention. In 
those circumstances, the Convention’s provisions were not recognised as unconditional and 
sufficiently precise within the meaning of EU case law. Therefore, the Court laid down that “the 
validity of that directive cannot be assessed in the light of the UN Convention, but that directive must, 
as far as possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with that Convention”.399 
6.2.2 How to deal with multiple and intersectional discrimination under EU law? 
The Court’s judgement reveals a weak and inadequate approach in dealing with discrimination based 
on multiple and intersectional grounds. The arguments used by the CJEU reflect a flaw in the EU 
legal system which is characterised by a single-ground equality paradigm. It would indeed appear 
that multiple and intersectional discrimination occurs frequently in the EU labour market and a new 
holistic approach is needed to accommodate the individual experience of multiple disadvantages.400 
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Crenshaw argues that “neither the gender aspect of racial discrimination nor the racial aspects of 
gender discrimination are fully comprehended within human rights discourses”.401 
Similarly, EU anti-discrimination law does not take into account the disability aspect of gender 
discrimination or the gender aspect of disability discrimination. In one judgement, the Court denied 
legal protection to a woman who suffered from discrimination on multiple and different grounds. In 
the case of Z., the CJEU ruled that there was no sex or gender discrimination, no disability 
discrimination and no violation of EU provisions concerning maternity leave. The lack of a legal 
instrument which takes into account the intersection of two or more grounds of discrimination may 
compromise the effective protection of vulnerable individuals. 
To give an example, in this case, the claimant was obliged to bring an allegation of sex discrimination 
separately from the allegation of disability discrimination. This practice implies the impossibility to 
assess the inextricable link between the two grounds that brings about discrimination. As a result, the 
claimant, as a woman with disabilities, was not able to find protection under the Equal Treatment 
Directive and the Employment Framework Directive. The Court found that a commissioning father 
was not entitled to such leave either and that the refusal did not put female workers at a particular 
disadvantage compared to male workers. At the same time, it did not recognise the situation 
experienced by Z. as falling within the personal scope of Directive 2000/78 that prohibits 
discrimination on grounds of disability. It is noteworthy that the Court operated a comparison with 
male workers, as opposed to other women. In doing so, it did not compare the situation of a 
commissioning mother with that of a woman who has given birth or an adoptive mother. This 
framework of analysis shows that EU law does not always provide the necessary legal tools to identify 
the proper comparator and tackle multiple and intersectional discrimination. It seems evident that EU 
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law does not accommodate those multiple disadvantages stemming from the combination of 
vulnerable characteristics such as sex and disability. In such cases, the correct comparator would have 
been a “non-disabled woman” entitled to obtain the grant of maternity leave. 
It may be argued that, the most complex issue in this context concerns the identification of an 
adequate group with whom to operate a comparison with the disadvantaged individual. EU equality 
law is deeply linked to the formal idea of comparison which narrows the circumstances for 
challenging discrimination.402 The failure to adopt a comprehensive piece of legislation to combat 
multiple and intersectional discrimination leaves a significant gap in the EU legal system and 
contributes to enhance the hierarchy of equalities.  
6.2.3 The failure to apply the social model of disability 
It is worth noting that the case of Z. also confirms the CJEU’s hesitancy in embracing the social model 
of disability. The Court did not recognise the status of disability of the claimant under the Directive 
2000/78.  It wrongly hailed the Advocate General’s opinion according to which the incapacity to have 
a child by conventional means does not in itself prevent the commissioning mother from having 
access to, participating in, or advancing in employment. The Court therefore concluded that “it is not 
apparent from the order for reference that Ms Z.’s condition by itself made it impossible for her to 
carry out her work or constituted a hindrance to the exercise of her professional activity”.403 
Again, the CJEU’s reasoning emphasised the personal condition of the claimant without taking into 
account the crucial interaction between the individual impairment and the external barriers. This 
understanding is not convincing as it moves away from the social paradigm of disability and 
unjustifiably narrows the protection of the Directive 2000/78. Asserting that the individual condition 
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does not jeopardise the claimant’s effective participation in professional life is erroneous and echoes 
a remote medical model of disability. The Court should have noted that the claimant’s infertility, in 
interaction with the external rule preventing her from taking maternity leave, represents an evident 
and unlawful hindrance to her professional life.404 The Court should have applied the social 
construction enshrined in the CPRD and endorsed by its previous decision in the joined cases of Ring 
and Skouboe Werge. 
The analysis of this case indicates that the CJEU’s jurisprudence is failing to fully apply the social 
model of disability in the EU legal framework. The remarkable definition of disability drawn in Ring 
and Skouboe Werge has not been confirmed and crystallised in the following decisions of the CJEU. 
The Court seems to have definitively left behind the project to promote a judicial approach to 
disability equality law in compliance with international human rights law. 
6.3 The complex interplay between international law and EU law 
The case analysed above raises interesting questions regarding the relationship between international 
law and the EU legal order. As far as international agreements are concerned, EU law lays down that 
international law is an integral part of the EU legal order. Indeed, according to Article 216(2) TFEU, 
“agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member 
States”. At first sight, it would appear that EU law has embraced a monistic approach with respect to 
its relationship with international law.405 The monist term refers to a conception that views EU law 
and international law as one unitary and coherent system. By contrast, the dualist approach considers 
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international law and EU law as distinct and separate legal spheres.406 However, the Court of Justice’s 
case law shows that the relationship between EU law and international law is highly complicated.407 
On several occasions, the Court emphasised the necessity to verify the nature of the international 
agreement in order to admit its direct applicability in the EU legal order. The term ‘direct 
applicability’ means that international rules can be applied into EU law without a specific 
implementation measure, while ‘direct effect’ implies that relevant norms of EU law can be 
effectively invoked by individuals in judicial proceedings. 
In the case of Z., the CJEU ruled that the CRPD’s provisions are not unconditional and sufficiently 
precise and therefore do not have direct effect under EU law. The Court, in accordance with the 
opinion of the Advocate General, excluded that the UN Convention may be relied upon to challenge 
the validity of Directive 2000/78.408 The Advocate General submitted that Articles 5, 6 and 28 of the 
UN Convention are not specifically related to employment and occupation as they lay down general 
obligations addressed to the contracting parties to take steps to ensure that the aims of the UN 
Convention are achieved.409 In addition, the General Advocate argued that Article 27(l)(b) of the 
CRPD leaves at the discretion of contracting parties to determine the measures which may be adopted 
to safeguard and promote the realisation of the right to work of persons with disabilities on an equal 
basis with others. According to this stance, Article 27(l)(b) of the CRPD gives wide leeway to the 
EU institutions to take legislative measures to promote the realisation of rights enshrined in the UN 
Convention. 
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The CJEU embraced the Advocate General’s observations and reached a “surprising conclusion”410 
by focusing on Article 4(1) of the UN Convention that imposes on States Parties the general duty to 
adopt all appropriate measures for implementing the CRPD’s rights. For the first time, the Court 
stated that the CRPD does not produce direct effect because it is drafted in a programmatic form. This 
judgement reflects the narrow approach adopted in the case of Air Transport Association of 
America.411 In this instance, the CJEU denied the possibility to rely directly on Article 2(2) of the 
Kyoto Protocol to contest the validity of Directive 2008/101. The content of the international 
provision was regarded as not “unconditional and sufficiently precise so as to confer on individuals 
the right to rely on it in legal proceedings”.412  
Several national courts also consider the CRPD as a programmatic instrument that only outlines 
general policy objectives which have to be implemented by the States Parties.413 However, it is worth 
noting that the CPRD enshrines a binding framework and includes both legal provisions and 
programmatic standards. In primis, all States Parties have the clear legal obligation to implement the 
CRPD in their national systems by adopting legislative and administrative measures. Article 4 of the 
CRPD sets out a positive obligation on Sates Parties to ensure and promote the full realisation of all 
human rights without discrimination of any kind on the basis of disability.414 Furthermore, the CJEU 
and national courts have the legal duty to interpret EU and secondary legislation in line with the 
Convention. The CRPD constitutes an interpretative tool to guide the judicial interpretation of EU 
and national legislation. This approach has often been confirmed at national level as domestic courts 
widely rely on the CRPD to interpret domestic law.415 
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The European Court of Justice instead exhibits a particularly ‘protectionist’ and ‘minimalist’ 
approach with regard to the direct effect of international agreements in the EU legal framework. The 
reasoning of the Court strongly relies on an obsolete ‘dualist’ paradigm that privileges the autonomy 
of the EU legal order over its integration into an overarching international legal regime. The Court 
also avoids explaining the meaning of those conditions required to assess whether the content of an 
international treaty is “unconditional and sufficiently precise”. 
6.4 The incongruous CJEU’s reasoning: time for a change 
Against the above context, it may be said that the CJEU has reduced the chances to invoke 
international norms with the purpose of challenging rules of EU law. It indeed demands the 
assessment of ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise’ international provisions. Such a condition is 
merely fulfilled where the international norm relied upon contains a clear and precise obligation 
which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measures. 
The application of this ‘test’ appears inappropriate because it does not take into consideration the fact 
that every international human rights instrument needs specific mechanisms and measures to be 
implemented at EU and national levels. It may be suitable with respect to international agreements 
that only set out technical regulations and standards, but it results are inadequate in relation to human 
rights treaties including complex and sensitive legal provisions. To give an example, the Court 
recognised those provisions of the Open Skies Agreement establishing certain rules designed to apply 
directly and immediately to airlines as unconditional and sufficiently precise.416 The Court 
inaccurately applied the same ‘test’ in the case of Z. to verify the direct effect of the CRPD’s 
provisions in the EU legal order. The CRPD represents an overarching human rights treaty that cannot 
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be compared to an international air transport agreement. The peculiar legal nature of human rights 
treaties requires a more specific and coherent approach to assess their direct applicability at EU level. 
In light of these observations, the Court’s approach can be considered insufficient and incongruous 
as it purely aims at limiting the direct invocation of international agreement in the EU. The Court 
should therefore elaborate a comprehensive range of criteria and guidelines to further clarify the 
relationship between EU law and international human rights law. In doing so, it should revise the 
conditions to examine the validity of an EU act in the light of the rules of international law by taking 
into account the specific nature of human rights treaties. 
The decision in the case of Z. remains controversial because it also disregards the progressive legal 
developments led by the CRPD. Indeed, as examined in the first chapter, the Convention not only 
introduces general obligations, but also specific substantive rights affecting education, health, 
participation, work and employment, standard of living and social protection. In that regard, Article 
27 sets out specific and precise guidelines to promote and implement the right of persons with 
disabilities to work on an equal basis with others. For instance, it states the prohibition of 
discrimination with regard to all matters concerning all forms of employment, including conditions 
of recruitment, hiring and employment, continuance of employment, career advancement and safe 
and healthy working conditions.417 It also imposes the duty to enable persons with disabilities to have 
effective access to general technical and vocational guidance programmes, placement services and 
vocational and continuing training. It furthermore sets out the specific obligation to promote the 
employment of persons with disabilities in the private sector through appropriate policies and 
measures, which may include affirmative action programmes, incentives and other measures. This 
article provides clear objectives and identifies the appropriate means to achieve the scope of the 
Convention. The CRPD adopts a substantive equality framework characterised by cross-cutting 
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provisions for implementing disability rights, such as the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation.418 Against this backdrop, it is worth noting that labelling the CRPD as a mere 
programmatic instrument is highly simplistic. This judgement underlines the complexity of the 
relationship between international and EU law, but also the importance of investigating the interaction 
between the UN Convention and EU law in order to define this controversial relationship. 
The content of the new equal treatment Directive that prohibits discrimination on grounds of disability 
and the state of play of the negotiations in the Council on this controversial piece of legislation will 
now be offered. 
7. Updating the EU anti-discrimination framework: the Commission’s proposal 
In 2008 the Commission presented a proposal for a Directive which addresses discrimination on 
grounds of disability, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation in both the public and the private 
sector, concerning access to social protection, education, goods and services (the so-called Horizontal 
Directive).419 The aim of the proposal is to set out a uniform minimum level of protection within the 
EU for people who have suffered such discrimination. It establishes a general framework to combat 
discrimination and put the principle of equal treatment other than in the field of employment and 
occupation into effect in the Member States. The new Equality Directive would reinforce the existing 
legal framework by addressing all four grounds of discrimination through a horizontal approach. The 
proposal is based on the strategy of the Amsterdam Treaty to contrast discriminatory treatments and 
is consistent with the horizontal objectives of the EU, in particular with the Lisbon Strategy for 
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Growth and Jobs420 and the objectives of the EU Social Protection and Social Inclusion Process.421 
Moreover, the Commission recognised the objective to strengthen the fundamental rights of citizens, 
in compliance with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The proposed Directive is a very ambitious instrument encompassing significant legal developments 
in comparison with the current equality framework. Interestingly, the proposal not only bans direct 
and indirect discrimination, but also acknowledges the denial of reasonable accommodation as an 
unlawful discrimination. This provision constitutes a remarkable improvement in EU anti-
discrimination law, because it is in line with the requirements of the UN CRPD. Disability enjoys a 
privileged position in the proposed Directive. For instance, Article 4 on “Equal treatment of persons 
with disabilities” states that: 
“the measures necessary to enable persons with disabilities to have effective non-discriminatory access to 
social protection, social advantages, health care, education and access to and supply of goods and services 
which are available to the public, including housing and transport, shall be provided by anticipation, 
including through appropriate modifications or adjustments. Such measures should not impose a 
disproportionate burden, nor require fundamental alteration of the social protection, social advantages, 
health care, education, or goods and services in question or require the provision of alternatives thereto”. 
The latter provision is the keystone of the proposal in relation to the needs of persons with disabilities 
and outlines a clear “anticipatory obligation” to introduce the necessary measures to guarantee 
equality. The Commission embraced the legal paradigm according to which human rights demand 
positive actions and therefore adopted a substantive approach of equality which gives rise to concrete 
obligations of conduct.422 Indeed, under Article 5, the Commission lays down the principle that 
“formal equality does not lead to equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent 
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any Member State from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for 
disadvantages linked to religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation.” This substantive 
model of equality endorses the concrete differences of disadvantaged persons and establishes the 
conditions for accommodating specific biological and unalterable diversities. It also refuses a passive 
role for the State and points out the necessity to introduce affirmative and relevant measures in the 
legal system for eliminating unequal treatments. In doing so, the proposal of the Commission reflects 
the innovations introduced by the CRPD, which aims to encourage a real disability law reform, based 
on a conception of non-discrimination that goes beyond formal equality and involves a relevant 
category of substantive rights.423 
The proposed Directive exhibits relevant changes that can positively impact EU anti-discrimination 
law, especially with regard to the rights of persons with disabilities. Despite these positive features, 
the proposal missed an opportunity to tackle two fundamental issues: the concept of disability and 
multiple and intersectional discrimination. The Commission did not adopt any legal guidelines to 
assess the concept of ‘disability’ and identify the scope ratione personae of the new Directive. The 
Commission decided to maintain the same approach used in the existing EU disability discrimination 
legislation. It considered it difficult to impose a single definition of disability on several Member 
States with different equality law. Moreover, the proposed Directive does not deal with the crucial 
issue of multiple and intersectional discrimination, which requires a comprehensive legislative 
approach for protecting complex individual identities. In this respect, the Commission showed a more 
prudent stance because it merely regarded multiple and intersectional discrimination as falling outside 
the scope of the Directive. This approach appears to not interfere with the Member States’ freedom 
to take, or not take action in this area. The lack of legal certainty stemming from the Commission’s 
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proposal may have refrained the CJEU from adopting a broader interpretation of the concept of 
disability and multiple and intersectional discrimination. 
In the following sub-section, the amendments submitted by MEPs will be examined in order to assess 
whether the proposed Directive has been improved in conformity with the CRPD. 
7.1 Enhancing the protection: the Parliamentary amendments 
In April 2009, the European Parliament (EP) adopted its opinion under the Consultation Procedure. 
MEPs proposed 80 amendments to the Commission’s text with the purpose of improving the legal 
content of the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation.424 It is noteworthy to underline that the Parliament aimed to 
introduce a specific provision that emphasises the importance of the principle of equality and the 
prohibition of discrimination. Amendment 2 set out that “the principle of equality and the prohibition 
of discrimination are general principles of international, European and national law that bind the EU 
and its Members States in all matters within their competence. This Directive contributes to reaching 
this aim and to overcome discrimination that is not compatible with it”. This provision would 
constitute a strong commitment to counteract discrimination, as it places the principle of equality at 
the heart of EU and national law. To do so, the Parliament recommended referring explicitly to the 
CRPD for interpreting the provisions of the Directive. 
7.1.1 Embracing the social model of disability 
Amendment 3 stated that “the Directive is one means by which the Community is complying with its 
obligation under the UN Convention and should be interpreted in that light”. The Parliament seems 
to reinforce the CRPD’s status in the EU legal order and stresses the necessity to accelerate its 
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implementation. In this framework, one of the most crucial amendments affects the definition of 
disability. The Parliament assimilated the legal developments occurring at international level and 
therefore recommended an overarching concept of disability in compliance with the UN Convention. 
According to amendment 17: 
“Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which, in interaction with various barriers, whether environmental or attitudinal, may hinder 
their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”. 
The Parliament reproduced the contents of Article 1 of the CRPD and the fundamental guidelines 
enshrined in the preamble. Disability was positively acknowledged as an evolving concept that results 
from the interaction of the individual impairments and the attitudinal or environmental barriers.425 
The main responsibility for eliminating unequal treatment of people with disabilities is therefore 
placed on society.426 
Another relevant contribution of the Parliament regarded the explicit recognition of discrimination 
by association as an autonomous category of discrimination. Amendment 41 proposed the 
introduction of a new Article 2(4) according to which “discrimination based on assumptions about a 
person's religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation or because of association with persons 
of a particular religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, shall be deemed to be 
discrimination within the meaning of Paragraph 1”. In addition, Article 2(5) laid down that denial of 
reasonable accommodation as regards “persons who associate with a person with a disability” shall 
be deemed to be discrimination, where the accommodation is needed to enable such persons to 
provide personal assistance to a person with a disability. Hence, the EP showed the relevance of 
providing reasonable accommodation “by association” and to not limit the duty solely to an individual 
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who personally has a disability. This provision correctly reflected the developments which occurred 
in the Coleman case when the Court of Justice ensured that the UK disability discrimination law 
provides protection on the grounds of someone's association with a disabled person.427 
The European Parliament’s amendment contributed to reduce the gap between EU anti-discrimination 
law and its international commitments. In other words, the EP may be said to have improved the 
Commission’s proposal, which previously failed to specify the criteria to fall under the protection of 
the new Directive. 
7.1.2 Time to take into account multiple discrimination 
The EP’s amendments reveal a clear intent to strengthen the model of substantive equality through 
the recognition of multiple discrimination. The multidimensional equality approach recognises the 
failure to classify a person on the basis of a single attribute, because various characteristics of an 
individual or any combination of them could constitute grounds of discrimination.428 The Parliament 
proposed to bring the prohibition of multiple discrimination within EU equality law. To this end, the 
following amendment was proposed: 
“This Directive also takes into account multiple discrimination. As discrimination can occur on two or more 
of the grounds listed in Articles 12 and 13 of the EC Treaty, in implementing the principle of equal 
treatment, the Community should, in accordance with Articles 3(2) and 13 of the EC Treaty, aim to 
eliminate inequalities relating to sex, race or ethnic origin, disability, sexual orientation, religion or belief, 
or age or a combination of these, and to promote equality, whatever combination of characteristics relating 
to the above-mentioned factors a person may have. Effective legal procedures should be available to deal 
with situations of multiple discrimination. In particular, national legal procedures should ensure that a 
complainant can raise all aspects of a multiple-discrimination claim in a single procedure”. 
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The Parliament sought to enlarge the personal scope of the Directive by means of the addition of a 
specific article that addresses multiple discrimination. Amendment 37 aimed to enrich the scope of 
Article 1 of the Directive which should lay down a framework for combating discrimination, 
“including multiple discrimination”, on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation. Moreover, Article 1(2) would introduce a clear definition of multiple discrimination that 
occurs when discrimination is based on any combination of the grounds of religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation or on any or more of these grounds. The Parliament’s proposal 
also broadened the list of multiple grounds of discrimination including sex, racial or ethnic origin and 
nationality.429 The prohibition of multiple discrimination would contribute to break the cycle of 
disadvantages and remove social obstacles.430 By contrast, the unidimensional approach perpetuates 
the limits of the formal model of equality which does not accommodate the disadvantages of the 
individual’s identity. In this respect, the EP recommended to ensure that a complainant could raise 
all aspects of a multiple-discrimination claim in a single procedure. The inconsistency of the current 
legislation lies in the impossibility to raise multiple grounds of discrimination in the same claim. As 
a consequence, courts face significant difficulties in developing a jurisprudence that takes into 
account the complex realities of multiple discrimination.431 As it was previously examined, the Court 
of Justice recently denied the right to maternity leave to a woman who had a child through a surrogacy 
agreement. The CJEU ruled that there was neither sex or gender discrimination nor discrimination on 
grounds of disability. In doing so, the Court did not afford protection to an individual who suffered 
from cumulative discrimination. 
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The amendments introduced by the Parliament may create the conditions to develop flexible 
mechanisms to identify a proper comparator and overcome the problems which stem from the 
traditional categories of anti-discrimination law. The specific proposal of the Parliament could bring 
about an unprecedented improvement in the legal protection of persons with disabilities, as it seeks 
to achieve an integrated framework for successfully dealing with multiple discriminations.432 The 
following paragraph will investigate in-depth the political and legal reasons that are preventing the 
final adoption of the proposed Directive. 
7.2 What happened to the Commission’s proposal? 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the Commission’s proposal 
now falls under Article 19 of TFEU. This means that, in order to adopt the Directive definitively, 
unanimity is required in the Council, following the consent of the European Parliament. Indeed, 
according to this provision, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, is empowered to take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation. The new procedure under Article 19 (ex 13) of the TFEU implies 
that the European Parliament is only consulted and its assent is not required to adopt the final 
Directive. A new “consent procedure” replaced the old “assent procedure”. Therefore, the Council is 
not legally obliged to take account of Parliament's opinion, but in line with the case law of the Court 
of Justice, it must not take a decision without having received it. Since then, the EP started several 
informal steps to influence the decision-making process within the Council. 
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7.2.1 Resistance and scepticism in the Council 
The journey of the proposed and controversial Directive through the European institutions is not over 
yet. The draft proposal is still stuck in the Council, wherein several concerns have been raised about 
its final adoption. The deliberations of the Council took place in its respective Working Group and 
led to a range of proposed amendments.433 The majority of EU countries have reacted positively to 
the possible introduction of a new Equality Directive, endorsing the fact that it aims to complete the 
existing legal framework by addressing all four grounds of discrimination.434 Many delegations have 
put accent on the importance of promoting equal treatment as a shared social value within the EU and 
the significance of the proposal in the context of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.435 Notably, some delegations would have improved the protection in favour of persons 
with disabilities instead of adopting a horizontal approach. 
By contrast, certain delegations have raised substantial criticisms in regard to the new Equality 
Directive. Owners of companies and a few Member States are mainly worried by the economic impact 
of the Directive’s implementation.436 These delegations outlined the necessity to acquire more 
experience with the implementation of existing Community before the introduction of a new 
extensive legislation. They also had concerns about the timeliness of the Commission’s proposal and 
the need to respect the division of competences, the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. 
Furthermore, they argued that the financial and practical implications of the provisions enshrined in 
the Directive are highly burdensome. With this backdrop, the negotiations within the Council are 
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highly complicated and the process to reach a compromise seems very intricate. In the next sub-
sections these issues within the Council will be closely scrutinised. 
7.2.2 The principle of subsidiarity: obstacle or opportunity? 
A few delegations argued that the Horizontal Directive would alter the division of competences 
between the European Union and the Member States as defined by the Treaties. In accordance with 
this position, the introduction at the European level of the “equal treatment” Directive would breach 
the principles of subsidiarity. In particular, some European countries fear the legal obligation 
concerning the access to goods and service, education and social protection to everyone and, 
consequently, claim the national competence to legislate in these matters. However, significant 
progress was made under the Latvian Presidency which succeeded to in clarify the Directive’s scope 
as well as the division of competences between the EU and its Member States.437 
It may be worth recalling that the principle of subsidiarity represents a fundamental principle for the 
functioning of the EU, which governs the distribution of competences between EU and Member 
States.438 Article 5(3) of the TEU states that: 
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union 
shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”439 
This principle sets out the essential preconditions for the intervention of EU institutions. It is “a rule 
of the proper execution of Community powers (Kompetenzausubungsregel)”.440 Article 5 emphasises 
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that the area concerned must not fall within the Union’s exclusive competence. The EU has to take 
action in cases where it would act more effectively than Member States, which cannot sufficiently 
achieve the action proposed.441 Article 5 (4) adds the further condition of proportionality according 
to which “any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty”. 
In light of the above principle, it is necessary to examine whether the EU’s action to combat disability 
discrimination in areas beyond employment would undermine the division of competence between 
EU and Member States.442 The EU institutions have already adopted a directive dealing with the 
prohibition of discrimination beyond employment relationships.443 The EU enacted the Race Equality 
Directive 2000/43/EC for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial and ethnic origin and 
sex in the context of employment, access to goods and services and in accessing the welfare and 
social security system. The Preamble of the Race Directive expressly recognises the importance of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the EC Treaty. Member 
States acknowledged that: 
“The objective of this Directive, namely ensuring a common high level of protection against discrimination 
in all the Member States, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason 
of the scale and impact of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. This Directive does 
not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives”.444 
The approval of the Race Equality Directive constitutes a significant precedent in EU law. As a 
consequence, it demonstrates that the adoption of an Equality Directive addressing discrimination in 
the fields of access to goods and services, welfare and social security systems does not interfere with 
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the division of competences between the EU and the Member States. Hence, the new Horizontal 
Directive would cover the application of the principle of equal treatment within the specific limits of 
EU competences. It may be argued that once the EU has performed its legislative role under the 
Treaty to regulate a particular matter, Member States cannot claim a violation of the subsidiarity 
principle in a similar situation. 
Moreover, the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member 
States, who have different national legislation concerning equality and non-discrimination. The 
urgent need to provide a uniform and comprehensive piece of legislation stems from the signature 
and ratification of the CRPD. To this end, a directive is the best instrument to ensure a coherent 
minimum level of protection against discrimination across the EU. The adoption of the Equal 
Treatment Directive would accelerate the process to harmonise the different legal orders within the 
EU enhancing the protection of their citizens. 
7.2.3 Does EU action go beyond what is necessary to achieve? 
Another important requirement established by Article 5 demands that EU action does not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve.445 This principle of proportionality affects the measure chosen to reach 
the goal and implies the adoption of the less restrictive norm.446 In this regard, the Directive does not 
impose specific measures on Member States to implement the prohibition of discrimination, but 
leaves them significant leeway to apply the EU provisions. The 2015 report of the Working Party on 
Social Questions concerning the proposed Directive outlined that Member States would still retain 
the main responsibility for the organisation of their social protection and educational systems.447 
Member States would continue to retain their discretional powers for organising, commissioning and 
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providing services of general economic interests. For instance, the concept of “access” embraced by 
the Directive does not encompass the determination of whether a person is entitled to obtain social 
protection or education. Member States are called upon to set out the conditions to identify those 
persons eligible for protection or education. In doing so, the Directive does not undermine the 
discretion of Member States in defining the personal scope of the protection. The Working Party also 
stressed the content of the exclusive competence of Member States as regards the organisation of 
their national protection and educational systems. With regard to social protection, Member States 
would have exclusive competence for the setting up, financing and managing of such systems and 
related institutions as well as the competence for determining the substance, the amount, the 
calculation and the duration of benefits and services.448 At the same time, they have to introduce the 
conditions of eligibility for benefits and services, as well as for the adjustment of those conditions in 
order to ensure the sustainability of public finances. The Horizontal Directive only underlines that 
the concept of social protection includes social security, social assistance, social housing and health 
care. The Directive would cover those rights and benefits that derive from general or special social 
security, social assistance and healthcare schemes, which are provided by the State or by private 
parties funded by the State. 
In the matter of educational systems, EU countries would exercise their exclusive competences “for 
the setting up, financing and management of educational institutions, for the development of curricula 
and other educational activities, for the definition of examination process and for the setting 
conditions of eligibility, including, for example, age limits regarding eligibility for schools, 
scholarship or courses”.449 It is evident that Member States would retain the main competence in 
organising their educational system and the content of teaching and of educational activities, 
including the provision of special needs education. 
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The Latvian Presidency’s clarification called for a broad flexibility in the application of the principle 
of equal treatment and showed the pragmatic intention to reach an agreement between the Member 
States. This legal background does not limit the wide margin of discretion of the Member States and 
their exclusive competences with respect to the implementation of the EU Directive. It could be said 
that the subsidiarity argument submitted by some Member States is not relevant to exclude the 
legitimacy of the EU action with regard to equality law. This concept, along with the principle of 
proportionality, represents a very vague and non-legal notion that should not constitute an obstacle 
to limit the EU’s legislative capacity. 
The main amendments introduced by the Council will now be analysed and it will be shown that the 
Council’s latest draft narrowed the protection of the proposed Directive. 
7.3 The new equality framework: one step forward, two steps back? 
Significant changes have been made with regard to the prohibition of discrimination and the scope of 
the proposed Directive. According to Article 1 of the last Council’s draft, the Directive lays down a 
framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual 
orientation, with a view to putt the principle of equal treatment within the scope of Article 3 into 
effect in the Member States.450 The new purpose of Article 1, as amended by the Council, narrows 
the corresponding provision of the Commission’s proposal. It indeed excludes multiple 
discrimination from the protection of the Directive and covers only the areas mentioned under Article 
3. The Commission’s proposal introduced a wide purpose through the adoption of an “open-ended” 
clause which aims to putting into effect the principle of equal treatment in any areas “other than 
employment and occupation”. The Council’s amendment confined the application of the equality 
provisions to those fields expressly covered by the Directive. 
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Moreover, the Council did not consider the EP’s amendment which sought to define and prohibit 
multiple discrimination. The latest provision of the Directive merely recognises the possibility to 
address multiple discrimination against woman without embracing the comprehensive definition 
adopted by the Parliament. Recital 13 lays down that “in implementing the principle of equal 
treatment irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, the European Union 
should, in accordance with Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, aim to 
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men and women, especially since women are 
often the victims of multiple discrimination”.451 The approach of the Council reduces the level of 
protection of those vulnerable persons who may suffer discrimination on any combination of the 
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. The Council rejected the extensive 
improvements made by the Parliament that enlarged the prohibition of multiple discrimination to the 
grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin and nationality in accordance with Directives 2000/43/EC452 
and 2004/113/EC.453 
It may be argued that the prohibition of multiple and intersectional discrimination still represents a 
crucial issue at EU political level. In 2017, the Maltese Presidency, with the support of the EP and 
civil society organisation, proposed significant amendments to include the concept of multiple and 
intersectional discrimination in the final draft. Remarkably, the Presidency sought to specify that 
“discrimination could also intersect with discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin and 
nationality, as well as sex or gender identity”. The progress report however highlights that some 
delegations in the Council were not in favour of singling out a specific provision concerning multiple 
and intersectional discrimination and preferred to refer to it in general terms.454 The negotiations’ 
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outcome confirms the assumption that Member States are not yet prone to revise their legislative 
equality frameworks and adapt them to the highest standards of protection of international human 
rights law. The adoption of an express provision prohibiting multiple and intersectional 
discrimination would indeed imply reviewing those equality norms that require a formal comparator 
to assess a discriminatory treatment and do not allow to claim discrimination on different grounds in 
the same compliant. As EU equality law does not encompass a specific provision prohibiting multiple 
and intersectional discrimination, the majority of Member States have not introduced any laws to 
address it.455 
7.3.1 The concept of discrimination under the Council’s proposal 
Major amendments affected Article 2 of the Directive in relation to the concept of discrimination. 
The Council included ‘discrimination by association’ in the principle of equal treatment and 
crystallised the findings of the CJEU in the Coleman case.456 The Court found that discrimination by 
association occurs when a person is discriminated against because of his/her association with 
someone who possesses a disability or another protected ground. The recognition of this form of 
discrimination represents an important development of EU equality law as it covers those individuals 
who effectively take care of vulnerable persons. The Council also revised the concept of harassment, 
which may be “defined in accordance with the national laws and practice of the Member States”. In 
doing so, it left a significant discretion to Member States to detail the content of ‘harassment’ in the 
light of their national legal systems. 
It is worth saying that the Latvian Presidency gave an important contribution with regard to the 
interpretation of the concept of discrimination under Article 2. It pointed out that, notwithstanding 
paragraphs 1 and 2, the Directive shall not preclude differences of treatment consisting in more 
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favourable for persons with disabilities as regards conditions of access to social protections, education 
and supply of goods and services. The Directive admits the possibility to guarantee favourable 
treatments for persons with disabilities in order to reinforce the implementation of the principle of 
equality. The introduction of this paragraph would enlarge the protection afforded to persons with 
disabilities in comparison with the Commission’s proposal, which only takes into account differences 
of treatment on grounds of age. 
7.3.2 The scope of the proposed Directive 
The Latvian Presidency also clarified the scope of the prohibition of discrimination under Article 3 
of the proposed Directive. It lays down that the prohibition shall apply to all persons, as regard both 
public and private sectors, including public bodies, in relation to access to social protection, education 
and supply of goods and other services. 
Notably, the area of ‘social advantages’ has been deleted by the new Council’s draft as EU law would 
allegedly not establish a clear definition of social advantage. This term is only mentioned in Article 
7(2) of Regulation No 492/2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union.457 The CJEU 
explained that the term means all the advantages which, whether or not linked to a contract, are 
generally granted to national workers. For instance, it covers public, transport, fare reductions for 
large families, child raising allowances, funeral payments, minimum subsistence payments and study 
grants.458 The Court of Justice, in the case of Christini v SNCF, held that this concept applies to all 
advantages, not just to those limited to a contract of employment. 459 In this case, a reduced fare 
entitlement was claimed by the widow of an Italian SNCF worker. The French SNCF railway 
company provided a scheme that offered a fare reduction to persons with large families. The SNCF 
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claimed that it was not available to foreign workers because Article 7(2) applied only to social 
advantages related to a contract of employment. The Court of Justice rejected the position of SNCF 
and showed a broad approach according to which also family members can benefit from social 
advantages.460 
It is noteworthy to underline that the prohibition of discrimination in relation to social advantage 
constitutes a fundamental aspect of the protection afforded to persons with disabilities and their 
family members as it covers essential financial benefits and non-financial advantages. The removal 
of this provision from the proposed Directive represents a backward step for the protection of 
vulnerable individuals under EU equality law. 
By contrast, the Council’s amendments enlarged the content of the prohibition of discrimination with 
regard to access to social protection. The Council specified that access to social protection includes 
social security, social assistance and social housing and healthcare. Under this paragraph, the 
Directive aims to cover the entire process of seeking information, applying and registration as well 
as the actual provision of social protection measures. 
The same wording is used to regulate access to education and supply of goods and other services.461 
The proposed Directive however does not apply to matters covered by family law, including marital 
status and adoption, as well as laws on reproductive rights. To the same extent, the organisation and 
funding of Member States' social protection and educational systems does not fall under the scope of 
the Directive. The prohibition of discrimination also affects individuals providing goods and services. 
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The Directive does not jeopardise the freedom to choose a contractual partner for a transaction, but it 
prohibits making such a choice on grounds of person’s religion or belief, age, disability and sexual 
orientation. This prohibition should only apply to persons providing good and services that are 
available to the public. It does not cover goods and services which are provided in the area of private 
and family life. The last version of the Directive replaces the provision of the Commission’s proposal 
that confined its application to individuals only insofar as they are performing a professional or 
commercial activity. This new wording may extend the area of application of the prohibition outside 
the context of private and family life, but it will mainly depend on the interpretation of the meaning 
of ‘private and family life’. 
The efforts made by the Latvian Presidency in 2015 are still highly relevant and created the conditions 
where Member States could reach an agreement. It detailed the content of central issues such as the 
concept of non-discrimination, the scope of the proposal and the distribution of competences in order 
to draw a clear picture of the areas covered by the Directive. 
Further developments have recently been made under the Slovak Presidency with regard to other 
sensitive issues such as the interplay between the Horizontal Directive and those provisions on 
accessibility for persons with disabilities included in the proposed European Accessibility Act (EEA), 
the prohibition of non-discrimination of specific age groups and the remit of national equality 
bodies.462 Despite that, the 2016 progress report concludes that further political discussions are 
needed to reach the required unanimity in the Council. 
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7.3.3 Reasonable accommodation: narrowing the Commission’s approach 
Another important amendment submitted by the Council regards the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation. Article 4(a) of the proposed Directive states that “in order to guarantee compliance 
with the principle of equal treatment in relation to persons with disabilities, reasonable 
accommodation shall be provided within the areas set out in Article 3”. This new provision points 
out a clear definition of reasonable accommodation that includes those “necessary and appropriate 
modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a 
particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with 
others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Interestingly, the Council embraced the same 
definition of reasonable accommodation enshrined in the CRPD, but eliminated the reference to the 
crucial “anticipatory duty” of the Commission’s proposal. 
In addition, the new proposed Directive does not require the provider of housing to make structural 
alterations to the premises or to pay for them in order to comply with the above obligation. The duty 
upon the provider to make structural modifications is imposed in the sole case such alterations are 
funded by public investments.463 The Council also intervened to clarify the extent to which the 
reasonable adjustments cause a disproportionate burden on the duty-holders. It sets out precise 
guidelines such as: 
a) the size, resources and nature of the organisation or enterprise, aa) the negative impact on the person 
with a disability affected by the fact that the measure is not provided; b) the estimated cost; c) the estimated 
benefit for persons with disabilities; d) the life span of infrastructures and objects which are used to provide 
a service; e) the historical, cultural, artistic or architectural value of the movable or immovable property in 
question; f) the safety and practicability of the measures in question. 
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The Directive introduces detailed standards for assessing the impact of the reasonable 
accommodation and adds four new requirements such as i) the negative impact on the person with a 
disability affected by the fact that the measure is not provided; ii) the life span of infrastructures and 
objects which are used to provide a service; iii) the historical, cultural, artistic or architectural value 
of the movable or immovable property in question and iv) the safety and practicability of the measures 
in question. 
However, the duty to provide reasonable accommodation has been alleviated in comparison to the 
proposal of the Commission and the Parliament’s amendments. Indeed, the lack of a clear anticipatory 
obligation undermines the entire effectiveness of the provision and perpetuates the inconsistency of 
the current legislation. It is evident that Member States are afraid of imposing challenging duties on 
both private and public companies in order to implement the right of persons with disabilities to have 
access to education, social protection and goods and services. The economic aspect of the Directive 
will now be analysed with the purpose of assessing its impact on the budget of Member States and 
private enterprises. 
7.4 Financial implications: is the Directive too costly and burdensome? 
Member States claim that the Directive would provoke burdensome economic consequences and 
excessive additional duties.464 In this respect, it is important to underline that the Proposed Directive 
guarantees a significant leeway to Member States to comply with the EU provisions. The recent 
negotiations within the Council further extended the timeline concerning the Horizontal Directive’s 
implementation. Indeed, the transposition period is four years for the introduction of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions, while it is five years for ensuring accessibility to new buildings, 
                                                      
464 As the negotiations within the Council are made behind closed doors, it is very difficult to individuate which exactly 
are the Member States that are obstructing the adoption of the proposed Directive. However, according to the NGO AGE 
Platform Europe, the German Federal Government is mainly responsible for this impasse, because it continues to refuse 
to hold a substantive debate on this topic. See also the Press Release, NGOs call on Germany to stop blocking the Equal 
Treatment Directive, Brussels, 23rd July 2015. 
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transport services and infrastructure. Moreover, the latest amendments introduced an additional 
period of 20 years to provide accessibility for all other existing buildings, facilities, vehicles and 
infrastructures undergoing significant renovations.465 At the same time, Member States would 
maintain their exclusive competence for the organisation of the main areas covered by the Directive. 
This framework can therefore not be said to overburden the economic system of national 
governments, but it entails flexible conditions and timetables for a progressive realisation of those 
obligations introduced by the Directive. 
7.4.1 Costs of discrimination in education and health care 
Extensive research has been made by the EU institutions in relation to the impact of the Directive on 
Member States, with a particular focus on public service providers and small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs).466 The main NGOs working to combat discrimination in Europe have revealed that “long-
term costs of exclusion and discrimination are higher than short-term costs of inclusion and 
integration”.467 
The Commission found that the impact of discrimination on the basis of disability is particularly 
serious in the area of education and health care.468 Persons with disabilities often have a lower level 
of education and consequently lower educational qualifications. This means that they will encounter 
several obstacles to reach their full potential in the labour market. The employment rate of disabled 
people (50%) is still below that for the rest of the population (65%). According to the Commission’s 
                                                      
465 Art 15 of the proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
466 See for example, European Parliamentary Research Service, Implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons Complementary Impact Assessment of the proposed horizontal Directive on Equal Treatment, (January 2014, 
Brussels). See also, Commission staff working document, accompanying the Proposal for a council directive on 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation Impact Assessment, COM(2008) 426 final, (Brussels, 2.7.2008). 
467 Joint NGO Statement: EU equal treatment law: the time is now! Adopted by the “The Equality for All”, a coalition 
comprised of: AGE Platform Europe; European Disability Forum (EDF); European Network Against Racism (ENAR); 
European Youth Forum; ILGA-Europe - the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and 
Intersex Association; Social Platform; European Women’s Lobby; International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and 
Queer Youth and Student Organisation (IGLYO); European Network on Religion and Belief (ENORB); Eurochild. 
Brussels, 18 June 2015. 
468 Commission staff working document, COM (2008) 426 final. 
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research, the wage loss in the EU because of the lower education level of 3,592,000 severely or 
moderately disabled persons is estimated to amount to €28bn per annum.469 
As a consequence, the lower participation rate or qualification level of individuals with disabilities 
also negatively affects also their economic performance in the labour market. The loss of Gross 
Domestic Product is estimated to reach around 40.3 billion euro per annum. In addition, the 
Commission stated that almost 8.4 million disabled individuals face discrimination with regard to 
access to health services, and the resulting ill health is calculated to produce a loss of 599 million 
euros in net wages per year. Ill health brings about lower economic performance and a loss of GDP 
as a result of a diminishing workforce, estimated at 812 million euros per year. In this context, the 
direct tax revenue foregone is estimated to add up to around 213 million euros a year.470 
It cannot be denied that the structural changes required by the Directive are challenging in terms of 
short-terms goals, but they can produce considerable economic gains and long-term improvements 
for all of society. The concrete implementation of human rights requires economic expenditure and 
positive actions by governments. For this reason, the ‘too costly’ argument advanced by the Member 
States is also incompatible with the current human rights obligations. The full realisation of civil and 
political rights or socio-economic rights relies on the budgetary resources invested by State Parties, 
as all rights have budgetary implications and rights of persons with disabilities require supplementary 
funds.471 
7.4.2 Costs for SMEs and public service providers 
The central duty of private and public entities is to provide reasonable accommodation. Therefore, 
service providers will have to adapt their services to the needs of persons with disabilities. For 
                                                      
469 Ibid, p. 74. 
470 Ibid, p. 75. 
471 I. E. Koch, 'From Invisibility to Indivisibility: the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities' 
in O. Arnardottir & G. Quinn (Eds.) The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European 
and Scandinavian perspectives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff), p. 72. 
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instance, SMEs that provide goods and services are obliged to adapt their premises to persons with 
disabilities. At the same time, public entities have to modify both infrastructure and websites in the 
light of their available resources and the fundamental nature of their services. The last study 
commissioned by the Parliament to assess the impact of the proposed Directive on SMEs shows that 
the majority of costs would affect the realisation of adjustments to premises, but a greater burden 
would be placed on public service providers compared with SMEs.472 
In particular, the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation with regard to access to goods and 
services is mainly influenced by the way the provider performs its business. For instance, a company 
that provides services such as utility and professional services may have to adapt its communication 
materials and methods, whilst a goods provider may need to provide infrastructure adjustments where 
physical access to premises is essential. Hard costs are related to the necessity to make buildings and 
associated equipment accessible where the service is provided in a building. Soft costs depend on the 
way the service is provided and require changes to policies and procedures, ad hoc service changes 
and trainings. Duties upon private and public companies entail significant costs and benefits related 
to physical infrastructure and less expensive adjustments to non-physical infrastructure. 
The complementary impact assessment of the European Parliamentary Research Service found that 
regulatory and generic compliance costs over a five-year implementation period are estimated from 
€78 million euro in the Czech Republic to €492 million in Germany.473 The 20-year implementation 
period may reduce the gap between costs and benefits and mitigate the economic burden originating 
from the Directive’s application. The hard costs required by the proposed Directive are considerably 
significant, but they would bring about relevant long-term benefits for a great portion of EU 
population. 
                                                      
472 European Parliamentary Research Service, Implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
Complementary Impact Assessment of the proposed horizontal Directive on Equal Treatment, p. 198. 
473 Ibid, p. 197. 
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7.5 Final evaluation of the proposed Horizontal Directive 
The last section of this chapter has analysed the new Horizontal Directive proposed by the 
Commission, the amendments of the Parliament and the main issues raised by national governments 
within the Council. The proposed Directive was originally meant to be an overarching piece of 
equality legislation covering discrimination outside the area of employment. Its scope was to prohibit 
discrimination based on religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation by both the public and 
private sector in social protection, including social security and health care, social advantages, 
education, access to and supply of goods and services which are available to the public, including 
housing. 
The Commission’s proposal aimed to put in place a comprehensive EU equality framework with the 
purpose to reinforce the protection of persons with disabilities in compliance with the obligations 
stemming from the CRPD’s ratification. The amendments of the Parliament further improved the 
legal protection of the proposed Directive through the adoption of a wide definition of disability and 
the explicit prohibition of multi-discrimination. Despite these political efforts, the negotiations on the 
Horizontal Directive are currently in deadlock within the Council. The last Council instrument shows 
the difficulty to achieve a piece of legislation fully in compliance with the CRPD. A substantial 
discrepancy emerges from the initial Commission’s proposal and the final Council’s draft. In 
particular, the major amendments presented by the Parliament have been completely overlooked. 
The negotiations within the Council exhibit the resolute scepticism of owners of companies and the 
opposition from important Member States, especially from Germany, as they would be the most 
affected by the Directive’s adoption. The last Council’s instrument restricts the protection for persons 
with disabilities and ignores the relevant improvements advanced by the Parliament. The Council’s 
approach aims to confine the application of the Directive to those areas covered by Article 3 and 
excludes the prohibition of discrimination in the field of ‘social advantages’. The elimination of this 
190 
 
sensitive area narrows the material scope of the Directive and conflicts with the proposals of both the 
Commission and Parliament. In addition, the Council does not refer to multiple discrimination under 
the purpose of the Directive and merely mentions the objective to promote equality between men and 
women, especially since women are often victims of multiple discrimination. In doing so, the Council 
not only rejects the outstanding work made by the Parliament with regard to an exhaustive definition 
of multiple discrimination, but it leaves a great void in the EU legal system. The Council has also 
removed the ‘anticipatory’ obligation to provide reasonable accommodation on workplace and 
specifies that the providers of housing are not required to make structural alterations to the premises 
in order to accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities. By contrast, the anticipatory duty is 
only guaranteed in relation to the identification and elimination of obstacles and barriers to 
accessibility.474 
The most significant improvement introduced by the Council is solely represented by the explicit 
recognition of discrimination by association and denial of reasonable accommodation as unlawful 
forms of discrimination. The last instrument provided by the Council therefore reflects a political 
compromise that favours those Member States who agree on the final adoption of a weaker Directive 
in comparison with the original Commission’s proposal. 
It may be argued that a new Horizontal Directive would not overwhelm the economic capacity of the 
Member States as the short-term costs of inclusion and integration are widely compensated by future 
benefits in terms of the growth of GDP and taxes. Moreover, the subsidiarity argument submitted by 
the Member States may be viewed as a legalistic strategy to avoid supranational commitments. 
Member States would indeed retain their exclusive competences in the organisation of the areas 
                                                      
474 Art. 4 of the Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation: Accessibility for persons with disabilities: “Member 
States shall take the necessary and appropriate measures to ensure accessibility for persons with disabilities, on an equal 
basis with others, within the areas set out in Article 3. These measures should not impose a disproportionate burden. 1A. 
Accessibility includes general anticipatory measures to ensure the effective implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment in all areas set out in Article 3 for persons with disabilities, on an equal basis with others. 
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covered by the Directive. The new Horizontal Directive would address the principle of equal 
treatment within the specific limits of the EU competences such as the Race Directive already did in 
the past. In light of this intricate scenario, Member States are encouraged to accelerate the 
negotiations for a definitive adoption of the proposed Directive. A new multidimensional and 
comprehensive approach is needed to change outdated paradigms and eliminate hierarchy of equality. 
At the same time, they are called upon to introduce appropriate amendments in order to comply with 
their international obligations and enrich the protection of human rights in the European Union. 
The following table summarises the evolution throughout the legislative process of the main articles 


















The Directive lays down a 
framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age, 
or sexual orientation, with a view 
to putting into effect in the 
Member States the principle of 
equal treatment other than in the 
field of employment and 
occupation. 
Amend. 37 
for Art. 1 
1. This Directive lays down a 
framework for combating 
discrimination, including multiple 
discrimination, on the grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation, with a view to 
putting into effect in the Member 
States the principle of equal 
treatment other than in the field of 
employment and occupation.  
Art.1 
The Directive lays down a 
framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age, or 
sexual orientation, with a view to 
putting into effect in the Member 
States the principle of equal 
treatment within the scope of 
Article 3. 
Recital 13 
In implementing the principle of 
equal treatment irrespective of 
religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation, the 
Community should, in 
accordance with Article 3(2) of 
the EC Treaty, aim to eliminate 
inequalities, and to promote 
equality between men and 
women, especially since women 
are often the victims of multiple 
discrimination. 
Amend. 37 
for Art.1 (2) 
2. Multiple discrimination occurs 
when discrimination is based: 
(a) on any combination of the 
grounds of religion or belief, 
disability, age, or sexual 
orientation, or (b) on any one or 
more of the grounds set out in 
Paragraph 1, and also on the ground 
of any one or more of (i) sex (in so 
far as the matter complained of is 
within the material scope of 
Directive 2004/113/EC as well as 
of this Directive), (ii) racial or 
ethnic origin (in so far as the matter 
Recital 
13 
In implementing the principle of 
equal treatment irrespective of 
religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation, the European 
Union should, in accordance with 
Article 8 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European 
Union, aim to eliminate 
inequalities, and to promote 
equality between men and women, 
especially since women are often 




complained of is within the 
material scope of Directive 
2000/43/EC as well as of this 
Directive), or iii) nationality (in so 
far as the matter complained of is 
within the scope of Article 12 of the 
EC Treaty). 3. In this Directive, 
multiple discrimination and 





For the purposes of this 
Directive, the "principle of equal 
treatment" shall mean that there 
shall be no direct or indirect 
discrimination on any of the 
grounds referred to in Article 1. 
Art. 2 (1) No changes Art. 2 
1. For the purposes of this 
Directive, the “principle of equal 
treatment” shall mean that there 
shall be no discrimination on any of 
the grounds referred to in Article 1. 
For the purposes of this Directive, 
discrimination means: (a) direct 
discrimination; (b) indirect 
discrimination; (c) harassment; (d) 
instruction to discriminate against 
persons on any of the grounds 
referred to in Article 1; (e) denial of 
reasonable accommodation for 
persons with disabilities; (f) direct 




Art. 3 Scope 
Discrimination shall apply to all 
persons, as regards both the 
public and private sectors, 
including public bodies, in 
relation to: a) Social protection, 
including social security and 
healthcare; b) Social advantages; 
c) Education; d) Access to and 
supply of goods and other 
services which are available to 
the public, including housing. 
Subparagraph (d) shall apply to 
individuals only insofar as they 
are performing a professional or 
commercial. 
Art. 3 
Discrimination shall apply to all 
persons, as regards both the public 
and private sectors, including 
public bodies, in relation to: 
a) Social protection, including 
social security and healthcare; b) 
Social advantages; c) Education; d) 
access to and supply of goods and 
other services which are available 
to the public, including housing 
and transport. 
Subparagraph (d) shall apply to 
individuals only insofar as they are 
performing a professional or 
commercial activity. (d) (a) 
affiliation to and activities in 
associations and the services 
provided by such organisations. 
Art. 3 
Within the limits of the 
competences conferred upon the 
European Union, the prohibition of 
discrimination shall apply to all 
persons, as regards both the public 
and private sectors, including 
public bodies, in relation to: a) 
Access to social protection, 
including social security, social 
assistance, social housing and 
healthcare; b) blank; c) access to 
education; d) access to and supply 
and other service, including 
housing, which are available to the 
public and which are offered 




of persons with 
disabilities 
1. In order to guarantee 
compliance with the principle of 
equal treatment in relation to 
persons with disabilities: a) The 
measures necessary to enable 
persons with disabilities to have 
effective non-discriminatory 
access to social protection, social 
advantages, health care, 
Art. 4 No Changes Art. 4 
1. Member States shall take the 
necessary and appropriate 
measures to ensure accessibility for 
persons with disabilities, on an 
equal basis with others, within the 
areas set out in Article 3. These 




education and access to and 
supply of goods 
and services which are available 
to the public, including housing 
and transport, shall be provided 
by anticipation, including 
through appropriate 
modifications or adjustments.  
1a. Accessibility includes general 
anticipatory measures to ensure the 
effective implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for 
persons with disabilities in the 
areas set out in Article 3. 
 
Art. 4(1) 
Art. 4(1) b) Notwithstanding the 
obligation to ensure effective 
non- discriminatory access and 
where needed in a particular case. 
Amend. 97 
for Art. 4 
para. 1(a) 
In order to guarantee compliance 
with the principle of equal 
treatment in relation to persons 
with disabilities, (…): 
a) The measures necessary to 
enable persons with disabilities to 
have effective non-discriminatory 
access to social protection, social 
advantages, health care, education 
and access to and supply of goods 
and services which are available to 
the public (…), shall be provided 
by anticipation, including through 






1. In order to guarantee compliance 
with the principle of equal 
treatment in relation to persons 
with disabilities, reasonable 
accommodation shall be provided 
within the areas set out in Article 3. 
2. Reasonable accommodation 
means necessary and appropriate 
modification and adjustments not 
imposing a disproportionate 
burden, where needed in a 
particular case, to accommodate the 
specific needs of a person with a 
disability (…).  
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CHAPTER 4  
EU GOVERNANCE 
1. Ratifying and implementing the UN Convention: winners and losers of the EU institutional 
game 
On 30 March 2007, the EU signed the UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities on 
its opening day for signature. The CRPD has been signed and ratified by all 28 EU countries and a 
further 120 states worldwide. On 23 December 2010, the EU formally ratified the treaty. In doing so, 
it was the first, and so far only, international organisation to have become a party to the Convention.475 
The accession by the EU to the CRPD represents an unprecedented event in international and EU 
law. It is the first time that the EU as a whole signed and ratified a comprehensive human rights treaty. 
The EU’s capacity to negotiate and conclude international agreements on its own behalf is set out in 
Article 216 TFEU: 
“The Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations 
where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, 
within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties, or is provided 
for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope”. 
The Treaties lay down that agreements concluded by the Union are binding on its institutions and its 
Member States. Interestingly, the CPRD’s conclusion is said to constitute a “mixed” agreement to 
the extent that the EU and Member States are separated contracting parties and have ‘concurrent 
powers’ to conclude such agreement.476 As a consequence, EU institutions are bound to the provisions 
falling within EU competence and Union secondary legislation must be enacted in compliance with 
                                                      
475 Art. 43 of the CRPD states that “the present Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States and to 
formal confirmation by signatory regional integration organizations. It shall be open for accession by any State or regional 
integration organization which has not signed the Convention”. 
476 M. Rhinard, M. Kaeding, The International Bargaining Power of the European Union in ‘Mixed’ Competence 
Negotiations: The Case of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 1023. 
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the Convention’s rules. In the light of this framework, this chapter will explore the role performed by 
EU institutions in the ratification and implementation process of the UN Convention. The aim is to 
identify how the EU governance architecture is changing in order to deal with the CRPD. 
2. The negotiations of the CRPD and the EU 
The EU played a significant role in the process of negotiating and drafting the UN Disability 
Convention. The main institution involved in this procedure was the Commission, which lobbied for 
the adoption of an international instrument to protect the rights of persons with disabilities since the 
2003.477 
Indeed, the Commission released the Communication “Towards a United Nations legally binding 
instrument to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities” in order to 
emphasise the importance of reinforcing the existing international framework for the protection of 
persons with disabilities.478 In May 2004, the Council authorised the Commission to conduct 
negotiations on behalf of the then European Community. The Commission acknowledged that 
persons with disabilities are often marginalised because of physical, technical and social obstacles 
that prevent them from fully enjoying their rights in all regions of the world. The Commission 
proposed that “rather than create new law, the instrument should tailor the existing human rights 
implementation standards to the specific circumstances of people with disabilities, thereby improving 
access for people with disabilities to their rights”.479 The Commission Communication highlighted 
the goal to put into place a legally binding instrument that could reinforce the prohibition of non-
discrimination and the principle of equality:480 
                                                      
477 G. de Burca, The EU in the negotiation of the UN Disabilty Convention (2010) 35 European Law Review 174. 
478 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 24 January 2003 "Towards a 
United Nations legally binding instrument to promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities" COM 
(2003) 16 final. 
479 Ibid, Introduction. 
480 L. Waddington, ‘Breaking New Ground: The Implications of Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities for the European Community' in O. Arnardottir & G. Quinn (Eds.) The United Nations 
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“Equal access to the human rights can be guaranteed by ensuring that people with disabilities are not 
discriminated against on the grounds of their disability. The legally binding instrument should protect 
people with disabilities from discrimination in having access to and enjoying human rights”.481 
The EU’s position in favour of an international binding treaty based on equality and non-
discrimination has often been considered restrictive and prudent. For instance, Gráinne de Búrca 
argued that while the EU promoted a strong disability agenda, the Commission appeared sceptical 
with regard to the adoption of a separate Convention including substantive rights for disabled persons. 
On the contrary, the emphasis placed by the Commission on the principle of equality derived from 
the need to identify the legal basis of Community competence to negotiate the CRPD.482 The 
Commission mentioned Article 13 of the EC Treaty because this provision (now Article 19 TFEU) 
enabled the Community to combat discrimination on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation, in the areas of Community competence. In doing so, 
the Commission confirmed the leading role of the European Community at international level in 
carrying out an overall strategy concerning disability, which also represents a shared commitment by 
all Member States. The most important and beneficial results of the Commission’s work during the 
CRPD’s negotiations will be highlighted below. 
2.1 The Commission’s contribution to the drafting of the CRPD 
The Commission promoted the realisation of an international instrument to identify the full spread of 
human rights including political and civil/fundamental rights as well as economic, social and cultural 
rights. The Commission Communication hailed the human rights approach according to which states 
should take action to ensure that in reality people with disabilities are in a position to exercise their 
                                                      
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian perspectives (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff), p. 119. 
481 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 24 January 2003. 
482 L. Waddington, Breaking New Ground: The Implications of Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities for the European Community, in O. Arnardottir & G. Quinn (Eds.) The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian perspectives (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff), p. 119. 
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rights.483 It also encouraged the establishment of a strong monitoring mechanism to successfully 
implement the new international instrument.484 The Commission’s stance did not aim at obstructing 
the adoption of a substantive rights-based Convention. It rather pushed for introducing relevant 
provisions of EU equality law within the CRPD’s framework. The Communication indeed outlined 
the goal to bring the Community's experience in the field of combating discrimination at international 
level. In particular, the Commission set out those guiding principles that should have informed the 
Convention, drawing upon the experience of Directive 2000/78/EC concerning equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, which embodies specific provision for people with disabilities. The 
Commission’s contribution sought to ensure consistency between EU law and international legal 
standards in relation to the protection of disabled persons. 
The work of the Commission during the negotiations also decisively helped strengthening the 
European Community’s role on the international stage. The European Commission’s officials indeed 
explicitly demanded the insertion of an article in the Convention’s final draft to recognise the 
accession of international organisations to the CRPD. The action carried out by the Commission 
successfully culminated with the introduction of Articles 43 and 44, which provide the possibility for 
regional integration organisations to become party to the CRPD. It may be argued that the 
Commission, acting on behalf of the European Community (now EU), substantively contributed to 
the development of the existing UN binding instrument to safeguard the rights and dignity of persons 
with disabilities. 
2.2 Ensuring coordination between various EU actors 
The negotiations revealed how various institutional and non-institutional EU identities interact with 
each other. In this regard, the Commission’s role was not merely confined to the external 
representation of the European Community. During the CRPD’s drafting, the work of the Member 
                                                      




States was concretely coordinated by the Commission in order to present common position. It 
provided relevant expertise for the Member States in relation to EU disability law.485 The 
Commission also clarified the legal contents of Directive 2000/78 with the purpose of supporting the 
work of national delegations and avoiding discrepancies with EU law. Its coordinating function at the 
pre-sessional meetings was essential to purse a consensus position among the then 27 Member States 
with different political interests and legal approaches. Along with the Commission, the EU 
Presidency of the Council was committed to drive forward the work of the Member States within the 
pre-sessional meetings. Importantly, the discussion between the EU Member States was coordinated 
by the representatives of the country holding the Presidency of the Council of the EU.486 
The synergy between the Commission, the Council and the Member States facilitated the negotiations 
for the CRPD’s adoption and contributed to the development of a European shared strategy. 
Ultimately, the EU participation in the negotiations of the CRPD was also characterised by a 
pioneering alliance between the Commission and civil society organisations. In particular, the 
European Disability Forum (EDF) acted to support the EU’s position enhancing its role as a global 
actor. EDF contributed to promoting and protecting EU interests before other international actors. 
At the end of this process, on 27 February 2007, the Commission presented a proposal for a Council 
Decision on the signing, on behalf of the European Community, of the CRPD and its Optional 
Protocol.487 The Council Decision, dated 27 March 2007, authorised the Community to sign the 
CRPD and issued a declaration on the Optional Protocol stating that the Council of the European 
                                                      
485 G. de Burca, The EU in the negotiation of the UN Disability Convention, 35 European Law Review 174, p. 181. 
486 The presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) rotates among the EU Member States every six months 
and the country holding the presidency drives forward the Council's work. 
487 Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, presented by the Commission, Brussels, 29.8.2008 COM (2008) 
530 final 2008/0170 (COD). 
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Union shall reconsider the question of signing the Optional Protocol by the European Community as 
soon as possible.488 As previously noted, the EU signed the CRPD on 30 March 2007. 
2.3 The Commission and the Union’s external policy representation 
The negotiations of the Convention offer an interesting case study into the EU institutional 
architecture and the relationship between the main EU institutions. The Commission performed a 
steering role to shape the EU external policy with regard to disability and prevent internal divergences 
between Member States. It may be said that the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, excellently 
interpreted its role because it ensured the application of the Treaties and of EU legislation. It indeed 
promoted those values, legal provisions and objectives enshrined in Directive 2000/78. To the same 
extent, the Commission improved internal coordination so that the EU and its Member States acted 
efficiently together and spoke with one voice. The Commission’s nomination as the only EU 
negotiator correctly reflect the content of Article 218 TFEU according to which: 
“the Commission, or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy where 
the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally to the common foreign and security policy, shall 
submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision authorising the opening of 
negotiations and, depending on the subject of the agreement envisaged, nominating the Union negotiator 
or the head of the Union's negotiating team. 
The Council may address directives to the negotiator and designate a special committee in consultation 
with which the negotiations must be conducted.” 
This provision, in contrast with previous Article 300 EC,489 does not identify the Commission as the 
unique negotiator, but leaves the Council the power to nominate it depending on the subject of the 
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agreement envisaged.490 Notwithstanding this vague language, it seems evident that only the 
Commission and the High Representative can be nominated as negotiator. In this regard, the 
Commission should be appointed as negotiator when the international agreement entails matters of 
internal policy-making not related to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). This provision 
should be read together with Article 17 TFEU that establishes the duty of the Commission to ensure 
the Union's external representation with the exception of the CFSP. It is clear that the Treaties confer 
on the Commission the delicate function to ensure consistency between international agreement and 
EU law. The Commission had the institutional capacity to fit a complex international human rights 
instrument, such as the CRPD, into the wider EU law framework. The mechanisms adopted by the 
EU to monitor the correct implementation of the Convention will be now examined.  
3. Monitoring the CRPD’s implementation: new governance mechanisms 
The Convention introduces a unique mechanism of regional and national monitoring of its 
implementation.491 Article 33 of the CRPD sets outs a ‘three-tier’ monitoring framework which 
includes a national or regional focal point, an independent mechanism to promote, protect and 
monitor the implementation of the Convention and the involvement of civil society:492 
1. States Parties, in accordance with their system of organization, shall designate one or more focal points 
within government for matters relating to the implementation of the present Convention, and shall 
give due consideration to the establishment or designation of a coordination mechanism within 
government to facilitate related action in different sectors and at different levels. 
2. States Parties shall, in accordance with their legal and administrative systems, maintain, strengthen, 
designate or establish within the State Party, a framework, including one or more independent 
mechanisms, as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the present 
                                                      
490 P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (Oxford European Law Library, 2011), p. 196. 
491 G. De Beco, Article 33(2) of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: another role for national 
human rights institutions? (2011) 29 Netherlands Quarterly Human Rights 84. 
492 Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Implementation of the UN Convention on the rights of persons 
with disabilities in the EU's external relations, EXPO/B/DROI/2012/19, December 2013. 
195 
 
Convention. When designating or establishing such a mechanism, States Parties shall take into account 
the principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and 
promotion of human rights. 
3. Civil society, in particular persons with disabilities and their representative organizations, shall be 
involved and participate fully in the monitoring process. 
This new system complements the traditional mechanism provided at international level by the UN 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which has competence to receive and consider 
communications from or on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals subject to its jurisdiction 
who claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of the provisions of the Convention.493 
Article 33 CRPD is therefore the most complete and peculiar provision on national level 
implementation and monitoring ever drafted in a human rights international agreement.494 It indeed 
provides for the creation of independent national mechanisms besides traditional international human 
rights mechanisms. By doing so, Article 33 CRPD includes a set of provisions that resemble the new 
governance architecture of the EU. 
The concept of new EU governance stresses a shift away from the monopoly of traditional politico-
legal institutions and highlights the governing legitimacy and capacity of a broad sphere of actors.495 
The new EU governance model therefore includes “regulatory approaches which are less rigid, less 
prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes, and less hierarchical in nature”. 496 This approach 
implies the prevalence of voluntary and non-binding norms over coercive instruments, along with the 
involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process. An overview of the main EU governance 
forms will now be offered, showing the interplay between Article 33 CRPD and the current EU 
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governance mechanisms. In particular, the purpose of this study is to investigate to what extent the 
EU has implemented Article 33 CRPD. 
3.1 The experimentalist paradigm 
The CRPD embodies significant characteristics of the so-called experimentalist governance 
regime.497 Experimentalist governance constitutes a form of political cooperation based on open-
ended and participatory procedures that promote interaction between local and transnational actors.498 
In particular, experimentalist governance informs the treaty-body monitoring systems of the UN 
human rights regime and the transnational certification of environmental standards.499 This model 
focuses on the establishment of open-ended goals which are implemented by lower-level actors. Final 
results are subject to peer review and practices are systematically evaluated in light of the data 
collected. The experimentalism architecture requires the participation of stakeholder in the 
implementation process, an influential role of national monitoring mechanisms and regular reviews 
of the system. 
Article 33 CRPD may be said to reflect the main features of the experimentalist system to the extent 
that: i) States should designate one or more independent mechanisms to promote, protect and monitor 
implementation of the Convention; ii) stakeholders, in particular persons with disabilities and their 
representative organisations, shall be involved and participate fully in the monitoring process; iii) 
States Parties shall take into account the status and functioning of national institutions for protection 
and promotion of human rights (NHRIs). In addition, the CRPD adopts a flexible approach with 
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regard to several provisions and allows States Parties an appropriate degree of freedom to develop 
minimum standards, guidelines and benchmarks in consultation with civil society.500 
In line with the experimentalist paradigm, Article 31 furthermore sets out that States Parties have to 
collect appropriate information, including statistical and research data, to enable them to formulate 
and implement policies to give effect to the Convention. It seems clear that the CRPD includes 
innovative mechanisms of the experimentalism governance and enhances the involvement of 
stakeholders in all areas of the Convention’s implementation. The systematic interaction between 
different actors, coupled with continuous feedback and monitoring initiatives, represents a key aspect 
of the CRPD’s implementation. 
3.2 The open method of coordination 
Article 33 of the CRPD embraces the principle of participation that underpins the model of good 
governance proposed in the White Paper by the European Commission.501 This concept aims inter 
alia at improving the quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies by means of “wide 
participation throughout the policy chain from conception to implementation”.502 Participation should 
entail an inclusive approach in the process of developing and implementing EU policies. The aim is 
to create more confidence in the final result and in the institutions which deliver policies. The first 
chapter of this study has analysed the fundamental performance of civil society in the CRPD’s 
negotiations. However, non-governmental organisations have also been called upon to play an 
influential position in the implementation procedure. 
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The mandate conferred upon civil society along with the provisions concerning the national 
implementation and monitoring of the CRPD mirror the essential characteristics of the open method 
of coordination (OMC).503 The OMC is often considered the ideal model of experimentalist 
governance. Indeed, it is a system for coordinating policies among Member States through procedures 
of soft law in order to achieve EU objectives.504 This form of intergovernmental policy-making does 
not result in binding legislative measures and takes place in areas which fall within the competence 
of EU countries, such as employment, social protection, education, youth and vocational training. 
The participation of different actors is considered as an excellent landmark of the decisional and 
implementing process.505 In this respect, the OMC’s emphasis on broad participation reveals striking 
similarities with the structure of those independent mechanisms required by Article 33 of CRPD. This 
provision expressly demands the full participation of civil society in the monitoring process. National 
independent institutions shall therefore include stakeholders and persons with disabilities in their 
organisations. Such independent mechanisms have to promote, protect and monitor the 
implementation of CRPD. 
The OMC also promotes at EU level decentralised reciprocal learnings and voluntary participation of 
Members States within an open network, in which benchmarks, peer review, multilateral surveillance, 
scoreboards, trend charts are essential tools to spread transnational policies and promote policy 
learning.506 To the same extent, the CRPD includes a familiar obligation on States Parties to collect 
and research data in order to formulate and implement effective policies with regard to persons with 
disabilities. Moreover, Article 40 CRPD contains the general duty on the States Parties to meet 
regularly in a conference for the purpose of considering and reviewing any matter in relation to the 
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CRPD’s implementation. The objective of this governance model is not merely the involvement of 
civil society in policy-making, but it seeks to carry out periodic evaluation, monitoring and peer 
review of policies in order to exchange best practices. To this end, it facilitates experimentation and 
diffusion of new knowledge.507 
To conclude, it may be argued that the CRPD’s monitoring system combines several aspects of the 
EU governance mechanisms. In the light of this conceptual background, the next section will examine 
how Article 33 has been understood and applied by EU institutions and lower-level actors. 
3.3 The focal point 
The first requirement of Article 33 is the establishment of one or more focal points for matters relating 
to the implementation of the Convention, given due consideration to the designation of a coordination 
mechanism within national governments to facilitate related actions in different sectors and at 
different levels. 
To this end, the Council Decision 2010/48/EC lays down that, with respect to matters falling within 
the Community’s competence, the Commission shall be a focal point for matters related to the 
CRPD’s implementation.508 The Code of Conduct between the Council, Member States and the 
Commission setting out internal arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the 
EU relating to the CRPD provides additional details regarding the general functions of the EU focal 
point.509 The Commission holds the power to convene, on its own initiative or at the request of a 
Member State's focal point, a coordination meeting with the focal points of the Member States.510 
Moreover, in respect of matters falling within the Union competence, the Commission is in charge of 
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drafting the Union report, and may agree with Member States on the information they shall provide 
to enable it to do so.511 The Union report is a fundamental tool to monitor the work of the EU in 
relation to the CRPD’s implementation, because it analyses each legislative acts adopted by the Union 
that address those matters governed by the Convention. The Code of Conduct emphasises the 
necessity to strengthen the cooperation between Member States and the Commission. In particular, 
they are called upon to provide information to each other, before submitting the report to the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.512 Lastly, the Commission performed the 
fundamental duty to propose an appropriate framework for one or several independent mechanisms, 
taking into consideration the involvement of civil society and all the relevant Union institutions, 
bodies, offices or agencies. 
The above-mentioned instruments however do not identify the Commission’s service responsible for 
performing the tasks of the EU focal point. De facto, the Unit JUST D.3 “Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’” has taken upon the role of coordinating the work of the Commission in this field and 
implementing the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020.513 
The Commission has always pointed out the need for a new approach to implement disability rights 
which focuses on the identification and removal of the various barriers preventing disabled people 
from achieving equality of opportunity and full participation in all aspects of life. In this respect, the 
Commission has committed itself to review its socio-economic policies, programmes and projects in 
order to include rights and concerns of people with disabilities. However, the Commission 
experienced significant difficulties in carrying out its function because disability represents a cross-
cutting issue that falls under different legal areas and touches several competences. As a consequence, 
the Commission engaged all relevant Directorates-General in the Inter-Service Disability Group with 
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the purpose of improving its own internal machinery and supporting exchanges between its 
departments. They meet on a regular basis to exchange information and develop proposals for a better 
cross-sectoral coordination. The group promotes an effective inter-sectoral cooperation within the 
Commission in the field of disability. 
The designation of the Commission, as the focal point for the implementation of the Convention at 
EU level, is the logical outcome of its relevant contribution to the CRPD’s drafting. The role 
conferred to the Commission is in line with its mission to promote the general interest of the European 
Union, which the Commission accomplishes by participating in the decision-making process and 
overseeing the correct implementation of the Treaties and EU law. The Commission again emerges 
as one of the most important EU actors for implementing disability rights. The governance 
mechanisms that have been designated for ensuring coordination within national governments and 
facilitating action in different sectors and at different levels will now be outlined. 
3.4 Coordination mechanism 
The designation of a coordination mechanism between the EU and the Member States is a crucial 
step forward in the process for monitoring and implementing the CRPD.514 This approach seeks to 
promote cooperation between ministries in order to avoid the adoption of discordant and isolated 
measures by policymaker. 
As proposed by the Commission in its Communication on 30 July 1996, the High Level Group 
(DHLG) was set up to monitor the latest policies and priorities of governments concerning people 
with disabilities.515 The DHLG provides a significant involvement of representatives of people with 
disabilities in the follow-up of relevant policies and actions in their favour. This group constitutes a 
network of experts, representatives of the Member States, national focal points and NGOs to pool 
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information and experience. The meetings take place in Brussels twice a year by invitation of the 
Commission.516 The DHLG releases recommendation to the Commission on methods for reporting 
and addressing the situation of persons with disability in the EU. Furthermore, the Commission and 
the DHLG annually publish a joint report concerning the CRPD’s implementation. The reports 
encompass information on developments made in the establishment of the governance structures and 
processes foreseen by Article 33 of the CRPD. In these ways, the Commission and Member States 
reinforce cooperation in the field of disability and promote the exchange of good practice in the EU 
context. The DHLG, as a Commission expert group, encourages the dialogue between EU and 
national actors by means of flexible and non-bindings interactions. Indeed, it lacks formal tools to 
shape the CRPD’s implementation at European or national level and does not participate in the 
approval of the initial report to the UNCRPD Committee by the EU. 
Similarly, the Commission’s goal to support mutual learning and exchange of good practices is also 
pursued within the Work Forum on the Implementation of the Convention that meets every year since 
2010. The Forum’s composition reflects that of the DHLG and brings together representatives of the 
governance mechanisms provided by Article 33 CRPD, such as civil society, focal points, 
coordination and monitoring mechanisms. The Work Forum represents a platform for sharing 
experiences on the practical CRPD’s implementation and monitoring in order to promote solutions 
to common challenges.517 
Lastly, it is worth noting that political coordination is guaranteed within the Council Working Group 
on Human Rights (COHOM), which deals with human rights aspects of the external relations of the 
EU and supports the Council's decision-making process in this area.518 According to the Code of 
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Conduct, coordination meetings between the Member States and the Commission are held within the 
competent Council Working Group, composed of the representatives of Foreign Ministers of the 
MS.519 Coordination meetings are convened at the Presidency's own initiative or at the request of the 
Commission or a Member State, with possible reference to the Disability High Level Group in its 
area of competence. These meetings mainly focus on the division of competences and tasks between 
the EU and Member States. In particular, the Commission and the Member States, during the 
coordination meetings, “decide who will deliver any statement to be made on behalf of the Union and 
its Member States in cases where the respective competences are inextricably linked”.520 The work 
within the COHOM is essential to ensure sincere cooperation and complementarity between the EU 
and its Member State.521 In addition, the COHOM plays an important formal role in the approval of 
the European independent monitoring mechanism. It participates in the preparation of the Union’s 
position ahead of the UN High-Level meeting on Disability and Development in New York and in 
the discussion on the initial report of the EU to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities.522 
This institutional context highlights the existence of governance mechanisms which privilege 
informal arenas, cooperative problem solving and flexible instruments to facilitate exchange and 
mutual learning between the Member States and the EU.523 Thus, the Commission does not have 
formal and binding tools to coordinate policies of national governments and facilitate action in 
different sectors and at different levels. The EU embraced a coordination mechanism based on mutual 
learning programmes and stakeholders’ participation under the Commission’s institutional umbrella 
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in order to implement Article 33(1) CRPD. The structure of the EU independent monitoring 
framework created according to Article 33(2) CRPD will now be examined. 
4. The EU Framework for promoting, protecting and monitoring the CRPD 
The EU introduced a monitoring framework that promotes, protects and monitors the good 
implementation of the Convention in areas falling within EU competences. Promotion implies raising 
awareness of the Convention by organising public events and by providing trainings both to public 
officials and private citizens. Protection requires the assessment of individual complaints with regard 
to the violations of rights of persons with disabilities. Monitoring entails the evaluation of the 
compliance of legislation and practice with the CRPD.524 The Council put the Commission in charge 
of proposing an appropriate framework for one or several independent mechanisms, taking into 
account all relevant Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.525 To this end, the Commission 
identified five existing EU institutions and bodies to perform the tasks required by Art 33(2) CRPD: 
the European Parliament's Petitions Committee, the European Ombudsman, the European 
Commission, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the European Disability Forum 
(EDF). On 25 January 2012, the Commission's proposal was formally submitted to the Member States 
in COHOM and was definitively adopted by the Council on 29 October 2012.526 
The EU framework complements the national frameworks and independent mechanisms which bear 
the main responsibility for the promotion, protection and monitoring of the UNCPRD within the 
Member States.527 The EU framework’s action covers legislation and policies that fall under those 
areas where the Member States have transferred competences to the EU. This framework also carries 
out tasks with regard to the implementation of the Convention by EU institutions in their capacity as 
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Public Administration. The specific rules and behaviours that affect those EU institutions and bodies 
involved in the EU independent mechanism to implement the CRPD will now be analysed. This study 
can be approached from two perspectives. Firstly, it aims at analysing the EU institutional balance 
and the role performed by EU institutions into the CRPD’s implementation process. Secondly, it 
seeks to assess the efficiency of the EU governance system for the promotion, protection and 
monitoring of disability rights. 
4.1 The Commission’s experimentalist approach 
The Commission is fully integrated in the EU independent mechanism to promote, protect and 
monitor the CRPD. Informal meetings and soft policy instruments characterise the Convention’s 
promotion within the EU. The Commission mainly supports mutual learning and exchange of good 
practices through events and stakeholder’s engagement.528 It releases reports, disseminates 
information and organises training. In particular, the Commission has the duty, in cooperation with 
its Disability High Level Group, to prepare an annual report on the implementation of the Convention 
in the Member States and the EU. The report provides for a detailed analysis of the implementation 
of CRPD articles and statistical information on disability in the EU. The report systematically refers 
to and uses the Convention as a benchmark. It refers to legislative measures adopted under the scope 
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of the CRPD and contributes to delineating a clear picture of the status of persons with disabilities in 
the EU. 
Importantly, during the preparation of the report, the focal point constantly consults all the relevant 
stakeholders, including Members States within the Council Working Group on Human Rights. 
Furthermore, the DHLG’s meetings are open to EU-level civil society organisations (CSOs) and 
Disabled People’s Organisations (DPOs). The crucial interactions between the Commission and 
NGOs are also reinforced by the financial support provided to civil society organisations, in particular 
disabled persons' organisations that promote and raise awareness of the Convention. Stakeholders' 
involvement and mutual learning are also achieved through the annual conference that celebrates 
European Day of Persons with Disabilities on the 3rd December. Moreover, the Commission 
organises trainings for legal practitioners and policy makers, arranging information sessions on the 
UNCRPD for staff, setting up an annual Work Forum among all concerned actors at EU level, in the 
Member States and from civil society and DPOs.529 
This context underscores the prevalence of mechanisms that reflect the experimentalist architecture 
of the CRPD and the fundamental principles of good governance adopted by the Commission in the 
White Paper. This “soft” model is integrated by the traditional powers of the Commission, which may 
initiate an infringement procedure according to Article 258 TFEU.530 The Commission may intervene 
where a Member State has failed to fulfil their Treaty obligations.531 This means that the Commission 
can ensure compliance with the Convention and monitor Members States’ legislation in situations 
where they are implementing EU law. So far, the Commission has systematically encouraged the 
development of tools to share good practice and the participation of all relevant stakeholders in the 
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process of promoting and monitoring the CRPD at EU level. The role of the European Parliament 
will now be discussed in order to identify to what extent it is contributing to the CRPD’s 
implementation. 
4.2 The European Parliament and the protection of disability rights 
The European Parliament participates to the EU independent mechanism required by Article 33 
CRPD, but it lacks adequate structures to monitor, promote and protect the Convention in the EU. 
The function to protect the CRPD is performed by the EP’s Committee on Petitions (PETI) in its 
capacity by hearing petitions and analysing issues of non-compliance.532 Indeed, according to Article 
227 TFEU: 
“Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a 
Member State, shall have the right to address, individually or in association with other citizens or persons, 
a petition to the European Parliament on a matter which comes within the Union's fields of activity and 
which affects him, her or it directly”. 
The right of petition is a fundamental right of EU citizens and represents a simple means of contacting 
the institutions with a request or complaint. The petition must be related to an area falling within the 
sphere of activity of the EU and concern the petitioner directly. The PETI has the authority to provide 
non-judicial remedies, table questions to the Council and Commission, issue report and resolutions. 
The PETI does not coordinate the work between national CRPD mechanisms and the UN’s 
Committee. However, it is empowered to receive complaints concerning EU law before their 
submission to the UN’s Committee. According to the Parliamentary Rules of Procedures, the petition 
may take the form of a request arising from a general need, an individual grievance or an application 
to the European Parliament to take a position on a matter of public interest.533 In this regard, any 
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citizen of the European Union and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office 
in a Member State shall have the right to address a petition to the Parliament, individually or in 
association with other citizens or persons.534 
The PETI’s work is highly linked with the other EU institutions. The Committee may request 
assistance from the Commission in the form of information on the application and documents relevant 
to the petition. The Committee may ask also the President to forward its opinion or recommendation 
to the Commission, the Council or the Member State authority concerned for action or response.535 
Against this background, it is worth noting that the Committee does not have the competence of 
overruling competent legal authorities and imposing binding remedies.536 Despite that, in 2015 the 
Committee received a significant amount of petitions regarding disability rights and contributed to 
improve the protection of persons with disabilities at the EU level. 
The Parliament congratulated the Committee on the work it undertaken in relation to petitions 
received on issues related to disability.537 It noted that considerable efforts have been made to ensure 
the successful launch of the EU framework under the terms of Article 33 of UN CRPD and recognised 
the willingness of the Committee to continue to support this activity. Moreover, in the 2015 report, 
the Parliament highlighted the necessity to adequately resource the European Union Framework in 
line with the requirements of the Convention.538 The Parliament called for enhancing the capacity of 
the Committee on Petitions and its Secretariat in order to fulfil its protection role. To this end, it 
proposed “the establishment of a designated officer responsible for the processing of disabilities-
related issues”.539 The Parliament also emphasised the need for further efforts and action on behalf 
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of the Committee in the protection of people with disabilities, such as actions directed to promote the 
swift ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty. 
The establishment of a specific officer dealing exclusively with disability issues would facilitate and 
improve the CRPD’s protection in the EU. Indeed, petitioners cannot always directly present their 
cases to the Committee on Petitions because of the lack of meeting time and of human resources at 
the Committee Secretariat. In addition, the new designated officer should support the use of video-
conferencing, or of any other means enabling petitioners and persons with disabilities to become 
actively involved in the work of the Committee on Petitions. In doing so, the EU would comply with 
Article 13 CRPD that aims to ensure effective access to justice for persons with disabilities, through 
the provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their effective 
role as direct and indirect participants in all legal proceedings. To conclude, it may be said that the 
appointment of a specific body dedicated to the protection of persons with disabilities will simplify 
and clarify the functioning of the EU independent monitoring framework. 
4.2.1 The PETI’s main tasks and achievements 
The PETI’s contribution to the effective improvement of rights of persons with disabilities has been 
particularly relevant. For instance, Dan Pescod (British), on behalf of the European Blind Union 
(EBU) and the Royal National Institute of Blind People (RNIB), presented Petition 0924/2011 
relating to the access for blind people to books and other printed products. The petition promoted 
accession to the Marrakesh Treaty, an international copyright agreement that aims at facilitating 
access to published works for persons who are blind, visually impaired, or otherwise print disabled.540 
PETI examined the petition and invited the Parliament’s President to formally contact the Council 
and the Commission in order to accelerate the procedure of accession to the Treaty by the EU. It also 
proposed to submit an Oral Question to Plenary and requested a meeting with the Commissioner of 
                                                      
540 Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise 
Print Disable, Word Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO (June 27, 2013). 
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the Internal Market and Service.541 As a consequence, the Treaty was successfully signed by the EU 
and Member States in 2014, but the negotiations for its ratification are still in deadlock. 
However, on 28 January 2016, the European Parliament, with regard to the petitions from EU citizens 
with print disabilities, and particularly Petition 924/2011, released a motion for a resolution on the 
ratification of the Marrakesh Treaty.542 The Parliament’s motion underlines “that seven EU Member 
States have formed a minority block which is impeding the process of ratifying the Treaty” and calls 
“on the Council and the Member States to accelerate the ratification process, without making 
ratification conditional upon revision of the EU legal framework or the decision of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union”. Importantly, the Parliament recalls Articles 24 and 30 of the UN CRPD, 
which set out the rights of persons with disabilities to education, without discrimination and on the 
basis of equal opportunity, while ensuring that laws protecting intellectual property rights do not 
constitute an unreasonable or discriminatory barrier to access by persons with disabilities to cultural 
materials. 
PETI plays a remarkable role in the EU framework for the promotion of disability rights. It does not 
have the competence to provide judicial remedies and the effectiveness of its work depends upon the 
intervention of other institutional actors. Yet it has contributed to increase the awareness of disability 
rights in the EU and constitutes an effective channel to exercise pressure on the main EU institutions. 
As such, in this context, civil society organisations and individuals have the possibility to perform 
lobbying and advocacy activities to ensure that public authorities understand and support their cause. 
Indeed, the most significant petitions have been supported by NGOs and civil society organisations 
                                                      
541 Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Petition, 
“The protection role of the Committee on Petitions in the context of the implementation of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (Brussels, 2015), p. 29. 
542 European Parliament, Motion for a Resolution, pursuant to Rule 216(2) of the Rules of Procedure on the ratification 
of the Marrakesh Treaty, based on petitions received, notably Petition 924/2011, 28.1.2016 (2016/2542(RSP). 
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engaged in public campaigns for combating stereotypes, prejudices and harmful practices relating to 
persons with disabilities.543 
4.2.2 The Disability Intergroup of the European Parliament 
The European Parliament’s monitoring duties are also carried out by the Disability Intergroup, an 
informal group of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who are interested in promoting the 
disability policy in their work at EU and national level. Their priorities are defined by the Intergroup 
Bureau, which meets regularly to approve the work programme of the Disability Intergroup. The new 
work programme for 2015-2016 outlines the importance of adopting the proposed EU Directive 
implementing the principle of equal treatment, aiming to extend the protection against discrimination 
beyond employment, to social protection and healthcare, social advantages, access to and supply of 
goods and other services available to the public, including housing and education.544 The Disability 
Intergroup called for a revision of the Europe 2020 strategy in order to tackle the dramatic 
employment rate of persons with disabilities (under 50%) who are excluded from EU economic and 
social policies.545 The 2020 Strategy is not in line with the fundamental provisions of the European 
Disability Strategy and the UN CRPD, as it does not set out specific indicators related to 80 million 
Europeans with disabilities. 
The Disability Intergroup ensures that the European Parliament agenda takes into account disability 
and contributes to awareness-raising of the UN CRPD. However, the Disability Intergroup is not 
financially supported by the European Parliament and is not involved in its official activities. It 
represents a voluntary initiative to promote an exchange of views between political groups from all 
                                                      
543 Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department C Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Petition, 
“The protection role of the Committee on Petitions in the context of the implementation of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities” (Brussels, 2015), p. 40. 
544 Disability Intergroup of the European Parliament, Work Programme 2015-2016. 
545 European Commission, Europe 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, Brussels, 3.3.2010, COM 
(2010) 2020. The Europe 2020 strategy promotes smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The aim is to improve the 
competitiveness of the EU whilst maintaining its social market economy model and improving significantly the effective 
use of its resources. 
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Member States. This body does not formally express the Parliament views and has no capacity to 
effectively influence the legislative process. It seems that the Disability Intergroup, acting on behalf 
of the EP, does not have sufficient tools to fulfil the delicate function of monitoring the CPRD. 
Indeed, according to Rule 34 of the European Parliament Rules of Procedure, individual members 
may form “Intergroups” to hold informal exchanges of views on specific issues across different 
political groups and promote contact between members and civil society. Nonetheless, such 
groupings “may not engage in any activities which might result in confusion with the official 
activities of Parliament or of its bodies”. This means that the Disability Intergroup is an informal 
forum for policy dialogue with a limited political mandate; it therefore cannot properly monitor the 
CRPD on behalf of the Parliament. The analysis will now focus on the European Ombudsman's 
mandate and procedure within the EU independent mechanism. 
4.3 The European Ombudsman 
The European Ombudsman is an independent and impartial body that investigates complaints about 
maladministration in EU institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies.546 According to Article 228 
TFEU, the Ombudsman is empowered to receive complaints from any citizen of the Union or any 
natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State concerning instances 
of maladministration in the activities of the Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies. Only the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, when acting in its judicial role, does not fall within the 
Ombudsman’s mandate. The Ombudsman examines such complaints and reports on them. Moreover, 
it has the duty to “conduct inquiries for which he finds grounds, either on his own initiative or on the 
basis of complaints submitted to him directly or through a Member of the European Parliament” (Art. 
228(2) TFEU). In case the Ombudsman finds an instance of maladministration, he shall refer the 
matter to the institution, body, office or agency concerned, who shall have a period of three months 
                                                      
546 L. C. Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance, and the International Human Rights System (Brill, Leiden, 2004). 
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to inform him of their views. The Ombudsman shall then forward a report to the European Parliament 
and the institution, body, office or agency concerned. The work of the Ombudsman may be said to 
be characterised by the use of soft law instruments which do not give rise to substantive legal rights.547 
Despite that, on 4 July 2007, the Ombudsman reviewed the actions undertaken by the EU 
Commission in the area of disability rights to assess whether or not they were consistent with its legal 
obligations. 
4.3.1 The Ombudsman’s own-initiatives 
The Ombudsman opened an own-initiative inquiry concerning the integration of persons with 
disabilities by the Commission with the purpose of verifying that these citizens were not 
discriminated against in their relations with the institution.548 To this end, the Ombudsman started an 
open and transparent dialogue with all relevant stakeholders such as individuals with disabilities, 
representative groups, and other ombudsmen at national and regional levels. The Ombudsman stated 
that the Commission made significant progress to integrate people with disabilities. In particular, the 
employment of persons with disabilities by all EU institutions respects the prohibition of non-
discrimination on grounds of disability and the duty to provide reasonable accommodation. 
Another significant Ombudsman’s own initiative inquiry focused on the European Schools’ treatment 
of disabled children with special educational needs (SEN children).549 The Ombudsman regretted that 
the financial support and assistance given to officials with disabled family members was insufficient 
and encouraged the adoption of a new policy based on inclusion. It pointed out that the integration of 
SEN children should comply with the obligation to provide inclusive, non-discriminatory education 
                                                      
547 M. Smith, Centralized Enforcement, Legitimacy and Good Governance in the EU (Routledge, New York 2010). See 
also, P. G. Bonnor, The European Ombudsman: a novel source of soft law in the European Union (2000) 1 European 
Law Review 39. 
548 Decision of the European Ombudsman on own-initiative inquiry OI/3/2003/JMA concerning the European 
Commission, 04 Jul 2007. 
549 Integration of children with disabilities by the European Schools, Case OI/3/2003/JMA, Opened on 19 Nov 2003 - 
Decision on 04 July 2007. 
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for all enshrined in the UN CRPD. The Ombudsman concluded that the Commission should try to 
strengthen its own role in the European Schools' SEN policy. 
Recently, the EU Ombudsman intervened in relation to the use of the European Structural and 
Investment Fund (ESI) that are the European Union's main investment policy tool.550 It stated that a 
Member State used ESI Funds to renovate a large institution housing disabled persons. By contrast, 
the ESI Funds are meant to finance the closure of such institutions and the transition to community-
based living.551 The Ombudsman found a violation of Article 19 CRPD, which promotes the 
deinstitutionalisation of persons with disabilities. The Ombudsman emphasised that the Commission 
should dissuade Member States from breaching fundamental rights when their activities are funded 
by the EU cohesion policy. To this end, the Ombudsman proposed guidelines for improvement to the 
Commission. For instance, the Commission should initiate infringement proceedings against a 
Member State if its actions in the framework of the cohesion policy amount to a violation of EU law. 
The suspension of funding constitutes an effective deterrent in case of violations of specific 
provisions of Regulation 1303/2013. In addition, it recommended the creation of a clear and 
transparent framework to encourage the participation of civil society in monitoring and implementing 
the ESI Funds. In this regard, the Commission should launch an online platform to involve small civil 
society organisations, report abuses of Funds and Charter violations and submit complaints. The 
Ombudsman also suggested to setting up mixed working parties composed by Commission 
representatives, Member States and civil society.552 
 
                                                      
550 Decision of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry OI/8/2014/AN concerning the European 
Commission, 11 May 2015. 
551 Art. 9(9) Regulation (EU) no 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17, December 2013. See 
also, G. Quinn and S. Doyle, Taking the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Seriously: The Past 
and Future of the EU Structural Funds as a Tool to Achieve Community Living (2012) 9 The Equal Rights Review 69. 
552 Paragraph 48 (VIII) of Decision of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry OI/8/2014/AN 
concerning the European Commission, 11 May 2015. 
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4.3.2 The Ombudsman’s limited mandate 
As noted above, the Ombudsman does not have the power to impose binding measures on EU 
institutions in order to correct an instance of maladministration. Maladministration includes non-
compliance with EU law and human rights obligations under the Charter of Fundamental Rights.553 
The Ombudsman performs its protection tasks through investigation of complaints and own-initiative 
inquiries. Ombudsman's proposals aim at achieving friendly solutions and persuading EU institutions 
to improve their administrative practices. However, if an institution fails to comply with his 
recommendations, the Ombudsman can criticise it publicly or if the issue is serious enough, he may 
release a special report to the Parliament.554 By contrast, the Ombudsman cannot start any procedures 
with regard to the implementation of EU law by Member States and cannot evaluate the compatibility 
of EU legislation with the Convention. In this context, the Ombudsman’s role is limited, because his 
mandate does not reflect those strategic requirements of Article 33(2) CRPD concerning the 
promotion and protection of the Convention. The Ombudsman’s contribution is more significant in 
the process of monitoring the CRPD, as his specific reports and initiative inquiries show the extent 
to which the EU institutions and agencies are compliant with the Convention. The monitoring 
component is crucial to foster accountability and strengthen the capacity of EU institutions to fulfil 
their commitments. An overview of the functions of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights will now 
be offered as this Agency has a key role to play with respect to Article 33 CRPD. 
 
 
                                                      
553 Decision of the European Parliament on the Regulations and General Conditions Governing the Performance of the 
Ombudsman's Duties 94/262/ECSC. See also Linda C. Reif, Ombudsman institutions and Article 33(2) of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, (2014) 65 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 213. 
554 European Ombudsman, Strategy for the mandate, September 2010. See also Lisa Waddington, Reflections on the 
Establishment of a Framework to Promote, Protect and Monitor Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of 




4.4 The monitoring role of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights 
The Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) was established by Council Regulation 168/2007 in order to 
provide the EU relevant institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and its Member States with 
assistance and expertise relating to fundamental rights when implementing EU law.555 The FRA 
cannot perform any functions to protect disability rights as it lacks the competence to investigate or 
examine complaints. Nevertheless, it represents a vital part of the EU independent mechanism to 
promote and monitor the CRPD’s implementation. The Agency can formulate and publish 
conclusions and opinions on specific thematic topics, for the Union institutions and the Member 
States when implementing EU law. It also publishes an annual report on fundamental rights issues 
for highlighting examples of good practice. The FRA has the duty to develop a communication 
strategy and encourage dialogue with civil society in order to raise public awareness of fundamental 
rights.556 In doing so, FRA’s activities may be essential for promoting disability rights and raising 
awareness of the CRPD. 
It is not however clear if the Convention falls under the scope of the FRA’s action.557 The founding 
Regulation 168/2007 lays down that the Agency should, in its own work, refer to those fundamental 
rights within the meaning of Article 6(2) TEU, including the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 6 TEU underlines the EU 
fundamental rights acquis and does not make reference to the CRPD’s conclusion. Notwithstanding, 
the Convention’s ratification by the EU and the recent CJEU’s judgements signal that the CRPD 
forms an integral part of the EU fundamental rights acquis, as it prevails over instrument of EU 
                                                      
555 Art. 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights. 
556 Ibid, Art. 2 (h). 
557 L. Waddington, Reflections on the Establishment of a Framework to Promote, Protect and Monitor Implementation of 
the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 33(2) CRPD by the European Union (Maastricht 
Faculty of Law Working Paper 2011/3), p. 8.  
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secondary law.558 As a consequence, the CRPD may be considered as the benchmark of the FRA’s 
mandate. This means that FRA should refer in its monitoring work to those fundamental rights 
enshrined by the CRPD. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy to recall Article 26 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
provides that the “Union recognises and respects the right of persons with disabilities to benefit from 
measures designed to ensure their independence, social and occupational integration and participation 
in the life of the community”. To the same extent, the Multiannual Framework 2013-2017 for the 
FRA establishes that the Agency shall carry out its tasks in the area of discrimination based on 
disability.559 To this end, the FRA has to collect, analyse and disseminate reliable and comparable 
information and data. It has to develop methods and standards to improve the comparability, 
objectivity and reliability of data at European level.560 
The development of standards and data constitutes a fundamental tool to evaluate and monitor 
national practice and legislation with regard to disability rights. For instance, the FRA developed 
human rights indicators on Article 19 CRPD in order to allow EU Member States and all stakeholders 
to apply the indicators in practice. This project aims at assessing the fulfilment of Article 19 of the 
CRPD on the transition from institutional care to community-based support for persons with 
disabilities.561 According to the OHCHR’s guidelines, a human rights indicator is “specific 
information on the state or condition of an object, event, activity or outcome that can be related to 
human rights norms and standards; that addresses and reflects human rights principles and concerns; 
and that can be used to assess and monitor the promotion and implementation of human rights”.  562 
                                                      
558 See Joined Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11, para. 29: “primacy of international agreements concluded by the European 
Union over instruments of secondary law means that those instruments must as far as possible be interpreted in a manner 
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559 Art. 2(g) of Council Decision No 252/2013/EU of 11 March 2013 establishing a Multiannual Framework for 2013-
2017 for the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 
560 Art. 4 (a) (b) Regulation (EC) No 168/2007. 
561 Indicators available online at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2014/rights-personsdisabilities-right-independent-
living/indicators 
562 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human rights indicators A Guide to 
Measurement (New York 2012). 
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The FRA’s indicators cover important topics such as non-discrimination, reasonable accommodation, 
accessibility of support services, budget allocation, complaints and redress mechanisms, awareness-
raising measures and training. They are fundamental part of a systematic process to implement, 
monitor and realise rights. They may contribute to assess violations of international and national 
human rights norms by national and EU tribunals, civil society organisations and policymakers. In 
this regard, the FRA’s work is necessary to carry out those tasks enshrined in Article 31 of the CRPD 
that require the collection of statistical and research data. It may be argued that the FRA’s role will 
be more effective in promoting and monitoring the CRPD, because its current methods of operation 
reflect the key features of the open method of coordination (continuous feedback, reporting, peer 
reviews, revising practices and gathering data). The involvement of the European Disability Forum 
in the EU monitoring mechanism will be discussed below. 
4.5 The European Disability Forum’s challenge to open up the EU decision-making process 
The inclusion of the European Disability Forum (EDF) in the EU independent monitoring system 
symbolises the most remarkable aspect of the governance mechanism adopted by the EU according 
to Article 33 CRPD. Indeed, the designation of EDF complies with the international requirement to 
involve civil society in the monitoring process and it represents a concrete application of new 
governance paradigms. EDF is the main disability rights organisation in Europe, and has lobbied for 
achieving fundamental political objectives, such as the clause on combating discrimination on the 
grounds of disability in Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty of the EU and the inclusion of the concept 
of reasonable accommodation in the Framework Equality Directive. 
EDF plays a central role for promoting the Convention’s implementation through awareness-raising 
campaigns, media activities and organisations of public events. EDP conducts those specific tasks 
that are expressly required by Article 8 CRPD on awareness-raising. For instance, in 2011 EDF 
launched the “Freedom of Movement” campaign to promote the removal of all barriers for persons 
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with disabilities in the EU. This campaign was supported by the publication of the ‘Freedom Guide’, 
which identified the environmental and attitudinal barriers within the EU preventing persons with 
disabilities from the full participation in social life. Crucially, EDF raises awareness throughout 
society to foster respect for the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities. It encourages all organs 
of the media to portray persons with disabilities in a manner consistent with the CRPD and aims at 
combating stereotypes, prejudices and harmful practices. To this end, it initiates effective public 
awareness campaigns to develop positive perceptions towards persons with disabilities, in particular 
with regard to their contribution to the workplace and the labour market. EDF organises awareness-
training programmes concerning the rights of persons with disabilities in order to strengthen technical 
knowledge and advocacy capacity of civil society organisations.563 An overview of the European 
Disability Forum’s participation throughout the EU policy chain will now be given. 
EDF is responsible for monitoring the EU’s implementation of the CRPD. This strategic duty implies 
the examination of legislative proposals and policy of the EU and the assessment of development or 
retrogression of rights of persons with disabilities in the EU legal context. In this regard, EDF is 
involved in a continuous dialogue with the EU institutions. On 14 January 2016, the EDF Executive 
Committee met the bureau of the Disability Intergroup of the European Parliament in order to discuss 
various issues, such as the role of the Parliament in the follow up of the UN’s Concluding 
Observations on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the impact of austerity measures on persons 
with disabilities and the situation of refugees and migrants with disabilities. The MEPs of the 
Disability Intergroup endorsed the EDF’s proposal to hold a 4th European Parliament of Persons with 
Disabilities in 2017, co-organised by EDF and the European Parliament. 
The European Parliament of Persons with Disabilities is an event to mainstream at EU level the 
situation of the most vulnerable groups of individuals as women, youth, children and people with 
                                                      
563 Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) by the European Union, Brussels, 5.6.2014, SWD (2014) 182 final, p. 49. 
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disabilities. To mainstream implies that the needs of disadvantaged people must be taken into account 
in the design and implementation of all policies and measures. This forum is shaped according to the 
rules governing the plenary sitting of the European Parliament. The event involves the participation 
of delegates from organisations representing persons with disabilities (DPOs) who vote a resolution 
calling on the EU institutions, the Member States, social partners, civil society and other stakeholders 
to take appropriate steps towards the CRPD’s implementation. It aims at reinforcing the link between 
national representatives of organisations of persons with disabilities and EU decision-makers. Such 
an event may constitute a considerable contribution to EU governance as it helps the European 
Parliament to individuate work priorities and develop long-term policy perspectives. Moreover, on 
17 February 2016, EDF participated in the meeting of the European Parliament’s Employment 
Committee focusing on the implementation of the UN’s recommendations to the EU on the promotion 
of rights of persons with disabilities.564 The European Ombudsman and the FRA, as members of the 
EU Monitoring Framework along with EDF and the Parliament, also took part in the debate. EDF 
emphasised that the UN’s recommendations set out a clear roadmap and a list of actions to be adopted 
in line with the CRPD: review of the European Disability Strategy, revision of EU laws and adoption 
of the European Accessibility Act. This meeting represents another decisive moment of the 
constructive relationship between the Parliament and EFD, because MEPs have the opportunity to 
share and exchange ideas with key EU bodies and the European disability movement. Thus, EDF can 
effectively monitor to what extent the EU will address the UN’s recommendations and implement 
the UN CRPD. 
This framework has enabled the European Parliament and its committees to gradually improve the 
quality of their policy deliberation through regular consultation and public hearings with EDF. The 
need of reinforcing the culture of consultation and dialogue is a central guideline of the Commission’s 
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White Paper. The principle of good governance indeed demands measures to consolidate the 
consultative process in the European Parliament, given its role in representing the citizens. In 
particular, public hearings are expressly required to enhance dialogue between Parliament and civil 
society. The consultative process within the Parliament and its committees with regard to the CRPD’s 
implementation demonstrates the emergence of a strong interplay between the European Parliament 
and EDF. 
The fundamental rules, processes and behaviours that characterise the way in which powers are 
exercised by the EU actors within the independent framework have been described above. The 
analysis of the EU system created in accordance with Article 33 CRPD to implement the Convention 
has been done through the lens of the experimentalist approach to governance. An overview of the 
main weaknesses and positive aspects of the governance mechanism designed by the EU will now be 
offered. The final objective is to assess whether the open method of coordination, as ideal model of 
experimentalist governance, is appropriate for implementing the Disability Convention. 
4.6 Focal point and coordination mechanism: innovative or inefficient practices? 
The European Commission has been appointed both as a focal point (Art. 33.1) for implementation 
and as a mechanism for monitoring the CRPD’s implementation (Art. 33.2). As a focal point, the 
Commission is responsible for the implementation of the Convention on behalf of the EU and for the 
Union examination by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It ensures cross-
sectoral coordination within its own institution, between all EU bodies and with the Member States.565 
To achieve internal coordination, the Inter-Service Disability Group involves all relevant 
Directorates-General in order to share policy initiatives between different departments. This internal 
mechanism is crucial to ensure dialogue between DGs and facilitate the fulfilment of common 
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goals.566 For instance, the overall aim of the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 is to boost the 
participation of people with disabilities in society and in the European economy, notably through the 
Single Market.567 However, the achievement of these ambitious objectives may be compromised by 
the coordination mechanism developed within the Commission’s Inter-Service Group on Disability. 
This practice seems necessary to put together departments that work in different areas, but further 
and stronger coordination is needed to implement the Disability Strategy in a systematic way. Indeed, 
the Inter-Service Group’s role is mainly consultative and is not informed by clear procedures for the 
adoption of common proposals or policy instruments. The Commission, as a focal point, will face 
significant obstacles to effectively achieve cross-sectoral coordination within its own institution. It 
may be argued that the lack of a permanent and specific department dealing with the Disability 
Strategy and CRPD’s implementation will slow down the EU action. 
In a different manner, a vertical coordination mechanism has been informally developed to coordinate 
all EU bodies and the Member States. The vertical coordination mechanism should foster related 
actions in different sectors and at different levels, but the EU has not formally nominated any bodies 
to carry out this duty.568 Despite that, two main actors are involved in this process: the Council 
Working Party on Human Rights (COHOM) and the Disability High Level Group (DHLG). They 
ensure coordination between the EU institutions and Member States. It is worth noting that this 
mechanism combines two opposite governance models: a traditional hierarchal approach and an 
experimentalist paradigm. The COHOM is part of the Council of the European Union and only 
includes representatives of Foreign Ministers of the MS. By contrast, the DHLG promotes 
participation of national focal points and civil society organisations along with Member States 
representatives. The coexistence of a classic procedure of coordination with a new mode of 
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governance may consolidate the effectiveness of the vertical mechanism. This hybrid system 
represents a good practice to develop cooperation between EU and Member States taking into account 
views of European DPOs and NGOs. To conclude, the de facto vertical mechanism that links EU 
institutions, national governments and private actors may be considered as highly innovative and 
efficient. It mixes bottom-up political dynamics with top-down structures in order to facilitate 
political coordination in a delicate sensitive area. 
The following section will now evaluate the functioning of the governance mechanism designated to 
implement the CRPD and will offer a critical analysis of the EU independent framework. 
4.7 Lights and shadows in the EU independent framework 
Each member of the EU independent framework shares the common mission to promote, protect and 
monitor the Convention’s implementation. Every member exercises its functions in line with the 
specific powers and competences conferred by the EU Treaties. All relevant EU institutions, agencies 
and bodies of the governance mechanism shaped their functions and behaviours to put into practice 
the requirements of Article 33 CRPD. 
The Commission’s role encompasses distinctive features of the new EU modes of governance. The 
procedures that affect the Commission’s work are characterised by the existence of structured 
channels for enhancing feedback and civil society's engagement. The continuous consultation of 
organised civil society within the DHLG represents a positive element of the mechanism to 
independently implement the CRPD. Consultation and dialogue not only contribute to foster 
transparency and accountability of EU institutions, but also help the Commission in developing long-
term policy perspectives.569 By contrast, a weak point of this governance mechanism is that the 
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Commission has no authority to release formal recommendations to the Member States in case of 
non-compliance with the CRPD or Disability Strategy’s objectives. 
For instance, according to the European Employment Strategy (EES), the most interesting example 
of the OMC, the Commission has the power to issue recommendations for policy change when the 
Member States’ performances are not in line with the EES guidelines.570 The EES emerged in the 
1990s when the EU Member States decided to set up common objectives and targets for employment 
policy. Currently, the Member States and the Commission agree on the establishment of initial goals, 
general guidelines and a series of indicators to promote the creation of more and better jobs in the 
EU.571 In this context, national governments have the duty to submit National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs) that are analysed by the Commission. Crucially, based on the assessment of the NRP, the 
Commission publishes a series of Country reports and issues country-specific recommendations. 
Neither the recommendations nor the guidelines are legally binding, but they are part of a 
comprehensive strategy to share information and good practices.572 The NRPs circulate between the 
Member States to exchange feedback. At the same time, indicators ensure transparent data and 
reliable benchmarks to assess positive results. This system assures a multilateral surveillance 
mechanism based on the involvement of the Member States, the Commission and the EU Council. 
This model may be also appropriate with regard to the CRPD’s implementation in the EU. The 
Commission independently monitors to what extent the Member States apply EU legislation falling 
under the scope of the CRPD. In doing so, the Commission prepares an annual report on the 
application of the Convention in the Member States and the EU, but it lacks the competence to make 
recommendations for policy changes. To effectively accomplish the objectives of the CRPD, the EU 
should reform the monitoring system. It should provide a clear monitoring mechanism based on the 
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submission of National Reform Programmes by national governments and the final analysis by the 
Commission for compliance with the Disability Strategy 2010-2020. The Commission should not 
only publish a series of Country and Union reports, but also release specific recommendations to 
promote legislative improvements. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that the Concluding Observation of the UN CRPD Committee points out the 
incompatibility of the Commission's dual role, as EU focal point (Article 33.1 CRPD) and a member 
of the Monitoring Framework (Article 33.2 CRPD).573 Indeed, according to the 'Paris Principles', the 
representatives of the Government departments should participate in the deliberations only in an 
advisory capacity.574 Therefore, the Commission should be removed from the mechanism to monitor 
the CRPD’s implementation. To comply with the Committee’s recommendation, the Commission has 
recently expressed its intention to withdraw from the EU independent framework.575 The exclusion 
of the Commission will be detrimental to the effective functioning of the monitoring system as it is 
the only body capable to protect citizens via its power to start infringement procedures against 
Member States breaching EU law. The Commission’s role should be reinforced by taking into 
consideration the main rules and procedures that inform the open method of coordination. The Code 
of Conduct should confer on the Commission the power to release Country reports or 
recommendations. In this way, Member States will be encouraged to follow the guidelines agreed 
with the EU institutions in order to avoid negative peer reviews. The Parliament’s participation within 
                                                      
573 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Concluding observations on the initial report of the European 
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the EU governance system will now be evaluated and it will be shown that the Parliament is seeking 
to acquire a major role in the CRPD’s implementation. 
4.7.1 Is the European Parliament marginalised? 
The European Parliament mainly performs its duty to implement the CRPD through political debates, 
informal meetings and public hearings. It examines legislative and policy documents for assessing 
their compliance with the CRPD and carries out several awareness-raising activities. The Parliament 
is represented by PETI, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), the Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). 
As previously noted, PETI has the authority to protect the rights of persons with disabilities and 
monitor the CRPD’s implementation. Despite the non-binding nature of its decisions, PETI is 
effectively contributing to the enhancement of disability rights. It does so by hearing petitions from 
any EU citizens concerning EU legislation and reporting on the petitions it receives. Its competences 
are in line with the “soft” policy mechanisms of the open method of coordination. However, its role 
might be improved to better achieve the aims of Article 33 CRPD. 
In primis, the appointment of a specific officer responsible for dealing with legal issues related to 
disability is strongly required in order to strengthen the Committee’s protection role. Secondly, PETI 
should release an annual report on the main disability issues stemming from the petitions to facilitate 
the identification of possible legal solutions. Thirdly, a systematic and periodic exchange of 
information should be set up between PETI and national monitoring institutions. The lack of 
coordination between PETI and national mechanisms constitutes a critical point of the functioning of 
the governance system to implement the CRPD. In this regard, the interplay between EU and 
domestic actors is essential to carry out the sensitive task to protect the rights of persons with 
disabilities. PETI may potentially address the CRPD’s broad scope, but it needs a comprehensive and 
enhanced capacity to perform its protection role. 
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With the exception of PETI, the European Parliament does not have any formal structure to 
implement the CRPD. Nevertheless, the Employment Committee is crucially promoting the 
implementation of the UN’s recommendations to the EU and the role of the European Parliament in 
this context. The European Parliament is currently drafting a report on the UN’s recommendation in 
order to tackle crucial issues such as the adoption of the Accessibility Act and the effects of austerity 
measures on persons with disabilities.576 EDF and members of civil society are constantly involved 
in public hearings and events organised by the Employment Committee. This report is a spontaneous 
initiative of the Parliament and symbolises a remarkable starting point to lead efforts for the CRPD’s 
implementation. Importantly, the Parliament calls for the EU to ratify the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention and urges a cross-cutting review of EU legislation and funding programmes to complying 
fully with the CRPD. It also asks the Commission to update the declaration of competence in light of 
the Concluding Observations, to review the European Disability Strategy and to develop a 
comprehensive EU CRPD strategy with a clear timeframe, benchmarks and indicators.577 
The Parliament is gradually emerging from the institutional shadows by means of the political action 
of a proactive group of MEPs and claims a greater involvement in the EU governance. 578 It is 
important to underline that the Parliament is excluded from the official drafting of the EU periodic 
report to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which is still under the 
exclusive Commission’s competence. Moreover, the Parliament does not participate in any 
procedures of the de facto vertical and horizontal coordination system. In the light of this backdrop, 
it may be said that the European Parliament’s role has been marginalised within the EU independent 
framework. 
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This institutional scenario may jeopardise the adequate implementation of the CRPD at European 
level. The Parliament has always worked to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities pushing 
for the adoption of the Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive. For this reason, the European 
Parliament should be more influential both in the coordination system and the implementation 
process. To this end, the Commission should invite the Parliament to take full part in the debate 
concerning the implementation of the Convention within the High Level Group on Disability.579 In 
this way, the Parliament would be involved in the fundamental mechanism that ensures vertical 
coordination between the EU and Member States. The Parliament might also give a relevant 
contribution to the internal coordination among the EU institutions. Currently, the EU mechanism 
does not provide for an inter-institutional coordination mechanism and the European Parliament may 
fill this governance gap. Good coordination among all EU institutions is however an essential 
condition to achieve the ambitious objectives of the Convention. Lastly, the Code of Conduct should 
be revised in order to expressly update the Parliament’s role in the EU independent framework.580 It 
may be recommended to formally recognise the Parliament’s task to provide an annual report on the 
implementation of the CRPD by the EU and to present a periodic report to the UN Committee. 
This excursus on the procedures adopted by the EU to face the challenges posed by the CRPD’s 
ratification highlights some controversial features of the EU institutional framework and governance. 
In particular, the mechanism established according to Article 33 CRPD brings about the obscuration 
of the European Parliament, the closer body to the European citizens and civil society organisations. 
Nonetheless, the Parliament is taking a leading role in the Convention’s implementation through the 
political initiatives of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs. The adequate nature of the 
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existing policy arrangements to address the rights of persons with disabilities at European level will 
now be examined. 
4.7.2 Is the open method of coordination appropriate? 
The governance system required by Article 33 CRPD employs those typical mechanisms and 
procedures of the experimentalist approach. The EU has responded to this challenge by crafting a 
governance model that mirrors the open method of coordination. In 2010, the European Commission 
adopted the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 in order to pursue its objectives by actions in 
eight priority areas. The approach to achieve these shared goals is based on voluntary political 
cooperation. Member States still retain a significant portion of autonomy in the adoption of national 
policies to accomplish the EU objectives.581 It would seem that the Member States are quite reluctant 
in conferring political competence to the European Union in a sensitive area such as disability law 
that affects different legal sectors (equality law, access to justice, legal capacity and accessibility). 
However, Member States are supported by the Commission’s expertise and guidance in implementing 
strategic objectives. This soft coordination system has already been applied in specific policy fields 
such as employment and growth, social protection and social inclusion, but never with regard to 
equality issues.582 As a result, this new scenario raises several concerns in relation to the feasibility 
of the open method of coordination in the disability sector. 
4.7.2.1 An overview of the reporting mechanism 
The main weakness of the existing governance mechanism affects the reporting and benchmarking 
process. Peer review and reporting are central elements of the OMC. Indeed, governments should 
provide national plans to the Commission concerning the situation of persons with disabilities in their 
domestic system. To this end, Member States started to report on disability by means of the National 
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Reform Programmes (NRPs). The MS were asked to follow the guidelines offered by the DHLG in 
a discussion paper on “Disability mainstreaming in the new streamlined European social protection 
and inclusion processes”.583 The DHLG, as a Commission expert group, encouraged to mainstream 
disability into social protection and social inclusion, taking into account the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the CRPD. The DHLG outlined important strategic and key policy priorities 
such as overcoming discrimination, increasing integration of people with disabilities in the labour 
market, tackling disadvantages in education, enhancing assistance to families with disabled members, 
ensuring decent housing and improving access to quality services that are accessible and affordable. 
Notably, national reports have not mainstreamed disability in a systematic and coherent way. Several 
countries have not addressed the fundamental framework of guidance given by the DHLG. Some 
NRPs failed to report on the implementation progresses made by the country or paid insufficient 
attention to core European policy concepts.584 The majority of States did not provide clear and 
analytical evidence with regard to the implementation of disability policies. In doing so, the 
Commission could not carry out any rigorous assessment of the rights of persons with disabilities at 
national level. 
The launch of the EU Disability Strategy 2010-2020 and the entry into force of the CPRP slightly 
improved the reporting system. Disability strategies and action plans have been developed by some 
Member States to highlight areas which will be at the forefront of government action. For instance, 
in June 2011, Germany released a National Action Plan that covers crucial issues such equality, social 
and political participation of persons with disabilities, empowerment and self-help. To the same 
extent, the Latvian government adopted the Guidelines for the Implementation of the CRPD 2014–
2020 and Denmark launched a new National Action Plan on disability in October 2013. By contrast, 
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Greece, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia failed to release any national disability action plan or 
strategy. Most of the national disability plans does not take into consideration specific disability 
indicators or does not develop reliable data. Therefore, EU institutions cannot promote the 
exchanging of good practices and benchmark progresses by Member States. This context reveals that 
the reporting mechanism should be more incisive in order to involve all the EU Member States and 
improve the OMC’s effectiveness. National plans should not merely contain political guidelines, but 
should identify clear legislative actions and enforcement mechanisms. In this respect, 
recommendations for enhancing the EU governance mechanisms will be offered below. 
4.7.2.2 Enhancing the EU Disability Strategy: some suggestions 
Frequently, the OMC has not been considered a proper tool to accelerate the process of EU 
integration.585 Indeed, it is not based on a comprehensive system of sanctions and the concrete 
achievement of its objectives depends upon the extent to which national plans are implemented by 
governments. The adoption of non-binding recommendations and atypical acts do not ensure the 
uniform application of EU rules in Member States. Moreover, fundamental EU institutions such as 
the European Parliament and the CJEU have a secondary role. The Court of Luxembourg does not 
have a structural position in protecting rights under the CRPD, as it can intervene only in response to 
specific cases submitted by individuals. However, the establishment of an independent framework 
reflecting the experimentalist governance approach results from the international obligation under 
Article 33 CRPD. The absence of hard sanctioning mechanisms should not constitute an obstacle in 
a governance architecture that incentivises reciprocal learnings.586 As a consequence, the reporting 
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methods and the coordination mechanisms of the OMC should be enhanced to mainstream disability 
in the EU. 
Firstly, the DHLG, along with the Parliament’s contribution, may relaunch the objectives of the 
Disability Strategy 2010-2020 developing precise timeframes and key performance indicators. Such 
instruments will be useful for identifying good practices and for measuring countries’ performances 
in the area of disability. In this regard, the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has 
already provided human rights indicators with regard to the right of political participation of people 
with disabilities. As a member of the EU independent framework, it may assist the Commission and 
the Parliament in adopting new policy strategies and indicators. The formulation of clear performance 
indicators by the EU institutions can facilitate the benchmarking process and improve the report 
mechanism. By doing so, the Member States will be encouraged to elaborate statistics and data on 
the impact of their policy measures. At the same time, the EU institutions will have the necessary 
tools to share good practices and evaluate the Member States’ performance. 
Secondly, the EU governance system designed to implement the CPRD should introduce procedures 
to penalise non-cooperation by the Member States. The Commission does not have the duty to 
formally release specific recommendations that emphasise poor performances. On the contrary, the 
Commission’s recommendations to comply with EU guidelines and indicators constitute the main 
“soft” sanction of the OMC. Recommendations will spur the Member States to participate in the 
reporting mechanisms in order to avoid negative publicity.587 Moreover, this procedure will urge the 
non-compliant State to follow positive models and propose legislative reforms. The OMC does not 
provide tangible coercion mechanisms and infringement procedures to punish non-implementers.588 
However, 'peer pressure' and 'naming and shaming' by the EU Commission may represent soft 
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procedures to foster learning and improvement mechanisms at domestic level.589 No formal sanctions 
should be adopted against those Member States whose performances do not comply with agreed-upon 
standards. Instead, Commission recommendations addressed to individual Member States may 
constitute powerful tools to influence national policy discourses.590  
Thirdly, the EU independent framework reveals an excessive fragmentation. Unreasonable 
decentralisation may bring about poorly defined responsibilities and unclear competences.591 It may 
be said that the EU governance mechanisms should be simplified in order to avoid the coexistence of 
multiple EU bodies with overlapping functions. To this end, precise duties and responsibilities should 
be conferred to the EU actors involved in the open method of coordination. The OMC is not seen as 
a panacea to implement the CRPD, but the improvement of certain mechanisms may contribute to 
facilitate the achievement of the Disability Strategy objectives. In doing so, Member States will 
remain the main responsible in a sensitive area where they are still reluctant to lose important portions 
of legislative power. 
An outline of the key recommendations to improve the EU governance architecture is offered below: 
• The Commission’s powers should be strengthened to increase the effectiveness of 
the monitoring and reporting system. In case the Commission will definitively 
abandon the independent framework, a reform of the Code of Conduct would be 
needed to expressly recognise soft procedures to sanction non-compliant behaviour 
by Member States; 
• The Parliament should play a leading role with regard to the EU external relations 
and internal policies. On one hand, the Parliament should be in charge of preparing 
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the annual report on the CRPD’s implementation by the EU to the UN Committee. 
The Parliament has actively facilitated interactions and constructive dialogues 
between the EU and the CRPD Committee. The European Parliament regularly 
organises events and public hearings to discuss the CRPD’s review process and the 
list of issues released by the CRPD Committee. For instance, in February 2016, the 
Parliament promoted an exchange of views concerning the CRPD’s implementation, 
within the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, with the participation of 
all the members of the EU Independent Framework. Furthermore, the Parliament 
drafts on a regular basis reports and resolutions with regard to the Convention’s 
implementation and the concluding observations of the CPRD Committee. It may be 
said that the Parliament embodies the political capacity to act as the main contact 
point for the purpose of CRPD reporting. On the other hand, the Committee on 
Employment and Social Affairs, acting on behalf of the Parliament, should be 
acknowledged as the central coordinator between EU institutions, EU agencies and 
civil society. It has a strong competence in the field of the rights of persons with 
disabilities and is promoting several political initiatives to improve their legal 
protection at EU level; 
• The EU Ombudsman and PETI should formally monopolise the duty to ensure the 
implementation of the CRPD through an independent officer responsible for 
disability legal cases; 
• The Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) should acquire an active role in the 
monitoring process. Its functions are highly relevant to support the work of the 
Commission in measuring the impact of the Disability Strategy 2010-2020. 
Indicators and data developed by FRA should be used to systematically benchmark 
and evaluate national strategies concerning the rights of persons with disabilities; 
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• The European Disability Forum (EFD) is identified as the main NGO involved in the 
promotion of disability rights in the EU. It participates in all the main meetings and 
procedures of the EU independent framework. The central challenge is to improve 
the quality of the EU policy deliberation ensuring regular consultation and public 
hearings with civil society. Its contribution may also be significant in assisting the 
EP in drafting reports to the UN Committee and monitoring the CRPD’s 
implementation. 
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A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE DUTY TO PROVIDE REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION: US AND CANADA 
1. Introducing the legal framework 
This chapter will adopt a comparative legal approach in order to analyse the implementation of the 
duty to provide reasonable accommodation in the United States and Canada. To this end, a brief 
overview of the judicial understanding of the concept of disability will also be given. 
The UN CRPD encompasses the obligation to guarantee and protect the employment rights of people 
with disabilities in the open labour market. Article 27 of the Convention states that: 
“States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to work, on an equal basis with others; this 
includes the right to the opportunity to gain a living by work freely chosen or accepted in a labor market 
and work environment that is open, inclusive and accessible to persons with disabilities. States Parties shall 
safeguard and promote the realization of the right to work, including for those who acquire a disability 
during the course of employment, by taking appropriate steps, including through legislation”. 
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation represents an essential requirement to effectively 
enhance the rights of persons with disabilities in the workplace. The concept of reasonable 
accommodation is specifically defined by Article 2 of CRPD. It includes: 
“All the necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue 
burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise 
on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Art. 2 CRPD). 
It is worth noting that the concept of reasonable accommodation was for first time introduced in the 
American legal system by the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity and then it was also embraced 
by Canadian courts to deal with religious diversity.592 However, in both countries, the duty to provide 
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reasonable accommodation was merely related to aspects of religious observance and practice without 
any reference to disability. The obligation to provide reasonable accommodation to persons with 
disabilities in the workplace was expressly introduced by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
only in 1990. Since then, the concept of reasonable accommodation has been enshrined in several 
legal instruments at international, European and national level.593 For instance, Canada introduced 
the duty to provide reasonable accommodation with an express reference to persons with disabilities 
within the Employment Equity Act in 1995. Furthermore, the EU adopted the obligation to 
accommodate persons with disabilities under Article 5 of the Directive 2000/78 by means of a 
“transatlantic borrowing” from the ADA.594 
The US has been selected because it was the first Western country to adopt a comprehensive piece of 
legislation (the ADA) which addresses the duty to accommodate persons with disabilities in the 
workplace. However, the US is yet to ratify the CRPD. President Obama signed the treaty in 2009 
showing the intention to be bound by its legal obligation. Nonetheless, the CRPD’s ratification 
became a problematic political issue. Indeed, the final bill obtained only 61 votes for and 38 against 
in the Senate, five votes short of the two-thirds majority needed for ratification. By contrast, Canada 
lacks an overarching piece of legislation that specifically focuses on the rights of persons with 
disabilities, but it signed the Convention on the day it opened for signature and ratified the CRPD in 
March 2010. 
The purpose of this chapter is to stress positive and negative practices with regard to the judicial 
interpretation of the concept of disability and the duty to accommodate persons with disabilities. In 
doing so, this chapter will compare a country which has ratified the CRPD (Canada) with one which 
has not (United States). The aim is to identify the appropriate modification and adjustments for 
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fostering the rights of persons with disabilities in the workplace. To the same extent, it seeks to assess 
the legal impact of the obligation to accommodate on employers. 
2. US disability law 
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which prohibits discrimination 
in employment, public accommodation and government services.595 The ADA’s enactment was 
hailed as the most radical and inspiring change affecting disability rights at the international level.596 
The ADA’s adoption may be considered as the final outcome of the increasing pressure exercised by 
disability rights activities in the 1960s. In this respect, the “independent living movement” for the 
promotion of disability rights represented a fundamental segment of the American movement for 
disability rights. It has its roots in Berkley (California) and contributed to founding the first Center 
for Independent Living in the USA.597 Disability rights activists were strongly encouraged by the 
positive results obtained by African-American and Women’s civil rights campaigners. They 
successfully fought to achieve the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national origin and gender. Similarly, in the 
1970s, disability advocates started to lobby Congress for equal treatment, equal access and equal 
opportunity for persons with disabilities and marched on Washington to include civil rights for 
persons with disabilities into the 1972 Rehabilitation Act. The wave of protests gradually influenced 
the Congress’ political agenda who passed several pieces of legislation to tackle disability 
discrimination, such as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act of 1975. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504) introduced equal opportunity for 
employment within the federal government and prohibited discrimination on the basis of either 
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physical or mental disability. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, which was 
renamed in 1990 to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), focused on the inclusion 
of children with disabilities into regular classes and the rights of parents to be involved in the 
educational decisions affecting their children. 
After nearly three decades of lobbying activities, the ADA was enacted in 1990 to ensure equal 
treatment and equal access of people with disabilities to employment opportunities and to public 
accommodations. It is noteworthy that the ADA was approved with the bi-partisan political support 
of Republicans and Democrats; President George Bush described the act as “the world’s first 
comprehensive declaration of equality for people with disabilities”. 
2.1 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
Despite the enthusiasm surrounding the ADA’s adoption, Courts applied a strict interpretation of the 
concept of disability and narrowed the ADA’s mandate.598 The ADA indeed enshrined a “social” 
definition of disability covering not only those individuals who have an impairment that substantially 
limits a major life activity, but also those persons who are “regarded as having such an impairment”. 
The ADA adopted a flexible and broad definition of disability aiming at curbing society’s stereotypes 
related to persons with disabilities. Under the ADA, the term "disability" means, with respect to an 
individual: 
(i) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such 
individual; 
(ii) a record of such an impairment; 
(iii) being regarded as having such an impairment. 
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In doing so, the ADA embraced a social model of disability according to which disability implies an 
interaction between individual impairment and social barriers. This approach has positively included 
under the ADA’s protection those individuals who meet the requirement of "being regarded as having 
such an impairment".599 The “regarded as” prong significantly extended the ADA’s personal scope 
in order to erase disability discrimination and employment decisions based on a stereotyped or 
misrepresented perception of disability. In this respect, the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEOC) 
released an Interpretative Guidance stating that “an individual rejected from a job because of the 
myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be covered under this part of the 
definition of disability”.600 The ADA introduced promising legal provisions to improve the protection 
of persons with disabilities. The Supreme Court however rejected the EEOC’s guidance and clarified 
the circumstances under which an individual may fall under the protection of the “regarded as” prong. 
The sceptic view of the Supreme Court will be briefly examined below. 
2.2 The judicial backlash: Sutton v United Air Lines 
The decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines symbolised the emergence of a sort of judicial backlash 
against the ADA. The Court held that the plaintiffs did not fall under the ADA’s protection, because 
their impairment could be mitigated by the use of glasses and as such it was not substantially limiting 
of any major life activity.601 The case began with the petition of two sisters, Karen and Kimberly 
Sutton, who suffered from myopia. They applied for a job as commercial airline pilots with United 
Air Lines, but their application was rejected by United Air Lines. The respondent’s justification was 
that the uncorrected visual acuity of the petitioners did not meet the employer’s minimum vision 
requirements. As a consequence, they filed suit under the ADA, which prohibits covered employers 
from discriminating against individuals on the basis of their disabilities. 
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The Court ruled that the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life 
activity should take into account the effects of mitigating measures such as assistive or prosthetic 
devices. An individual who is currently functioning well due to mitigating measures will not be 
considered as a person with disabilities under the ADA. This interpretation appears controversial 
because whether a person has a disability shall be determined without regard to the availability or use 
of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations, prosthetic devices, medications or 
auxiliary aids. This ruling had therefore the effect to exclude from the ADA’s protection several 
millions of individuals with diabetes, seizures disorders, heart disease and psychiatric conditions.602 
Moreover, the Court stated that a claimant does not fall under the ADA’s definition of disability that 
covers who is “regarded as having such impairment” unless he or she sufficiently alleges to be 
regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. In doing so, the Court required 
that “an employer mistakenly believes that an individual has a substantially limiting impairment” or 
that “an employer mistakenly believes that an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits 
one or more major life activities”.603 In both cases, the personal impairment must be perceived as 
limiting one or more major life activities. The Court negatively assumed that the inability to perform 
a single or particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of 
working. According to this view, the petitioners failed to adequately allege that their poor eyesight is 
regarded as an impairment that substantially limits them in the major life activity of working. They 
merely alleged that the respondent regarded their poor vision as precluding them from holding 
positions as a global airline pilot.604 The claimants therefore did not demonstrate that the respondent 
perceived them as having a substantially limiting impairment preventing them from performing a 
broad class of tasks beyond the particular job of pilot. As a result, the Court found that an employer’s 
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vision requirement does not reflect a belief that the petitioners’ vision substantially limits their major 
life activity. 
This ruling violates the underlying rationale of the ADA to deal with society’s accumulated myths 
and fears concerning disability. The Court indeed demanded a high standard of what is regarded as 
“major life activities”, which includes the inability to work in a broad class of jobs. As a consequence, 
individuals mistakenly perceived as having an impairment that merely jeopardises a single job 
performance cannot fall under the ADA’s protection. The Court emphasised a restrictive 
interpretation of the “regarded as” prong at the expense of a universalistic approach that aims at 
ensuring protection for a broad category of individuals.605 
2.3 Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v Williams 
In 2002, the Supreme Court further narrowed the ADA’s definition of disability in the case of Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing Kentucky, Inc. v Williams.606 It held that the Sixth Circuit decision erred in 
qualifying as “disabled” an assembly line worker with carpal tunnel syndrome and related 
impairments under the first prong of the definition of disability. By contrast, the Sixth Circuit ruled 
that the claimant’s impairments substantially limited her major life activity of performing manual 
tasks, such as gripping of tools and repetitive work with hands. The Supreme Court underlined that 
Sixth Circuit did not apply the proper standard in determining that the respondent was disabled under 
the ADA. The Sixth Circuit focused its analysis only to a limited class of manual tasks and “failed to 
ask whether respondent’s impairments prevented or restricted her from performing tasks that are of 
central importance to most people’s daily lives”.607 The Supreme Court stated that the central inquiry 
must be whether the claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks central to most individuals’ 
daily lives. In this case, manual tasks unique to a particular job were regarded as not necessarily 
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important parts of most people’s lives; occupation-specific tasks were considered as having only 
limited relevance to the manual task inquiry. As a result, the Court stated that the plaintiff’s 
impairments precluded her from carrying out isolated manual task performances and she was 
therefore not substantially limited in a major life activity. The claimant was indeed still able to 
perform her personal hygiene and carry out personal or household chores. In a nutshell, the Court 
required that an impairment must substantially obstructs also non-working activities of the individual 
in order to trigger the ADA’s coverage. 
It may be said that the standard adopted by the Supreme Court to fall under the category of ‘disability’ 
is excessively challenging. The requirement of an “impairment that substantially limits a major life 
activity” deprived the ADA of its original purpose to tackle discrimination against persons with 
disabilities in such critical areas as employment. It is difficult to justify the Supreme Court’s legal 
reasoning because it places a heavy burden of proof on the employee to show the existence of a 
substantial limitation to non-working activities. It seems evident that the ADA has not triggered the 
expected transformative impact on the life of persons with disabilities.608 The Supreme Court 
expressly introduced a “demanding standard” to assess whether an individual can be considered as 
having a disability.609 This approach considerably limited the protection of persons with disabilities 
and brought about significant legal obstacles to address disability discrimination.610 Following the 
Court’s interpretation, over 97% of ADA employments claims have been rejected by federal courts. 
The restrictive approach of the Supreme Court may be due to the fact that the ADA expressly provided 
higher standards of protection in comparison with the previous Rehabilitation Act by introducing new 
and broader legal concepts such as the social model of disability and the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation in the workplace.611 American courts did not fully recognise the civil rights model 
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underlying the new piece of legislation. By doing so, they showed a conservative approach towards 
the implementation of a substantive model of equality that requires affirmative action and different 
treatments for persons with disabilities. Consequently, in 2006, Congress started to work on a new 
piece of legislation with the view of overriding the restrictive Court’s approach. The main 
improvements introduced by Congress will be briefly analysed below. 
2.4 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
In order to restore and reinvigorate the broader scope of the ADA’s mandate, Congress was forced to 
approve the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). Section 2 of ADAAA lays down that 
“Congress expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be interpreted consistently 
with how courts had applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, that expectation has not been fulfilled”. In addition, Congress recognised that “the holdings 
of the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion 
cases have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus 
eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect”. In doing so, 
Congress confirmed that the ADA sets out a clear and exhaustive national mandate for the elimination 
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.612 The ADA amendments however have not 
affected the substantive content of the duty to provide reasonable accommodation in the workplace. 
Title I on ‘employment’ prohibits discriminations with regard to the job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, discharge of employee and job training, referring to those employers who are 
engaged in an industry with at least fifteen employees. It is important to point out that Title I also 
obliges employers to guarantee reasonable accommodation unless such accommodation would pose 
                                                      




an undue hardship on the operation of the business. The category of reasonable accommodation 
includes: 
(i) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with 
disabilities, 
(ii) job restructuring, modifying work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position; acquiring or modifying 
equipment or devices, adjusting or modifying examinations, training materials, or policies, and providing 
qualified readers or interpreters. 
By contrast, an “undue hardship” is defined as an action requiring significant difficulty or expense 
when considered in light of factors such as an employer’s size, financial resources, and the nature and 
structure of its operation. Indeed, according to Sec. 101 (10B) of ADA, in determining whether an 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered 
include: 
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act; 
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable 
accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or 
the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; 
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity 
with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and 
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and 
functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship 
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity. 
Against this background, it may be said that the central purpose of ADA is to ensure equal 
employment opportunities for employees with disabilities, employment non-discrimination and 
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reasonable accommodation.613 The extent to which ADAAA has changed the legal definition of 
disability and the personal scope of the obligation to accommodate will now be analysed. 
2.4.1 The “regarded as” prong 
The most important development achieved by the ADAAA affects the “regarded as” prong of the 
disability definition. The ADA, as amended, retained the previous definition of disability but provided 
significant changes to reduce the demanding bar to demonstrate a substantial limitation on major life 
activity. Interestingly, the bill removed from the third “regarded as” prong the requirement to prove 
that an individual has, or is perceived to have, an impairment that substantiality limits a major life 
activity. Indeed, according to Paragraph 3 of Section 4 ADA, an individual meets the requirement 
of ̒being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has been 
subjected to an action prohibited under the ADA, because of an actual or perceived physical or mental 
impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity. This 
new provision specifically rejects the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Toyota in 
accordance with the terms “substantially” and “major” need to be interpreted strictly to create a 
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. 
In addition, the amendments further clarify that an impairment that substantially limits one major life 
activity “need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability”.614 The 
determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made 
“without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures” such as medication, medical 
supplies, equipment, use of assistive technology; reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or 
services.615 These rules expressly overcome the Supreme Court’s finding in Sutton that whether an 
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impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to the 
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures. 
The ADAAA extended the scope of the statute’s protection to a broader class of individuals with 
disabilities. By contrast, the category of individuals who are entitled to reasonable accommodation 
has been restricted. Employers no longer have the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation or a 
reasonable modification to policies, practices, or procedures to an individual who is only “regarded 
as” disabled.616 This limitation has been defined by Congress as an “acceptable compromise” given 
the expectation that real persons with disabilities would be covered under the first prong of the 
ADAAA’s disability definition.617 This reasoning is adequate with regard to those individuals who 
are mistakenly perceived as disabled without having any kind of impairment.618 However, persons 
who have an impairment that does not substantially limit their major life activities may still need 
reasonable accommodation to perform a specific job. The American legal framework may be 
criticised because the ADAAA enlarged the category of persons who are regarded as disabled, but 
reduced the legal guarantees in favour of them by eliminating the duty on employers to provide 
reasonable accommodation. The particular nature of reasonable accommodation under US disability 
law will now be examined in order to investigate how the Supreme Court interpreted the 
accommodation requirement. 
2.4.2 Reasonable accommodation 
The failure to provide reasonable accommodation for a “qualified individual with a disability” 
constitutes employment discrimination under the ADA. The term "qualified individual" means an 
individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of 
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the employment position that such individual holds or desires.619 In general, an accommodation is 
any change in the work environment that enables a worker with disability to enjoy or exercise 
employment rights and opportunities on an equal basis with others. There are two main categories of 
reasonable accommodations. The first one includes accommodations involving “hard costs” or 
concrete out-of-pocket expenses and requires alteration of the physical workplace, such as ramping 
stairs to accommodate the needs of individuals who use a wheelchair.620 The second category 
encompasses “soft costs” accommodations demanding alteration of the way a job is performed, such 
as personnel policy or practice.621 The EEOC however suggested that majority of accommodations 
do not entail significant costs for small businesses and reported an average cost of $240.00.622 
Under the ADA, a claim of disability discrimination has to follow a precise and interactive procedure. 
An employee must prove that he or she has a disability and that he or she is qualified to perform the 
essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation. Then, the plaintiff has to 
demonstrate that he or she has suffered adverse employment action on the grounds of disability. By 
contrast, once the plaintiff makes a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible, the 
burden of production shifts to the employer. The latter is then engaged in an “interactive process” to 
assess the individual limitation and determine the possible reasonable accommodation. The term 
'reasonable accommodation' thus "includes the employer's reasonable efforts to assist the employee 
and to communicate with the employee in good faith”.623 The employer can also decline the request 
and show that it is unable to accommodate the employee.624 
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The interpretation of the accommodation requirement stands out as a problematic issue under the 
ADA.625 The restrictive approach adopted by the Supreme Court with regard to the definition of 
disability compromises the implementation of the reasonable accommodation provision. Plaintiffs 
have to prove that they are “disabled enough” to fall under the definition of disability and seek a 
reasonable accommodation, but not “too disabled” to be regarded as unqualified for the job.626 
Employers may therefore assert that the individual impairment prevents the claimant from carrying 
out specific job functions.627 This means that only a narrow category of individuals is "disabled just 
right" to invoke the ADA’s protection.628 Several cases have been merely decided by looking at the 
plaintiff’s characteristics. This approach achieved the irrational outcome of considering “a person 
disabled enough to be fired from a job, but not disabled enough to challenge the firing”.629 
Moreover, once an applicant shows that he or she is disabled enough under the ADA, he or she faces 
another challenge. According to the ADA, the employer does not have the duty to provide a 
reasonable accommodation that would impose an “undue hardship” on the functioning of the 
employer’s business. The concept of undue hardship is highly vague and the lack of legal precedents 
jeopardises the identification of those accommodations that are reasonable. American courts’ rulings 
mainly focused on the issue of disability at the summary judgement phase and abstained from 
adopting a comprehensive definition of reasonable accommodation or undue hardship. It may be 
argued that the imposition of a high bar for classifying a person as disabled had a negative impact on 
the right to reasonable accommodation for workers with disabilities. The unique judgement of the 
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Supreme Court on reasonable accommodation will now be analysed and it will be shown how this 
concept has been understood in the American legal framework. 
 2.5 The Supreme Court’s controversial reasoning in US Airways, Inc v. Barnett 
The Supreme Court provided guidance to identify the construction of the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation in the case of US Airways, Inc v. Barnett.630 The Court’s decision offered significant 
guidelines to assess the scope of this obligation and the potential development of ADA 
jurisprudence.631 
The case involved Robert Barnett who worked for US Airways as cargo handler. He injured his back 
and was transferred to a less physically demanding mailroom position. His new position later became 
open to seniority-based employee bidding under US Airways’ seniority system, and employees with 
greater seniority wanted to apply for the job. US Airways refused his request to accommodate his 
disability by allowing him to remain in the mailroom, and he lost his job. Mr Barnett then filed suit 
under the ADA claiming that he was an individual with a disability who was qualified to perform the 
mailroom job. He contended that US. Air violated the ADA by refusing to provide him with a 
reasonable accommodation and reassigning him to the mailroom position. The District Court granted 
the company summary judgement finding that an alteration of the seniority system’s rules would 
result in an “undue hardship” to both US Airways and its non-disabled employees. According to the 
District Court, the US Air seniority system has been in place for “decades” and governed over 14,000 
U.S Air Agents. As a result, the US Air employees were justified in relying upon the policy.632 By 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision holding that US Air’s seniority policy does not 
automatically constitute a bar to reassignment under the ADA. The Circuit held that the seniority 
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system was merely a factor in the undue hardship assessment and that a case-by-case analysis is 
required to determine whether any particular assignment would constitute an undue hardship.633 
The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether “the ADA requires an employer to reassign a 
disabled employee to a position as a ‘reasonable accommodation’ even though another employee is 
entitled to hold the position under the employer’s bona fide and established seniority system.”634 
2.5.1 Does job reassignment amount to reasonable accommodation? 
The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and concluded that that accommodation was 
unreasonable because it would have disrupted other employee’s expectations of “fair, uniform 
treatment” under the seniority system.635 The Supreme Court’s majority opinion refused both parties’ 
argumentations embracing an “intermediate view” of the concept of reasonable accommodation.636 
Firstly, the Court rejected the US Airways' claim that a seniority system always trumps a conflicting 
accommodation request on the grounds of how the ADA treats workplace "preferences."637 US 
Airways argued that the ADA seeks only "equal" treatment for persons with disabilities and does not 
therefore require an employer to grant any preferential treatment. According to this view, “insofar as 
a requested accommodation violates a disability-neutral workplace rule, such as a seniority rule, it 
grants the employee with a disability treatment that other workers could not receive.” 638 By contrast, 
the Supreme Court clarified that “preferences” under the ADA may be sometimes necessary to 
achieve the Act's basic equal opportunity goal. The Act indeed requires “preferences in the form of 
reasonable accommodations that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace 
opportunities that those without disabilities automatically enjoy.”639 The Court pointed out that a 
                                                      
633 Ibid, at 1120. 
634 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 395–96. 
635 Ibid, at 403-404. 
636 S. F. Befort, Reasonable accommodation and reassignment under the Americans with Disabilities Act: answers, 
questions and suggested solutions after U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett (2003) 45 Arizona Law Review, p. 951. 





preferential treatment that breaches an employer's disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the 
accommodation beyond the Act's potential reach. The reasonable accommodation requirement 
implies that employers have the duty to treat employees with disabilities differently (or preferentially) 
in order to effectively accomplish its intended objective. In doing so, a difference in treatment does 
not represent per se an exception from the ADA’s reasonable accommodation mandate. 
Secondly, the Court rejected the Barnett’s stance according to which the statutory words ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ mean only ‘effective accommodation’. Barnett argued that reasonable 
accommodations qualify as those workplace modifications that enable an individual with a disability 
to perform the essential functions of a position. The plaintiff added that any other view would make 
the words ‘reasonable accommodation’ and ‘undue hardship’ virtual mirror images creating a 
practical burden of proof dilemma.640 However, the Court was not persuaded by the Barnett's legal 
interpretation of ‘reasonable’ accommodation. Pursuant to the Court’s view, the word ‘reasonable’ 
does not mean ‘effective’, but it is the word ‘accommodation’ that conveys the need for effectiveness. 
As a consequence, an accommodation could be effective in terms of enabling essential job 
performance without being reasonable. Moreover, the Court explained that an effective 
accommodation could be unreasonable because of its impact, not on business operations, but on other 
co-workers. Lastly, with regard to the burden of proof allocation, the Court held that a plaintiff needs 
only to show that an accommodation seems reasonable on its face and the defendant then must show 
‘special circumstances’ that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular case. To conclude, the Court 
stated that the proposed accommodation was not reasonable in the present case as the reassignment 
conflicted with the seniority system’s rules. 
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2.5.2 Seniority system’ rules and reasonable accommodation requirements 
The Court recognised the importance of seniority to employee-management relation and supported 
those decisions of lower court’s ruling that a seniority system always trumps a request of reasonable 
accommodation. According to this view, the statute does not require that employers submit proof on 
a case-by-case basis that a seniority system should prevail. The typical seniority system indeed grants 
important advantages for employees “by creating, and fulfilling, employee expectations of fair, 
uniform treatment”.641 These benefits include job security and objective standards for predictable 
career advancement. As a result, requiring the typical employer to adopt a complex case-specific 
"accommodation" decision would undermine the employees' expectations of consistent and uniform 
treatment. Such management decision-making would be inevitable discretionary and violate the rules 
of a seniority system. Thus, the Court found a conflict between the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation under the ADA and the labour goal of restricting employer discretion.642 This 
decision underlines that accommodation requirements may bring about arbitrary treatments in the 
workplace and frustrate employment policies aiming at constraining employer discretion.643 In this 
respect, accommodating an individual impairment may not only reinforce employer discretion, but 
also have a negative impact on non-disabled employees’ contractual rights or expectations. However, 
according to the ADA, the disabled employee is free to show that under the "special circumstances" 
of the case, an exception to the seniority policy would be "reasonable." For instance, the employee 
would be entitled to claim an exception to the standard application of seniority rules if he showed that 
"one more departure" from the seniority rules "will not likely make a difference."644 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning clearly privileges labour goals over equal opportunities policies and 
non-discrimination norms. In doing so, it promotes the adoption of objective workplace policies 
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limiting employer’s discretion and decision-making. This interpretation may have the positive effect 
to enhance uniform treatment in the workplace and employees’ expectations with regard to 
employment opportunities. This approach however disregards the ADA’s mandate to foster the 
integration of persons with disabilities in the workplace and jeopardises the statutory goal of ensuring 
equal opportunity. The same understanding of reasonable accommodation has since been adopted by 
several courts of appeals. Another example of this judicial interpretation of the reassignment 
requirement will now be offered. 
2.5.3 The 8th Circuit: a conservative approach 
In Pam Huber v. Walmart Stores, Inc., the Eight Circuit ruled that “the reassignment language merely 
requires employers to consider on an equal basis with all other applicants an otherwise qualified 
existing employee with a disability for reassignment to a vacant position”.645 
This case originated from the claim of Huber who worked for Wal-Mart as a dry grocery order filler. 
She had a permanent injury to her right arm and hand; she therefore could no longer perform the 
essential functions of her job. The parties stipulated Huber's injury is a disability under the ADA and 
Huber sought, as a reasonable accommodation, reassignment to a router position, which was a vacant 
and equivalent position under the ADA. Wal-Mart, however, declined the plaintiff’s request to be 
automatically reassigned to the router position. Wal-Mart required the claimant to apply for the router 
position with other applicants. Ultimately, Wal-Mart denied Huber the router position because she 
was not the most qualified candidate. As a consequence, Huber filed suit under the ADA, arguing she 
should have been reassigned to the router position as a reasonable accommodation for her disability. 
The District Court granted summary judgement in favour of Huber, but the Court of Appeals (Eighth 
Circuit) concluded that Wal-Mart did not violate its duty, under the ADA, to provide reasonable 
accommodation. 
                                                      
645 See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 (8th Circuit 2007). 
256 
 
The Eight Circuit’s ruling reflects the Supreme Court’s finding in Barnett as it adopts a restrictive 
approach according to which the ADA does not include mandatory preference provisions. The Circuit 
agreed that the ADA “is not an affirmative action statute” because it merely prohibits employment 
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. The ADA does not demand an employer 
to reassign a qualified disabled employee to a vacant position when such a reassignment would violate 
a legitimate non-discriminatory policy of the employer to hire the most qualified candidate.646 
Pursuant to this view, the ADA only requires an employee to take into equal consideration the 
employer’s request for a reassignment to a vacant position. 
It appears evident that policies underlying business interests prevail over legal requirements to 
accommodate persons with disabilities. To conclude on this point, one may argue that American 
courts have been reluctant to embrace the civil rights conception of disability enshrined in the ADA 
and apply the statutory substantial obligation to accommodate. 
2.5.4 The preferential nature of reasonable accommodation 
Case law under the ADA shows that reasonable accommodations implying preferential treatment for 
persons with disabilities are regarded as affirmative actions. Courts adopted strict standards to apply 
the duty to provide reasonable accommodation and prevent the ADA from imposing affirmative 
action provisions. American courts are sceptical with regard to affirmative action laws and the 
preferential nature of the duty to provide reasonable accommodation. However, the reasonable 
accommodation requirement should not be automatically associated with the conventional concept of 
affirmative action.647 For instance, traditional affirmative actions are often based on pre-designed 
policies that aim to enhance the inclusion of marginalised minority groups in the labour market.648 
To this end, they set up specific numerical goals to increase the representation of minority groups in 
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the workplace. In this respect, affirmative action expressly requires preferring one group over others 
in order to compensate disadvantages and achieve equality of results.649 These policies are common 
in gender and racial anti-discrimination laws that adopt affirmative action such as racial quotas 
or gender quotas. In contrast, reasonable accommodation under the ADA involves personalised 
special treatments and does not provide for pre-determined statistical goals or quotas. This duty 
entails an interactive dialogue between employer and employee in order to individuate the proper 
accommodation. Reassignment does not apply at the hiring stage, when affirmative action programs 
are usually highly pervasive. It indeed operates as a “post-hire mechanism” which does not negatively 
affect other groups of workers.650 It may be argued that reasonable accommodation and affirmative 
action share significant similarities, but also differ under certain circumstances. Despite that, both 
categories rely on a concept of equality that seeks differential treatment for an under-represented 
group of individuals. The ADA indeed further compels employers to provide preferential workplace 
adjustments to persons with disabilities regardless of whether those same modifications are provided 
to the non-disabled workers. The concept of reasonable accommodation is based on a substantive 
model of discrimination that requires employers to treat persons with disabilities differently than 
other non-disabled individuals.651 The preferential treatment of persons with disabilities underlying 
the duty to accommodate should be recognised by American courts as the cornerstone of the ADA’s 
protection. Thus, the Congress’ original idea was “to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals of disabilities”. 
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2.5.5 The American model of reasonable accommodation: duty or privilege? 
The courts’ interpretation of the ADA reveals that such a law has been perceived to ensure benefits 
to individuals who are merely considered to have a disability. The ADA has been wrongly identified 
as a “redistributive scheme” that privileges persons with disabilities who do not deserve such 
advantages.652 As a result, the Supreme Court imposed a strict standard to identify the ADA’s 
personal scope and apply the duty to provide reasonable accommodation. By evoking those negative 
consequences that may affect non-disabled co-workers, the Court seems to endorse the idea according 
to which minority groups are in a privileged position in comparison with other groups. This approach 
implies that accommodating marginalised groups may bring about reverse discrimination at the 
expense of non-disabled individuals. 
Nevertheless, the Court’s understanding of the concept of reasonable accommodation is still highly 
ambiguous. The case of PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin may be cited here as it shows to what extent 
the obligation to accommodate workers with disabilities has been approached by US courts.653 This 
case originated from the claim of Casey Martin, a talented golfer who qualified for the PGA TOUR 
in 2000. Martin was also an individual with a disability as defined in the ADA who has been afflicted 
with Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, a degenerative circulatory disorder that obstructs the flow 
of blood from his right leg back to his heart. He made a request for permission to use a golf cart to 
accommodate a mobility impairment, but the petitioner refused to review those records or to waive 
its walking rule. The petitioner mistakenly assumed that accommodating the plaintiff’s impairments 
would have made work easier for the disabled. This decision therefore precluded him from playing 
in any PGA tournament. 
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The Court found that a modification that provides an exception to a peripheral tournament rule 
without impairing its purpose cannot be said to “fundamentally alter” the tournament. Therefore, a 
sports governing body must make reasonable accommodations to provide a physically impaired 
athlete with an opportunity to compete in the subject sport.654 The Court clearly stated that 
discrimination under the ADA includes the failure to make reasonable modifications in policies or 
accommodations to individuals with disabilities unless an entity can show that the modification would 
have "fundamentally altered the nature” of such policies. This judgement pointed out the correct 
scope of the duty to accommodate which does not require an employer to make working tasks easier 
for the recipient, but aims to enable an individual to perform essential job functions on equal basis 
with others.655 
Against this backdrop, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the notion of 
reasonable accommodation remains controversial. It relies on a formal approach to non-
discrimination that does not demand an effective adaption of those labour policies that hinder the full 
and effective participation of persons with disabilities in the workplace. The reasonable 
accommodation requirement is widely perceived as a charitable provision which requires expensive 
and positive actions upon employees. It may be argued that the legal obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation is wrongly associated to a privilege towards persons with disabilities that justifies 
unequal treatment of workers. This understating is also evident in a leading judgement of the Supreme 
Court concerning the similar duty to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of 
employees. In the case of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the su.656 The Court expressly stated 
that this accommodation would have triggered an "unequal treatment” of workers granting a privilege 
to those individuals who claim Saturdays off for religious reasons. 
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The legal interpretation of the duty to provide reasonable accommodation given by the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decisions will be now analysed. It is submitted that the Canadian Supreme Court has 
better understood and applied the obligation to accommodate than the US Supreme Court. 
3. Canadian disability law 
Canada recently ratified the CRPD showing a renovated commitment to tackle discrimination and 
achieve full inclusion for persons with disabilities. The Canadian legal framework presents significant 
differences in comparison with the American legal system in relation to the protection of persons 
with disabilities. It indeed lacks a comprehensive piece of legislation dealing exclusively with the 
rights of persons with disabilities. 
The main instrument to provide equality and combat discrimination is the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (the Charter) which includes all those human rights that have constitutional protection 
and applies to all different jurisdictions in Canada.657 According to Section 15 of the Charter: 
“Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal 
benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national 
or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability”. 
The Charter however has a limited scope as it ensures protection only with regard to government laws 
and actions. By contrast, the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) has a broader application and 
prohibits natural and legal persons from discriminating against an employee, tenant or service-user.658 
Section 3 of the CHRA states that: 
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“The prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, 
sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon 
has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.” 
Moreover, the CHRA specifies that discriminatory practices are exclusively allowed on the basis of 
a bona fide occupational requirement. It must be established that accommodation of the needs of an 
individual or a class of individuals affected would impose undue hardship on the person who would 
have to accommodate those needs, considering health, safety and cost (Section 15.2). 
It is worth noting that Canadian human rights law does not provide any legal definition of ‘disability’ 
and an explicit duty to provide reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities. This 
obligation is however included in the Employment Equity Act which requires every employer to 
implement employment equity by making such reasonable accommodations as will ensure that 
persons in designated groups achieve a degree of representation in each occupational group in the 
employer’s workforce that reflects their representation in society (Paragraph 5.b).659 
The next sections will briefly examine the judicial understanding of the definition of disability and 
the Canadian courts’ interpretation of the legal nature of the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation. It will be shown that the Supreme Court of Canada embraces a substantive model 
of equality that reflects the main legal developments enshrined in the CRPD. 
3.1 The social model of disability 
In Mercier,660 the Supreme Court emphasised a flexible and broad definition of disability that takes 
into account several factors such as evolving biomedical, social and technological developments. 
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The Court ruled that the City of Montréal and the City of Boisbriand discriminated against Réjeanne 
Mercier and Palmerino Troilo on the basis of their disability. The City of Montréal refused to hire Mr 
Mercier as a gardener-horticulturist because a pre-employment medical exam revealed an anomaly 
of his spinal column. Similarly, the City of Boisbriand dismissed Mr Troilo from his position as a 
police officer as he suffered from Crohn's disease. However, according to the medical evidence, the 
claimants could perform the normal duties of the position at issue because they had no functional 
limitations. 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning is highly relevant as it adheres to an evolving concept of disability 
that also includes the subjective element of being considered disabled. Discrimination is often based 
on subjective perceptions and stereotypes rather than the concrete existence of functional limitations. 
The Court underlined that the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms (Charter) does not define the 
ground ‘handicap’. Nonetheless, it excluded that the word ‘handicap’ solely entails a physical or 
mental anomaly that results in functional limitations. The Court adopted a ‘liberal and purposive 
interpretation’ and a ‘contextual approach’ that acknowledge the subjective component of any 
discrimination based on grounds of disability.661 The definition of disability indeed does not merely 
require the presence of individual functional limitations. 
The Court positively refused a narrow definition of ‘handicap’ and privileged a multidimensional 
approach that contemplates the socio-political dimension of being disabled. In doing so, the reasoning 
mainly focused on human dignity, respect and the right to equality rather than the biomedical 
condition of the individual. The Court recognised that “disability may exist even without proof of 
physical limitations”.662 It correctly emphasised that discrimination on grounds of disability may 
occur because of social prejudices and stereotypes.663 As a result, courts should not only consider an 
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individual’s biomedical impairment, but also those external circumstances that hamper the enjoyment 
of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court rejected the medical model of disability that focuses on 
the precise cause of the disability and pointed out the importance of assessing those relevant effects 
of the discriminatory treatments. It made clear that disability represents a social construct that should 
be interpreted in a broad manner: 
“A handicap may be the result of a physical limitation, an ailment, a social construct, a perceived limitation 
or a combination of all of these factors. Indeed, it is the combined effect of all these circumstances that 
determines whether the individual has a “handicap” for the purposes of the Charter”.664 
In the present case, the Court established that the applicants will have the burden of proving: 
(i) the existence of a distinction, exclusion or preference, in this case the dismissal and the refusal to hire; 
(ii) that the distinction, exclusion or preference is based on a ground of handicap, and (iii) that the 
distinction, exclusion or preference has the effect of nullifying or impairing the right to full and equal 
exercise of human rights and freedoms.665 
It is worth saying that the Court’s words resemble the definition of discrimination of Article 2 of the 
CRPD according to which discrimination on the basis of disability means any distinction, exclusion 
or restriction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. This judgement is remarkable as it anticipates those crucial and innovative developments 
introduced by the CRPD with regard to substantive equality and the social model of disability. The 
Court found that the notion of disability should be interpreted consistently with various biomedical, 
social or technological factors without be confined under a rigid and immutable definition. This 
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approach is interesting because it takes into account the interaction between persons with impairments 
and those external barriers that may hinder their participation in society. 
Three significant judgements of the Supreme Court of Canada will now be examined in order to show 
how the concept of reasonable accommodation is understood and applied in Canada. 
3.2 Defining the meaning of reasonable accommodation 
In the case of Meiorin,666 the Supreme Court of Canada adopted an outstanding interpretation of the 
legal duty to accommodate that fosters the substantive concept of equality. By doing so, the Court 
acknowledged that the prohibition of discrimination and the subsequent obligation to provide 
reasonable accommodation are crucial legal requirements to design workplace standards.667 
The Meiorin decision originated from the compliant of a firefighter in British Columbia who was 
fired because she failed to pass a mandatory physical test. She argued that the test brought about 
adverse effect discrimination based on sex because men as a group have a higher aerobic capacity 
than women, and consequently are more able to meet the standard required by the law. The Court 
holds that the claimant established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifted to the 
government to demonstrate that the aerobic standard could be regarded as a bona fide standard. The 
government failed to show that the particular aerobic standard required by the law was reasonably 
necessary to select those individuals who are able to perform the tasks of a forest firefighter safely 
and efficiently. The government failed to prove that it would have experienced an undue hardship if 
a different standard were adopted. 
This case does not specifically address disability discrimination, but outlines clear guidelines to 
develop an interpretive framework that encourages the implementation of the substantive model of 
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equality.668 The importance of this judgement stems from the elaboration of “a unified three-step test” 
in order to assess the existence of discriminatory practices in the workplace or justified bona fide 
occupational requirements.669 The Court required that: 
I. The employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the 
performance of the job.  The focus at the first step is not on the validity of the particular standard, but 
rather on the validity of its more general purpose.  
II. The employer must establish that it adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith belief 
that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related purpose.  
III. The employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that 
legitimate work-related purpose.  To show that the standard is reasonably necessary, it must be 
demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics 
of the claimant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.670 
The three-step test of the Supreme Court demands an overview of the validity of the general purpose 
of the standard adopted and the assessment of the employer’s subjective reason for introducing such 
standard. Then, it aims at verifying the impossibility to accommodate individual employees sharing 
the characteristics of the claimant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer. Whether the 
employer cannot demonstrate that the rule represents a bona fide requirement in accordance with the 
three-step test, it would be considered as a discriminatory rule.671 This new approach implies that 
employers have the obligation to accommodate the characteristics of individual employees unless it 
is impossible to avoid discriminating without imposing undue hardship upon the employers. 
The Court emphasised that employers have the legal obligation to take into account both the 
differences between individuals, and differences that characterise groups of individuals.672 In this 
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regard, to the extent that a standard unnecessarily fails to accommodate the differences among 
individuals, it does not comply with the prohibition of discrimination under human rights law. The 
Court indeed stated that: 
“Employers designing workplace standards owe an obligation to be aware of both the differences between 
individuals, and differences that characterize groups of individuals. They must build conceptions of equality 
into workplace standards. By enacting human rights statutes and providing that they are applicable to the 
workplace, the legislatures have determined that the standards governing the performance of work should 
be designed to reflect all members of society, insofar as this is reasonably possible”.673 
The Court's reasoning for the first time maps a clear route to promote substantive equality by 
highlighting that those standards concerning the performance of work should be adopted to promote 
the participation of all members of society, insofar as this is reasonably possible. Conceptions of 
equality must be translated into reasonable workplace standards. By doing so, the duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation is not merely a provision to be implemented on a case-by-case basis, but 
it constitutes an inclusive and universal approach to the design of workplace environment. The 
analysis will now focus on how the Supreme Court implemented the three-step test in another 
important case that specifically regards persons with disabilities. 
3.3 Accommodating persons with disabilities: the promising case of Grismer 
In Grismer,674 the Supreme Court applied the three-step test with regard to the duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities in the context of housing and services 
industries. The Court underlined that accommodation implies “what is required in the circumstances 
to end discrimination. Standards must be as inclusive as possible”.675 
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The claimant suffered from homonymous hemianopia (H.H.) which eliminated most of his left-side 
peripheral vision in both eyes. The B.C. Superintendent of Motor Vehicles cancelled his driver’s 
licence because his vision no longer complied with the standard of a minimum field of vision of 120 
degrees. Grismer however claimed that the use of glasses with prisms would have compensated his 
disability. After several rejections of the licence and despite passing the requisite tests, the 
claimant brought a complaint before the B.C. Council of Human Rights. The Council concluded that 
the standard was a prima facie direct discrimination and that the Superintendent failed to show that 
an inflexible application of the visual field standards, without individual assessments, was reasonably 
necessary. As a result, the Superintendent was ordered to assess individually whether Mr. Grismer 
was able to drive safely, regardless of his capacity to meet a 120-degree field of vision. 
In this case, the Court applied the Meiorin test and the Superintendent was then required to 
demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the discriminatory standard had a bona fide reasonable 
justification. The Superintendent argued that the standard was reasonably necessary to the goal of 
highway safety, balancing the need for people to be licensed and the need for public safety. In this 
regard, the accommodation required by the complainant was impossible without undue hardship. This 
aim was considered legitimate and rationally connected to the general purpose of issuing driver’s 
licences. The standard of a minimum field of vision of 120 degrees was also adopted in good faith. 
By contrast, the standard was not reasonably necessary to achieve the goal. According to the Court, 
the Superintendent failed to show that this condition undermines reasonable highway safety. The 
evidence indeed indicated that individuals with less than full peripheral vision have the ability to 
drive safely. Moreover, the Superintendent did not prove that the risk or cost associated with the duty 
to provide individual assessment constituted undue hardship. 
The fundamental point of this judgement is that the discriminatory practice is not the refusal to release 
a driving licence, but the refusal to ensure an individual assessment of the claimant’s ability to drive 
without undermining the essential aim of reasonable road safety. The Superintendent did not provide 
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a reasonable approach to licensing and adopted an absolute standard which was not supported by 
convincing evidences.676 As in Meiorin, the third stage of the test was crucial to assess the validity of 
the government’s defence. The Superintendent did not prove that its non-accommodating standard 
was reasonably necessary for ensuring highway safety.677 The Court emphasised that there were at 
least two ways in which the Superintendent could have showed that a standard that does not allow 
accommodation is reasonably necessary. He could have argued that that no one with the particular 
disability can drive safely and meet the desired objective of reasonable safety. Alternatively, he could 
have showed that accommodation is unreasonable because testing for exceptional individuals who 
can drive safely despite their disability is impossible short of undue hardship.678 The Court expressly 
recognised that both ways are types of accommodation that have been overlooked by the 
Superintendent. 
The judgement of the Canadian Supreme Court is highly relevant to improve the protection of persons 
with disabilities and clarify the legal content of the duty to accommodate. The Court’s approach 
refuses the formal interpretation of the prohibition of discrimination and endorses the substantive 
purpose of human rights legislation. To this end, it provides valid tools to tackle discrimination in the 
workplace and establishes clear guidance for employers to implement the obligation to provide 
reasonable accommodation. This duty has been often underestimated by employers or reduced to an 
extraordinary remedy to address the conditions of workers with disabilities by national courts. The 
judicial uncertainty surrounding the legal understanding of the concept of reasonable accommodation 
has been positively overcome by the interpretation developed by the Canadian Supreme Court. 
It may be argued that the Court’s decisions in Meiorin and Grismer laid down the foundations for a 
substantive equality framework in line with the CPRD. However, the post-Meiorin and post-Grismer 
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period case law showed an increasing reluctance towards the model of reasonable accommodation 
delineated by the Supreme Court.679 Lower courts started to adopt a ‘minimalist’ version of 
accommodation and a ‘formal’ comparator group analysis.680 It seems that governments pushed for a 
restricted definition of discrimination and for reconsidering stereotype as an essential component of 
a claim of discrimination.681 Against this background, the Supreme Court of Canada was called again 
to interpret and reinvigorate the duty to provide reasonable accommodation for persons with 
disabilities. The more recent case of Moore will now be analysed to assess how the Court confirmed 
its approach towards a substantive model of equality. 
3.4 Boosting the duty to accommodate 
In Moore v British Columbia, the Court handed down a landmark decision which refuses to apply a 
formalistic comparator group analysis and shows a significant understanding of the duty to 
accommodate.682 
The case regarded a child, Jeffrey Moore, who was diagnosed with a severe learning disability and 
therefore required intensive remediation to learn to read. Due to funding cuts by the Province, the 
Diagnostic Centre was closed by the school district and Jeffrey was transferred to a private school.  As 
a result, his father filed a complaint with the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal against the school district 
and the Province on the grounds that Jeffrey had been discriminated against because of his disability 
and been denied a “service customarily available to the public”. 
Lower courts wrongfully applied a formal comparative discrimination analysis and concluded that 
there was no discrimination against Jeffrey. According to this approach, the claimant has to 
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demonstrate the existence of differential treatment in comparison with “a mirror comparator group to 
whom a sough-after benefit is provided”.683 In the case at issue, the mirror comparator was 
represented by other special-needs students who did not receive the accommodation required. 
Consequently, the lower courts did not recognise any discrimination against the claimant and strictly 
applied a formal comparative approach. 
The Supreme Court’s judgement is highly relevant as it rejects the lower courts’ reasoning and 
emphasise the flaws of this formalist comparative model. The Court correctly stated that: 
“Comparing J only with other special needs students would mean that the District could cut all special 
needs programs and yet be immune from a claim of discrimination.  If J is compared only to other special 
needs students, full consideration cannot be given to whether he had meaningful access to the education to 
which all students in British Columbia are entitled.  This risks perpetuating the very disadvantage and 
exclusion the Code is intended to remedy”.684 
The Supreme Court rightfully identifies the ratio of the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation to persons with disabilities. Disability accommodation cases indeed do not aim at 
demonstrating that persons with disabilities are treated differently in comparison with members of 
other groups. The main scope of such cases is to assess the failure to provide those reasonable 
adjustments that would enable persons with disabilities to enjoy their rights on equal basis with others. 
It is therefore incoherent the judicial approach that demands the proof of being treated differently 
from others to trigger the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation.685 The formalist 
comparative model fails to properly determine the group to whom the claimant should be compared 
and the object of the comparison. The accommodation indeed requested by the claimant was not 
provided to any member of other groups of individuals. The discrimination claim would have been 
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unsuccessful also in case the claimant had attempted to compare his experience to the treatment 
granted to students without disabilities. 
The specific nature of the duty to accommodate requires focusing the analysis on the adverse impact 
on the claimant of the failure to provide such adjustments rather than on the differential treatment the 
individual receives in comparison with others. This interpretation is line with a substantive model of 
equality demanding the realisation of positive measures to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights 
to persons with disabilities. It thus abandons the understanding according to which the obligation to 
make reasonable accommodation only implies the negative duty to not carry out differential 
treatments between individuals in similar situations. In Moore, the Court convincingly clarified the 
legal nature of the concept of reasonable accommodation and reinforced the protection of persons 
with disabilities in compliance with the CRPD. 
The dissimilarities between the judicial approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Canada and in the 
US will be now briefly summarised. 
4. Comparing the judicial interpretation of disability law in the US and Canada 
An overview of the main differences between the interpretation and implementation of the concepts 
of disability and reasonable accommodation in the US and Canada will now be given. It will be shown 
how US disability law still adheres to a formal model of equality, whereas the Canadian Supreme 
Court has adopted significant decisions to promote substantive equality. 
4.1 The definition of disability 
The American legal system is characterised by a contradictory approach with regard to the 
understanding of disability. The ADA indeed adopted a social model of disability that takes into 
account the interplay between the impairment of the individual and those external barriers that hamper 
his/her participation in society. The ADA also covers those individuals who meet the requirement of 
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"being regarded as having such an impairment".686 The “regarded as” prong remarkably addresses 
discriminations based on a stereotyped or misrepresented perception of disability. However, the 
judicial interpretation of the ADA leaded to a highly restrictive approach to statutory coverage.687 In 
Sutton, the American Supreme Court ruled that it is necessary to consider the ameliorative effects of 
mitigating measures in order to determine whether an individual has a disability. Moreover, the Court 
concluded that an individual can fall under the ADA’s definition of disability only if he or she 
sufficiently alleges to be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. The 
judicial backlash against the ADA pushed the US Government to approve the ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008 (ADAAA) in order to restore the broader scope of the ADA. Against this background, it may 
be argued that American judges are unfamiliar with the socio-political conception of disability and 
the substantive model of disability law according to which disability results from the failure of society 
to advance the rights of persons with disabilities. 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that Canadian law lacks a comprehensive definition of disability. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court adopted a creative and extensive understanding of disability in line 
with the renewed international framework. The Supreme Court’s reasoning is highly interesting 
because it embraces a flexible and open concept of disability. It includes several elements such as the 
subjective component of being considered disabled and those biomedical, social or technological 
factors that are in continuous evolution in our society. The multidimensional approach towards 
disability embraced by the Supreme Court represents a landmark interpretation of a complex and 
evolving phenomenon that requires different levels of analysis and intervention. 
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4.2 The legal nature of reasonable accommodation 
As outlined in Section 2.3, the American Supreme Court adopted rigid standards to fall under the 
protection of the ADA and apply the subsequent obligation to provide reasonable accommodation. 
The Court emphasised the negative implications that may affect non-disabled co-workers when 
employers are called upon to accommodate marginalised groups of individuals. This approach seems 
to imply the idea that minority groups are in a privileged position in comparison with other groups. 
The case law relating to the ADA indeed shows that the concept of reasonable accommodations is 
regarded by the Supreme Court as a means to provide preferential treatment for persons with 
disabilities. The reasonable accommodation obligation is perceived as a charitable provision 
demanding burdensome and positive actions on employees. This reasoning has been clearly adopted 
in the case of Airways Inc. v Barnett, where the Court was called to balance between the duty to 
provide reasonable accommodation and the labour goal of restricting employer discretion.688 
According to the American Court, accommodating persons with disabilities may generate arbitrary 
treatments in the workplace, reinforce employer discretion and frustrate non-disabled employees’ 
contractual rights or expectations. The Supreme Court’s interpretation promoted labour goals over 
equal opportunities policies and equality norms. 
By contrast, the judicial approach of the Canadian Supreme Court in Meiorin, Grismer and Moore 
reflects the ambitious developments of international human rights law to realise substantive equality 
goals. The CRPD indeed aims at ensuring that reasonable accommodations are provided to all persons 
with disabilities through proactive and anticipatory steps. To this end, the Court developed a stringent 
test to assess bona fide occupational requirements. The test implies a significant legal responsibility 
on the employer who has to reasonably justify that a particular disability jeopardises the performance 
of the job. The three-step interpretative guidelines of the Court are comprehensive and precise enough 
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to verify the validity of certain standards. The Canadian Court seems to promote a concept of 
reasonable accommodation that requires a structural change of the legal framework by challenging 
able-bodied norms and introducing diversity in all new norms.689 
It is worth noting that the Canadian Court’s judgements reveal a profound understanding of the duty 
to accommodate that is in line with the current CRPD’s principles. The Canadian Court refuses the 
imposition of absolute standards or requirements that can compromise the content of human rights 
law and curtail the protection of persons with disabilities. In addition, the Court rightfully points out 
that the scope of the obligation to accommodate is to assess the failure to remove barriers to persons 
with disabilities. It therefore disregards a formal model of equality that considers reasonable 
accommodation as only a negative duty that precludes comparable situations from being treated 
differently. This approach significantly differs with the interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court 
which shows significant difficulties in interpreting the social model of disability and the duty to 
provide reasonable accommodation in compliance with international human rights law. 
Against this background, it may be said that the judicial interpretation of the Canadian Supreme Court 
may represent a leading model for the judiciary to implement the duty to provide reasonable 
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A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE DUTY TO PROVIDE REASONABLE 
ACCOMMODATION: UK AND ITALY 
1. Comparing the UK and Italy 
This chapter aims to analyse two different legal systems with respect to the application of the 
obligation to make reasonable accommodation in order to stress positive and negative experiences. 
To this end, existing regulations and national courts’ judgements will be examined and compared. 
The final objective is to draw from the following comparative assessment what may be viewed as 
successful legal practices and judicial reasoning which reflect the legal developments introduced by 
the CRPD. 
The choice of selecting the UK and Italy originates from the idea to assess and compare the protection 
of persons with disabilities under an overarching legal scheme such as the UK Equality Act and a 
system which lacks a comprehensive piece of legislation such as the Italian legal system. Italian 
equality law may be considered ‘fragmented’ because it does not have a unified system of norms in 
the field of equality and non-discrimination. This study assesses how disability equality law has been 
implemented in the UK and Italy by highlighting the main relevant approaches of national judges. In 
particular, the comparative analysis will examine the legal implications stemming from the duty to 
provide reasonable adjustments for persons with disabilities on the workplace. 
This research will demonstrate that UK courts are progressively adhering to a formal approach 
towards equality which disregards those social barriers existing in society that hamper the full 
enjoyment of fundamental rights. By contrast, Italian courts are gradually recognising a substantive 
model of equality that is in line with the CRPD. Moreover, it will be shown how the CPRD and EU 
law are having a significant impact on the interpretation of domestic law in Italy, whereas UK judges 
avoid referring to supranational norms when deciding cases related to persons with disabilities. An 
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overview of the main equality norms for the protection of persons with disabilities under UK law will 
be now given. 
2. Introducing the UK legal framework 
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation in the workplace is embodied in Article 5 of Directive 
2000/78 and Article 5(3) of the CRPD. It constitutes the main non-discrimination obligation that 
ensures the full enjoyment of human rights for persons with disabilities on equal basis with others. 
Unlike the CRPD, EU law does not expressly consider the denial of reasonable accommodation as a 
form of discrimination. By contrast, according to UK law, the failure to provide reasonable 
accommodation is a form of discrimination.690 
The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 was the principal legal instrument to tackle discrimination 
against persons with disabilities in the UK. The DDA provided three types of obligations: the reactive 
reasonable adjustments duty, the anticipatory reasonable adjustment duty and the obligation not to 
withhold consent unreasonably to the making of adjustments.691 
The reactive duty imposed employers to make adjustments in case of any physical feature that places 
the disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons without disabilities. The 
anticipatory provision set out the duty to anticipate and take reasonable steps to remove barriers 
affecting groups of disabled people. The latter obligation stated that landlords are prohibited from 
withholding their consent unreasonable to the making of the necessary alterations in favour of persons 
with disabilities. Against this background, the most interesting provision is the reasonable 
anticipatory duty, because it demands an active role of employers and the preventive removal of all 
barriers. Despite that, this provision did not apply to the employment area and private sector. 
                                                      
690 Section 20 of Equality Act 2010. 
691 A. Lawson, Disability and Equality Law in Britain: The Role of Reasonable Adjustment (Oxford, 2008). 
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Currently, the DDA has been replaced by the 2010 Equality Act. It represents a remarkable piece of 
legislation that seeks to harmonise the UK legal framework with regard to equality and non-
discrimination. It indeed replaces nine previous major pieces of legislation and implement four main 
EU Directives in order to simplify and systematise equality law.692 
 
The UK Equality Act however embraces the previous legal approach adopted by the DDA and sets 
forth a reactive reasonable adjustment duty only in the context of employment. By doing so, it failed 
to bring about a systemic change under UK equality law.693 It requires an anticipatory reasonable 
adjustment duty exclusively in non-employment areas. It imposes on service providers the obligation 
to take steps to identify and remove accessibility barriers in advance of complaints by particular 
disabled people.694 By contrast, the duty to provide reasonable accommodation in the workplace is 
merely reactive and cannot be triggered until an employee with disabilities is placed at a substantial 
disadvantage. 
Section 20 of the Equality Act requires three requirements to trigger the duty to make adjustments: 
4. The first requirement is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice puts a disabled person 
at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not 
disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage. 
                                                      
692 See B. Hepple, The New Single Equality Act in Britain (2010) 5 The Equal Rights Review 11. 
The UK Equality Act replaces the following nine pieces of national legislation: Equal Pay Act 1970, Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975, Race Relations Act 1976, Disability Discrimination Act 1995, Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003, Employment Equality (sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 
2006, Equality Act 2006, Part 2, Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007. It also implements four EU 
Directives: Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin (Race Directive); Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation (Framework Employment Directive); Council Directive 2004/113/EC 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services 
[2004] OJ L373/37 (Equal Treatment Amendment Directive); European Parliament and Council Directive 2006/54/EC 
on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation (Recast Equal Treatment Directive). 
693 A. Lawson, Disability and Employment in the Equality Act 2010: opportunities seized, lost and generated (2011) 40 
Industrial Law Journal, 359. 
694 European network of legal expert in gender equality and non-discrimination, Reasonable accommodation for disabled 
people in employment, A legal analysis of the situation in the EU Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, 
prepared by D. Ferri and A. Lawson (European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, 2016). 
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5. The second requirement is a requirement, where a physical feature puts a disabled person at a substantial 
disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such 
steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage. 
6. The third requirement is a requirement, where a disabled person would, but for the provision of an auxiliary 
aid, be put at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are 
not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to provide the auxiliary aid. 
This chapter will explore to what extent UK courts have been applying and interpreting the concept 
of reasonable accommodation. The aim is to identify whether the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation is implemented in compliance with the CRPD’s provisions. 
2.1 Archibald v Fife: an outstanding case 
The ruling in Archibald v. Fife is the most significant and illustrative case concerning the 
implementation of the obligation to provide reasonable adjustments in the UK legal system.695 It made 
clear that any employer has to ensure reasonable accommodation for an employee who has become 
disabled and is no longer able to perform his/her previous tasks. In this case, the employer should 
transfer him/her to a different job for which the employee is qualified. 
In the case of Archibald v Fife Council, the applicant was a road sweeper who became unable to work 
because of complications from a spinal anaesthetic. She started to use a wheelchair and then was able 
to walk with the assistance of walking sticks. She applied for different jobs in order to find suitable 
alternative employment in other departments. However, Council policy demanded competitive 
interviews for each application and she could not comply with the high physical standards required. 
The Council argued to have undertaken all the necessary redeployment procedures and she was 
therefore dismissed. The claimant asserted that, in dismissing her because of the inability to work as 
a road sweeper, due to her disability, the Council treated her less favourably than others who could 
                                                      
695 Archibald v Fife Council [2004] UKHL 32, see also D. Renton, A new era for equality law? Archibald v Fife Council 
reconsidered (2006) 21 Disability and Society 709. 
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do their work. She alleged that the Council had failed to comply with the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation imposed by the DDA. She should have been transferred to a vacant post within the 
Council without requiring her to undertake a competitive interview for the post.696 The House of 
Lords was therefore called to clarify whether this obligation is triggered when an employee becomes 
incapable of performing his/her current working tasks, but retains the capacity to do a different job 
for the same employer. In its ruling, the House of Lords clarified the specific purpose of equality law 
that aims to protect persons with disabilities. 
2.1.1 The purpose of equality law 
The judgement properly identified the different legal purpose underlying gender equality law and 
legislation that addresses disability discrimination. Gender equality law aims to ensure that men and 
women are treated equally, as they are the “opposite sides of the same coin”.697 A more favourable 
treatment for men implies that women are discriminated against. Gender differences are generally 
regarded as irrelevant. By contrast, the DDA recognises that differences between persons with 
disabilities and others are highly relevant. As a consequence, disabled individuals cannot be treated 
in the same way of persons without disabilities. The obligation to make reasonable adjustments is 
indeed the legal tool to address the special needs of disabled people. The court acknowledged that 
this concept entails an element of more favourable treatment. This understanding adheres to the 
substantive equality approach that characterises the new international human rights framework, which 
requires positive action measures, accommodation programmes and preferential treatments for 
certain groups of individuals.698 In particular, this approach is in line with the scope of Directive 
2000/78, which does not merely aim to secure equality of opportunity, but expressly contemplates 
the possibility to provide specific positive action. Article 7 states that: 
                                                      
696 Archibald v Fife Council [2004] UKHL 32, para. 26. 
697 Ibid, para. 47. 




1. "With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent 
any Member State from maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for 
disadvantages linked to any of the grounds referred to in Article 1. 
2.  With regard to disabled persons, the principle of equal treatment shall be without prejudice to the 
right of Member States to maintain or adopt provisions on the protection of health and safety at work 
or to measures aimed at creating or maintaining provisions or facilities for safeguarding or promoting 
their integration into the working environment. 
This provision specifically addresses persons with disabilities and encourages the adoption of positive 
measures to promote the participation of persons with disabilities in the labour market. It was 
expressly introduced to allow positive action in the field of disability which would be otherwise 
considered as positive discrimination by the CJEU.699 Even if the DDA predates the Directive 
2000/78/EC, the House of Lords correctly interpreted the goal of securing equality by recognising 
that the duty to provide reasonable adjustments might imply under certain circumstances the 
preferential treatment of persons with disabilities over non-disabled individuals. The legal 
requirements to trigger the obligation to accommodate workers with disabilities will now be briefly 
examined. 
2.1.2 When is the duty of making adjustments triggered? 
According to Section 6 of the DDA, the duty to provide reasonable adjustments applies “where any 
arrangements made by or on behalf of an employer or any physical feature of premises occupied by 
the employer, place the disabled person concerned at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with 
persons who are not disabled”.700 Moreover, “it is the duty of the employer to take such steps as it is 
                                                      
699 R. Whittle, 'The Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation: an Analysis from a 
Disability Rights Perspective' (2002) 27 European Law Review 303. 
700 Disability Discrimination Act 1995, s.6(3)(c), 1995 C. 50. 
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reasonable, in all the circumstances of the case, for him to have to take in order to prevent the 
arrangements or feature having that effect”.701 
The obligation applies in relation to those arrangements for determining to whom the job should be 
offered and to any terms or condition on which employment, promotion, transfer, training or any 
other benefit is offered or afforded.702 However, the term 'arrangements' is not properly defined and 
may include the Council's redeployment policy. In the case of Archibald, the main issue was to 
determine whether the arrangements adopted by the employer placed the complainant at a substantial 
disadvantage in comparison with non-disabled persons. The job description required the capacity to 
walk and sweep, the claimant could not clearly meet these requirements, and hence she was dismissed 
for incapacity. 
The court highlighted that ‘the effect of being placed at a substantial disadvantage’ does not depend 
on the circumstances that there are other persons with disabilities doing the same job. According to 
this approach, if there are only non-disabled people performing the same job, the duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation is not triggered.703 It would be the claimant’s disability rather than 
Council's arrangements which has 'the effect of placing the disabled person at a substantial 
disadvantage'. As a result, the Council could not provide any reasonable adjustments to prevent this 
effect. This approach would rely on an obsolete model of disability that merely focuses on individual 
impairment and ignores social barriers. 
On the other hand, if there are also disabled people doing the same job, then the Council could take 
specific action to prevent the job description having the effect of placing persons with disabilities at 
a substantial disadvantage in relation to others. In such cases, the employer has the obligation to 
change or modify the job description by introducing the possibility to transfer the disabled persons to 
                                                      
701 Ibid, s. 6(2)(a)(b). 
702 Ibid, s. 6(2)(a)(b). 
703 Archibald v Fife Council [2004] UKHL 32, para. 64. 
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another job, as expressly mentioned by section 6(3)(c). The Court however rejects this formalistic 
comparative approach and concludes that the duty to provide reasonable accommodation arises in 
any case “where an employee becomes so disabled that she can no longer meet the requirements of 
her job description”.704 The Court outlines that the DDA is not based on the 'like for like' comparison 
which is expressly required by the Sex Discrimination and Race Relations Acts. This means that it is 
not necessary to demonstrate that other individuals are in similar circumstances to the disabled person 
in order to trigger the duty. 
The Court’s interpretation seems to accept the limits of a rigid comparative approach that strictly 
demands the existence of a comparator who does not share the same characteristic as the claimant 
and enjoy a better treatment. It rather focuses on the assessment of the employee’s incapacity to 
comply with the requirements of the job. By doing so, the Court goes beyond the comparator-based 
approach as it jeopardises the recognition of preferential treatments and does not acknowledge that 
the discriminatory treatment should be assessed in relation to the relevant characteristic of the 
individual and the external barriers that jeopardise his/her fundamental rights.705 
2.1.3 The transfer to an existing vacancy: is it a reasonable adjustment? 
Section 6(3)(c) expressly includes “transferring him to fill an existing vacancy” as an example of step 
which an employer could take to comply with the duty to provide reasonable accommodation. In the 
case of Archibald, the controversy is to evaluate whether this clause includes the opportunity to 
transfer the claimant to fill an existing vacancy at a slightly higher grade without competitive 
interview. The Court correctly noticed that this example of reasonable accommodation is undefined 
and the transfer can therefore be upwards as well as sideways or downwards. The transfer to an 
existing vacancy is not merely confined to short-listing or considering the disabled person. The Court 
indeed highlighted that the employer has already the obligation not to discriminate against a disabled 
                                                      
704 Ibid, para. 64. 
705 See for instance, A. McColgan, Discrimination, Equality and the Law (Hart Publishing, 2014), p. 231. 
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employee in the opportunities provided for promotion, transfer, training or any other benefit.706 
Hence, the duty to provide reasonable accommodation aims to reinforce the existing anti-
discrimination provisions in order to effectively secure substantive equality. As a result, the employer 
should have transferred Mrs Archibald to a sedentary position which she was qualified to fill. The 
Court properly identified the nature of this obligation that entails an additional effort on the employer 
to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy human rights on an equal basis with others. To this end, 
it demands not only the removal of those specific disadvantages that hamper the enjoyment of all 
human rights, but also the adoption of specific arrangements to overcome such barriers. 
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation is indeed characterised by an “individual and solution 
oriented” nature that focuses on the uniqueness of the specific case.707 According to the UN 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
The duty to provide reasonable accommodation is an ex nunc duty, which means that it is enforceable from 
the moment an individual with an impairment needs it in a given situation, for example, workplace or 
school, in order to enjoy her or his rights on an equal basis in a particular context (…) Reasonable 
accommodation seeks to achieve individual justice in the sense that non-discrimination or equality is 
assured, taking the dignity, autonomy and choices of the individual into account. 
Against this background, it is worth noting that the House of Lords encouraged the duty-bearer to 
carry out an interactive dialogue with the disabled person in order to identify an appropriate and 
suitable adjustment. By doing so, the employer should refrain from making elusive assumptions 
concerning the feasibility of the reasonable accommodation for a particular person with disabilities.708 
In the case of Archibald, the House of Lords emphasised the importance of removing those 
arrangements that place the claimant at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who 
                                                      
706 DDA, section 4(2)(b). 
707 European network of legal expert in gender equality and non-discrimination, Reasonable accommodation for disabled 
people in employment, A legal analysis of the situation in the EU Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, 
prepared by D. Ferri and A. Lawson (European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, 2016). 
708 Ibid, p. 49. 
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are not disabled. To this end, the employer has to identify individual solutions that can effectively 
ensure equality on the workplace, such as transferring a disabled employee from a post which he/she 
can no longer do to a job position which he/she can reasonably perform without applying standard 
procedures. 
Following this overview of the House of Lords’ approach with regard to the duty of making 
reasonable adjustments, the focus shifts to the interpretation of the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation given by UK courts following the adoption of the Equality Act 2010. The goal is to 
assess to what extent the judicial understanding of this obligation has changed as a result of the new 
Equality Act and the CRPD’s ratification by the UK. 
3. The Equality Act 2010 
In the UK, the duty to provide reasonable accommodation is included in section 20 of the Equality 
Act 2010. This duty is supposed to be triggered when a “provision, criterion or practice” or a “physical 
feature” puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with their peers who are 
not disabled. The Equality Act however does not provide any example of such reasonable 
accommodation.709 This leaves a broad margin of flexibility to employers and employee in regard to 
the identification of those proper adjustment for the specific case. At the same time, the lack of such 
list can generate legal uncertainty in relation to the measures that employers are called to adopt to 
ensure equality in the workplace. 
The main controversial approaches adopted by UK courts in relation to the duty of making reasonable 
adjustments will be analysed below. It will be shown that the House of Lords’ findings in Archibald, 
notwithstanding how well informed they were, have been reversed in favour of a more restrictive and 
formal model of equality. 
                                                      
709 European network of legal expert in gender equality and non-discrimination, Country Report Non-Discrimination, 
United Kingdom 2016 (European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, 2016). 
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3.1 Wade v Sheffield Hallam University: a shift away from substantive equality? 
The case of Wade v Sheffield Hallam University represents a significant judicial shift with regard to 
the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation in the workplace.710 This case shows evident 
similarities with the Archibald one, but the judges’ conclusions are considerably divergent. In this 
case, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) decided that it was not reasonable for an employer to 
transfer a disabled employer to a vacant post without undertaking a competitive interview.711 
The claimant worked for the University and became disabled because of an allergy. She was placed 
on long-term sick leave. The respondent started a restructuring within the library by slotting in staff. 
The claimant applied for the new vacancy and failed to meet the essential criteria required for the 
post. The University argued that she was not capable of fulfilling the new role as she lacked the ability 
to lead teams and to work within the newly restructured faculty of organisation. The employee 
claimed that the requirement of undertaking a competitive interview for the post put her at a 
substantial disadvantage. She asked for a ‘softer’ assessment process instead of a competitive 
interview process and therefore claimed that the University breached the duty to provide such 
reasonable adjustment. The EAT upheld the first tribunal’s decision and found that the 
accommodation claimed was not reasonable. 
This decision moves away from the House of Lords’ judgement according to which the disapplication 
of a competitive interview process and the adoption of specific trainings to upskill an employee could 
be reasonable adjustments. By contrast, the EAT agreed with the respondent's evidences that the new 
role evolved and the claimant was not suitable for the job. The EAT’s conclusions appear to assume 
that the employee could not be upskilled by providing trainings. This approach does not acknowledge 
that the obligation to make reasonable adjustments is the fundamental legal instrument to advance 
                                                      
710 Wade v Sheffield Hallam University UKEAT/0194/12/LA. 




the right of employees with disabilities in the workplace. By doing so, the court denies the element 
of more favourable treatment underlying the concept of reasonable accommodation. 
In the case of Archibald, the House of Lords properly underlined the meaning of this duty that requires 
positive measures and specific arrangements to ensure equality in the workplace. Thus, under the 
previous DDA, the ‘transfer to an existing vacancy' was expressly considered as a reasonable step 
that an employer could take to accommodate an employee with disabilities. The EAT’s findings are 
incompatible with the model of substantive equality embodied under the UK legal framework. The 
possibility to provide trainings to upskill an employee in order to move him/her into a new job would 
indeed represent a feasible adjustment. This arrangement would not imply an automatic appointment 
of the person with disabilities, but it would facilitate his/her inclusion in the workplace. This 
controversial decision may also be the outcome of the new Equality Act’s adoption which does not 
set out any example of reasonable accommodation. As a result, judges and employers may find 
several difficulties in identifying the adequate adjustments for persons with disabilities. The next 
section will examine other domestic judicial cases related to the duty to make reasonable adjustment. 
The aim is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the UK courts’ approach when it comes to equality 
law and disability discrimination. 
3.2 The case of Jennings v. Barts & The London NHS Trust 
In the case of Jennings v. Barts & The London NHS Trust,712 the EAT upheld the decision of the first 
instance tribunal, according to which the dismissal of a disabled employer who was on long-term sick 
did not breach the duty to provide reasonable accommodation.713 
The claimant worked as senior support engineer when he was dismissed for the reason of his poor 
attendance record due to ill health. The absences were mainly due to angina and a stress related 
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psychiatric condition. The Trust applied its absence procedure in a rigorous way by initiating 
disciplinary proceedings. The claimant first received a written warning under the short-term absence 
policy and then the Trust started the long-term absence procedure. The claimant did not attend the 
meetings arranged under the long-term absence procedure and he asked to rearrange the meetings 
until after he had had a further occupational health assessment.714 At the final stage meeting of the 
long-term absence procedure, the Trust decided to dismiss him. 
The claimant claimed that it would have been a reasonable adjustment to exempt him from the Trust’s 
short-term absence policy. The Employment Tribunal however found that the respondent did not fail 
to make reasonable adjustments because it was not practical for the Trust to follow the claimant's 
suggestions and tailor its absence policies to the specific needs of Mr Jennings. Such adjustments 
would have brought about serious “operational problems” for the department that was moving into 
further period of intense activity. Moreover, he had “ample and fair opportunity to catch up with the 
process, but ultimately failed to make any case”.715 The EAT concluded that Mr Jennings’ absence 
record was “severely poor” as he was absent for 100 days over a period of eight months. As a result, 
the Court did not find any disability discrimination and did not overturn the Trust’s decision to not 
tolerate his absence record under the absence management policy. 
3.2.1 Sickness absence and reasonable adjustments: a critical view 
The EAT’s judgement raises several concerns with regard to the implementation of the duty to 
provide reasonable adjustments in the workplace. The EAT indeed upheld the blanket refusal of the 
Trust to revise and tailor its absence policy to the peculiar case of Mr Jennings. By doing so, the EAT 
enabled any employer to strictly apply its sickness absence policy and dismiss an employee with a 
disability by proving that all the possible adjustments have been considered and that they will not 
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work. The EAT was convinced by the fact that Mr Jennings' department was very busy and his 
absence would have provoked operational difficulties. 
This approach clearly privileges the priorities and the operational needs of the employer at the 
expense of the effective participation of disabled employees in the workforce. The Tribunal’s 
conclusion does not seem to be in line with the new developments of international human rights law 
and the broad interpretation given by the CJEU of the concept of reasonable accommodation.716 
Indeed, the rigorous application of the Trust’s absence policy may represent a “provision, criterion 
or practice” that places the disabled person concerned at a substantial disadvantage in comparison 
with persons who are not disabled. It is worth noting that persons with disabilities are more likely to 
have health-related absences then their non-disabled peers. As a result, the employer’s absence policy 
should provide tailored measures and procedures in relation to persons with disabilities who are on 
long-term sick leave. Several reasonable adjustments have been disregarded by the employer, such 
as the reduction of the claimant's work or hours of work, the recognition of disability-related absence, 
the amendment of the attendance criterion and sickness absence policies of target setting, the lowering 
of performance targets, the removal of the threat of disciplinary action for a period of time or the 
change of the department within which the claimant worked.717 These measures would have been 
reasonable in order to facilitate the claimant to return to work without causing burdensome pressure 
on his colleagues and department. 
It may be said that this judgement is a controversial back-step in the context of the protection of the 
rights of persons with disabilities. The EAT’s decision does not make any mention of the CPRD and 
frustrate the Equality Act 2010’s purpose to ensure the inclusion of persons with disabilities in the 
workplace on equal basis with others. A similar approach has been adopted by the EAT in the case 
                                                      
716 See Ring v. Dansk, CJEU, C-335/11 and C-337/11. 
717 Paragraph 6.3 of the CMD (Discussion Summary), see Jennings v Barts & The London NHS Trust, 
UKEAT/0056/12/DM, paragraph 31. 
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of Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Higgins,718 where the Tribunal examined the 
reasonableness of the accommodation which consists of offering a disabled employee reduced hours 
as part of a phased return to work. A brief overview of this case will now be offered to highlight the 
dominant judicial understanding of the concept of reasonable accommodation in the UK. 
3.3 The case of Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Higgins 
Mr Higgins, an employee of Jobcentre Plus (JCP), was on long-term sickness because of a heart 
condition since June 2009. In August 2010, he submitted a “fit note” of his GP according to which 
he would have benefited from a phased return to work on altered hours. The JCP’s policy ensured 
employees to work part-time on medical grounds ("PTMG") over a 13-week period in order to 
gradually facilitate them a return to work from sick leave. This policy was applied to the specific case 
of Mr Higgins, who asked for an extension of the PTMG plan to 26 weeks. His request was refused 
and Mr Higgins was dismissed. Against this factual background, the first instance tribunal recognised 
that a blanket refusal to review the length of the plan beyond 13 weeks was a violation of the duty to 
provide reasonable accommodation. By contrast, the EAT overturned the tribunal’s decision that did 
not properly identify the disadvantage which the adjustment was to avoid and did not assess to what 
extent the adjustment would have been effective to avoid the disadvantage. 
3.3.1 The EAT’s approach to reasonable accommodation 
According to the EAT, in a case where the employer is alleged to be in breach of the duty to make 
reasonable adjustments imposed by section 20(3) of the 2010 Act, the Tribunal should identify: (i) 
the employer's provision, criterion or practice (PCP) at issue; (ii) the identity of the persons who are 
                                                      
718 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Jobcentre Plus) v Higgins, UKEAT0579/12/2510. 
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not disabled in comparison with whom comparison is made; (iii) the nature and extent of the 
substantial disadvantage suffered by the employee.719 
In this case, the EAT properly found that the PCP was not merely the requirement to work, but rather 
the 13-week rehabilitation period in the procedures. The EAT argued that the concept of a PCP is 
excessively wide. Indeed, according to the Code of Practice on Employment (2011), it “is not defined 
by the Act but should be construed widely to include, for example, any formal or informal policies, 
rules, practices, arrangements or qualifications including one-off decisions and actions”.720 However, 
the EAT correctly stated that the requirement to work contractual hours was the real cause of the 
claimant’s disadvantage, who asked to extend the PTMG plan from 13 to 26 weeks. By doing so, the 
claimant would have been ready to return to work. He indeed suggested that it was reasonable to 
review the PTMG plan up to 26 weeks as he would have known his full capacity of working by that 
time. 
The identification of the employer’s policy as a PCP may be viewed as correct as it puts the employee 
at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with other non-disabled employees who are more likely 
to return to their normal working hours at the end of the 13-week period. The EAT’s interpretation 
of the obligation to make reasonable accommodation with regard to the nature and extent of the 
substantial disadvantage suffered by the employee will be discussed below 
3.3.2 What are those fundamental steps to prevent the employee’s disadvantage? 
It appears controversial the EAT’s decision according to which the PTMG plan did not violate the 
duty to make adjustments. The EAT found that it was not reasonable for Mr Higgins not to have 
started working the hours he was fit to do merely because the letter contained no provision for 
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720 Ibid, paragraph 33. 
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review.721 The EAT noted that Section 20(3) of the new 2010 Equality Act requires the Tribunal to 
apply a fundamental test in order to assess whether an employer has the duty to make a particular 
adjustment. The duty to take a step is triggered “if it is a step which it is reasonable for the employer 
to have to take to avoid the disadvantage”.722 The 2010 Act however does not contain any provision 
that embodies those factors that determine whether it was reasonable for a person to have to take a 
particular step.723 The Equality and Human Rights Commission's Code of Practice on Employment 
provides a list of "some of the factors which might be taken into account" when deciding what is a 
reasonable step for an employer to have to take. The first main factor is "whether taking any particular 
steps would be effective in preventing the substantial disadvantage".724 
The EAT concluded that that the Tribunal failed to address to what extent the step or steps taken by 
the employer would have been effective in preventing any substantial disadvantage caused by the 
PCP. The EAT indeed did not consider an essential step for Jobcentre Plus to ensure, at the beginning 
of the 13-week rehabilitation plan, the review and extension of this period. The EAT did not recognise 
the effectiveness of this step in preventing disadvantages to Mr Higgins because “if, at the end of the 
period, the employee continues to be under a substantial disadvantage, the duty to make an adjustment 
will still be applicable and can be judged in the circumstances at that time”.725 
 
 
                                                      
721 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (Jobcentre Plus) v Higgins, Appeal No. UKEAT/0579/12/DM, EAT, 
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722 Ibid, paragraph 49. 
723 It is worth noting that the “key events in this case occurred shortly after the coming into force of the 2010 Act on 1 
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Act 1995. The 1995 Act contained, within section 18A(1), a statutory direction to have regard to certain factors in 
determine whether it was reasonable for a person to have to take a particular step. One of these factors was "the extent to 
which taking the step would prevent the effect in relation to which the duty is imposed". See paragraph 51 of Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions (Jobcentre Plus) v Higgins. 
724 Equality Act 2010 Code of Practice, Employment Statutory Code of Practice, paragraph 6.28. 




3.3.3 A controversial understanding of reasonable accommodation 
The EAT’s reasoning may be criticised as it deprives the ‘duty of taking reasonable steps’ for an 
employer of its original and rational purpose. The steps should be indeed taken to effectively prevent 
the effects of those substantial disadvantages which discriminate the employee.726 They are therefore 
required by the Equality Act to determine whether an employer has the obligation to make a particular 
adjustment. It seems evident that the underlying objective of this duty is to prevent potential 
disadvantages and discriminatory barriers for the disabled worker before they concretely materialise. 
In this regard, it would have been appropriate to preventively consider whether the adjustment would 
alleviate or avoid the alleged substantial disadvantage. The "properly constructed phased return to 
work" proposed by the employee would have alleviated or avoided the alleged substantial 
disadvantage. By contrast, a 13-week period without reviews would have not prevented the 
substantial disadvantage at the end of such period. The Equality and Human Rights Commission's 
Code of Practice on Employment expressly refers to the word ‘preventing’ to identify the reasonable 
steps. By doing so, it aims to reinforce the duty to provide reasonable accommodation and 
anticipating the legal protection before the criterion put the disabled worker at a substantial 
disadvantage in comparison with others. 
It seems clear that UK judges are interpreting the 2010 Equality Act on the basis of a legal approach 
that only requires a reactive duty in the field of employment. It is worth noting that the 2010 Equality 
Act fails to specify what those factors to assess are, if it is reasonable for an employer to take a 
particular step to accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities. This gap can be filled by taking 
into account the provisions of the Equality and Human Rights Commission's Code of Practice on 
                                                      
726 According to paragraph 6.28 of the Equality and Human Rights Commission's Code of Practice on Employment, the 
following are some of the factors which might be taken into account when deciding what is a reasonable step for an 
employer to have to take: “whether taking any particular steps would be effective in preventing the substantial 
disadvantage; the practicability of the step; the financial and other costs of making the adjustment and the extent of any 
disruption caused; the extent of the employer’s financial or other resources; the availability to the employer of financial 




Employment which provide clear guidelines concerning the meaning of reasonable steps. The Code 
of Practice also emphasises that the duty to make reasonable adjustments requires employers to take 
positive steps to ensure that disabled people can access and progress in employment.727 This approach 
goes beyond the aim to achieve formal equality by simply avoiding treating disabled workers, job 
applicants and potential job applicants unfavourably. It expressly means “taking additional steps to 
which non-disabled workers and applicants are not entitled” in order to ensure substantive equality 
in the workplace.728 This understanding of the concept of reasonable accommodation properly reflects 
the values and legal commitments of the CRPD which has crystallised the shift from a formal to a 
substantive paradigm of equality under international human rights law. The main flaws affecting UK 
equality legislation will now be summarised in light of the case law analysed above. 
3.4 The 2010 Equality Act: Gaps and missed opportunities 
The Equality Act has been introduced to simplify, harmonise and improve British equality law by 
bringing together over 116 separate pieces of legislation into one single Act.729 In this regard, 
important provisions have been adopted such as a comprehensive definition of discrimination which 
now applies to all protected characteristic, the positive duties on public authorities to promote equality 
for of all protected grounds and the obligation of public authorities to take into account socio-
economic disadvantages when taking strategic decisions.730 Despite that, the UK legal framework 
concerning reasonable accommodation shows some flaws that might generate uncertainty in relation 
to the identification of those arrangements that should be provided by the employer to accommodate 
workers with disabilities. 
It may be argued that the new 2010 Equality Act has not significantly improved the protection of 
persons with disabilities in the workplace in comparison with the previous Disability Discrimination 
                                                      
727 Chapter 6 of Equality and Human Rights Commission's Code of Practice on Employment, paragraph 6.1. 
728 Ibid, paragraph 6.1. 
729 B. Hepple, The New Single Equality Act in Britain (2010) 5 The Equal Rights Review 24. 
730 Ibid, p.11. 
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Act. It does not provide an anticipatory obligation to make reasonable adjustments and fails to 
introduce a list of such accommodations. The responsive nature of this obligation has the effect to 
provide tailored solutions for those individuals who seek the adjustment, but it does not ensure an 
accessible working environment for all workers with disabilities. The reactive duty does not require 
any steps to remove the external barriers before the actual appearance of a person with disabilities. 
Furthermore, the Equality Act does not indicate those fundamental factors which might be taken into 
account when deciding what a reasonable step for an employer to have to take is. UK judges therefore 
find several obstacles in interpreting and applying the obligation to make reasonable accommodation 
in compliance with the substantive model of equality. By contrast, the Code of Practice, elaborated 
by the Human Rights and Equality Commission, represents an invaluable technical guide to 
understand the Equality Act and to apply it in practice. However, it seems that UK courts are 
overlooking the main guidelines enshrined in the Code of Practice when interpreting the meaning of 
reasonable steps to make adjustments in the workplace for employees with disabilities. The goal of 
effectively preventing the substantial disadvantage included in the Code of Practice appears to be 
incompatible with the mere reactive duty included in the Equality Act. 
Moreover, UK courts still avoid referring to the CRPD when deciding national cases related to 
persons with disabilities. It is worth noting that the UK ratified the CRPD in 2009, but it has never 
been incorporated in domestic law.731 The UK Government has stated that “the Convention is not 
legally binding in domestic law in the UK but is given effect through the comprehensive range of 
existing and developing legislation, policies and programmes that are collectively delivering the 
Government’s vision of equality”.732 The lack of a domestic act that expressly incorporates the CRPD 
may therefore slow down the implementation of international human rights law. The UK is 
characterised by a dualist legal system which requires a domestic piece of legislation to give direct 
                                                      
731 UK Independent Mechanism, Disability rights in the UK: UK Independent Mechanism Submission to inform the 
CRPD List of Issues on the UK (February 2017). 




enforceability to international law. Against this legal context, UK judges may be reluctant to 
explicitly refer to and rely on the CRPD’s provisions in judicial cases that affect the rights of persons 
with disabilities. By doing so, the protection of persons with disabilities under the current human 
rights legal framework risks to be extensively lowered. However, it is worth noting that the UK’s 
ratification of the Convention set out a clear obligation to interpret national legislation in compliance 
with the provisions enshrined in the CRPD. UK courts should therefore align their interpretation of 
existing legal norms with the CRPD’s value and legal framework.  
4. Italian law and the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation 
The Italian legal framework does not provide a comprehensive and coherent piece of legislation that 
ensures equality and non-discrimination for persons with disabilities. It is instead characterised by 
several regulations that take into account different aspects of the protection of persons with 
disabilities. 
Law 68/99 on the right to employment for people with disabilities (Norme per il diritto al lavoro dei 
disabili) promotes work placement and work integration of people with disabilities by supporting 
services and targeted employment. It provides rules based on the principle of placement of people 
with disabilities which respects their working capacities without penalising the employing company. 
According to Article 18, companies with more than 15 employees must employ workers with 
disabilities in accordance with a quota system (companies with 16 to 35 workers must employ one 
person with disabilities, companies with up to 50 workers, two people with disabilities, and with more 
than 50 workers, a number of people with disabilities equivalent to 7% of the total number of 
employees).733 
                                                      
733 Legge 12 marzo 1999, n. 68, Norme per il diritto al lavoro dei disabili (G.U. n. 68 del 23 marzo 1999, s.o. n. 57) come 
modificata dal decreto legislativo 14 settembre 2015, n. 151. 
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It is worth noting that until 2013, Italian equality law lacked a specific provision concerning the 
obligation for employers to ensure reasonable accommodation.734 The Legislative Decree no 216 of 
9 July 2003, transposing the Directive 2000/78 that establishes a general framework for equal 
treatment in occupation and employment, failed to introduce the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation. However, the Italian legal system recently experienced crucial developments with 
regard to the protection of persons with disabilities following an adverse ruling in Case C-312/11 
Commission c. Italia.735 
In this case, Italy was found to have failed to comply with its obligations under EU law. In particular, 
Italy omitted to transpose Art. 5 of Directive 2000/78/EC concerning the reasonable accommodations 
for disable persons within the national legal system.736 The Court held that “Italy has transposed the 
directive into its national law without ensuring that the guarantees and adjustments provided for 
regarding the treatment of persons with disabilities in the workplace are to apply to all persons with 
disabilities, all employers, and all aspects of the employment relationship”.737 
As result, the Italian government adopted the “Decreto Lavoro” in order to comply with the CJEU’s 
judgement and expressly introduced the duty to provide reasonable accommodations for persons with 
disabilities in the work environment.738 The new Article 3-bis of Decreto Legislativo 216/03 lays 
down that “in order to guarantee the principle of equal treatment, public and private employers have 
the obligations to adopt reasonable accommodations in accordance with the UN CRPD”, but this is 
to be done “without imposing new costly burdens on the financial budget” as far as public employees 
are concerned. 
                                                      
734 Decreto Legislativo 9 luglio 2003, n. 216 “Attuazione della Direttiva 2000/78/CE per a parità di trattamento in materia 
di occupazione e di condizioni di lavoro”. 
735 Case C–312/11 Commission v Italy, EU:C:2013:446. 
736 L. Waddington, G. Quinn and E. Flynn (2013) 4 European Yearbook of Disability Law. 
737 Case C-312/11 Commission v Italy (2013) CJEU 446. 
See also, A. Bogg and C. Costello, Research Handbook on EU Labour Law (2016), p. 490. 
738 Decreto-legge 28 giugno 2013, n. 76 (Gazzetta Ufficiale - Serie generale - n. 150 del 28 giugno 2013), converted in 
law by the Legge 99/13. 
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This legal response to the CJEU’s adverse ruling is positive and shows the political willingness to 
promptly and formally comply with EU obligations. Nonetheless, Italian law does not explicitly 
emphasise a comprehensive and substantive commitment to provide reasonable accommodation. 
Employers are indeed exempted from implementing those arrangements that require new costly 
measures in terms of financial and human resources. Moreover, the law fails to indicate a list of such 
adjustments and does not provide any definition of reasonable accommodation. This ‘minimal’ 
approach may create uncertainty when employers or judges are called to assessing the reasonableness 
of those accommodation claimed by employees. Despite that, the new Article 3-bis of Decreto 
Legislativo 216/03 mentions that the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation must be 
applied in line with the CRPD. This express reference to the Convention is highly relevant and may 
represent the legal ground to invoke the enforceability of the CRPD in the domestic legal system. 
The Italian case law regarding the duty to provide reasonable accommodation will now be examined. 
The aim is to identify the main differences between the UK and Italy with regard to the obligation to 
accommodate persons with disabilities in the workplace. The question of whether Italian equality law 
complies with the CRPD’s provisions will also be answered. 
4.1 The case of GC v L. SRL: facts and findings        
The case of GC v L. SRL739 is highly interesting because it shows that the denial of adopting 
reasonable accommodation or the dismissal of an employee resulting from the lack of reasonable 
accommodation constitutes a specific form of discrimination.740 
The claimant was fired as she was considered unable to perform her job as warehouse handler and 
unavailable to be delegated to different tasks. She claimed that the dismissal breached the duty to 
provide reasonable accommodation according to Directive 2000/78 and Decreto-Legge 76/2013. By 
                                                      
739 CG v L. SRL, Tribunale Pisa, Ordinanza 16 aprile 2015. 




contrast, the employee agreed with the occupational doctor’s findings according to which she is 
incapable of performing several tasks (requiring material handling or exposure to vibration) and 
highlighted the lack of other available posts she could be transferred to. 
The Court first found that the claimant fell under the definition of disability developed by the CJEU 
in the case of Skouboe Werge as she was suffering from Raynaud’s disease.741 The Court emphasised 
that the concept of ‘disability’ must be also understood as referring to a hindrance to the exercise of 
a professional activity, not only, to the total impossibility of exercising such an activity. The Court 
therefore concluded that the employer has the duty to provide reasonable accommodation for the 
employee with disabilities who cannot perform his work on equal basis with others. In this regard, 
the Court underlines that that obligation covers all employers and “it is not sufficient for Member 
States to provide support and incentives”.742 They must require all employers to adopt effective and 
practical measures, where needed in particular cases, to adapt the workplace to persons with 
disabilities. 
It is worth noting that the Italian Court expressly referred to Article 2 of the CRPD that defines the 
concept of reasonable accommodation and to the Framework Equality Directive’s provisions 
concerning the duty to make appropriate measures to adapt the workplace to the disability.743 By 
                                                      
741 Cases C-335/11 and C-337/11, CJEU: “the concept of disability must be interpreted as including a condition caused 
by an illness medically diagnosed as curable or incurable where that illness entails a limitation which results in particular 
from physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and 
effective participation of the person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with other workers, and the limitation 
is a long-term one”. 
742 Judgement of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 4 July 2013 – European Commission v Italian Republic, (Case C 312/11), 
para. 62. 
743 CG v L. SRL, Tribunale Pisa, Ordinanza 16 aprile 2015: “Ed a norma dell’art. 2 della Convenzione, per accomodamenti 
ragionevoli devono intendersi le modifiche e gli adattamenti necessari ed appropriate che non impongano un onere 
sproporzionato o eccessivo adottati, ove ve ne sia necessità in casi particolari, per garantire alle persone con disabilità il 
godimento o l’esercizio, su base di uguaglianza con gli altri, di tutti i diritti umani e delle libertà fondamentali. Mentre il 
ventesimo ed il ventunesimo considerando della direttiva 2000/78 prevedono l’introduzione di misure appropriate, ossia 
misure efficaci e pratiche destinate a sistemare il luogo di lavoro in funzione dell’handicap, ad esempio sistemando i 




doing so, the judge recognised the enforceability within the domestic system of those fundamental 
provisions of international and EU law that address the rights of persons with disabilities. 
4.1.1 Defining the nature of reasonable accommodation 
The Court properly identified the nature and the scope of the duty to make reasonable 
accommodation. It stated that the employee has the burden to prove that the adoption of reasonable 
adjustments would be ineffective to accommodate and advance the rights of persons with disabilities 
in the workplace. This means that those practical measures to adapt the workplace to the disability 
would not be sufficient to enable a disabled employee to have access to, participate in, or advance in 
employment, or to undergo training without putting his/her health at risk. Whether the employer fails 
to demonstrate the ‘uselessness’ of such measures, the dismissal of the worker with disabilities cannot 
be regarded as lawful. Therefore, the link between the inefficacy of reasonable accommodation and 
the subsequent justified dismissal is a necessary legal requirement that the employer has to prove. 
Against this background, the Italian judge pointed out the objective and functional nature of the duty 
to provide reasonable accommodation in compliance with the prohibition of discrimination under EU 
law. By applying this approach, the Court found that the company structure could adequately be 
adapted to the needs of the disabled employee without causing disproportionate burdens for the 
employer and risks for the employee’s health. The employer should have redistributed the tasks 
between those employees with the same qualifications and allocate the claimant to a different post in 
the warehouse. This measure would have ensured a balanced and efficient company structure and the 
possibility to work for the disabled employee.744 
This judicial interpretation reflects the main objective of the duty to make adjustments that aims at 
facilitating the achievement of equality in the workplace. This approach is in line with the CRPD’s 
                                                      
744 CG v L. SRL, p. 9. 
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scope and the obligations under EU law according to which making adaptations is no longer a mere 
charitable goal but constitutes a legally enforceable right for persons with disabilities.745 
The most relevant findings of the above judgement will now be briefly summarised and examined to 
identify the impact of international and EU law on the judicial interpretation of the concept of 
reasonable accommodation. 
4.1.2 International, EU and national law: a positive approach of the Italian Court 
The judgement in the case of CG v L. SRL symbolises a significant development with regard to the 
implementation of equality law in the Italian legal system which has experienced important changes 
in the last years. The duty of making reasonable adjustment in the workplace was introduced only in 
the 2013 by means of the Decreto Lavoro. This obligation was previously absent in the national legal 
framework and the Italian government was forced to adapt its domestic legislation to the obligations 
of EU law following the CJEU’s judgement in European Commission v Italian Republic. 
In addition, Italy ratified the CRPD in 2009 and committed to improve the rights of persons with 
disabilities at national level. However, Italian law does still not provide any operational definition of 
reasonable accommodation and any example of such adjustments.746 The UN CRPD Committee, in 
its concluding observations on the initial report of Italy, was concerned that the legislation “lacks a 
definition of reasonable accommodation and does not include an explicit recognition that the denial 
of reasonable accommodation constitutes disability-based discrimination”.747 It therefore 
recommended to “adopt a definition of reasonable accommodation aligned with the Convention, and 
                                                      
745 V. Della Fina, R. Cera, G. Palmisano, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A 
commentary (Springer International Publishing 2017), p. 169. 
746 R. Albano, E. Ballocchi, Y. Curzi, P. M. Torrioni, Mutamenti nel diritto al lavoro delle persone con disabilità. Un 
processo di civilizzazione incompiuto (2016) 3 Osservatorio MU.S.I.C Working Paper, p. 32. 
747 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations on the initial report of Italy, 6 October 
2016, CRPD/C/ITA/CO/1. Para. 9. 
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enact legislation that explicitly recognises the denial of reasonable accommodation as disability-
based discrimination across all areas of life, including within public and private sectors”.748 
It may be said that this legal framework appears highly confusing and fragmented as it does not set 
out a comprehensive regulation in terms of equality and non-discrimination. Nevertheless, the Italian 
Court, in the case of CG v L. SRL, fully embraced a substantive understanding of equality which 
acknowledges the functional role of the duty to provide reasonable accommodation for persons with 
disabilities in the workplace. It filled the mains gaps of the ‘minimalist’ approach that characterises 
Italian law to combat discrimination by expressively mentioning and implementing the provisions of 
international and EU law. 
The Court’s interpretation seems to encompass those recent constitutional developments that concern 
the interplay between supranational and domestic law in the Italian legal system. The Italian 
Constitutional Court, with regard to the efficacy of the European Convention of Human Rights in the 
national legal system, indeed stated that international obligations must be considered as “interposed 
standards” (norme interposte) between the Constitution and ordinary law.749 This concept implies the 
primacy of international law on the basis of which the constitutionality of national law must be 
evaluated.750 This judgement clarified the meaning of the amendment introduced in 2001 to Article 
117 of the Italian Constitution according to which: “the legislative power belongs to the state and the 
regions in accordance with the Constitution and within the limits set by European Union law and 
international obligations”. 
This legal framework outlines that EU law has a direct effect in the domestic system and it can be 
directly applied by ordinary judges. Italy, by signing and ratifying the European treaties, has joined 
a supranational legal order and conferred relevant legislative powers to the European Union subject 
                                                      
748 Ibid, para. 10. 
749 F. Biondi Dal Monte and F. Fontanelli, The Decisions No. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court: The 
Efficacy of the European Convention in the Italian Legal System (2008) 9 German Law Journal 890. 
750 The Decisions No. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court. 
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to the respect of the fundamental constitutional principles of the Italian order. By contrast, the 
provisions of multilateral international treaties, such as the CRPD, cannot be directly applied in the 
domestic system and do not generate a new legal order.751 This means that international law 
obligations only represent interposed standards of review of domestic legislation. International 
treaties, having an “infra-constitutional” rank, are placed between ordinary law and constitutional 
law. As a result, ordinary judges lack the power to directly nullify national laws which do not comply 
with international norms, but retain the possibility to initiate a procedure before the Constitutional 
Court to assess the indirect violation of Article 117 of the Constitution. 
It may be said that this context provides fertile and positive grounds to promote the implementation 
of international treaties in the domestic system. The “infra-constitutional” nature of international 
treaties does not admit the disapplication by ordinary judges of internal norms in conflict with 
international law. The violation of international norms by a domestic statutory norm implies its 
unconstitutionality and it can be exclusively declared by the Italian Constitutional Court. The 
supremacy status of international norms over conflicting national laws is however recognised. 
Ordinary judges are therefore more prone to take into account norms of international treaties when 
interpreting and applying national legislation. In the case of CG v L. SRL, the Italian judge expressly 
mentioned the CRPD and Directive 2000/78 to fill the legal gap stemming from the lack of a 
definition of the concept of reasonable accommodation under national law. The explicit reference to 
the CRPD contributed to align the judicial interpretation of the obligation of reasonable 
accommodation towards the provisions of international human rights law. 
The analysis will now focus on other domestic cases that concern the judicial implementation of the 
duty to provide reasonable accommodation. The objective is to carry out a broad assessment of the 
                                                      
751 The Decisions No. 348 and 349/2007 of the Italian Constitutional Court, para. 3: “the Convention does not set up a 




judicial understanding of this obligation and identify the prevailing approach towards the concept of 
reasonable accommodation in Italy. 
4.2 The first instance Court and the assessment of the proportionality of reasonable 
accommodation  
The first instance Court of Bologna was called to decide whether the refusal of a hospital (Azienda 
Ospedaliero-Universitaria Policlinico S. Orsola Malpighi) to for six months hire a nurse who was 
unable to work during night shifts could be considered a discriminatory treatment.752 This case took 
place in 2013 before the formal implementation by the Italian government of the duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation according to Directive 2000/78. 
The hospital opened a selection to hire nurses for a period of six months in order to cover other 
workers on leave. The selection expressly required the unconditional physical ability to carry out the 
specific tasks of the job. The claimant applied for the post and was declared eligible for the job, but 
the medical prescription stated that he/she was not able to work in night time. The hospital therefore 
did not conclude the contract with the claimant who claimed that the refusal was in breach of Directive 
2000/78. The Court had to clarify if the physical conditions of the claimant could justify the refusal 
of the hospital to hire him/her. 
It is worth noting that the Court explicitly highlighted the importance of referring to supranational 
norms in order to solve domestic interpretative issues and fill legal gaps.753 In doing so, it recalled 
the leading definition of disability elaborated by the CJEU in the famous case of Ms Ring and Ms 
Skouboe Werge to assess whether the claimant could be considered as a disabled person.754 Moreover, 
                                                      
752 N.R.G. Lav. 171/2013, Tribunale Ordinario di Bologna, Sezione Lavoro. 
753 Ibid, “La sentenza della Corte di Giustizia consente, per altro, di risolvere i problemi interpretativi”. “I medesimi 
principi ricavabili dall’art. 5 della direttiva 2000/78/CE si trovano nella ricordata convenzione ratificata dallo Stato e, 
conseguentemente, devono essere utilizzati dal Giudice nazionale”. 




it mentioned the social model of disability embraced by the CRPD and the concept of reasonable 
accommodation as defined by its Article 2. The Italian Court seems to acknowledge the influential 
role of international and EU law in the national legal system when interpreting vague and incongruous 
domestic norms in the field of equality and non-discrimination. The interpretative difficulties 
generated by the lack of specific legal provisions at national level have been positively overcome 
through the implementation of those precise and coherent supranational norms that regulate the rights 
of persons with disabilities. 
In this case, the crucial issue was the identification of the proper reasonable accommodation. With 
regard to Article 5 of Directive 2000/78, the Court emphasised that national judges have the 
competence to evaluate if the reduction of the patterns of working time may represent an 
accommodation giving rise to a disproportionate burden for the employee. To this end, the Court took 
into account two main conditions: the contractual typology of the job (a short-term contract of six 
months) and the general working context (the hospital had more than 4000 workers). By considering 
these two factors, it concluded that a working shift of 12 hours exclusively in the day time would not 
have caused a disproportionate burden for the employer and would not have affected the patterns of 
working time of other workers. As a result, the employee had the duty to accommodate the claimant 
with disabilities and provide a change of the patterns of working time in accordance with Article 5 of 
Directive 2000/78. The refusal to conclude the contract was therefore a discriminatory treatment by 
virtue of the violation of the duty to provide reasonable accommodation on the workplace. 
This judgement remarkably hails the ratification of the CPRD by the Italian government and the 
integration of its provisions in the domestic system. The judicial understanding of the obligation to 
accommodate workers with disabilities properly follows those standards and provisions developed at 
international and EU levels. The first instance Court of Bologna indeed assessed the proportionality 
of the accommodation by taking into account the ‘size’ of the hospital in terms of human resources 
and the potential impact of the adjustment on other employees. The law does not specify any 
305 
 
guidelines to evaluate whether the accommodation gives rise to a disproportionate burden to the 
employee. The Court however did not apply a mere cost-benefit analysis seeking to assess “the cost 
of reasonable accommodation in relation to a perceived benefit to the employer and the employee”.755 
By contrast, it considered not only the financial implications for the employer that has to provide 
reasonable accommodation with regard to a short-term contract of six months, but also the effects of 
such adjustment on others workers. This approach moves beyond the traditional assessment of the 
perceived benefit to the employer and employee by emphasising the potential impact of the specific 
adjustment on the entire company’s organisation and structure. The Court’s reasoning aims at 
avoiding discriminatory decisions and advances a balanced approach that includes several factors, 
such as the size of the organisation, the impact of the measure on the employee and its effect on other 
workers. The Court, when determining if an accommodation would have entailed a disproportionate 
or undue burden, correctly assessed the proportional relationship between the means employed and 
the final aim of ensuring the enjoyment of the right concerned.756 
Another case concerning the duty to provide reasonable accommodation will now be examined and 
the extent to which such an obligation is applied in the national legal system will be reviewed. By 
highlighting the main differences between the dominant approach in British and Italian courts 
regarding the concept of reasonable accommodation, this research will be able to identify the impact 
of the CRPD at national level. 
4.3 The link between the dismissal of an employee and the duty to accommodate 
Case n. 442/2015 R.G. regards the unlawfulness of the dismissal of an employee that suddenly 
become physically unable to perform his/her job.757 The claimant was indeed fired by the company 
                                                      
755 United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and 
Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2002, para 45. 
756 See for instance the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for human Rights, Equality and 
non-discrimination under article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, A/HRC/43/26. 
757 Case N. 445/2015 r.g., Tribunale di Ivrea, Ordinanza 21.02.2016. 
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Officine Meccaniche Piemontesi s.r.l as soon as she was found unable to carry out her usual tasks. 
She claimed that the dismissal was unlawful because her inability was caused by insalubrious working 
conditions and by the lack of adjustments to avoid occupational diseases. The claimant argued that 
the company could have provided reasonable accommodation to enable her to perform the job or she 
could have been allocated to a different position. The first instance Tribunal of Ivrea found that the 
claimant falls under the definition of disability developed at EU level and subsequently she could 
enjoy the legal protection under Italian law that sets out the duty to provide reasonable 
accommodation on the workplace. 
The Tribunal of Ivrea stated that the notion of reasonable accommodation includes all those measures 
that are necessary to prevent the dismissal of an employee who becomes disabled. To this end, the 
employer has to modify the organisational structure of the company if the adjustment does not impose 
a disproportionate burden. Interestingly, the Court clarifies that this obligation affects and limits the 
employer’s power to dismiss an employee.758 The employer is thus entitled to lawfully fire an 
employee who becomes unable to perform his/her job only when all the necessary reasonable 
adjustments have been adopted according to Article 3 (3-bis) of Decreto Legislativo n. 216 of 2003. 
According to the Court, the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation is the cornerstone of the 
legal protection of workers with disabilities. This means that all the specific provisions within the 
Italian legal framework to safeguard the rights of workers should be interpreted and applied in 
compliance with the general rule that lays down the duty to accommodate. This approach seems to 
strengthen the protection of persons with disabilities as it tries to systematise the fragmented Italian 
law with regard to equality and non-discrimination. The obligation of making reasonable 
accommodation should be therefore considered as a “comprehensive and unifying clause” that brings 
together and shapes all the legislation concerning the rights of persons with disabilities. This Court’s 
reasoning is to be welcomed as it embraces a substantive model of equality which recognises the 
                                                      
758 Ibid: “L’adempimento di questo obbligo, gravante su ogni datore di lavoro, condiziona il suo potere di recesso”. 
307 
 
central role of the provision of reasonable accommodation to ensure the enjoyment of fundamental 
rights on an equal basis with others. 
In light of this correct background, the Court appropriately concluded that it is not sufficient for the 
employer to demonstrate the impossibility to transfer the employee to a different position. The 
employer has also to show that the necessary adjustments would bring about a disproportionate 
burden, as defined by Article 5 of Directive 2000/78. Moreover, the unreasonableness of such 
accommodation should be proved by means of rigorous and concrete evidences and by taking into 
account every possible solution to accommodate the worker with disabilities (transfer to a different 
post, modification of working shifts, organisational and material changes). In this specific case, the 
Court found that the adjustment required to accommodate the claimant would have meant a cost of 
almost 10.000 euro, less than the compensation offered by the company to the employee to conciliate 
the lawsuit. In addition, in view of the technical expertise, transferring the employee to a different 
position would have been feasible for the company’s organisation and would have been compatible 
with the claimant’s health conditions. As a result, the Court nullified the dismissal of the claimant 
and condemned Officine Meccaniche Piemontesi to reinstate the employee in her previous post. 
This judgement is relevant because it shows that the judicial understanding of the concept of 
reasonable accommodation increasingly adheres to the international standards enshrined in the 
CRPD. The human rights approach developed at international level is gradually being correctly 
applied by national judges. The Italian Court properly identified that the link between the dismissal 
of an employee and the failure to provide reasonable accommodation is an essential legal requirement 
to declare the unlawfulness of such dismissal. This decision clearly fosters the rights of workers with 
disabilities as it also imposes the reinstatement of the employee in the original position. This 
framework positively promotes substantive equality by imposing precise and rigid obligations on the 
employer that cannot discriminate persons with disabilities in the workplace. 
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The next section will summarise the main findings of the comparative analysis concerning the 
implementation of the duty to accommodate persons with disabilities in the UK and Italy. 
5. Findings and conclusions of the comparative analysis 
The comparative analysis between the UK and Italy shows significant legal and judicial divergences 
with regard to the duty to provide reasonable accommodation. Three main issues will now be 
examined: the consistency and the effectiveness of the law, the judicial reasoning and the CPRD/EU 
law impact. 
5.1 The consistency and the effectiveness of the law 
From a normative point of view, it is worth noting that the UK has remarkably adopted an overarching 
piece of legislation that addresses discrimination on several grounds such as race, sex, disability, age, 
gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, religion or belief, sexual orientation, and 
pregnancy and maternity. This may be viewed as a remarkable development because it harmonises 
and extends the personal scope of UK equality law. 
However, the Equality Act did not significantly improve the substantive content of the legal 
protection for persons with disabilities. The duty to provide reasonable accommodation in the 
workplace has not been reinforced by introducing a specific anticipatory obligation to remove those 
barriers that hamper the enjoyment of fundamental rights on equal basis with others. The reactive 
nature of the duty may generate relevant difficulties in implementing ex-post facto the reasonable 
adjustment required by the employee. The adjustment’s request, the interactive dialogue between the 
employee and the employer to identify the proper accommodation and its effective realisation are 
steps that may reduce or nullify the reasonable accommodation’s utility. 
The 2010 Equality Act also lacks a list of reasonable accommodation and a provision setting out those 
guidelines to determine when or whether the employer has to take reasonable steps to avoid the 
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employee’s disadvantage. The preventive identification and adoption of common legal standards to 
ensure that workers with disabilities are not discriminated against in the workplace would guarantee 
the effectiveness of the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation. It may be argued that this 
framework does not assure legal consistency and certainty in relation to the implementation of the 
duty to accommodate. 
When compared to the UK approach, the Italian approach may be characterised as ‘minimalist’ when 
it comes to the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation. It indeed contains a single provision 
that merely refers to the duty to accommodate as defined under the CRPD. Moreover, the law does 
not set out any list of reasonable adjustments or guidelines to assess to what extent employers have 
to implement this obligation. It appears that the concept of reasonable accommodation for persons 
with disabilities is new for Italian equality law. This legal context shows evident gaps and may bring 
about uncertainty when employers are called to adopt reasonable accommodation. Italian equality 
law should be therefore systematised and harmonised through a comprehensive approach that ensure 
equality and non-discrimination to persons with disabilities. To this end, a new piece of legislation 
would be advisable in order to put together the different provisions concerning the protection of 
persons with disabilities. In particular, clear legal provisions defining the concept of disability and 
the main employer’s obligations should be expressly introduced in order to facilitate the identification 
of reasonable accommodation. 
The interpretation and application of the substantive content of the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation by British and Italian courts will now be summarised. The aim is to identify the 
correct understanding of the concept of reasonable accommodation. 
5.2 Judicial reasoning 
The case law analysis concerning the interpretation of the reasonable accommodation’s duty reveals 
the emergence of two divergent approaches in the UK and Italy. 
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5.2.1 Negative practices 
It may be said that British courts are gradually moving away from the remarkable decision handed 
down by the House of Lords in Archibald. In other words, the substantive model of equality has been 
set aside and replaced by the traditional formal paradigm of equality. Cases such as Wade v. Sheffield 
Hallam University and Jennings v. Barts & The London NHS Trust show that reasonable 
accommodations are still perceived more as a privilege rather than as a right for workers with 
disabilities. 
In the case of Wade v. Sheffield Hallam University, the EAT held that it was not reasonable to remove 
the requirement for competitive interview and move the employee to a new position. The Court 
incorrectly disregarded the possibility to upskill the employee by providing those necessary trainings 
to reach the standards required for the job. The duty of making adjustments explicitly demands the 
transfer to an existing vacancy to effectively promote substantive equality. The nature of reasonable 
accommodation aims to ensure full equality in practice by adopting specific measures to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages linked to disability. 
Another crucial issue is that the EAT, in the case of Jennings v. Barts & The London NHS Trust, has 
not recognised that employer’s absence policy should be tailored to persons with disabilities who are 
on long-term sick leave.759 The EAT’s judicial reasoning omits to consider that workers with a 
disability runs the additional risk of an illness connected with their disability and they are therefore 
more exposed to the risk of accumulating days of absence on grounds of illness. Absence management 
policies should take into account the specific needs of workers with disabilities in order to not place 
them at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons without disabilities. The EAT’s 
decision in Jennings v. Barts & The London NHS Trust is not compatible with the provision 
                                                      
759 See case examined above, Jennings v. Barts & The London NHS Trust. 
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prohibiting indirect discrimination when there is a practice, policy or rule which applies to everyone 
in the same way, but has a worse effect on some people than others. 
The EAT in Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v. Higgins also concluded that the blanket 
refusal to review the plan designed to assist the person with disabilities in returning to work was not 
unreasonable.760 This decision frustrates the scope of equality law and the nature of the obligation to 
provide reasonable accommodation. The objective of substantive equality is indeed to promote and 
facilitate the participation of persons with disabilities in the workplace. It may be said that UK courts 
are applying and interpreting the Equality Act in a controversial way that reduces the legal protection 
for persons with disabilities. The case law previously examined represent a critical shift away from 
the coherent reasoning of the House of Lords in Archibald and as noted above, this shift may be 
viewed as ill-advised because it moves back to a formal model of equality and a charity approach 
towards disability that does not address the issue of creating an inclusive working environment for 
persons with disabilities. 
5.2.2 Positive practices 
Against a ‘fragmented’ legal framework, which might generate confusion and uncertainty in relation 
to the rights of persons with disabilities, Italian judges positively embraced an objective and 
functional understanding of the duty to provide reasonable accommodation. 
In the case of CG v L. SRL, the first instance Court of Pisa found that the employer should have 
allocated the worker with disabilities to a different position in the company, because this measure 
would have been reasonable both for the company organisation and the disabled employee. Moreover, 
the first instance Court of Bologna concluded that the refusal of a hospital to, for six months, hire a 
nurse who was unable to work during night shifts was discriminatory. The Court considered both the 
                                                      




financial consequences for the employer and the effects of the adjustment requirement on other 
workers. This reasoning not only ensures the enjoyment of the right concerned, but also considers 
other fundamental factors such as the employer’s needs and the company’s structure. A feasible 
accommodation indeed must be necessary and proportional. In this regard, there are no guidelines 
under Italian law to assess the feasibility of an accommodation. However, Italian courts verified the 
impact of the measure on the financial capacity of the employee and its positive effects on the 
requested party and any other workers. This reasoning seems consistent and logical as it weights the 
necessity of removing a particular barrier for the worker with disabilities and the proportionality of 
the measure that should not impose an undue burden on the employer. 
This judicial understanding of the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation represents a 
valuable practice that may contribute to align the Italian jurisprudential approach towards those 
international and EU standards for the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities. In order to 
determine whether an accommodation is reasonable, a case-by-case approach is needed, but it would 
be important to clarify some legal guideline for assessing the feasibility of the accommodation 
required. A cost-benefit analysis may bring about hypothetically discriminatory decisions.761 Judges 
should therefore carry out a broader and functional analysis to assess the accommodation’s feasibility 
by considering the size of the organisation, the cost of the accommodation, its impact on the general 
workplace and its positive effect for the employee. 
5.3 The impact of International and EU law: protectionism vs legal integration? 
In light of the case law previously examined, one may conclude that International and EU law have 
had a more relevant and significant impact in the Italian legal system rather than the British one. 
                                                      
761 Human Rights Council, Equality and non-discrimination under Article 5 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, (27 February-24 March 2017) A/HRC/43/26. 
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The pure dualistic system that characterises the UK legal framework jeopardises the enforceability of 
supranational norms. According to the so-called dualistic approach, international law and national 
law are two separate and independent legal orders, reciprocally isolated.762 In the UK’s dualistic 
system, an international treaty ratified by the Government must be incorporated by domestic 
legislation in order to produce effects into the national legal system. Otherwise national courts have 
no power to enforce the provisions included under international treaties. 
Despite the CRPD’s ratification by the UK, the lack of a national law incorporating the Convention 
does not allow its direct enforceability in the UK system. However, the CPRD may be a useful tool 
to interpret and apply the existing UK legislation in the field of human rights law and equality. UK 
courts instead do not make references to the Convention in order to interpret the concept of reasonable 
accommodation. At the judicial level, it may be argued that British judges are reluctant to apply the 
norms of the CPRD. This approach may not only lower the legal protection of persons with 
disabilities, but it is also detrimental in relation to those legal gaps affecting the 2010 Equality Act. 
This judicial reluctance may be legally justified because of the nature of the CRPD which does not 
have direct effects in the UK legal order. The absence of UK legislation incorporating the CRPD 
should not however refrain UK judges from referring to international norms as an aid to their 
interpretation of domestic law. This emerging hesitancy is not acceptable as it deprives persons with 
disabilities of those fundamental rights enshrined in an international legal instrument to which the 
UK is party. The British courts’ approach may be seen as ‘protectionist’ as it resembles a dualistic 
view that emphasises the primacy and independence of the legal system of one’s own state. 
International law and domestic law are both recognised as valid systems, but they are still considered 
as distinct legal orders. By doing so, it protects domestic law from the interference and influence of 
                                                      
762 See H. Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992), p. 111 and also A. 
Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 213. 
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supranational norms. The interplay between international and national law is highly narrowed by the 
lack of reference to international norms by UK courts. 
With regard to the impact of EU law, it is important to underline that Directive 2000/78 has been 
implemented before by the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and subsequently, by the Equality Act 
2010. In Paterson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, the EAT said that UK legislation 
must “be interpreted so as to give effect to the Directive”.763 In particular, this implies that British 
courts should interpret the Equality Act in compliance with EU law when it is unclear. It is also worth 
noting that the Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted in line with the CPRD as already clarified by 
the CJEU. Against this legal background, UK judges have the obligation to refer to EU law in order 
to address the main legal flaws concerning the protection of persons with disabilities under UK law. 
For instance, courts may take into account Directive 2000/78 to properly identify the nature of 
reasonable accommodation and the substantive scope of disability equality law. However, the case 
law analysis outlines that UK judges still hesitate to expressly refer to the provisions of EU equality 
law when the Equality Act is not sufficiently clear. It may be concluded that the UK judiciary is being 
characterised by the emergence of a ‘protectionist’ approach with regard to supranational law that 
limits the impact of EU and International law in the domestic system. 
The Italian case law shows a more positive and open approach towards supranational norms in 
comparison with the UK one. The existence of a written constitution which shows a formal openness 
to supranational norms positively promotes the integration of the CRPD in the Italian legal order. The 
CRPD is gradually impacting the judicial interpretation of domestic law that concerns the rights of 
persons with disabilities. Italian judges are more likely to explicitly refer to the provisions of the 
CRPD when deciding complicated issues that are poorly regulated at national level. This approach 
reflects the fact that international obligations have an “infra-constitutional” nature and must be 
                                                      
763 Paterson v. Commissioner of Police of The Metropolis [2007] UKEAT (23 July 2007). 
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considered as interposed standards between the Constitution and ordinary law. The unity of 
international law and domestic law is therefore based on the primacy of the Italian constitution. 
Italian judges expressly mention CJEU’s judgements and Directive 2000/78 to solve those 
interpretative issues caused by the lack of specific legal provisions under Italian law defining the 
concept of reasonable accommodation. The above analysis reveals that Italian judges consider EU 
law as a valuable tool to decide those domestic cases affecting the rights of persons with disabilities 
on the workplace. This approach remarkably promotes a unified system of norms and the integration 
of the CRPD within the Italian legal framework. It differs from the judicial reasoning of UK courts 
which protect the UK legal order from the potential influence that the CRPD might have on the 













 “To deny people their human rights is to challenge their very humanity.” 
 Nelson Mandela, South African civil rights activist 
 
CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
1. The EU legal framework: main findings 
The main findings of this research concern the impact of the CPRD on the EU legal framework. It 
has been shown that: i) the CJEU is failing to apply the social model of disability enshrined in the 
CRPD; ii) the CJEU’s understanding of multiple and intersectional discrimination is not fully in line 
with the substantive model of equality; iii) the CJEU is embracing a ‘protectionist’ and ‘minimalist’ 
approach with regard to the status of the CRPD in the EU legal order. 
1.1 The definition of disability: a missed opportunity 
The CJEU has gradually departed from the remarkable approach towards the definition of disability 
adopted in the case of Ring and Skouboe Werge. In this case, the CJEU positively hailed the social 
model of disability endorsed by the CRPD by focusing its analysis on those external barriers that 
hinder the full and effective participation of persons with disabilities in professional life on an equal 
basis with other workers. The Court’s reasoning was highly significant as it thoroughly clarified the 
personal scope of the Directive 2000/78 which lacks a comprehensive definition of disability in line 
with the CRPD’s provisions. The CJEU rightfully sets out that disability does not require the complete 
impossibility of working, but it does imply a hindrance to the exercise of a professional activity. The 
CJEU’s understanding of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of disability complied with the 
Directive’s objective to enable persons with disabilities to have access to or participate in 
employment. This interpretation marked a crucial development in comparison with the judicial 
understanding of disability in Chacón Navas, when the CJEU applied an obsolete medical model of 
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disability. The CJEU, for the first time, delineated and implemented a flexible and social construct of 
disability which considers the interplay between individual impairments and external barriers. 
At first glance, it may be said that the CRPD has positively influenced the interpretation and 
implementation of EU equality law. However, the ‘progressive’ stance adopted in Ring and Skouboe 
Werge with regard to equality norms has not been confirmed in the most recent judgements of the 
CJEU. In the case of Kaltoft, the CJEU had to decide whether obesity can be considered a disability 
covered by the Directive 2000/78/EC. The CJEU’s reasoning wrongfully focused on the physical 
constraints of the claimant to evaluate whether he fell within the Directive’s personal scope. This 
judgement symbolises a controversial step back with regard to the interpretation of the concept of 
disability. The Court disregarded the interactions between the claimant’s personal characteristic and 
the external barriers that hinder his full participation in professional life. By doing so, the CJEU 
restored the medical model of disability in EU equality law by classifying disability as a medical 
condition merely located within the individual. 
The failure to apply the social model of disability is also evident in the case of Z. where the Court 
concluded that the impossibility to have a child by conventional means does not in itself prevent the 
commissioning mother (the claimant) from having access to, participating in or advancing in 
employment. The Court pointed out that “it is not apparent from the order for reference that Ms Z.’s 
condition by itself made it impossible for her to carry out her work or constituted a hindrance to the 
exercise of her professional activity”. The Court once again referred to the medical definition of 
disability and concentrated its analysis on the personal characteristic of the claimant to trigger the 
protection of the Directive 2000/78. 
The CJEU’s problematic assessment of the concept of disability was ultimately demonstrated in the 
case of Glatzel. The Court based its reasoning principally on the nature of the individual impairments 
(the claimant suffered from unilateral amblyopia) and the medical standards required by the Directive 
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2006/126 to release a driving licence. The Court incorrectly abandoned a social model understanding 
of disability according to which disability must not be exclusively understood with regard to the 
degree of the deficiency at issue, but must be determined on the basis of the final outcome provoked 
by that deficiency in a given social context. 
This case law analysis exhibits that the CJEU shifted its understanding of disability from a social 
model to a medical approach which still defines functional limitations as the final result of a physical 
condition. The CJEU missed the opportunity to provide a legal definition of disability which reflects 
the social contextual model adopted by the CRPD. 
1.2 The legal gaps in addressing multiple and intersectional discrimination 
The CJEU adopted an inadequate approach to address discrimination based on multiple grounds. The 
CJEU’s reasoning related to the legal protection of women with disabilities echoes the main gaps of 
EU equality law which is characterised by a single-ground equality paradigm. In particular, EU 
equality norms fail to contemplate the disability dimension of gender discrimination or the gender 
aspect of disability discrimination. In the case of Z, the Court denied legal protection to a woman who 
suffered from discrimination on multiple and different grounds. In the same judgement, the CJEU 
ruled that there was no sex or gender discrimination, no disability discrimination and no violation of 
EU provisions concerning maternity leave. This judgement proves that the lack of adequate legal 
instruments which recognise the intersection of two or more grounds of discrimination jeopardise the 
effective protection of vulnerable individuals. 
The main flaw of EU law derives from the impossibility to group multiple grounds of discrimination 
in the same claim. In the case of Z., the claimant was obliged to bring an allegation of sex 
discrimination separately from the allegation of disability discrimination. This framework impedes 
determining the inextricable link between the two grounds that brings about discrimination. As a 
result, the claimant, as a woman with disabilities, was not able to find protection under the Equal 
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Treatment Directive and the Framework Equality Directive. The Court found that a commissioning 
father was not entitled to such leave either and that the refusal did not put female workers at a 
particular disadvantage compared with male workers. Similarly, it did not find the situation 
experienced by Z. to fall within the personal scope of Directive 2000/78 that prohibits discrimination 
on grounds of disability. The Court wrongfully applied a comparison with male workers, instead of 
comparing it to a woman who has given birth or an adoptive mother. 
It is clear that EU law does not provide the necessary legal tools to identify the proper comparator 
and tackle multiple and intersectional discrimination. This is strongly linked with a ‘formal’ 
comparative analysis that merely requires the identification of an adequate group with whom to carry 
out a comparison with the disadvantaged individual. This approach is very limited as it narrows the 
possibilities to combat multiple and intersectional discrimination. 
1.3 The substantive equality paradigm under the CRPD 
This research found that the substantive model of equality adopted by the CRPD has not yet been 
incorporated in the EU legal framework. The CPRD provides an innovative and consistent legal 
framework to tackle discriminations. It has pioneered a line of fundamental substantive ‘equality-
promoting’ provisions that may improve the legal protection of persons with disabilities: i) the 
prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination (Art. 2); ii) the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation (Art. 5.3); iii) the objective to promote multidimensional equality (Arts. 6 – 7) and 
iv) the duty to launch affirmative action programs (Art. 27). The CPRD abandoned the formal model 
of equality (also known as ‘sameness’ or ‘symmetrical’ approach) and instead opted in favour of a 
substantive approach according to which individuals in different situations should be treated 
differently. This new paradigm requires to accommodate the concrete differences of persons with 
disabilities not only by considering their biological characteristics, but also by removing those 
environmental, attitudinal and legislative obstacles that jeopardise their full enjoyment of human 
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rights. Substantive equality demands an active role of the State and sets out the importance of 
providing positive measures in the legal system for eliminating discriminations. 
1.4 The complicated relationship between the CRPD and the EU legal system 
The ratification of the CRPD by the EU raises several and interesting questions regarding its legal 
status within the EU legal order. According to the Treaties, as far as international agreements are 
concerned, international law is an integral part of the EU legal order. According to Article 216(2) 
TFEU, “agreements concluded by the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its 
Member States”. It would appear that EU law has embraced a monistic approach to regulate its 
relationship with international law. However, the Court of Justice’s case law has revealed that the 
interplay between EU law and international human rights law is not properly defined yet. 
In the case of Z., the CJEU ruled that the CRPD’s provisions are not unconditional and sufficiently 
precise and therefore do not have direct effect under EU law. The same approach has been confirmed 
in the case of Glatzel. The Court excluded that the UN Convention may be relied upon to challenge 
the validity of EU norms. The Court surprisingly concluded that the CRPD does not produce direct 
effects in the EU legal order since it is drafted in a programmatic form. In this respect, only those 
international treaties containing ‘unconditional and sufficiently precise’ provisions can produce direct 
effects. This condition is fulfilled where the international norm relied upon enshrines a clear and 
precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any 
subsequent measures. 
1.5 The state of play of the proposed Horizontal Directive 
Another finding of this research is that the last Council’s draft of the new Horizontal Directive 
significantly reduces the legal protection of persons with disabilities in comparison with the initial 
Commission proposal and the major amendments presented by Parliament. 
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The last Council’s instrument removes the field of ‘social advantages’ from the material scope of the 
prohibition of discrimination. In addition, the express reference to the prohibition of multiple 
discrimination has been eliminated from the final draft leaving a crucial gap in EU equality law. The 
Council also removed the ‘anticipatory’ obligation to provide reasonable accommodation in 
workplace and specifies that housing providers are not required to make structural alterations to the 
premises in order to accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities. By contrast, the most 
remarkable legal improvements adopted by the Council concern the explicit recognition of 
discrimination by association and denial of reasonable accommodation as unlawful forms of 
discrimination. 
The last Council’s draft reflects a political compromise that favours those Member States (Germany 
in particular) that would be most affected by the financial impact of the Directive’s adoption. 
However, several studies by the Commission prove that a new Horizontal Directive would not result 
in excessive economic costs for the Member States. Short-term costs of inclusion and integration 
would be compensated by long-term benefits in terms of GDP growth and taxes. In addition, several 
Member States advanced the subsidiarity argument to slow down the negotiations within the Council 
and obstruct the adoption of the final draft. This stance is not completely legitimate as Member States 
would retain their exclusive competences in the organisation of the areas covered by the Directive. 
The new Horizontal Directive would address the principle of equal treatment within the specific limits 
of the EU competences as the Race Directive already did in the past. 
Member States should accelerate the negotiations for a definitive adoption of the proposed Directive. 
The negative trend of the CJEU’s jurisprudence in dealing with the social model of disability and the 
substantive model of equality shows the necessity to update and reinforce EU equality law. In 
particular, the legislator should intervene to clarify the meaning of disability and introduce an explicit 
provision that prohibits multiple and intersectional discrimination in line with the CRPD. 
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1.6 Key recommendations for improving the interpretation of EU equality norms 
The analysis of the CJEU’s judgement reveals that the CRPD is not fully producing the expected 
results at EU level. A more coherent and progressive judicial approach is required in relation to the 
legal understanding of the concepts of disability and multiple discrimination. Moreover, the CJEU is 
minimising the impact of the CPRD in the EU legal system without properly clarifying the 
relationship between EU law and international human rights law. The following recommendations 
aim to improve the judicial interpretation of the EU equality norms and identify the legal status of the 
CRPD. 
In the first instance, the CJEU is showing an unreasonable reluctance and prudence in its assessment 
of the equality norms contained under EU law. In doing so, it is again promoting the re-emergence 
of a medical or welfare model of disability according to which functional limitations are deemed to 
be a direct outcome of the individual impairment. Instead, the CJEU should consider not only an 
individual’s biomedical deficiency, but also those external circumstances that hampers the enjoyment 
of fundamental rights. The CRPD makes clear that disability represents a social construct that should 
be interpreted in a broad manner. The ratio of the substantive model of equality is indeed to identify 
social barriers and address those relevant effects of the discriminatory treatments. To this end, it aims 
to ensure that differential characteristics are accommodated within the equality norms. The CJEU 
should not hesitate to recognise that structural disabling barriers are not located within the individual, 
but are often represented by environmental, attitudinal and legislative measures. 
In addition, the Court’s judgement in relation to multiple and intersectional discrimination negatively 
mirrors the limits of the single-ground equality model of EU law. Multiple and intersectional 
discrimination against women with disabilities occurs frequently in the labour market and a new 
holistic approach is needed to accommodate the individual experience of multiple disadvantages. In 
this respect, the Court should abandon a formalist comparative approach when deciding cases of 
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discrimination based on disability and gender. This approach fails to properly determine the group to 
whom the claimant should be compared with and the object of the comparison. The accommodation 
requested by the claimant (paid leave equivalent to maternity or adoptive leave) was not provided to 
any member of other groups of individuals (male workers). The judicial analysis should therefore 
focus on the adverse impact on the claimant of the discriminatory treatment (the failure to provide 
paid leave) rather than on the differential treatment the individual receives in comparison with others. 
A new ‘substantive’ and ‘functional’ approach aiming at addressing the effects of discriminatory 
measures is highly required to replace a ‘formalistic’ comparative model which is inadequate to tackle 
multiple and intersectional discrimination. 
With regard to the legal status of the CRPD, the CJEU’s reasoning demands the assessment of 
‘unconditional and sufficiently precise’ provisions to ensure the direct effects of international treaties 
within the EU legal order. It may be said that the blanket application of this ‘test’ does not consider 
the legal complexity of an international human rights treaty such as the CRPD. It is worth noting that 
the CRPD represents an overarching human rights treaty that cannot share the same characteristics of 
those international agreements setting out technical standards. This approach reflects the 
‘protectionist’ scope of preserving the EU legal framework from the interference of international 
human rights law. This understanding of the relationship between EU and international law conflicts 
with the formal openness of EU Treaties to others legal orders. Furthermore, the assumption that the 
CRPD’s provisions are not precise enough is not fully accurate. The Convention not only introduces 
general obligations, but also specific substantive rights and implementation provisions which set forth 
explicit and well-defined obligations. Consequently, labelling the CRPD as a mere programmatic 
instrument is highly reductive. With this background, the CJEU should identify new criteria to assess 
the direct applicability of international provisions. To this end, the peculiar legal nature of the CPRD 
in comparison with other international agreements should be acknowledged. The CJEU should also 
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consider the CRPD’s provisions as having direct effects because they set out specific substantive 
rights, obligations and procedures. 
2. EU governance: main findings 
With regard to the impact of the CPRD on EU governance, the key findings of this research are the 
following: i) the main flaw of the existing governance mechanisms is the ‘reporting and 
benchmarking’ process; ii) the EU independent framework reveals an excessive fragmentation; iii) 
the European Parliament is marginalised and the role of civil society organisations should be 
enhanced. 
The governance mechanism put in place by the EU to comply with Article 33 CRPD mirrors the open 
method of coordination (OMC). In 2010, the European Commission launched the European Disability 
Strategy 2010-2020 in order to pursue its objectives with actions in eight priority areas. The approach 
to achieve these shared goals is based on voluntary political cooperation. Member States still retain 
a significant portion of autonomy in the adoption of national policies to accomplish the EU objectives. 
Member States are supported by the Commission’s expertise and guidance in implementing strategic 
objectives. This framework raises several concerns in relation to the feasibility of the OMC in the 
disability sector. The main weakness of the EU governance mechanisms is represented by the 
‘reporting and benchmarking’ process. Peer review and reporting are fundamental aspects of the 
OMC. Accordingly, governments should systematically release national plans to the Commission 
concerning the situation of persons with disabilities in their domestic system. National reports 
however have not mainstreamed disability in a comprehensive and coherent way. The majority of 
States did not provide clear and analytical evidence with regard to the implementation of disability 
policies. In doing so, the Commission cannot carry out any rigorous assessment of the rights of 
persons with disabilities at national level. 
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It has also been argued that the EU independent framework reveals an excessive fragmentation and 
decentralisation of competences and responsibilities. The EU governance mechanisms should be 
simplified in order to confer clear duties to those EU actors involved in the OMC and avoid the 
coexistence of several EU bodies with overlapping functions. In particular, the role of the European 
Parliament is marginal within the EU independent framework as it lacks formal structures to monitor 
the CRPD’s implementation.  
The Parliament is officially excluded from the drafting of the EU periodic report to the UN CRPD 
Committee and it does not participate in any procedures of the de facto vertical and horizontal 
coordination system between the EU institutions and Member States. Despite that, the EP promoted 
several political initiatives to foster the CRPD’s implementation at EU level and encourage the 
participation of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in the decision-making. To give 
an example, in 2016 the EP released a Resolution on the implementation of the CRPD as a follow up 
to the UN Recommendations to the EU. The EP urged a cross-cutting review of EU legislation and 
funding programmes to fully comply with the CRPD, an update of the declaration of competence in 
light of the Concluding Observations, a review of the European Disability Strategy and the 
development of a comprehensive EU CRPD strategy with a clear timeframe, benchmarks and 
indicators. Moreover, the EP and its committees have gradually improved the quality of their policy 
deliberation by means of regular consultations and public hearings with European Disability Forum 
and other NGOs. The participation of civil society organisations is a fundamental principle of good 
governance which aims to open up the decision-making process and promote the dialogue between 
EU institutions and civil society. The consultative process within the Parliament and its committees 
with regard to the CRPD’s implementation shows the emergence of a beneficial interaction between 
the European Parliament and NGOs. However, the involvement of civil society organisations in the 
policy chain should be adequately resourced and structured to perform the crucial function of 
monitoring the CPRD’s implementation in the EU. 
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2.1 The importance of reforming the EU independent framework 
The OMC is not the correct tool to accelerate the implementation of the CRPD in the EU. It is not 
based on a comprehensive system of sanctions and the concrete achievement of its objectives depends 
upon the extent to which national plans are implemented by governments. The adoption of non-
binding recommendations and atypical acts do not ensure the uniform application of EU rules in the 
Member States. However, the lack of hard sanctioning mechanisms should not represent an obstacle 
in a governance architecture that incentivises reciprocal learnings. The reporting methods and the 
coordination mechanisms of the OMC should be reinforced to promote the CRPD’s implementation 
in the EU. The OMC is not seen as a panacea to implement the CRPD, but the improvement of certain 
mechanisms may contribute to facilitate the achievement of the Disability Strategy objectives. In 
doing so, Member States will remain responsible for a sensitive area where they are still reluctant to 
lose important portions of legislative power. 
2.2 Key recommendations for improving the EU governance mechanisms 
The Commission should relaunch the objectives of the Disability Strategy 2010-2020 in order to 
develop precise timeframes and key performance indicators. Such instruments will be useful for 
identifying good practices and for measuring countries’ performances in the area of disability. In this 
regard, the European Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) may assist the Commission and the 
Parliament in adopting new policy strategies and indicators. The formulation of clear performance 
indicators by the EU institutions can facilitate the benchmarking process and improve the report 
mechanism. By doing so, Member States will be encouraged to deliver data on the impact of their 
policy measures. At the same time, the EU institutions will have the necessary tools to share good 
practices and evaluate Member State performance. In conclusion, the EU governance system 




3. Good governance and participatory democracy: the CPRD’s positive practice 
A key finding of this research is that the CPRD’s adoption proves that there are beneficial effects of 
the increasing participation of civil society organisations within international political processes. The 
contribution of civil society organisations to the drafting and monitoring of the CRPD’s 
implementation represents good practice of participatory democracy that may be replicated at EU 
level. 
Civil society organisations and NGOs have adequate advocacy and policy instruments to properly 
support stakeholders’ concerns and provide specific information, expertise, analysis and reports to 
decision-makers. In this respect, NGOs have advanced influential proposals, criticisms and 
perspectives for building an effective framework for the protection of persons with disabilities. Their 
advocacy initiatives have significantly impacted the final draft of the CPRD. The most successful 
contributions of civil society organisations concerned the participatory democracy approach (Art. 
4.3), the social model of disability (Art. 1) and the acknowledgment of multi-discrimination against 
women with disabilities (Art. 6). The participation of civil society groups has been regulated by 
structured and formalised procedures that ensured the effective functioning of the entire decision-
making process. Firstly, the participation of NGOs in the Ad Hoc Committee’s work has been granted 
to all non-governmental organisations enjoying consultative status within the UN Economic and 
Social Council. Secondly, their participation has been enlarged to those organisations who could 
prove they carry out relevant activities in respect to the work of the Committee. 
With this background, a key recommendation is that the ex-ante establishment of certain requirements 
for structuring the participation of civil society is an essential pre-condition to put good governance 
at EU-level into practice. Inclusive and open procedures necessitate the involvement of actors in a 
high representative capacity. This assessment should be based on qualitative criteria, such as NGO 
capacity to represent common interests and carry out effective advocacy activities. A structured 
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participation would not jeopardise the independency of civil society organisations, and it would create 
the conditions needed to promote the participation of representative groups of individuals that can 
advance constructive dialogue and bring relevant expertise to the decision-making process. The 
model of participatory democracy adopted by the CRPD may be feasible for improving the EU 
decision-making process in those sensitive and technical areas related to human rights law. 
4. Canada and the United States: main findings 
The first key finding of the comparative analysis between the United States and Canada is that the 
US Supreme Court still adheres to a medical model of disability, whereas the Canadian Supreme 
Court has adopted significant decisions that promote a social understanding of disability and 
substantive equality. 
4.1 Opposite understanding of disability 
This study has demonstrated that the expectations around the ADA have not been fulfilled. Despite 
the enthusiasm surrounding the ADA’s adoption, American courts apply a strict interpretation of the 
concept of disability and narrow the ADA’s mandate. The ADA embraces a social model of disability 
that takes into account the interplay between the impairment of individuals and those external barriers 
that hamper their participation in society. The ADA also protects those individuals who meet the 
requirement of "being regarded as having such an impairment”. The “regarded as” prong addresses 
discriminations based on a stereotyped or misrepresented perception of disability. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court did not acknowledge the social model of disability enshrined in the ADA and adopted 
a highly restrictive approach to statutory coverage. The decision in Sutton v. United Airlines 
symbolises the emergence of a sort of judicial backlash against the ADA. The Supreme Court 
maintained that an individual can fall under the ADA’s definition of disability only if he or she 
sufficiently alleges to be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working. In 
doing so, the Supreme Court introduced a “demanding standard” to assess whether an individual can 
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be considered as having a disability. This approach considerably limits the protection of persons with 
disabilities and brings about significant legal obstacles to address disability discrimination. American 
judges show a sceptical and conservative stance towards the socio-political conception of disability 
and the substantive model of equality. The Supreme Court seems to endorse a medical or welfare 
perspective of disability according to which persons with disabilities are still seen as objects of 
charity. 
By contrast, the Canadian Supreme Court has developed an extensive understanding of disability in 
compliance with the CPRD. In Mercier, the Supreme Court emphasised a flexible and broad 
definition of disability that takes into account several factors such as evolving biomedical, social and 
technological developments. The multidimensional approach towards disability embraced by the 
Supreme Court represents a landmark interpretation of a complex and evolving phenomenon that 
requires different levels of analysis and intervention. This judgement is remarkable as it anticipates 
those crucial and innovative developments introduced by the CRPD with regard to substantive 
equality and the social model of disability. 
4.2 Identifying the correct nature of reasonable accommodation 
The second main finding of the comparative analysis is that the interpretation of the duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation given by the Canadian Supreme Court represents a leading model for the 
judiciary to correctly implement the substantive model of equality. The Supreme Court’s approach 
towards the notion of reasonable accommodation instead remains controversial and mirrors a formal 
model of equality which does not ensure the removal of those external barriers that hinder the full 
participation of persons with disabilities in the workplace. 
The American Supreme Court adopted rigid standards to fall under the protection of the ADA and 
apply the subsequent obligation to provide reasonable accommodation. In Airways Inc. v Barnett, the 
Court concluded that accommodating persons with disabilities may generate arbitrary treatments in 
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the workplace, reinforce employer discretion and frustrate non-disabled employees’ contractual rights 
or expectations. The Supreme Court’s interpretation promoted the labour goal of restricting employer 
discretion over equal opportunities policies and equality norms. In addition, the Supreme Court 
highlighted the negative implications that may affect non-disabled co-workers when employers are 
called upon to accommodate marginalised groups of individuals. This reasoning is based on the idea 
that minority groups are in a privileged position in comparison with other groups. The case law 
relating to the ADA indeed shows that the concept of reasonable accommodations is regarded by the 
Supreme Court as a means to provide preferential treatment for persons with disabilities. The 
reasonable accommodation obligation is perceived as a charitable provision demanding burdensome 
and positive actions on employees. This understating reflects the Supreme Court’s approach to the 
duty to make reasonable accommodations for the religious needs of employees. In the case of Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, the plaintiff requested to have Saturdays off since according to his 
religion he needed to observe the Sabbath. The Court expressly stated that this accommodation would 
have triggered an "unequal treatment” of workers granting a privilege to those individuals who claim 
Saturdays off for religious reasons. 
On the other hand, the judicial approach of the Canadian Supreme Court in Meiorin, Grismer and 
Moore positively emphasises a concept of reasonable accommodation that requires a structural 
change of the legal framework by challenging able-bodied norms and introducing diversity in all new 
norms. The Canadian Court’s judgements reveal a profound understanding of the duty to 
accommodate, in line with international human rights law. The Canadian Court rightfully points out 
that the scope of the obligation to accommodate is to assess the failure to remove barriers to persons 
with disabilities. It therefore disregards a formal model of equality that considers reasonable 





4.3 Key recommendation for promoting substantive equality 
The key recommendation here is to consider the interpretation of the Canadian Supreme Court as a 
‘good practice’ for understanding and implementing equality provisions related to persons with 
disabilities. 
It positively embraced a definition of ‘handicap’ that encompasses the socio-political dimension of 
being disabled and recognised that “disability may exist even without proof of physical limitations”. 
Moreover, the Canadian Supreme Court correctly identified the legal nature of the duty to 
accommodate. The judicial analysis focused on the adverse impact on the claimant of the failure to 
provide such adjustments rather than on the differential treatment the individual receives in 
comparison with others. This interpretation is in line with a substantive model of equality demanding 
the realisation of positive actions to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights to persons with 
disabilities. This approach significantly differs with the interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court 
which refrains from applying the civil rights model introduced by the ADA. American courts are 
unreceptive to the requirements of providing affirmative measures and different treatments for 
persons with disabilities. 
5. The UK and Italy: main findings 
The case law analysis concerning the interpretation of the reasonable accommodation’s duty in the 
UK and Italy reveals the emergence of two divergent judicial approaches. British courts are moving 
away from the remarkable decision handed down by the House of Lords in Archibald in order to 
adhere to a formal paradigm of equality, whereas Italian courts are adopting a substantive approach 





5.1 Positive and negative practices in implementing the duty to accommodate 
British courts are gradually abandoning the substantive model of equality in favour of the traditional 
paradigm of equality. Reasonable accommodations are still perceived more as a privilege rather than 
a right for workers with disabilities. In Wade v. Sheffield Hallam University, the EAT held that it was 
not reasonable to remove the requirement for competitive interviews and move the employee to a 
new position. The UK Court denied the possibility to tailor the employer’s absence policy to persons 
with disabilities who are on long-term sick leave. In doing so, the Court’s judicial reasoning failed to 
consider that workers with a disability run the additional risk of an illness connected with their 
disability and they are therefore more exposed to the risk of accumulating days of absence on grounds 
of illness. Absence management policies should consider the specific needs of workers with 
disabilities in order to not place them at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons 
without disabilities. The UK Court’s approach jeopardises the scope of equality law and the nature 
of the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation. The scope underlying the reasonable 
accommodation’s duty is to ensure full equality by adopting specific measures to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages linked to disability. 
By contrast, Italian judges have positively embraced an objective and functional understanding of the 
duty to provide reasonable accommodation in compliance with the CRPD. In the case of CG v L. 
SRL, the Court found that the employer should have allocated the worker with disabilities to a 
different position in the company, because this measure would have been reasonable both for the 
company organisation and the disabled employee. The Court considered both the financial 
consequences for the employer and the effects of the adjustment requirements on others workers. 
This reasoning is highly coherent as it balances the necessity of removing a particular barrier for the 
worker with disabilities and the proportionality of the measure that should not impose an undue 
burden on the employer. This judicial understanding of the obligation to provide reasonable 
accommodation represents a valuable practice that may contribute to align the Italian jurisprudential 
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approach towards those international and EU standards for the protection of the rights of persons with 
disabilities. 
5.2 The impact of international and EU law in the domestic system 
The second key finding is that international and EU law have a more relevant and significant impact 
on the Italian legal system than on the British system. 
The pure dualistic system that characterises the UK legal framework jeopardises the enforceability of 
supranational law. At judicial level, it may be argued that judges are reluctant to apply the norms of 
the CPRD. It has been shown that UK courts do not refer to the Convention in order to interpret the 
concept of reasonable accommodation. This protectionist approach may not only lower the legal 
protection of persons with disabilities, but it is also detrimental in relation to those legal gaps affecting 
the 2010 Equality Act. The case law analysis outlines that UK judges hesitate to explicitly mention 
EU law provisions to apply national legislation or fill the gaps of the Equality Act. It may be 
concluded that the UK judiciary is characterised by the emergence of a protectionist approach with 
regard to supranational law that limits the impact of EU and International law in the domestic system. 
The Italian case law shows a more positive and open approach towards supranational norms in 
comparison with the UK. The CRPD is gradually impacting the judicial interpretation of domestic 
law that concerns the rights of persons with disabilities. Italian judges are more likely to explicitly 
refer to the provisions of international law when deciding complicated issues that are not properly 
regulated at national level. This approach reflects the fact that international obligations have an “infra-
constitutional” nature and must be considered as interposed standards between the Constitution and 
ordinary law. To the same extent, Italian judges expressly mention CJEU’s judgements and the 
Directive 2000/78 to solve those interpretative issues caused by the lack of specific legal provisions 
under Italian law defining the concept of reasonable accommodation. This research has revealed that 
Italian judges consider EU law as a valuable tool to decide those domestic cases affecting the rights 
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of persons with disabilities on the workplace. This approach moves away from the protectionist 
judicial reasoning of UK courts and promotes a monistic legal system that integrates supranational 
and national norms. 
5.3 Key recommendation for interpreting reasonable accommodation 
This author recommends to adopt an objective and functional understanding of the duty to provide 
reasonable accommodation. This interpretation represents a remarkable model to correctly implement 
the concept of reasonable accommodation at national level. This legal obligation is often new for 
nearly all Member States and its implementation may frustrate the scope of substantive equality. 
Judges should carry out a functional analysis to verify whether the accommodation requested by the 
employee is feasible and proportional. Different factors, such as the size of the organisation, the cost 
of the accommodation, its impact on the general workplace and its positive effect for the employee 
should be comprehensively considered. However, the main goal of such adjustments is to facilitate 
the achievement of equality in the workplace. Accommodating workers with disabilities does not 
represent a mere charitable goal, but a legally enforceable right to ensure the full participation of 
persons with disabilities in the workplace on equal basis with others. 
6. How long is the ‘road to equality’? 
The CRPD has undoubtedly influenced the judicial interpretation of equality norms at EU and 
national levels. However, eleven years since its adoption, the CRPD’s full potential has still not been 
unleashed in order to achieve its ambitious goal to effectively foster equality for persons with 
disabilities in the EU legal framework. To this end, judiciary and policy makers must transpose the 
social understanding of disability and the substantive approach towards equality into concrete judicial 
and legal practices. Moreover, the improvement of the EU independent framework is an essential 
requirement to boost the effective monitoring of the CRPD’s implementation in the EU and its 
Member States. It is clear that the ‘road to equality’ is not yet complete, but the emergence of positive 
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judicial approaches towards non-discrimination norms may facilitate and accelerate the translation of 
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